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THE EXPOSITOR

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Volume XVI

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THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. XVI.

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THE NEW SONG OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

In the Apocalypse of John we have two definite references to a "new song" which is sung by the redeemed in heaven, together with a third reference in which the saints sing a song which is described as the Song of Moses, the servant of God, and the song of the Lamb, which may be comprehensively rendered as *Hymns New and Old*, the newness of the song of the Lamb being implied in its own title, and in the other title with which it is contrasted and coupled (to wit, the song on the shore of the Red Sea). We may say, then, without straining the Scripture language, that the Apocalypse knows of three "new songs," which may turn out to be one new song to which threefold reference is made. It is significant that in two of the passages,

> ᾄδουσιν ᾠδὴν καινήν (Apoc. v. 9),
> ᾄδουσιν ὡς ᾠδὴν καινήν (Apoc. xiv. 3),

we are advised by the marginal references or by the variation in the printed type, that we are dealing with Old Testament matter; while in the third passage,

> ᾄδουσιν τὴν ᾠδὴν Μωϋσέως τοῦ δούλου τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὴν ᾠδὴν τοῦ Ἀρνίου, λέγοντες (xv. 3),

the first part of the description is Old Testament language, as well as almost every word of the song which follows. We could hardly have a better instance of the latency of the New Testament in the Old (to use Jerome's language).

It appears, then, that to the Apocalyptic writer Heaven was imagined as a choral fulfilment of Old Testament references to new songs that were to be sung by God's people: nor need we suppose that the new song was re-

garded only as an other-world song of ultimate triumph of Christ and His people, for in the Odes of Solomon we find the same music affirmed for the present life :

"A new song to the Lord from them that love Him" (Ode xli. fin.).

Or, as we may more closely render it, with something of an exhortation to doxology, at the close of the Ode in question,

"New praise (*or*, glory) to the Lord from them that love Him."

Indeed, the whole of the Odes of Solomon are a collection of such new songs, and they prove that if the new song of the Apocalypse is a song of a future life, and a song of heaven, there was an overflow of that same jubilation in the primitive Church on earth.

Now let us return to the Old Testament, and try and find out why the early writers fastened on the predictions of and injunctions to new songs which are found in the Old Psalter. Obviously they did not think it sufficient to explain, as a modern critic might do, that there was a time when the old songs were themselves new and affirmed their newness, and that when a writer began a strain like

"O sing unto the Lord a new song,"

he was describing his own composition. For the new people all of the Old Testament was old, and only new in the sense that it was prophetic of good things to come. The "new songs" of the Psalter were an intimation of a future time, when, to use again the language of the Odes of Solomon, "there should be none voiceless or dumb, because the Lord had given a mouth to His creation." Let us then see if we can find out how the early Christian writers expressed their musical dependence upon the Old Testament, and found themselves foretold.

It is characteristic of early Christianity that it lays an extraordinary emphasis upon the word "new"; we could tell that it was rightly lettered on the back of its literature

as a "New Testament," by observing the redundancy and the range of the word "new" within the pages: it begins with an amazement over "a new teaching" and "a new authority," with "new wine" bursting old bottles, and lands us at last in "a new song," and "a new heaven and a new earth," and a "renovation of all things." The adjective is especially emphasised in the Epistle to the Hebrews, but it is implied in almost all the writings of the New Testament. It was the adjective of polemic, as well as the adjective of experimental happiness. Suppose we turn to the *Testimonies* of Cyprian, which conserves for us so much of the primitive polemic against the Jews on the part of the Judæo-Christians and Gentile Christians, we shall find that the whole of Cyprian's first book, or very nearly the whole of the book, is occupied in proving two things from the Old Testament, (i.) that the Jews are fallen from grace; (ii.) that a new situation has been developed in religion; in consequence of this there is

a new circumcision:
a new law:
a new covenant:
a new baptism:
a new yoke:
new pastors:
a new house and temple of God:
a new sacrifice:
a new priesthood:
a new prophet:
and
a new people.

When we read this series of polemical articles and put with them the corresponding passages of the Old Testament, we get a better idea of the primitive Christian propaganda and its revolutionary elements than could have been gath-

ered from the solemn fixity of the beliefs and practices of the Church of the Nicene and Chalcedonian formulas.

In this Cyprianic summary there is no direct reference to the new song. I am going to suggest that the new song was implicitly and perhaps actually a part of the proclaimed novelties of the Church : in order to prove this, I shall take the principal passages in the ancient Psalter in which the new song is affirmed, and examine the use that is made of them in the primitive Christian testimonies. We can make the examination best by taking a book like the *Demonstratio Evangelica* of Eusebius, in which the whole argument is based on the quotation of a succession of *Hebrew Logia*, as Eusebius persistently calls them (with occasional variation of *Prophetical Testimonies*), which *Logia* are, for the most part, a re-arrangement by Eusebius of primitive standard proof-texts, so as to follow the Biblical order, and enable the reader to turn the pages of the Scripture as each successive anti-Judaic argument is developed.

Quite at the beginning of this great work (whose importance has never been adequately appreciated), we find Eusebius setting Moses on one side, on the ground that there is another lawgiver for the Gentiles, Moses himself being witness. He explains that this is why, while we accept the *Logia* of the Jews, we do not follow their mode of life : *τὰ παρὰ Ἰουδαίοις ἀποδεχόμενοι λόγια, τὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς βίον παρητησάμεθα*. The Gentiles are exhorted in the Psalms, says Eusebius, not to sing the old and Mosaic song, but another new song ; for it says :

Ps. xcv. (xcvi.)—"Sing unto the Lord a new song,
Sing unto the Lord, *all the earth*,
Declare his glory *among the Gentiles*,
His marvellous works among all the peoples.

. . . . .

Bring to the Lord, *ye clans of the Gentiles*,
Bring to the Lord glory for His name."

Here we see that the Psalm is being quoted as anti-Judaic and pro-Gentilic. The new song is polemically employed. Eusebius continues with :

> Ps. xcv. (xcvi). 10. "Say *among the Gentiles* that the Lord reigneth, etc.,"

and

> Ps. xcviii. 1.—"Sing unto the Lord *a new song*, for He hath done marvellous things. The Lord hath made known his salvation. *Before the Gentiles* He hath revealed His righteousness. . . ."

Upon which Eusebius remarks that "in these words he declares the new song not to belong to the Jewish people, but to all the Gentiles, the old song that came by Moses being proper to the Jews only." He then proceeds to say that the "new song" is the same thing as the "new covenant" of which Jeremiah speaks in a well-known passage, and explains the doctrine of the Old and New Covenants. *The New Song is the Gentile Song* : it is the same thing as the new covenant ; one novelty is as anti-Judaic as the other. Cyril of Jerusalem says nearly the same thing : "for now that the Church in Judæa is cast off, the Churches of Christ are increased throughout the world : *and of them it is said* :

> (Ps. cxlix. 1)—"Sing unto the Lord a new song : and His praise in the Church of the Saints." *Cat.* xviii. 25.

At this point we may profitably stop for a moment and ask the question whether this curious exegesis is primitive, and whether it illuminates the New Testament. Certainly we shall now better understand the actual songs of the redeemed in the Apocalypse, for, upon examination, they also turn out to be pro-Gentile. Take, for example, Apoc. v. 9 :

> "They *sing a new song* and say : Worthy thou to receive the book and to open its seals, for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God *out of every tribe and tongue and people and nation*," *etc.*

Here the new song has its Gentile connotation.

In Apocalypse xiv. 3 the new song is affirmed to be the song of the 144,000 redeemed souls, from the various tribes of Israel, i.e., of the Judæo-Christians, not of the Jews generally.

In Apocalypse xv. 3 the redeemed who have gotten the victory sing what is described as the Song of Moses and the Song of the Lamb, in the following strain :

"Great and wondrous are thy works, O Lord God Almighty : Just and true are thy ways, *O King of the Gentiles* : who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name ? For thou only art holy, and *all the Gentiles* shall come and worship before thee." [1]

We see then that, in so far as this song is concerned, it is pro-ethnic. It was the newness of the people and of their covenant with God that was emphasised in the new song.

Now let us return to Eusebius, and we shall see that he strikes the same note over and over again, in such a way as to imply that he is dealing with primitive matter, and not merely cultivating exegetical tastes of his own. From the fact that he repeats himself, often *verbatim*, we infer that he is repeating some one else.

In *Dem. Ev.* i. 10 (p. 38) we find Eusebius explaining the "new song" in terms of the "new sacrifice," just as in the previous passage he associated it with the "new covenant." He quotes the fortieth Psalm : "I waited patiently for the Lord," as a prediction of the sacrifice of Christ, and when he comes to the verse,

> "He hath put a new song in my mouth,
> a hymn to our God,"

he makes the explanation of the new song by means of the great passage,

[1] Here we have restored, with Nestle, the reading *King of the Gentiles*, for which there is strong support in the MSS. and for which Moses himself is in evidence in Deut. ix. 16, where we also read *King of the Gentiles* against the Lucianic *King of the Ages*, and the Hesychian *King of the gods*, and with the support of Philo and the Memphitic Version.

"Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not;
. . . . . .
I delight to do thy will, O God."

The explanation runs parallel to the use of the Psalm in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

In *Dem. Ev.* Bk. ii. 2. (p. 50) Eusebius quotes the 98th Psalm, which again opens with "Sing unto the Lord a new song," and explains that the Psalm is a disclosure of the New Song, and of the Arm of God, and a manifestation of His salvation *to all the Gentiles.*

Here again we are struck with the use of the Psalm in anti-Judaic polemic, and infer that the new song is to be regarded in a pro-Gentile manner. The Psalm in fact says:

"Sing unto the Lord a new song:
for the Lord hath done marvels.
. . . . . .
The Lord hath made known his salvation
Before *all the Gentiles* he hath revealed his righteousness.
. . . . . .
All the ends of the earth knew the salvation of God:
Shout to the Lord all the earth."

In *Dem. Ev.* Bk vi. 5. (p. 262) we have a similar interpretation of the 96th Psalm:

"Sing unto the Lord *a new song*;
Sing unto the Lord, *all the earth.*"

Here the pro-ethnic character of the Psalm is emphasised by the following summary:

"The coming of the Lord upon earth,
and His Kingdom *over the Gentiles,*
and a new song, to be given *not to Israel,*
but to the *Gentiles.*"

Παρουσία Κυρίου ἐπὶ γῆς, βασιλεία τε αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν, καινόν τε ᾆσμα, οὐ τῷ Ἰσραήλ, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἔθνεσι δοθησόμενον.

Eusebius quotes the Psalm, so as to emphasise these points:

"Sing unto the Lord a new song,
Sing unto the Lord, *all the earth.*
. . . . .

Declare *among the Gentiles* his glory,
Among *all the peoples his* wonders.
Bring to the Lord, *ye clans of the Gentiles.*

. . . . .

Say *among the Gentiles that the Lord reigneth.*

. . . . .

For he cometh, he cometh to judge *the earth.*"

And that we may not miss the point on which he is laying stress, Eusebius recapitulates as follows: "Here again the Lord is foretold as coming among men: and that a New Song will be sung at His coming, to wit, the song of the New Covenant, *not by the Jewish race, but by all the Gentiles,* since He says that the coming Lord will be their King."

There is no mistaking the anti-Judaic note in this section; it is even more pronounced than in previous passages. Eusebius then goes on once more to the 98th Psalm, where he again lays stress on the references to the Gentiles, and maintains again that the coming of the Lord was foretold as being the cause of many blessings to the Gentiles, and that from Him, and *not before,* the new song of the covenant was sung to all men.

In *Dem. Ev.* Bk. vi. 8. (pp. 286, 7) we find Eusebius returning to the same theme (the new song) in order to prove from the ancient Psalter "that the Lord was going to descend from Heaven for the salvation of the human race, and that a new song was to be sung over this, and that this new song was, in fact, the new covenant." As we shall see, the argument acquires peculiar interest, for it is almost certain that Eusebius is using the language of the *Odes of Solomon.*

He begins by quoting the 144th Psalm ver. 3, "What is man that thou hast knowledge of him, or the son of man that thou makest account of him?" (v. 5) "Bow thy heavens, O Lord, and they will come down, touch the mountains

and they will smoke." (ver. 9) "I will sing a new song unto thee, O God."

"The Psalmist," says Eusebius, "marvels at the knowledge of God the Word in regard to man, and is in great astonishment at His kindness (*ὑπερεκπλήττεται τῆς φιλανθρωπίας*), by which He sets Himself below the Divine Nature, and by minishing Himself of His natural greatness (*τῆς συμφυοῦς μεγέθους ἑαυτὸν σμικρύνας*) He made the human race worthy of His own knowledge."

"And one must remember along with this that *new covenant* which the coming of Christ was to introduce to men; for this is *the new covenant* (sc. *the new song*) which is given after the old by Christ *to all the Gentiles*. And that is why the Logion before us says, O God, I will sing a new song unto thee."

Here, then, once more, we see Eusebius equating the new covenant with the new song, and interpreting the new song in an anti-Judaic manner. In doing so, he reflected the language of the *Odes of Solomon* (vii. 3), where the Odist tells us that

> "The Lord hath *caused me to know himself*
> without grudging in his simplicity.
> Because *his kindness has minished his greatness.*"

Here almost every word of the Ode is reflected in the comments of Eusebius.

We are entitled to infer that the use which Eusebius makes of the passages of the Old Testament in which the "new song" is spoken of is in the main traditional, and belongs to the early anti-Judaic testimonies; even in the Apocalypse the "new song" is clearly borrowed from the ancient Psalter, and is interpreted anti-Judaically for the most part. We suspect, then, that it occupied a place of its own among the new things of the New Covenant of which Cyprian discourses in his first book of *Testimonies.*

Now let us see whether we can confirm this supposition by a reference to the New Testament itself. In the Epistle to the Romans c. 9—11 we have the most anti-Judaic part of the New Testament, in which quotations from the Psalms and Prophets are freely employed to show the rejection of the Jews and the calling of the Gentiles; and the argument which is dropped at the end of the eleventh chapter is picked up again in the fifteenth in a string of passages to prove that Christ is a minister of the covenant to confirm the promises made to the Fathers, and that *the Gentiles* are to glorify God for His mercy. The promises made to the Fathers are, in the first instance, the promise made to Abraham that in his seed *all nations* should be blessed; and in the next instance to Isaac and Jacob, to whom the promises are renewed. This is Testimony matter of the first rank. The Apostle then quotes a number of pro-Gentile passages, among them:

> "Praise the Lord, *all ye Gentiles:*
> Praise Him, *all ye people.*" Ps. cxvii.;

and

> "Rejoice, *ye Gentiles,* with His people." Deut. xxxii. 43;

and

> "I will give thanks to thee *among the Gentiles,*
> and will sing Psalms to thy name." Ps. xviii. 49.

Here we see the same method of interpretation at work, and we can also note that the Gentiles are not merely received into Covenant, they are actively engaged in God's praise. Thus we have the same combination of the New Song with the New Covenant that we found in Eusebius and elsewhere. It need hardly be pointed out that almost all the anti-Judaic matter in these chapters of the Epistle to the Romans is older than St. Paul: the quotations can often be detected again in quarters where dependence upon Romans cannot be affirmed. The New Song and the New

Covenant belong to the earliest stratum of *Testimonia* and to the Logia which antedate the New Testament itself.

If there should still be any doubt whether we are right in carrying back into the earliest times Eusebius' argument about the new song and the new covenant, the following passage from Irenaeus may, perhaps, furnish an illuminating study. Irenæus is arguing for the underlying unity of the Law and the Gospel, and showing that the new covenant was foretold by the prophets: he says: "The things new and old which are brought forth from the treasury are indisputably the two covenants; he presents the old legislation which was aforetime; but he shows also a new law, which is a life according to the Gospel, even as David says:

"Sing unto the Lord a new song." Ps. xcvi., xcviii. 1;

and Isaiah:

"Sing unto the Lord a new hymn: its beginning is, his name is glorified *from the end of the earth:* they tell his praise *in the islands.*" Isa. xlii. 10, 12;

and Jeremiah:

"Behold, saith he, I make a covenant, not like that which I made with your fathers in Mount Horeb."

One could almost affirm at a glance that these passages came from a Testimony Book. To make sure of the matter, however, let us look at a collocation of similar ideas and language in Bar Ṣalibi's treatise against the Jews (p. 38).

"And *concerning the praise which is hymned by the Gentiles:*

David said, Sing a new song to the Lord. Let his praise be in the congregation of the righteous:

Sing unto the Lord a new song; praise him from the ends of the earth: let the sea roar and the fulness thereof and the islands."

Here is the very sequence from David and Isaiah, as in Irenæus, but quite independently: and here is the same argument concerning the praise that is hymned by the Gentiles. Bar Ṣalibi's *Testimonies against the Jews* are

seen to underlie the arguments of Irenæus; and the *Evangelical Demonstrations* of Eusebius are evidently based on a similar tradition.

Bar Ṣalibi also makes sequence between the passages quoted by Irenæus from the Psalms and from Jeremiah. His language is as follows:

And David said:

"Sing unto the Lord a new song,"

and

"The Lord has made plain his salvation before *all the Gentiles.*"

Observe how he has made clear that *a new song is given to all the Gentiles.*

Again Jeremiah said:

"To the house of Israel and of Judah I will make a new covenant, and not like the covenant which I made with their fathers."

We may, I think, conclude that the early Church regarded their new song as one of defiance as well as of delight: it was the song of the great revolt, of which the New Testament and the early Fathers still show the traces. The only evidence which seems to lack the anti-Judaic note, at least in part, is that of the Apocalypse, which will not say, "The New Song, and not the Song of Moses," but suggests instead that the spirits elect sing both the song of Moses and the song of the Lamb. But this only means that the writer occupies an intermediate position, and was alternately and coincidently an old-time Jew and a new believer. This need not surprise us, nor does it disturb the course of the argument. On the contrary, it helps to illuminate it.

Rendel Harris.

ORIGEN ON "OUR DAILY BREAD."

Among Origen's briefer and less ambitious works none is more attractive than the treatise on *Prayer*; and nowhere are his character and spirit more fully revealed. It expresses with clearness and strength emotions that find utterance elsewhere only in broken sentences or casual hints; the passionate desire for the attainment of truth that we find in the phrase "*thirsting for light*"; the fervour that breaks out in the words "*My Jesus*," when for the moment the subtleties of speculation are flooded and submerged by a sudden ecstasy of devotion to his Saviour and his Lord.

If this treatise were our only debt to Ambrose; if the "taskmaster," as Origen calls him, had not urged his friend and fellow-worker to undertake the commentaries on the Gospels of Matthew and John and the reply to Celsus in defence of the faith; if he had not used the resources of his wealth to ease and expedite the scholar's work, he would still have established a lasting claim to the gratitude of the Christian Church. But we owe to him, in part at any rate, this little book as well. For Origen, as we learn from the prefatory chapter, was led to discuss "the problem of prayer" in answer to the united appeal of Ambrose and Tatiana. Of Ambrose we know enough to tell us what kind of man he was; what he cared for; his ardour in study, his patience in the search for truth, his devotion to sacred literature; the fidelity of his affection; his courage and constancy in the face of persecution: he was worthy of his friend. But Tatiana has no memorial but this. Ambrose's wife she can hardly have been: she may have been his sister; but even that is pure conjecture, nothing more. She was modest and brave, and by now past middle age; for Origen, who must quote Scripture in all places and

for all purposes, with questionable taste compares her condition to Sarah's, as described in the concluding words of the verse in Genesis (xviii. 11). This is all that we know of her.

I.

The "problem of prayer" Origen interprets in the larger sense, and handles it with freedom. He sets himself to shew that prayer is neither unreasonable nor futile; how it can be reconciled with divine foreknowledge, providence, predestination, the mysteries of election; and he answers, to his own satisfaction, the questions that he raises. He explains in detail, and with reasons given, to whom we should pray; what we should ask for; the conditions of prayer in place and in posture; the spirit and the disposition that make prayer effectual; the nature of the spiritual agencies that help or hinder; his thought culminating, though long before he reaches his close, in the declaration that "who so lives as to link prayer with deed, makes his whole life an endless chain of prayer."

But after Origen has dealt with "the problem," returning from his inevitable digressions into philosophy, his refutation of heresy, his exposition of difficult and doubtful passages in the Old and New Testaments, he takes our Lord's Prayer, the model of all prayer for those who believe in Him and His gospel, and examines it clause by clause. In this part of his work there are two passages to which we naturally turn to discover what light they can throw upon questions that have divided expositors in all ages:— (1) Whether we should read "deliver us from evil," or "from the evil one"; and (2) in what sense we are to interpret the word that describes the bread for which we are to ask (ἐπιούσιος); whether it is to be our "daily" bread, as the Authorised Version has it; or bread "for the coming day,"

according to the marginal note of the Revisers; or whether it is to be understood in a different sense altogether.

II.

Upon the first of these questions Origen is silent; but as to his opinion, there is no room for doubt. For to him the distinction between evil in the abstract and evil as embodied in a person would have seemed not so much artificial as unreal. While Plato held that "no man sins willingly," Origen always maintains that "every sin is voluntary," due not to want of knowledge but to defect of will: free-will, with its power to choose between good and evil, is man's inalienable prerogative. But at the same time Origen so conceived the relation of unseen agency to human action as to regard every act of virtue as the response of the human will to the influence of a spiritual power,—the angel assigned to each man for his help and defence; and every sinful act as a surrender to the spirits of evil—"the spiritual hosts of wickedness in heavenly places"—who are ever busy on earth for man's hurt and undoing. There are many gates of sin, he tells us, with a malignant power assigned to each; but over them all is the evil one. Deliverance from evil, to his mind, must involve deliverance from the evil one and his hosts, from whom evil is inseparable even in thought. For evil is not merely a tendency, or a power: it is a personality.

III.

Though silent on the first question, Origen has much to say about the second. His standpoint, as we see at once, differs widely from our own. When we ask for "daily bread," it is bread in the ordinary, the material, sense that we have in mind; the food that sustains and strengthens the body, supplies force to our energies, rekindles

the activities of the intellect. Many of us, it is safe to say, include more than this in our thought, and take "bread" also to represent all that ministers to moral and spiritual vigour. But this is an enlargement of the conception; and although some of us widen it more than others, however freely we expand the circle of thought, the centre of the circle for all of us is "bread" in the plain and literal sense of the word. The case is so simple, so free from doubt, as to need no systematic proof. Even one witness is more than will be required. But to avoid any appearance of dogmatism, let us take the first that comes to hand. Addressing the Baptist Union in London, Mr. William Adamson, the honoured representative of West Fife in the House of Commons, said that the Church too often in the past had despised "material" things, forgetting that the Master taught us to pray—"give us this day our daily bread." Mr. Adamson no doubt would agree that we must regard "bread" not only as substance but as symbol; but the prayer in its intention, for him as for most of us, begins with the substance, even if it does not end there.

Now Origen resolutely rejects any such reference to the term. He refuses to admit that the words can be taken to denote *material* food. The case, as he regards it, is not one in which two interpretations may be allowed; the literal, for "simple" folk,—those who are still in the flesh; in Christ indeed, but babes in Him; and the spiritual, for those who have advanced beyond the earlier stages of growth in perfection. The literal interpretation, in his opinion, expresses a conception that is not merely elementary and incomplete, but a conception that is positively false,—one that distorts and degrades the mind of Jesus Christ. In the heat of his indignation, he overlooks the natural and cogent objection that to interpret "bread" in its literal sense is to lower the prayer from its moral

and spiritual heights to the level of the material plane; and that no other word in any of its clauses can be found to justify such a descent. He demurs on the ground that our Lord bade us ask for things that are great and heavenly, and that it would be inconsistent with Christ's own teaching for Him to bid us ask for what belongs only to the flesh. He will accept no compromise, such as we allow, between the letter and the spirit: the literal interpretation he rejects, and rejects it without reserve.

And yet Origen is not always consistent with himself in asserting the principle that we have no right to pray for material blessings. For in another chapter of his treatise, where he deals with the adaptation of divine agencies to human ends, he gives us two cases, by way of illustration, in which he seems to admit the very thing that he here denies. A man in sickness prays for help; and a physician of righteousness and experience, who knows how to treat the disease, appears for his relief; sent by God; the agent of the divine will, fulfilling the divine purpose. Another, who is rich and generous, overhears the prayer of a needy man who in sore straits makes his appeal to God; relieves the distress, and in relieving it acts in obedience to the Father's design: he too is a minister of God, and acts as such. We may pray then for relief in sickness, and for deliverance from poverty, "material" blessings both of them; and Origen, it is clear, uses the words "sickness" and "poverty" in their ordinary sense as applied to the natural order of human life; for though he requires that the physician shall be "righteous," the condition comes in not because his cure is spiritual, but because he is acting under divine guidance. Sickness is the result of hunger; poverty a cause of it: if it is allowable to pray for deliverance from those evils, how can it be unlawful for us also to pray that we may

be safeguarded against the need that is the outcome of the one and the occasion of the other ?

IV.

When he comes to deal with the word (ἐπιούσιος) that we interpret as "daily," Origen tells us that the word is not to be found in Greek literature or philosophy, or in common use among the people. He suggests that the word was coined by the evangelists Matthew and Luke, who use it in the same form ; but he does not account for their agreement. He quotes from the Septuagint, as akin to it in form, the word that we know as "special" or "peculiar" (περιούσιος), and suggests that the translators coined it in the same way. In neither case does he attempt to go back from the Greek to the Semitic originals. For his command even of Hebrew was slight ; and there is no evidence that he had any knowledge of Syriac.

But taking the Greek words as a basis, he proceeds to suggest two interpretations, one of which he prefers, without absolutely rejecting the other.

In either case we are to assume that what concerns us is in no way or degree material, but something wholly spiritual in its nature. For Origen allegorises here, as he always does when dealing with the Old Testament Scriptures or the New, and sometimes in handling other books as well. For instance, in his commentary on Matthew's Gospel, when he expounds the parable of the pearl of great price, he gathers together a mass of detail taken either from Ælian or from Pliny, or possibly from both, to shew the varieties of pearls, their origin, the districts from which they come, their respective qualities, their relative values and the methods by which they are obtained. He completes his account with a statement in which his authorities agree : that as among bees there is a queen-bee, so among oysters

there is a king-oyster who rules and guides: when the king is taken, the rest of the shoal follow, as left without resource or leader. Then he proceeds to treat his science as if it were scripture, and turns it into allegory too, with a mass of detail that it is needless to record,—all leading up to the conclusion that Christ Himself is the "chief of the shoal," surpassing the lesser pearls of the law and the prophets, and that those who win Him win all the rest also. In the same way, he identifies the tribes and the kings that were conquered and exterminated by the children of Israel, as recorded in the earlier books of the Old Testament, with evil forces and beliefs; and in his exposition of the passage in Matthew that contains the history of John the Baptist's imprisonment and execution, while accepting the historical details as true, he reads his own meaning into them. Herod is the principle of lawlessness in power; Herodias, his brother's wife, is "a kind of evil opinion and vicious teaching" (inspired by the evil principle with which she is associated); while her daughter, resembling her in nature as in name,[1] completes a trinity of wickedness. The incidents of history, wherever he finds them, have little value for him; when he accepts them as realities—and he does not so accept them in all cases,—he escapes at once from the details to the higher truths that he holds them to embody.

So here Origen allegorises the "bread." It is food that nourishes not man's body, but his soul. By it our spiritual hunger is satisfied, our spiritual strength renewed and developed: it is "the living bread," "the bread that came down from heaven," with which our Lord identified Himself.

[1] Josephus, *Ant.* xviii. 5, §4, gives her name as Salome; but Origen, *De Orat.* c. 22, says distinctly that she bore "the same name as her mother."

But this still leaves its description and definition, as given by Matthew and Luke, ambiguous. How is the word that they use to be explained? Origen, as stated above, has two theories. For convenience, we may begin with his second choice, before setting forth the explanation that he prefers.

It has been suggested, Origen says, that the word ἐπιούσιος is built up from ἐπί and ἰέναι, to denote that which "comes on" or "follows" immediately, as to-morrow immediately follows to day. If that explanation be sound, as many scholars have held it to be, then the intention of our prayer is that God will grant to-day "bread for the coming day," as the marginal note of the Revised Version proposes: in other words, we ask for relief not only from immediate need but from immediate anxiety,—to see our way assured for one step in advance, if no further.

But this literal interpretation will not fit in with Origen's habit of thought. For him a "day," when the word occurs in Scripture, is not the day of twenty-four hours, but stands for one of the aeons, or ages,—great periods of time, each of which represents a stage in the existence of the world. "To-day" is the "age" that now is; as "yesterday" is the "age" that is past, and "to-morrow" the "age" that is to be. The succession of the "ages" corresponds to the succession of the years in human experience, which are shadows and types of the higher order; in which a moon, that Origen can imagine but cannot describe, travels on its way in company with a corresponding sun. With the completion of each such period, the spirit in which God lives and reigns draws nearer to Him in purity and in knowledge; the material element with which it is associated grows less, the spiritual element grows larger. The food that sufficed for its needs in the earlier stage becomes insufficient as it advances: its needs develop, not in amount but

in kind, with its progress. And what the prayer asks for, if the proposed interpretation be accepted, is that through the divine grace we may receive *now* that which would otherwise be reserved for us hereafter; that we may receive possibilities of perfection that in their nature belong not to the present but to the future.

For reasons that he does not explain, Origen, without ruling out of court this interpretation, prefers to derive both words, not from *ἰέναι* but from *εἶναι*, or its substantive *οὐσία*: *ἐπιούσιος* is that which contributes to *true being*; *περιούσιος*, that which is concerned with *true being*, and is related to it, or has fellowship with it. He then asks, as he was bound to ask, what we conceive *true being*, or substance, to be; where we are to look for it; whether we are to regard spirit as primary and essential; or whether matter comes first, while existence apart from matter is secondary and consequential. Matter, he explains, as defined by Aristotle and by the Stoics, is without form or quality; but while changeless itself, it admits changes and modifications of all kinds, so taking on the qualities that such processes involve. But spirit, on the contrary, has its seat in what is immaterial and therefore constant; to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing can be withdrawn; for such change is a property of bodies that are subject to growth and decay, through being in a state of flux, and needing for their stability accession and increment,—growing so long as influx exceeds outflow, decreasing when loss outstrips gain.

Life, therefore, in its highest and purest and most lasting form, is spiritual. The true man is spiritual in nature; and the true bread that nourishes the true man must be one in nature with that which it sustains. If spirit is the basis of life, then the bread that our being requires must be spiritual also; and the prayer must be interpreted in

that sense. All material associations are to be discarded and disallowed.[1]

Such is the pith of Origen's argument. But in the course of it he raises many questions, widely differing in kind and in moment. It is his way: he never can hold straight on his course. His method—or rather, his tendency—recalls the description that John Bright once gave of Gladstone as an orator: "he works round the bay, runs up every navigable river and every inlet, to see what is there"; he cannot "strike through deep water from point to point." But Origen's excursions in exposition have an even wider range, embracing as they do what is below the earth, in the depths; and what is above it, in the heights. His energy and his enterprise are boundless; but he often fails to enlighten, and sometimes even to inspire.

V.

To follow Origen through all the questions that he raises incidentally, related in various ways to the Bread of Life, would be too long a journey. It will be enough for our immediate purpose to take two that are most characteristic of his thought to serve as illustrations.

Christ, he repeats, is the living bread; the bread that came down from heaven: it is upon Him—His body and His word—that the spirit feeds. Then he proceeds to distinguish according to his manner. For while he never fails to lay stress on the unity of God in His threefold Personality as the cause and source of all things, no teacher, either of his own time or of other ages, has shewn so keen a sense of the differences in human conditions, character,

[1] Origen, it will be noticed, does not refer to a third explanation that has been proposed, deriving the word from ἐπεῖναι, ἐπών; "that which is present," "at hand," and so "that which suffices." The etymological objections to any connexion of the word with εἶναι have been pointed out by scholars. In such compounds the final vowel of the preposition is invariably dropped.

powers and needs. Even Aristotle, though more systematic and more logical in method, is not more analytical in temper. For those who possess the inalienable power of free-will, as all rational beings possess it—whether higher or lower in the spiritual order,—will use their prerogative in ways of endless variety; and Origen never loses sight of the infinite range of choice with all its divergence in result. Difference, diversity (διαφορά) is always a dominant note in his thought.

And so he distinguishes in this case. The sustaining Word, while one in its essence, is varied and manifold, adapted by the divine economy to the capacity of each who receives it. For "athletes," as Origen describes them in more than one place, full-grown and vigorous spirits, there is the strong or solid meat; for those who are less robust, a diet of herbs,—so he allegorises the words of Paul (Rom. xiv. 2): "he that is weak eateth herbs"; and for the young and tender in the faith "the pure milk of the word." For not every one, as Origen would interpret the text, "has faith to eat all things." Some truths, some forms of knowledge, some revelations of God, we are not able to receive in the earlier stages of our growth; indeed, until we are fit to receive them, they would work in us for harm and not for help. And he would go further and assert, as we have already seen him to imply, that there are treasures of divine wisdom and grace to which we shall not and must not attain until we have passed from the conditions of the age that now is into the conditions of the age that is to be.

The same bread, he continues, is the common food of angels and of men; for the relation between the two orders is close and constant. The angels are strengthened for the discharge of their functions by the contemplation of wisdom in accordance with truth. And as man "did eat

angels' food," so angels may be fed by men. He quotes the Old Testament story of the angels' visit to Abraham by the oaks of Mamre, and of their entertainment with the cakes of "fine meal baked on the hearth." The story, he says, is "purely allegorical." Its purpose is to shew that saints can give rational and spiritual food, not only to men but to beings of higher rank; either for their actual good, or to shew what sustenance men have been able to secure for themselves. In such a manifestation the angels find pleasure as well as support; they become more eager to co-operate with men for their good, and to press forward the growth of spiritual truth in those who, furnished with nutritious wisdom, gave them viands, if one may so say, and cheer. And why, he adds, should we marvel that men can feed angels? For Christ Himself says that He stands at the door and knocks, and that when admitted He will come in and sup on what His host provides; while He in turn will then impart of His own to him who has entertained the Son of God in the measure of his power (Rev. iii. 20). Extremes meet: the words are taken and applied in their most literal sense that they may serve as a basis for allegory that is fanciful, if not fantastic. And yet beneath what is extravagant it is possible to discover the gleam of a divine truth.

ALFRED DALE.

STUDIES IN CONVERSION.

X. SYNESIUS OF CYRENE.

IN Neander's *Memorabilia of the Christian Life* there is a notice of Synesius of Cyrene, a bishop of the fifth century, which led me long ago to believe that in him I might find a subject for one of these Studies in Conversion less hack-

neyed than the majority of them must be ; but, on turning to the works of the man himself, I was so disappointed that I abandoned the thought of including him in this series. On hearing, however, from a friend that the late Principal Rainy had declared himself more interested in Synesius than in the well-known figures of the same age, I returned to the subject, which is for many reasons a fascinating one, Synesius having had in him a great deal of human nature ; and I seem to see now that his case illustrates a kind of conversion well deserving a place among the rest. This is the conversion due to a sense of duty in a providential position or in an office the duties of which cannot be discharged without a religious change. Again and again instances of such conversion have come within the range of my own experience. I have seen a man elected to an office in the Church, who only then awoke to the full claim which religion had upon him, and thenceforward lived up to this new conception of duty. I believe it is very far from uncommon for parents first to become earnestly religious when their children are born, because they feel how unfit they are to train these young immortals for their destiny, unless they be decided themselves ; and this is a motive of which ministers might make use in dealing with fathers about baptism. Instances will occur to every reader of ministers who have entered on their office without being themselves earnest Christians, but who, by the solemnity of their position, have been made aware of their own deficiencies, and have thereupon turned to the proper quarter for their removal. Synesius was called upon to be a Christian bishop, whilst he was still a heathen and unbaptized ; there were strong reasons of a public and philanthropic nature which made it desirable that he should occupy this position of authority, and the sense of responsibility carried him over the line of decision. It is

obvious to say that this was putting the cart before the horse, because personal decision ought to come first, and the public service of God and man to follow after; but the wind which bloweth where it listeth does not always act according to rule; and it is well worth watching a case in which this very good rule was reversed. Miss Alice Gardner, indeed, in her work entitled *Synesius of Cyrene, Philosopher and Bishop*, in the series entitled *The Fathers for English Readers*, denies that there was any conversion, because Synesius does not give the usual account of conviction of sin followed by the joy of believing; and the same position is taken by Grützmacher,[1] the author of the latest German work on the subject. But this is to take too limited a view of what conversion is. If a sincere and earnest man is seen at one stage as a Pagan gentleman and at another, a little later, as a Christian bishop, there must have been a change in the interval deserving of close study.

In the Book of Acts it is mentioned that among the Jews and proselytes gathered in Jerusalem at Pentecost, when the Holy Spirit was poured forth and the Church founded, there were some from "the parts of Libya about Cyrene"; and it may be taken as a sign that these had not heard the message of the Gospel in vain when, somewhat later, in chapter xi. 20, we read that "certain men of Cyrene" were found preaching the Gospel to Greeks at Antioch, thus initiating the movement in the direction of Gentile evangelisation of which St. Paul was subsequently to take control. In harmony with this prominence of natives of Cyrene in the early Christian movement is the occurrence of "Lucius of Cyrene," in chapter xiii. 1, among the "prophets and teachers" out of whose number Barnabas and Saul were selected to head the mission to the Gentiles.

[1] *Cyrenius von Cyrene: Ein Charakterbild aus dem Untergang des Hellenenthums.* Leipzig, 1913.

But, indeed, there is an earlier point of contact between Cyrene and Christianity in the fact that Simon, who bore the Lord's cross on the way to Calvary, was a Cyrenian; and the familiar way in which he is mentioned, in Mark xv. 21, as "the father of Alexander and Rufus," has been taken to indicate, that from a bearer he had become a herald of the cross, first to his own family and afterwards to his fellow-countrymen.

If a reader of the Book of Acts, opening the atlas, glances at a map in search of Cyrene, he will find himself looking at a portion of the globe on which the attention of every reader of the newspapers was fixed some little time ago; for Cyrene is part of the territory in North Africa recently taken by the Italians from the Turks, and it lies between two cities with which he is probably familiar, Alexandria and Carthage. There is now, indeed, no Cyrene, the town, along with four others, which formed with it the region known as Pentapolis, having for many centuries been blotted out of existence under the evil rule of the Turk. Just before the outbreak of the war above alluded to, an American archæological expedition had started to dig up the buried cities of Cyrenaica, the region of which Cyrene was the centre; but perhaps the buried cities may experience a happier resurrection under the rule of a Christian state.

At the date of the founding of Christianity Cyrene had been for centuries a centre of civilisation. It had been founded in the Age of Colonization by adventurers from the Peloponnesus, who, roaming the Mediterranean in search of a home, were attracted by the beauty and fruitfulness of this region between the sea and the desert and left to their successors the task of transforming it into a little Greece. After many vicissitudes it came, like the rest of the world, under the dominion of the Romans, who united it with Crete into a province, but left to the cities

a considerable amount of home-rule. After the changes introduced by the Emperor Diocletian the Pentapolis became a province by itself, and bore the name of Libya Superior, in distinction from the real Libya, which was called Libya Inferior.

The Christianising of this region, of which we have seen the beginnings in the Book of Acts, went on rapidly in subsequent decades, and how complete it had at last become may be inferred from the fact that at the Council of Nice, in 325 A.D., there were present no fewer than seven bishops from Libya Superior and Inferior. By the sixth canon of this council the churches of the Pentapolis were placed under the oversight of the bishops of Alexandria. At the time of which we have to speak in this article the headship among the five cities had shifted from Cyrene to Ptolemais; Synesius was Bishop of Ptolemais and Metropolitan of Cyrenaica; and he was responsible to Theophilus, the Bishop of Alexandria.

The exact date of the birth of Synesius is not known; but it is calculated to have been about A.D. 375. He was of an aristocratic family in Cyrene; and he was brought up in the employments of an open-air life, such as the breeding of dogs, the breaking of horses, and the sport of the chase—tastes which he retained to the end of his life. He had his full share of pride in long descent, and, even after he was a Christian bishop, he could speak with contempt of an opponent, because, as he phrased it, he did not know the name of his grandfather; while he was somewhat too ready, in and out of season, to refer to his own supposed derivation from Sparta and even descent from Hercules. He had plenty of relatives of his own rank in life, a brother Euoptius being his constant confidant and correpondent, and perhaps his successor in his office of bishop, while a sister, married to a government-official, resided at Con-

stantinople and so brought him into touch with what was then the capital of the world. He had, at all stages of life, a genius for friendship; and, being gifted with an ever-ready pen, he did not allow such connexions to suffer decline.

When his education at home was completed, he was sent for the university-stage to the not distant city of Alexandria, then the second or third city of the world and a great centre of culture. Here he was happy enough to come under the influence of the celebrated Hypatia, a woman-professor of that age, who excelled no less in the severely scientific than in the brilliantly speculative elements of learning. In his novel called by her name, Charles Kingsley has caused to live again the city and the atmosphere into which Synesius was introduced. The student adored the teacher for her talents, her acquirements and her character; and to the end of his life he kept up correspondence with her, confiding to her sympathetic mind every turn of his fortunes; but the element of passion did not enter into the connexion between them; and, indeed, it is probable that she was much the older of the two.

There is reason to believe that he profited from her strictly scientific prelections; for, at a subsequent stage, he invented and presented to an influential patron an improved method of reckoning time; but it was chiefly in the region of speculative philosophy that he was her zealous disciple. She was a teacher of Neoplatonism. This was a phase of human thought at that time making a noise in the world and represented by not a few famous names, of which that of Plotinus is now the best remembered. It was really the last effort of Paganism to set up a system in competition with Christianity, and it borrowed not a few elements from its rival. Thus, it had a trinity in the Godhead; and the second person in its trinity especially bore

a striking resemblance to the Second Person in the Christian Trinity. Its practical aim was an existence of peace and tranquillity, though the initiated aspired to attain, in rare moments, an absorption in the divine to which they gave the name of Ecstasy. There was sometimes violent conflict between this philosophy and Christianity, some of the most celebrated Neoplatonists writing books against the Christians, and Hypatia herself perishing in an outbreak of violence from the opposite quarter—a calamity which happily Synesius did not live to witness. In the circles, however, to which he belonged there was no open conflict between the two forms of belief, and it was possible to pass from the one to the other without exciting opposition.

Though thus an adherent of a philosophy the professed aim of which was calm deepening into ecstasy, it may be doubted whether Synesius was fitted by nature for such a career. Though he had the aspirations of a philosopher, his gifts were those of a man of action. Hardly had he returned to his native province when he was captured by the demands of practical life, being sent on an embassy to Constantinople, to represent to the Court the grievances of his fellow-countrymen and obtain an amelioration of their lot. The way to succeed in such an enterprise was a long and tedious one. Connexions had to be formed with persons of influence, who might whisper the business at some favourable moment in the imperial ear. Officials had to be consulted and papers drawn up. Finally, on the appointed day, a golden crown was presented to the Emperor from his distant subjects, and the envoy delivered an oration in the presence of the Court, which had of course, in its conclusion, to explain the actual business, but might, in its earlier stages, take a very wide range indeed. In point of fact, the visit of Synesius to the capital lasted no

less than three years. With the introductions which he had brought from home and from the circle about Hypatia he was able to form numerous acquaintances in high quarters. Day by day he climbed the stairs of the imperial offices or could be seen before the doors which he wished to open to him seated on a rug so gorgeous that an official, who had often looked upon it with a covetous eye, entreated him to leave it to him when he was quitting the city. The time happened to be one of great internal strain and disorder in the Empire ; and persons in high positions, and especially the Emperor, could not easily find time to listen to petitions like those of Synesius. He became profoundly interested in the political drama unfolding before his eyes, and his sympathies were strongly enlisted on one of the sides. He seemed to see the ancient Roman virtue giving way and the grasp of the rulers relaxing, while mercenaries were obtaining the upper hand and making themselves the masters of those whom they were supposed to serve. When, therefore, he at length gained an opportunity of addressing the Court, his oration assumed the shape of a lofty philosophical discourse on government in general and, then, on the actual condition of the Empire, while he summoned the judge before whom he was pleading to live up to the dignities and duties of his position at the head of affairs and thereby inaugurate a more glorious era. It is astonishing that such a speech should have been listened to from such a quarter. But the very novelty and daring of the orator prevailed ; and his effort had the practical result that he gained the object for which he had come to the capital.

During his stay he had gained much else besides. He had formed numerous ties with personages in high places, with whom he could negotiate in future either on behalf of the province to which he belonged or of individuals

in whose interests he might be asked to exert an influence. He had been introduced to the selectest circles of philosophy and culture and there found friends who in future continued to be his correspondents, furnishing him with news of what was going on in the great world. There was no other man in the Pentapolis with such connexions in the capital. Besides, his oration remained as a literary monument of the three years he had spent in the city where more than anywhere else at the time history was being made; and he also threw the same experiences into the form of a romance. which still possesses historical value.

It cannot have been easy, after being thus for a time a part of great events, to retire into the obscurity of Libya. But he had his philosophy to sustain him, which told him that philosophical calm was more to be desired than the glare of cities or the ambitions of a court. Besides, he had married and had the interests of a growing family to look after. He set up life on a farm or estate on the southern boundary of the province, not far from the desert; and there he had the rural pursuits of a gentleman of leisure to occupy his attention. He had literary ambitions too, and, in the years that followed his settlement in this district, he wrote three books, which were very characteristic products of his genius.

Of these the first, entitled *On Baldness*, is a gigantic *jeu d'esprit*, which was intended to prove to his literary friends in Constantinople and Alexandria that, though buried in the country, he had not lost either the fire of wit or the elegance of style familiar to their circles. In the second, entitled *Dion*, he painted the portrait of a philosopher of a previous age, for whom he entertained an admiration, using the opportunity at the same time for expounding his own conception of the philosophic character. The third, *On Dreams*, is now the most interesting

to us, because it shows at how many points a sincere believer in Paganism was conscious of the need of a revelation more clear and reliable than that of natural reason. While we can easily realise the religion of the saints of the Old Testament and perceive how proficiency in the Jews' religion was a preparation for Christian faith, it is not so easy for us to realise the religious habits of a pagan or to understand how sincere Paganism might be a stepping-stone to Christianity. But Synesius was a sincere pagan; in his self-revelations we become acquainted with the religious habits of a believer in the classical deities; and we can estimate how the practice of such a religion might help or hinder the transition to a profession of Christianity.

It is a question not easily answered how far Synesius' native vivacity might have carried him in the production of books, had he remained living as a farmer and country gentleman on the very outskirts of civilisation. It may be doubted whether in his writings themselves there was substance enough to have enabled them to survive the tooth of time, had they not experienced an accession of interest through their being the products of one whom the Church had reason to remember for his position and services. But events were now at hand which were to impose upon Synesius' earthly course a direction totally different from that which he himself contemplated; out of the tranquillity which he esteemed the highest good he was to be shaken by the rude onsets of adversity; and yet out of his suffering and disappointment Providence was to shape for him a record in the strangeness of which there is the guarantee of immortality.

Synesius had been born in an evil age, when changes threatening the foundations of society were imminent. The Roman Empire, which had so long ruled the world, was beginning to decay. No longer was it able to send forth

from headquarters the troops of governors, of divers stations and name, required to rule the subject nations with dignity and justice and keep at bay the forces of disorder. Multitudes of these officials were not only cruel and corrupt, but cowardly and weak, thinking of nothing but the means by which they could recoup themselves for the bribes through which they had obtained their offices and fill their empty pockets. As Rome thus was losing its hold, there were others ready to pounce upon the unprotected lands. Naturally the danger was most threatening on the outskirts ; and not only did the Germanic tribes keep pouring over the Rhine and the Danube into the Roman possessions, and the Persians maintain incessant warfare on the distant Eastern border, but at many points from beyond the bounds of civilisation warlike tribes almost without names pushed their way across the zone of the Roman rule, menacing the life and property of the terrified inhabitants. The Pentapolis was one of these frontier portions of the Roman Empire ; from out of the deserts to the South warriors kept pouring in ; and, to meet them, the governors displayed such incompetency and poltroonery that private persons had to take up arms to defend themselves. Among these was Synesius, who, manifesting the utmost intrepidity in the dangerous circumstances, thereby drew upon himself the attention and the hope of the distracted population. It was in situations such as this that the Church of that age rose to be a power also in civil affairs. Where the civil government was so incompetent as to be unable to ensure to its subjects the elementary advantages due from the state, any organisation with men of character at its head and with sentiments of unity and mutual help pervading its members was certain to have the responsibilities of government thrust upon it, the weak and downtrodden looking to it for assistance. The episcopate especially

became, even against its will, a rival to the state; and, when a bishopric fell vacant, the suffering inhabitants looked round for a man of good social standing and public spirit, who could protect them from the dangers to which they were exposed. Thus it was that Synesius had the office of bishop thrust upon him.

It may not say much for the Christianity of those who offered him the dignity that they should have chosen a pagan for their bishop; but it says a great deal for the character of Synesius, that his neighbours should not have been aware of the inconsistency to which they were exposing themselves. He at first received a shock at the proposal, and it was with a veracity more genuine than was usual in such cases that he said, *Nolo episcopari*. But he was persuaded, chiefly by the advice of certain old men, to reconsider his decision; and he resorted to a course not unlike that followed by anxious inquirers in similar perplexities: he would, he resolved, draw up a statement on the points in which his beliefs differed from those of Christians and submit them to the highest authority in the Church, who happened to be Theophilus of Alexandria, leaving him to decide whether one holding such views was fit to be a bishop.

The points on which he differed from the Christians were three: he held that the soul was created after the body; also, that the whole world will one day be utterly destroyed; and, thirdly, he could not accept the doctrine of the resurrection except in a mystical and figurative sense. There was, besides, the serious practical consideration, that he was a married man; and he refused to put his wife away, as many in similar circumstances did in that age of enthusiastic Monasticism.

Surprise has been expressed that Theophilus did not at once reject such a candidate. But the heresies of Syne-

sius probably seemed to him of a fantastic order, which a brief experience of practical life among Christians would soon drive out of his brain; and he may not have been insensible of the glory that would redound to himself from bringing a convert of such eminence into the fold. At all events, he invited him to Alexandria, where Synesius stayed for seven months, though this was a longer period than a vacancy could be kept open in accordance with canonical law; and in the end Synesius accepted baptism and consecration.

It is of these months, when he was halting between two opinions, that we should like to possess more information than has come down to us. But at least he took ample time to make up his mind. He had even the opportunity, during these months, in a great Christian city, of informing himself fully both as to the rites of which he was to be the executant and of the facts and doctrines of which he was to be the herald; and, since he was an honest man, it does not require very much depth of inquiry to divine the course which his broodings pursued. The most formidable obstacle in his mind appears to have been a dread of being supposed to have deserted the pursuits of philosophy; and the strongest incentive was the prospect of rendering service to his native land. Deeper motives may have developed later; but this was the dominant one at the time, and it proved sufficient to overcome the contrary influences. Neander was of opinion that there could be traced in the bishop's subsequent effusions a gradual deepening of experience and a permeation of his ideas and language with a Christian spirit. Miss Gardner thinks that this alteration was inevitable in one who was constantly discharging the ordinary functions of a bishop; but there are not wanting passages in his later productions which warrant the more sanguine and charitable estimate of the great Church historian.

As a bishop, Synesius amply fulfilled the hope of those who had elected him, in so far as they expected him to become a champion of their cause and to redress their wrongs. The province was suffering from the injustice and cruelty of a governor named Andronicus, who thought of nothing but the extortion of money from his miserable subjects and resorted to unheard-of tortures to extract money from his victims, refusing to recognise the sanctuary afforded by the Church and threatening, with odious blasphemy, to drag those whom he was pursuing even from the feet of Christ. Against this baseborn but arrogant man Synesius proceeded with success, bringing him to his knees and driving him from office. Such an encounter suited the manly and warlike spirit of Synesius. But, in the more ordinary and spiritual duties of his office, he moved with more awkwardness. A philosopher might have been expected to prove lenient to heretics ; but Synesius, perhaps sensible of inability to cope with such inquirers himself, insisted on absolute obedience to his own superior, the Archbishop of Alexandria. His sense of humour enabled him to see the ludicrous side of certain parts of the business falling to his lot, as he moved from place to place, in his diocese. But the sense of the inadequacy of his preparation for the duties to which he was covenanted was borne in upon him by other incidents of his administration ; and the melancholy thus caused was deepened by the course of Providence in his domestic lot. Three young sons, of whom he was excessively fond, were snatched away from him one after another ; and the brokenhearted father was completely bewildered with the blows of calamity. His own life appears to have been shortened ; but we have no certainty as to the date of his death. His last utterances which have survived are full of the most pathetic humility ; but, as Neander has hinted, this may have been the most

appropriate state of mind in which to end for one who had been filled at one time with the pride of philosophy and had to condescend at last to be saved like an ordinary sinner.

Miss Gardner gives the following hymn as the ripest expression of Synesius' Christian experience :—

Christ, think upon me,
Son of the Highest,
Heavenly Ruler,
Think on Thy servant,
Sinful and wretched,
Calling upon Thee.
Grant me release from the
Tumult of passions,
Death-bringing evils,
Rooted within my
Spirit polluted.
Saviour Jesus,
Let me behold Thy
Radiant glory.
Then will I clearly
Sound forth Thy praises,
Thou the soul's Healer,
Healer of bodies.
Praise to the Father
And to the Spirit.

JAMES STALKER.

HUMAN PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY.

IV.

IT is my purpose, in a future contribution to this journal, to apply some of the results of previous articles on Infinity, Perfection, and Eternity, to a discussion of the Doctrine of the Trinity. The conception of a triune God, as embodied in Christian Creeds, and as stated by most orthodox theologians, falls short of suggesting that the Divine hypostases are subjects in the ordinary psychological sense; yet many popular presentations and applications of the

Doctrine of the Trinity go so far in the direction of tritheism as to affirm that God is a social Being. Indeed unless that be the implication of the dogma, it is difficult to find in it, however true it be, any value practical or philosophical. Thus as things stand and have long stood, the orthodox formulation of the Doctrine of the Trinity is at variance with applications made of it, and its presentation is characterised by vacillation and the equivocal usage of terms. It seems desirable therefore that speculative development of the teaching that a triune God must be a Social Being be undertaken, its logical issues made clear, and a decision arrived at as to its compatibility with theology as a whole.

But before a discussion of so many-sided and intricate a problem can be entered upon, it is essential that yet another preliminary study be pursued. The concepts of human personality and individuality are inevitably involved in any attempt to inquire as to what should be meant by the Divine "Persons" or Hypostases; and the elucidation of the former concepts is the task to be undertaken in the present article.

Both 'personality' and 'individuality' are terms which have been used with many connotations. 'Personality' indeed, at the hands of different writers, has denoted everything between mere 'selfness'—the quality of being a perduring subject of experience—and the full possession of all the attributes, functions, mental and moral endowments, of the most completely developed human being situated in the most advanced social environment. As, for our ultimate theological purpose, the reality and the qualities of selfhood are perhaps even more important than the characteristics of fully developed personal life, the former qualities call for the larger share of our attention here.

As to the reality of our 'selfness,' or the fact that 'we'

are really perduring subjects of continuous experience, each with his own *βίος*, the first question to be answered is, whether the conception of a subject at all—momentary or enduring—is psychologically necessary. And this, as is well known, has been, and still is, a matter of dispute. The question scarcely needs to be thrashed out here, and must be disposed of briefly and summarily. At the outset, it may be remarked that by the bare concept of a subject, the psychologist does not mean the empirical ego which is perceived as an object among other objects, nor any special kind of substance or soul. The concept simply implies that everything which is experienced must be referred to some experient; it denotes one of the two terms between which any cognitional relation subsists. And it is generally adopted as a valid concept because 'awareness of' cannot be expressed by one word, nor be conceived without the implication of a subject of awareness. All attempts that have been made to dispense with the notion of the subject can quite plainly be shown really to imply it. The latest attempt of this kind resorts to personification of consciousness, or the conscious process *in* which an object is experienced; but, obviously, it is not the process in which something is apprehended that does the apprehending. Perhaps until it has been found possible to dispense with the conception of the subject, we may continue to rely, with the great majority of psychologists, on its validity.

The next question which arises, is as to how we attain to knowledge of the subject—how the subject becomes aware of itself. Here again opinions differ. Many philosophers maintain that the subject can only be known mediately or indirectly; that we only have knowledge about it (as we have of Julius Caesar) and no acquaintance-knowledge (as we have of a colour). Others maintain

that in this particular case, as in all others, there can be no " knowledge about," or knowledge by description, without direct acquaintance. The former school asserts that it is impossible for the subject to be presented as object to itself ; implying that whatever is object of cognition is *ipso facto* not-self : the latter school do not see why this may not be, in that a substance may stand in relations to itself, and the knowledge-relation may well be one of such relations. This question will not at first sight appear to have any concern with our subsequent theological inquiry : so long as the subject have knowledge of itself, whether by an immediate inner perception or by means of a notion attained only through reflexion such as is possible at the level of self-consciousness, it will perhaps seem immaterial how the knowledge in question comes about. The case, however, is really otherwise. For in arguments that the Trinitarian conception of the Deity is, on philosophical grounds, necessary, much turns on whether self-consciousness, Divine as well as human, can be conceived after the model of immediate perception or ' acquaintance,' or only as mediated through knowledge of an object which is not-self. If a subject can directly know itself, or be presented to itself, as, e.g., redness is presented, the plea that God, in order to be a Self-conscious Being, must have an eternal ' Other,' can be dismissed ; and, therewith, one of the ways in which the doctrine of the Trinity is approached by philosophy as contrasted with the theology of Christian revelation.

This somewhat technical point, then, demands further consideration. It has already been shown that the question is a vexed question ; and the arguments on either side must be carefully weighed.

In the first place, it seems difficult to accept the view that the subject's knowledge of itself can be of the nature of acquaintance (*kennen*, as distinguished from *wissen*). For

what has sometimes been called 'inner sense,' viz., that by which acts of awareness are apprehended as such, is not at all on a par with sensation of what is external or non-mental, like a red colour. Inner sense, indeed, is not sense at all, or comparable to it. It is only possible when the level of self-consciousness, as distinguished from consciousness, has been reached; and it is rather to be compared with reflexive thought than simple sensation. Further, 'acquaintance' always and necessarily gives knowledge of an entity as characterised by its qualities; it is the kind of knowledge which, e.g., the normal man has of colour, and is in marked contrast with the sort of knowledge which a blind man may have *about* colour. But what qualities of the pure 'I,' or subject, are presented to our so-called inner sense, by which we are aware of our acts of awareness, and, as is alleged, of our 'I' itself? The subject only knows itself as 'that which has this awareness'; and this would seem to be 'knowledge about' (*wissen*), rather than knowledge of a 'what' or a *quale* (*kennen*). Further, it seems doubtful whether there is any 'acquaintance' which does not imply 'knowledge about.' A thing-per-se is not known by acquaintance; it is only known as that to which the attributes belong, and therefore by description; and the subject or pure ego is surely such a thing-per-se. Indeed the distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about, recently emphasised through the influence of Mr. Bertrand Russell's writings, does not seem to other philosophers (e.g., Prof. Stout) to be tenable when taken for an ultimate and hard distinction; and Mr. Russell's contention that there is no 'knowledge about' without 'acquaintance,' has been shewn, at least to the present writer's satisfaction, to be invalidated by the fact that 'knowledge about' is presupposed as ultimate and original, in the attempts which have been made to derive

it from 'acquaintance.' Lastly, the argument that our knowledge of the 'I' presupposes identity of the 'I which has this awareness' with the 'I which pronounces the judgment "I have this awareness"'—an identity which cannot legitimately be affirmed without acquaintance-knowledge by the one 'I' of the other—does not seem happy; for those who maintain that our knowledge of the pure subject in us is mediate, or is 'knowledge about,' expressly maintain that the former 'I' is the empirical self which, together with its act of awareness, is presented as object to the latter 'I,' or the pure subject.

If the foregoing remarks have force, it will then be established that the pure subject is a concept, or, as Berkeley expressed it, a notion; not a presentation, or an object of acquaintance-knowledge and direct apprehension: that the subject is known by its work, or in the empirical ego that it has constructed; that the constructor is *implied* in, and inferred from, the construction. And this construction is only possible when the level of self-consciousness is reached through social intercourse. If this be so, knowledge of an 'other' is presupposed in all knowledge of self, as a condition of such knowledge.

The next point for consideration is the relation of the subject, or pure ego, presupposed in all experience, to time; that is to say, its enduringness or persistence through time. In what was said in a previous article concerning the specious present, or the time-duration of one experience, it was stated—and the statement is universally acknowledged as psychological truth—that our concrete present is no instant of time, but is of finite and measurable duration. During the brief specious present, then, the I or subject persists, though its mental states change; there is one subject, that is, to several successive objects, and there is no such actuality as an instantaneous subject. So much

of persistence or continuity is unanimously granted to the subject. But more than this can *with certainty* be claimed. Not merely because most psychologists would admit that memory must be believed to be absolutely trustworthy for very recent stretches of the past—which would extend the certain persistence of an identical ego somewhat beyond the duration of a specious present; but because (what is often overlooked) our specious presents are not a series of discrete durations, absolutely separated like mathematical instants, but overlap, just as do, for immediate experience, the past, present, and future, in any one specious present. It cannot be maintained, then, that the subject is perhaps different in each successive specious present, and is in that way limited to a few seconds of existence. Furthermore, if memory be *ever* trustworthy for the distant past, the abidingness of the pure ego or subject of experience is ensured, however fallacious memory may be on other occasions; and certainly unless some such memories are true we are landed in utter scepticism as to all our scientific knowledge. Memory judgments *consist in* awareness of subjective continuity, rather than prove it. The following of satisfaction or disappointment on expectation, and of fulfilment on purpose, again, are only experienceable at all if the same subject experience *both* the antecedent and the consequent. Such experiences, along with recognition, and much else that constitutes personality in the commoner senses of that term, involve the perduring ego in which common sense has always believed. The reality, noumenal and not merely phenomenal, of the ego presupposed when each of us thinks of his personal life, is thus philosophically ensured; and indeed it has resisted all efforts to explain it away. The stream of thought has not been resolved, by the rhetoric of a William James, into a series of thinkers: nor do Hume's 'bundles' of perceptions admit of being

called bundles unless they are something more; for they are only bundles to the subject which binds their contents together, and which, while not being any one item among those contents, nor yet all of them together, must of necessity be as real and ultimate as any of them. The latest attempt to shatter the continuing self is based on the foisting of mathematical or logical conceptions into the realm of the actual, without proof that they belong there. Just as the cinema, by approaching to the continuous in its rapid succession of different photographs, gives us the illusion of continuity, so the subject or the man of common sense, is said to be, like the man shown in the cinema, a series of quite different and momentary men, bound together not by numerical identity, but by continuity in the mathematical sense, and certain intrinsic causal laws. How and why through the brief lives of so many individuals, each one related to the next after the manner of Box and Cox, one increasing purpose should often run; why all the marks of our phenomenal continuity of experience should be empirically found by each successive individual of which we—who are but classes of momentary entities—are composed; why A's mental life and experience should be different from B's, and each be a rationally consistent whole: these are matters which are hardly explained by such a theory. But the new realism dispenses with any such principle as that of sufficient reason; it propounds what have been called "unfounded coincidences," and is content with presenting brute fact: it eschews all explanation or interpretation of man or the universe as the object of a mere sentimental craving with which man happens to be possessed.

From the perduringness of the subject of experience we pass naturally to the question of personal identity: indeed we have already passed to it. And before proceeding

further with it, it will be well to observe that there are two kinds of identity, which in this connexion need to be clearly distinguished. These are respectively numerical identity —i.e., identity with self, persistence through change of qualities or of manifestation ; and indistinguishable resemblance, consistent with numerical diversity. In the former sense of identity, an individual may become partly different yet be one and the same : when a postage-stamp is cancelled by a postmark it is still not only a stamp, but the same stamp ; and it is numerically non-identical with any other stamp, though undistinguishable from thousands of other such stamps. In the latter sense of identity, all current penny postage-stamps are " the same," qualitatively identical or indiscernible, though numerically different. Many stamps will give us an identical or individual presentation ; any one will give us the presentation of an individual.

Which of these two kinds of identity, then, is concerned, when we speak of personal identity ? And which self is affirmed to possess identity, the perduring pure ego (the subject) or the empirical self, the ' me ' as distinguished from the ' I ' ? If the person be taken to be the ' me ' at the stage of thinking and willing, its identity can only mean persistence unchanged of some element in it ; for the empirical self with its traits and character certainly changes as a whole. And this persisting element can only be the pure ego or subject, which effects and owns all the successive stages of personal development. Thus the identity of the person is reducible to identity of the subject of an individual *βίος*. This must be true whether the subject be always qualitatively identical with itself, i.e., immutable, or whether it be characterised by numerical identity alone, so that it remains one and the same entity although change may be the law of its being. The Thames is always the Thames and not the Trent, though conceivably

every molecule of water in the Thames at a given moment may have formerly constituted the Trent; and though the water in the Thames is never quite the same for two consecutive moments. Similarly A's self is always A's, not B's; and A is always A, though his empirical self or personality is continually developing and varying in content. If change and flux be characteristic of all reality, including the empirical—and even the pure—ego, it would be absurd to disbelieve in personal identity on the ground that a personality does not always possess the same or absolutely similar qualities. Change, moreover, is not alteration or substitution, but persistence of substance through alteration of states.

It is the pure ego, then, which possesses or preserves identity, and the identity is of the numerical kind. The subject cannot be immutable in the sense that its states never change; nor, for its self-identity, is it necessarily to be regarded as an immutable soul or as the mere 'form' essential to all thought—like the *res cogitans* of Descartes. These are theories as to the *kind* of substantiality to be attributed to the pure ego; and though inadequate or inappropriate, they are not the only forms in which personal identity can be conceived. How exactly the substantiality of the subject of experience is to be conceived, need not here be investigated. It will suffice to enumerate the characteristics of the pure ego which must of necessity be assumed for the explanation of the empirical fact that each of us lives a continuous mental life. This subject, then, must be (1) simple, in the sense that it cannot be resolved into a complex of discrete subjects, though its experience is highly complex. The phenomena of what is unhappily named 'multiple personality' by no means disprove this simplicity of the noumenal or pure self; for all so-called 'selves' into which the normal self is some-

times dissociated are originally synthesised by one and the same pure ego, and are only extreme cases of such temporary and slight abnormalities as absent-mindedness, lapse of memory, hysteria. The subject is (2) noumenal or ontal, not phenomenal; it is a thing-per-se with its individuality, and its feelings are what they are, in any given circumstance, because it is what it is. It has (3) numerical identity, though it is not necessarily—as Lotze held—a changeless real, or substantial in the commoner sense of that term. It is (4) never presented to itself as object; only a 'notion' of it is attainable, and that only at the level of self-conscious reflexion. It must further be (5) interested and purposive, not passively receptive. To be determined by pleasure and pain implies that the subject is somewhat determinant, spontaneous, and creative; for, to repeat what was said just now, its feelings, possibly different from another's in the same circumstances, are what they are solely because it is what it is. Lastly (6) the subject has individuality. It cannot have another's experiences, nor can its states ever be those of another subject. But the topic of individuality calls for fuller discussion later on.

In justification of the consumption of so much space by treating of the pure ego in detail, while the pure ego is admittedly but the nucleus or the precondition of what is commonly signified by 'personality,' it must be pleaded that this concept of the subject of the individual βίος is of fundamental importance in the study of the conceptions with which this article professes to deal. And it is time that the conception of the subject should increase, and other vaguer conceptions should decrease, in theological usage. That is to say, this definite concept of the subject should become, as it were, a fixed standard, by reference to which the meaning of such terms as 'Person' in Trini-

tarian, and 'nature,' in Christological, doctrine should be as far as possible determined. The interpretation, and we may add the fruitfulness or the sterility, of the conception of God as triune, depends entirely on whether or not the Divine hypostases are to be conceived as subjects.

In continuation of the study of personality, it will now be necessary to turn from the pure to the empirical self; indeed the term 'personality,' as generally used, connotes the higher stages of development of the empirical self. There is no definite conception of personality, accepted by all men, which merely awaits clear analysis and definition. As was said before, the term is sufficiently fluid and vague to admit of different denotation with different writers who make use of it. But all who are evolutionists will agree that personality is something which has been gradually attained, both in the race and in the individual; and the phenomena of dissociation of personality make us realise that it is not necessarily a stable and enduring acquisition when attained.

The conception of a person—if we dismiss the rare usage of 'personality' as a synonym for mere self-ness or subject-hood—is narrower in its denotation than that of an individual self; for the latter concept includes the lower animal and the human infant, to which—as a rule, though not always—the privilege of personality is denied. An empirical self is, by fairly general consent, only called a person when it has attained to a certain level of development, though where exactly the transition is fixed, is differently decided, for their own purposes or according to their own predilections, by different writers.

The lowest stage of selfhood, or the first 'self' with which we become acquainted, is, of course, the bodily self. In mediating this knowledge the organic sensations, which are continuous and are also prominent sources of feeling,

play the leading part; it is through them that we become aware of our embodiment and distinguish ourselves from the external world and other people. Bodily identity is therefore the kind of personal identity with which we first become familiar. The development of memory and ideation, while lifting us above the status of the animal, next renders possible the conception of the "inner self," distinct from the body. Social intercourse and intellection, which are instrumental to self-consciousness (such, e.g., as knowledge that we taste, as contrasted with tasting) lead to the conception of the empirical self as thinking and willing, possessing interests and a history, conscience and character, rights and social duties. It is at this level that most modern psychologists would begin to apply the conception of personality; though one writer unnecessarily emphasises one, and another another, characteristic of human nature when it has arrived at the self-conscious and social level, as the distinguishing and uniquely essential condition of personality. But inasmuch as a whole group of inter-related mental qualities or faculties emerge when inter-subjective intercourse through language has become a possibility, it seems arbitrary to select or to emphasise any one member of the group rather than another. Roughly speaking, the capacities which actually or potentially belong to man when he has attained language and social intercourse, are self-consciousness as distinguished from consciousness, social and ethical relations, thought and conscience; these, then, superimposed on continuity of memory, will, and the interweaving of interests into a system—which are lacking to animals and infants with their uncorrelated momentary impulses—should be regarded as constituting personality, if that word is to have any specific, natural, and unambiguous meaning. But as personality is reached by gradual development, its frontiers are necessarily difficult to draw

with precision. Narrower definitions than that just given are useless and arbitrary, unless adopted for some technical purpose. Thus Mr. Richmond, in his work *An Essay on Personality*, sees the essence of personality in capacity for fellowship, as distinct from individuality; a definition which would include ants and wasps among personalities. Royce, who was often a rhetorician, reduced personality to the capacity to pursue a life-purpose, or to aim at an ideal self; but this capacity presupposes, and is closely associated with, many others, equally characteristic of the mature man. For definitions restricted with a view to serving technical purposes, there is more to be said; but such definitions are out of place in philosophy and theology. Thus in jurisprudence, the essence of what is to be deemed a person has been said to be capacity to suffer, rather than capacity to reason, etc. This capacity is a basis of rights: though certainly it is not the sole basis, for we do not grant rights to earthworms and earwigs. Nor do meanings associated with 'person' such as have become obsolete, possess relevancy to the question of what 'personality' should nowadays connote with advantage. To this class belongs the earliest—the dramatic—meaning of *πρόσωπον*; also the classical forensic meaning of 'person.' The definitions furnished by the Schoolmen are of little interest to modern thought because in the Middle Ages personality was looked upon as "an inevitable datum or endowment"; whereas we know it to be an achievement, such as may involve struggle, fail of realisation, and suffer disintegration. Personality being thus a result of development and a matter of degree, we are pointed to an ideal which we have not already apprehended, and which is only realised in God. The personality of God is a conception which inevitably leads on to the question of His necessary triuneness; for if Divine personality, like human, be only con-

ceivable in relation to social life, it will be necessary to think of God as more comparable to a Divine Society than to an individual subject. This, however, is concerned with our future problem rather than with our present discussion.

One of the characteristics assigned above to the subject of a continuous experience or βίος, was individuality. And to this conception we may now turn. An individual, as the concept is used in logic, is an indefinable, though a presupposition of all logic and all thought. The term denotes what is regarded as self-identical and unique—that of which *something* is true which is not true of anything else. But the individuality of the self is not of the same kind as that, e.g., of an atom ; it is not only *in*, but also *for*, the self. The subject of experience is an individual because it can only have its own, and not another subject's, experience, in its entirety. This is not the same thing as to say that it is impossible for one individual's mental states to be directly *knowable*, through immediate apprehension, by another individual ; which, if possible, is never, so far as we know, an actuality. Whether such a limitation belong to human experience as a merely human limitation, or whether it pertain also to all conceivable experience, including that of God and that of the Divine hypostases (if these be subjects), is a question of importance in connexion with the Doctrine of the Trinity, though one not germane to the present article, and one very difficult to decide. But we are on certain ground when we maintain that there can be no experience which is not owned by some subject ; and on equally certain ground, perhaps, when we go on to affirm that A's experience can never be B's—at least so far as conscious, as opposed to subconscious states, are concerned. For in all experiences above the threshold of consciousness there is a peculiar relation to the subject

which owns them, such that we cannot easily conceive any mental state as having that relation to more than one subject, or centre of experience.

Further, the simplicity previously affirmed of the pure ego implies individuality in the sense of the indivisible, the atomic. The bodily self can be dismembered into parts; so can a collection such as a nation; and so can an empirical self—witness the separate and mutually exclusive attention-processes and the spheres of associated states which alternate with one another in cases of 'divided personality.' But the pure ego, which has synthesised *all* such 'secondary personalities,' and which sometimes can redintegrate them into one system of systems, is not dissociable into simpler egos.

'Individuality' also connotes uniqueness of character: this is one of the popular meanings of the word. And we have already seen that such uniqueness must be credited to each subject, in order to account for its peculiar response to presentations which evoke feeling and emotion. Here again the individuality of a man differs from the individuality of an atom or a mass-point, such as physics conceives; for it means, besides numerical self-identity, that variation from the type, that idiosyncrasy, which mass-points do not enjoy.

Individuality, then, as predicated of a human being, is only relatively applicable, and then only in some of its several senses, to the empirical self. But in all the senses which have been enumerated—viz., numerical singularity, indivisibility or simplicity, sole ownership of experience or mental states, uniqueness of character—individuality belongs to the pure ego, which is the precondition of the empirical ego and its personality.

How individuality comes about, and what the ultimate *principium individuationis* is, are questions which we

need not take over from the scholastics. Duns Scotus credited every individual soul with a *haeccitas*, along with the common nature, making individuality ultimate, and so pointing to creationism; while Aquinas favoured the view that human individuality is determined by the body, and that the soul's unique character is the outcome of its inclination to a particular embodiment. But this prior inclination needs to be accounted for; and St. Thomas is far from traducianism. Empirical science, especially of the evolutionary type, certainly seems to favour the traducianist theory; and creationism seems to be false to the genetic and evolutionary method. But the advantages are not wholly on the side of the one of these theories, nor the difficulties all on the side of the other; and there we must now leave the issue between them.

The theological significance of individuality, as a characteristic of the human subject, lies in that relative impermeability of an individual experience, in virtue of which any human experience, as it is for its experiment, can never be numerically identical with an experience of any other being, even of God. Upholders of absolutism, who are generally pantheists in spite of themselves and sometimes pantheists by choice, allow themselves to speak of the oneness of human and Divine experiences, or the inclusion of the human in the Divine; they do but confound qualitative resemblance or sameness with numerical identity, and fail to perceive the ambiguity of 'oneness.'

The fact of individuality, in emphasising the truth that all thought is in some individual's mind, does not conflict with the existence of common experience. Social thought, such as human science, is but individual thought modified by intercourse. What is common, is not the thinkers, or the thinking, but the objects thought about. A system of persons is not a person, nor a system of minds, a mind;

any more than a constellation is a star. All talk of a collective mind, a social mind, is of course as figurative as the phrase 'the spirit of a nation,' or 'the soul of a people.' There is no mind in a society which thinks independently of the individual members of that society, any more than there is one brain possessed by a society. And resort to such an idea is unnecessary to explain the difference between the experience of an individual and that of a people, if we bear in mind that the individual is a social individual, whose personality is the outcome of intercourse with his fellows.

This last point is also relevant to the discussion of the Trinitarian conception of God. According to what has just been said, it will be impossible, if once the Persons of the Trinity be conceived as subjects, to regard the Three in One as one subject with one mind; in other words, God cannot then be spoken of as *a* Person. Three subjects may be *of* one mind; their wills and purposes, that is to say, may agree: but for them to be one mind, a social mind, is quite another thing, and apparently quite an impossible thing. However, the bearing of any part of this article on the Trinitarian conception of God will be more profitably discussed when the latter subject, rather than human individuality, shall occupy our attention.

F. R. Tennant.

SCRIBES AND SADDUCEES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

IV.

In view of what has been argued above it is easy to see that there was a close relation between the scribes as a class generally and the Pharisaic Party. Outside the Sanhedrin and the Temple the vast majority of the scribes belonged

to the Pharisaic Party. But the Party was a much larger entity, and embraced many who were not professional scribes, those, in fact, who endeavoured to live in accordance with the rule of life laid down by the Rabbinical scribes. But, as we have seen, there were other circles included in the scribal class who did not belong to the Pharisaic Party, and it is highly probable that these were organised in a school (or schools) under the control of priests who upheld Sadducean views. Nor must the possibility be ruled out that there may have been different schools of thought among the Sadducees. There were certainly such among the Pharisees in the time of our Lord's ministry. This is an important point to remember in the study of the Gospels. Of the two opposed Pharisaic schools—those of Hillel and Shammai—the latter appears to have been predominant at this time, and it was against the most extreme and fanatical section of this school that our Lord's invective was probably directed. After 70 A.D. the position of affairs was different. Then the milder Hillelites triumphed. Even in the earlier period of the Gospels and the *Acts* individual Hillelites exercised a moderating influence, as the intervention of Gamaliel, the grandson of Hillel, shows (Acts v. 34 f.). But though the Hillelites, headed by Gamaliel, were an important element, they were not, at this time, the predominant one in the Pharisaic Party. Against the eager, active, aggressive and fanatical Shammaites they could at best only exercise a moderating influence.

It is, of course, quite possible that some of the scribes who are represented as having acted with the " chief priests " against our Lord and His disciples were Pharisees of the fanatical section just referred to. Some colour of probability is lent to this view by the fact that in the Fourth Gospel " Pharisees " are occasionally coupled with the " chief priests " in hostile action against Jesus (cf. John vii.

32, 45; xi. 47, 57; xviii. 3). That the author of the Fourth Gospel means to refer in these connexions to a section only, and not to the whole, of the Pharisaic Party is clear from ix. 13–16, in the last verse of which passage we read: *Some therefore of the Pharisees said, "This man is not from God, because he keepeth not the sabbath. But others said, How can a man that is a sinner do such signs? And there was a division* (σχίσμα) *among them* (cf. also vii. 50 ff.). It would be unsafe to ignore the evidence of the Fourth Gospel on this point, as everything suggests that the tradition behind it regarding contemporary Jewish life and conditions is extraordinarily good.[1]

That a section of the Pharisees of the school of Shammai may have acted in this way will appear less surprising when we remember what the characteristic positions of the school were. It was intensely conservative, not to say reactionary. In its interpretation of the Law it followed, as a rule, the old and simple Halakah, as against the more complicated and casuistic methods of the School of Hillel. It thus—on the basis of the Law and its interpretation—had some common ground with the Sadducean priesthood. It upheld, for instance, at any rate in theory, the literal application of the *lex talionis* ("An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth") in agreement with the Sadducees. Further, in a Baraitha preserved in the *Aboth de Rabbi Nathan*[2] we are told that it was the rule of the School of Shammai to admit to instruction only such as were intelligent, modest, of good family, and well-to-do, while the School of Hillel was willing to admit anybody who wished to come. The Shammaites

[1] Dr. I. Abrahams remarks (*Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, p. 12): "My own general impression, without asserting an early date for the Fourth Gospel, is that that Gospel enshrines a genuine tradition of an aspect of Jesus' teaching which has not found a place in the Synoptics." Cf. also p. 135 of the same work.

[2] Ed. Schechter (Recens. I.), ch. iii. beg.

were also very strict in enforcing the laws of purification. Thus they were both exclusive and severe, and it is easy to understand that with the fanatical members of this School our Lord would inevitably come into conflict (cf. esp. Mark vii.). To them He would appear in the light of a dangerous antinomian, a false Messiah. The school of Shammai, it is true, carried their fanaticism into the political sphere, and were passionately opposed to the Roman domination. Here they would, of course, part company with the Sadducees. But in their antagonism to Jesus this issue would not arise for them. In their eyes He was a false claimant to the Messiahship, and so they were able to combine with the ruling priesthood in suppressing what seemed to them a dangerous heresy. We find the young Pharisee Saul—who in spirit if not in training was a Shammaite before his conversion to Christianity—pursuing a similar course a few years later, for we are expressly told that he sought and received authority from the High Priest and the "chief priests" to take penal measures against "any that were of the Way" at Damascus (Acts ix. 1 f., 14). The results of our discussion so far may be summarised thus. At the time referred to by the Gospels the scribes, who were official members of the Sanhedrin and who are mentioned in company with the High Priest and "elders," were drawn mainly, it is probable, from the Sadducees ; some, no doubt, belonged to the Pharisaic Party, and probably the larger number of these was from the School of Shammai. At a later time the Pharisaic element among the members of the Sanhedrin was larger, but still probably recruited mainly from the School of Shammai. Outside the Sanhedrin the great body of the scribal class consisted of members of one or other of the great Rabbinical schools. In popular language "scribes" embraced all who belonged to the professional class that acted as teachers, expounders and

administrators of the Law, whether they were Sadducees or Pharisees. Some sections (or section) of the Pharisaic Party belonging to the School of Shammai found it possible to act with the Sadducean High Priest and his party because of their agreement on certain points in the interpretation and administration of the Law. It is important, therefore, to inquire, and if possible to determine from the context, whether, in any given New Testament passage, the scribes (or scribe) referred to were Sadducees or Pharisees. In some cases the possibility must be allowed for that some scribes may have occupied an intermediate or neutral position between the two great Parties.

V.

The two principal passages in the First Gospel that are directed against the "scribes and Pharisees" are contained in the Sermon on the Mount (v. 20–48; vi. 1 ff.) and in the great denunciation of ch. xxiii. Now it is to be noted that in the former of these passages the section dealing with the scribes is quite distinct from that which is concerned with the Pharisees. The whole is prefaced by verse 20:

For I say unto you, that except your righteousness shall exceed (that) of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Then follow (1) a section dealing with the scribes (v. 21–48), and (2) one directed against the Pharisees who are referred to as "hypocrites" (vi. 1–18). The section (1) dealing with the scribes never uses the term "hypocrites," and is based in each of its paragraphs upon some question of the interpretation of the Law. This point needs emphasising. Jesus is not here setting up a new Law to displace the old Mosaic code. The implicit reference throughout is to *the current interpretation of the old Law.* If the polemic had been directed against the Mosaic Law as such, Jesus would have used the formula

(or an equivalent) always employed in citing Scripture, viz. γέγραπται, "it is written"; [1] instead He says, *Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time* (τοῖς ἀρχαίοις) . . . *but I say unto you*. The contrast is between what the disciples have heard formerly as interpretation from the scribes, and what is now enunciated to them as the true interpretation by Jesus Himself. What Jesus is now concerned with is not the exposition of the letter of the Law as a legal ordinance enforced by penalties, and qualified by conditions and casuistical distinctions, but to declare the will of God. If the Law is to be regarded as expressing the will of God, as in fact a divine revelation, then the supremely important thing to emphasise is the divine will and mind behind its enactments. And it was just this that was obscured and lost sight of by the legal and casuistic discussion of the scribes.

In the introductory part of each of the paragraphs, then, we meet with not mere citations from the letter of the Mosaic Law, but summaries of the current scribal teaching based indeed upon the letter of the Law, but also developing it in a legal and casuistic manner. These scribal developments are only hinted at—they are rather implied than fully stated. But they would be perfectly well understood by the original readers. Is there anything in the paragraphs to suggest what particular school (or schools) of scribes may have been in the mind of the speaker? Paragraph (1) = Matthew v. 21 ff. is quite general and would apply equally to scribes of all schools ("and whosoever killeth, he shall be amenable to judgement" summaries the scribal interpretation). The same applies to paragraph (2) = Matthew v. 27 ff. ("Thou shalt not commit adultery"). But it is to

[1] Cf. iv. 4, 6, 11, 10; xi. 10; xxi. 13; cf. also xii. 3 5, ("Have ye not read"), etc., xxiv. 15; Luke x. 26; and see Zahn, *Das Evangelium Matthäus*, p. 220 f.

be noticed here that the saving clause in vers. 32 (*παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας*) agrees with the specifically Shammaite interpretation of Deuteronomy xxiv. 1, inverting the words ערות דבר (= *ἄσχημον πρᾶγμα*) into דבר עדות (= *λόγος πορνείας*. This, however, can have been no part of the original discourse of Jesus, but must have been introduced into the present context by the evangelist. As Professor B. W. Bacon remarks[1]:

> The words . . . are certainly a gloss . . . The position taken by Jesus is the same as in the case of the request to arbitrate (Luke xii. 13). He refuses to occupy the seat of the lawgiver or magistrate in the imperfect conditions of the world. No fault is found with Moses for the enactment necessitated by the hardness of men's hearts (wrong social and moral conditions). Only this legislation, whose aim is simply to make the best of things as they are in the interest of the family and home, is not to be confounded with the ideal standard of the kingdom of God, of which Jesus finds the pattern in the utterance of the Creator to the unfallen pair in Paradise . . . The exception transforms the principle into a rule . . . It is as much out of place in Matthew v. 32 as it would be in Genesis ii. 24.

It is an interesting piece of evidence, however, for the attitude of the compiler of the First Gospel. In spite of his general hostility (reflecting that of the early Palestinian Christian community) to the Shammaites, there was one point of agreement between them. The paragraph about oaths (Matt. v. 33–37) also has the scribal teaching of all schools in view. On the other hand that on retaliation (Matt. v. 38–42) in citing the text "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" certainly gains point if we suppose that our Lord had the literal interpretation of this precept specially in mind. This view was championed by both the Shammaites and Sadducees, as is well known while the Hillelites sanctioned a modification of the enactment

[1] *The Sermon on the Mount*, p. 177 f.

which allowed money compensation as an equivalent.[1] Again, in the paragraph about the law of love (Matt.v. 43–48) the opening words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour *and hate thine enemy*," clearly has in view some current scribal interpretation. This is represented by the additional words *and hate thine enemy*. These form, of course, no part of the written Torah. Dr. McNeile, in his commentary on the passage,[2] says the clause "is an inference which the Rabbis might draw from such passages as Deuteronomy xxiii. 4–7 [Eng. 3–6]," and Professor Bacon remarks[3] that it is a Semitic method of emphasising a distinction (cf. Matt. x. 37 = Luke xiv. 26)." But it certainly does not correctly represent the later Rabbinical teaching, It probably does, however, reflect the spirit of some contemporary Shammaites, who were fanatical and bigoted in their attitude towards opponents, and later took the lead with the zealots in uncompromising and passionate hatred of Rome. Indeed their fanatical hostility was not confined to foreign enemies, for they actually went so far as to massacre some of their opponents of the school of Hillel at an assembly convoked during the last days of the Temple's existence in order to enforce certain measures for preventing all communication between Jew and Gentile. The code thus enacted is known in the Rabbinical literature as "the Eighteen Articles," and the day on which it was promulgated, and which marked the triumph of the Shammaites over the Hillelites was later regarded as a day of misfortune (*Tosefta Shabb.* i. 16 f.; T.B. *Shabbath* 13*a*, 17*a*).

It is thus clear that the scribal teaching against which our Lord enunciated the principles of the new kingdom in

[1] The Book of Jubilees contains a polemic against any such compensation being allowed for any cases of homicide (xxi. 19 f.). It enforces the maxim "blood for blood."

[2] *The Gospel according to St. Matthew*, p. 71.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 92 f.

the Sermon on the Mount largely represents that of the scribal schools generally (whether Pharisaic or Sadducean), but that the predominant element in the current forms of it was probably Shammaite, and that it is with this element that He is specially concerned in the "Sermon." This conclusion is confirmed by the section that immediately follows, which is directed against the "hypocrites" (Matt. vi. 2–6, 16–18).[1] The almsgiving, prayer, and fasting of the "hypocrites" which are here in view represent the degenerate form of the watchwords of Pharisaic piety—righteousness, prayer, and repentance (צדקה ותפלה ותשובה) —which had been hardened into mere external formalities by some of the Pharisaic disciples of the scribes of the school of Shammai.

When we turn to Matthew xxiii. we at once notice that the distinction between scribes and Pharisees has been eliminated. There the address *Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites* constantly recurs (*vv.* 13, 15, 23, 25, 27, 29). When, however, the chapter is analysed it appears that the compiler of the First Gospel has fused originally distinct sections which dealt with scribes and Pharisees separately. He has also combined two originally distinct discourses; one uttered to the scribes and Pharisees with a later discourse, uttered by Jesus to the disciples, and containing a warning against the spirit of the scribes. The latter (cf. Mark xii. 38–40; Luke xx. 45–47) is imbedded in the opening section of Matthew xxiii. 1–7, where it has been combined with a woe upon the Pharisees (cf. Luke xi. 42 f.). Thus we have in these verses (1) a denunciation uttered to the scribes (Matt. xxiii. 1–3 = Mark xii. 38–40 and parallel), and with this a verse of invective against the scribes (*v.* 4 = Luke xi. 46); while *vv.* 5–7 are directed

[1] Verses 7–15 are probably out of place in their present context; see Bacon, *op. cit.* p. 146 ff.

against the Pharisees (*vv.* 6, 7 = Luke xi. 43). It is the scribes who sit in Moses' seat, and bind heavy burdens on men, while it is the Pharisees who are rebuked for ostentatious piety, and for their love of chief seats at feasts and in the synagogues.

This composite character marks the whole chapter. Fortunately we are able to disentangle the references to the particular classes aimed at, and to read them in their original sequence, for the most part, by a comparison with the parallel sections in Mark and Luke. We have already seen that verses 1–3 embody material belonging to a discourse uttered by Jesus to the disciples, and directed against the scribes. With this has been combined (1) a threefold woe upon and addressed to *the Pharisees*, which in its original sequence may be read in Luke xi. 42–44. This is imbedded in Matthew xxiii. 23 + 6–7 + 27–28; (2) a similar woe upon the scribes, contained in Luke xi. 46–48+53 = Matthew xxiii. 4+29–32+14. This has been amplified both in Matthew and Luke by an editorial insertion, containing a long quotation from an unknown book of the Wisdom literature, cited as *the wisdom of God* (Luke xi. 49–51 = Matthew xxiii. 34–36). There remains a passage denouncing scribal casuistry which is peculiar to Matthew (xxiii. 15–22+24). Here, it is true, the opening verse (15), the source of which is unknown, may be regarded as applicable rather to the Pharisees than the scribes. But the rest of the section undoubtedly has the scribes in view, and may be compared with Matthew v. 33 ff.

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Thus when we examine the sayings in their more original sequence and form we notice that a clear distinction is drawn between the scribes and the hypocritical section of the Pharisees. In the Matthaean form, as Bacon remarks,[1]

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 226 f.

this distinction has been obliterated, no difference being made between such sayings "as were appropriate to the Pharisees who did not "sit on Moses' seat" (Matt. xxiii. 2), nor "bind heavy burdens" (*v.* 11), nor "take away the key of knowledge" (*v.* 13), since not they but the scribes were the teachers; and such "as were appropriate to the scribes, who were not characterised by a punctilious scrupulosity of performance such as characterised their slavish pupils the Pharisees." What inference are we to draw from these phenomena? It seems to me that these can be explained by supposing that at the time when the First Gospel assumed its present shape scribes and Pharisees, though not, of course, identical, were so intimately connected that practically all the members of the scribal class were members of the Pharisaic Party; but that when the sayings were originally uttered this was far from being the case. The true distinction between them is more carefully preserved in the Sermon (Matt. v., vi.).

VI.

The question arises whether in the Gospel accounts some confusion has not arisen in the tradition on the subject of the scribes, Pharisees and Sadducees. Such confusion might easily occur if the composition and mutual relations of the parties or classes had changed between the time when the events occurred and the literary tradition first was shaped. Several Jewish scholars (e.g. Chowlson and Büchler) suspect confusion of this kind, and we have already seen clear cases of it in Matthew xxiii. An incident in which originally a *Sadducean* scribe figured might easily be interpreted later to refer to a *Pharisaic* scribe, especially if the tradition in its original form spoke merely of a scribe (or scribes). What seems to be a clear case of this sort is the question about the tribute-money (Matt. xxii. 15–22 =

Mark xii. 15–17 = Luke xx. 20–26). Here, according to Matthew and Mark, certain of the Pharisees and Herodians unite to "entangle" Jesus in His talk, by asking Him the question: "Is it lawful to give tribute to Cæsar or not?" According to Luke it was the "scribes and the chief priests" who sent forth "spies which feigned themselves to be righteous that they might take hold of his speech," and who propounded the question. Now the Lukan account, on the face of it, bears all the marks of authenticity. The "scribes" referred to by Luke must be Sadducean scribes. It is in every way probable that such a political question should have been raised by Sadducees rather than by Pharisees. Possibly the confusion in the Markan and Matthaean parallels has arisen, as suggested above, by misinterpreting the "scribes" referred to as *Pharisaic* scribes. It is also interesting to note that the whole of Luke xx. 1–40 [1] (=Matt. xxi. 23–27, 33–42, 46; xxii. 15–40 = Mark xi. 27–33; xii. 1–12, 13–34) is specifically directed against "the chief priests, scribes, and elders," i.e. against the Sadducees.

Another case in which Jesus attacks the Sadducean priesthood has been pointed out by a Jewish scholar, Mr. Jacob Mann.[2] This is the parable of the Good Samaritan, which is introduced in Luke x. 25 by the words: "And behold, a certain lawyer (*νομικός*) stood up and tempted him." After the opening question had been answered by Jesus, the narrative proceeds (*v.* 29): "but he, desiring to justify himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour?" Then follows the parable (*vv.* 30–37). The parable, as Mr. Mann points out, can only be understood rightly if it is

[1] Including the parable of the husbandman and the heir (Luke xx. 9 ff.), which, Luke says, the scribes and the chief priests "perceived that he spake against them."

[2] In an admirable article, *Jesus and the Sadducean Priests*, published in *The Jewish Quarterly Rev.* (new series), vi. pp. 415–422 (Jan. 1916).

interpreted as anti-Sadducean, and he explains the *νομικός* correctly as having been a *Sadducean* lawyer. It is true the introductory words of the narrative in Luke x. 25–28 have an apparent parallel in Mark xii. 28–31 (cf. Matt. xxii. 34 ff.). But it may be doubted whether the parallel is more than apparent. The setting and sequel in Mark are quite different. There "one of the scribes admiring the way in which Jesus had answered the Sadducees, asks: "What commandment is the first of all?" After Jesus has answered him, his rejoinder, in which he emphatically agrees with Jesus, and amplifies what he has heard by saying that the moral law is "much more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices," receives a striking commendation from the Master in the words: "Thou art not far from the kingdom of God." This is probably quite a different incident from that referred to in Luke x. 25 ff. The scribe in the Mark passage is certainly not a Sadducee, and doubtless belonged to the more moderate element of the Pharisaic Party, or he may have been one of the neutral section.[1] The friendly, not to say affectionate, way in which Jesus addresses him is noteworthy.

Mr. Mann, in his exposition of the Parable of the Good Samaritan, points out that both the priest and Levite of the story must have had some reason for acting in the way described. The usual explanation that they were animated simply by heartlessness is not very convincing. He suggests that the real reason was the requirements of the law of Levitical purity.

The robbers left their victim "half dead" (*ἡμιανθῆ*, Luke x. 30), having probably fallen into a swoon. To a pedestrian coming from a distance it appeared as if a corpse was lying in the road.

[1] I am glad to see that in the *Harmony of the Gospels* by Stevens and Burton the Lukan passage is regarded as quite independent of Mark xii. 28 ff., Matt. xxii. 34 ff. The real parallel to Mark xii. 28 in Luke is Luke xx. 39. [Possibly Matt. xxii. 35 has been assimilated to Luke x. 20*a*.]

Both a priest and a Levite, when passing by, would then avoid coming near the supposed dead body lest they become defiled; the former by reason of the Biblical prohibition (Lev. xxi. 1), the latter because he had to do service in the Temple, and had to keep himself Levitically pure.

This would accord with the strict letter of the Law, and as such would be upheld by the strict Sadducean priests. The Pharisees, on the other hand, insisted that it was a duty of obligation for even a high priest to contract Levitical impurity, and bury a dead body "lying on the highway with nobody to take care of it" (the so-called duty of מת מצוה). The letter of the Law (Lev. xxi. 1 ff., 11 ff.) is clearly against the Pharisaic rule, and the Rabbinical teachers resorted to various hermeneutic devices in order to get over this difficulty. These are certainly not very successful or convincing. They held that the מת מצוה was excluded from the injunction in Leviticus xxi. 11, that a high priest should not defile himself at the burial of even his nearest relation "neither for his father nor his mother."

Obviously (Mr. Mann adds) the Sadducees rejected such a deduction. They would adhere to the clear wording of the Biblical law. No exception was to be made in the case of מת מצוה. A Sadducean priest, then, when passing a dead body would have certainly avoided coming near it, and detecting a man lying unconscious in the road, as in the parable of Luke, would have passed on for fear of defilement. Against such a practice Jesus directed his attack.

The irony and point of the parable, so interpreted, are worthy of Jesus. The exaltation of the letter above the spirit of the Law could not have been more effectively rebuked, and it is clear that such rebukes were merited not only by the Pharisees, but also by their opponents, the Sadducees.

Mr. Mann also suggests that the saying reported in Mark xii. 41–44 = Luke xxii. 1–4, about the widow's "mite" was also directed against the Sadducean priests who were

sometimes inclined to despise the insignificant gifts of the poor to the Temple, "and their scant offerings amounting to a pigeon or meal-offering."

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From what has been argued above it is hoped that the importance of bearing in mind the diverse elements that made up the scribal class in the time of Jesus and the Apostles will be realised. That Jesus Himself drew distinctions between different members of the scribal class is evident. I have already referred to the scribe who by his discreet answer won for himself the great eulogium: "Thou art not far from the kingdom of God" (Mark xii. 34). Then there is the striking passage Matthew xiii. 52: *Therefore every scribe who hath been made a disciple to the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a householder, which bringeth out of his treasure things new and old.* Jesus here recognises the good elements in the profession of the scribes. Rightly used the scribe's gifts and acquirements enrich his Christian character, and enlarge his capacity for usefulness. The "kingdom" has need of such scribes as this. St. Paul was a splendid example. Jesus was no obscurantist who despised learning and culture, but was ready to welcome them warmly if the right spirit were behind them. What He attacked was the pedantry and frigid casuistry that are the special dangers of minds developed in the atmosphere of legalism. These unchecked lead inevitably to lifeless insincerity and moral eclipse.

G. H. Box.

THE HINDU IDEAL OF A HOLY LIFE.

The main purpose of any religion is to make men good. Its value is tested by the measure in which it sets that before it as an aim and accomplishes the aim it sets before irself. Therefore there is no more central inquiry that we can make in regard to any religion than as to the ideal of a holy life that it holds up and the means it provides for the realisation of that ideal. I propose to investigate the Hindu ideal of a holy life and to see what its conception of the saintly life is and of the means to its attainment.

There are at least two great streams that have combined to form the vast, slow-flowing river of Hinduism. One of these—to describe it broadly—is animism, the natural religion of ignorance and fear and ritual; the other is the religion of reflection and of the brooding, speculative spirit of the thinker. We find both those types of religion contributing elements which go to make up the Indian conception of holiness. The elements which the former contributes is not characteristically Hindu: it is such as one would find in any religion—in Christianity, as elsewhere. It views holiness as a ritual product, something that results from the fulfilment of an eternal rite. For example, the word for "holy" is *powitra*: but it means in Sanscrit, among other things, the sacred thread worn by the Brahman, the badge of membership of a holy caste. The word is seldom used in modern sacred literature to describe God or the gods: it is used for the ceremonially purified man. God may be great, powerful, eternal, remote: He may even, to the theist, be loving and intensely beloved, but He is seldom called, as the Jew called Him, righteous, holy. When I once asked a villager what the word *powitra* meant he replied at once by giving as its equivalent a liquid used

in ceremonies of purification. Again, in a story told to Sir Rabindranath Tagore's boys in his Bolpur school we have an example of the connotation of the word to ordinary ritual Hinduism. The hero of the tale—like the hero of many fairy tales—passes through many dangers till he comes into the presence of a goddess who is able to fulfil his desire. But though he sees her throne in all its splendour he cannot see her : the throne is empty. He is then told that she can only be seen by one who is perfectly holy. He thereupon reviews his acts done that day, and remembers that he had taken a draught of milk that morning without first washing out his mouth. That has made him unholy. These are sufficient examples of a common misunderstanding of what holiness is, a misunderstanding that persists still among ourselves when we forget that holiness cannot inhere in a place or belong to a person because of his class or profession ; that it is an attribute only of the will and character—a moral quality, a personal relation to a righteous God.

It is not that kind of misconception of what holiness is that I propose to examine, since it is no peculiarity of Hinduism. I wish to examine the ideal that springs from the most distinctively Hindu elements in the religion, from the whole aim and attitude to life that Hinduism as a doctrine and an idea prescribes to its followers. We have always to keep in mind in discussing Hindu thought that, as a consequence of the profound and far-reaching influence over the mind of India of the belief in the endless procession of the soul's rebirths and of these as inflexibly determined by the deeds men do, that mind has been, and is still, possessed and dominated above all other desires by the desire for release. To Hindus in all periods of their religious history the primary concern is with the problem of deliverance, while the question of what God is or whether there is a God is secondary. In this respect they differ radically

from at least Semitic and Christian peoples, whose whole religious history is governed and controlled by their thought of God and their dream of what He may be. One can scarcely exaggerate the depth to which this difference between the aim and end of these two types of religion reaches down. To the Hebrew prophet the whole universe and the whole of human existence lead up to the final, commanding fact of a just God, "a God of truth and without inquity, just and right is He." In a view of life controlled by doctrines such as those of transmigration and *karma* the highest person, the goal and crown of all, is not a God who can be worshipped and who redeems—there is in reality no room for such a Being within this scheme of things;—the goal and crown of all is the emancipated soul himself. Thus the Christian ideal is positive and ethical, a righteous life; the Indian ideal is negative and unethical, escape from the bondage of existence.

Or again, to put the difference in another fashion, the shadows that fall across man's life are explained in Christianity as due to sin, as having their root in an evil will that needs to be cured. In Hinduism and Buddhism life, on the other hand, is to be interpreted in terms of sorrow. This difference has been expressed by, I think, Amiel in a well-known antithesis: "The Christian says, Deliver us from evil: the Buddhist, says Deliver us from existence, for existence itself is sorrow." What the Buddhist says in large measure the Hindu also says. The root of evil is desire, and the way to deliverance is by the uprooting of desire. It is its bonds that bind us to life and make us its victims. If but this is uprooted, if we can get freedom from desire, then we shall be beyond sorrow, beyond the thrall of life. We shall have attained. This then is the ideal of Hinduism—not holiness, but passionlessness, not a righteous will, but a condition of soul that is beyond good and evil, that,

seeing life to be a cruel dream, has risen above the desire of its prizes, or the fear of its punishment, into a region of indifference and calm.

I find, in a recent article by an English scholar in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* on Hindu Pantheism, the statement made that "the abstract pantheism which Hindus profess is for the most part entirely without effect on daily life and conduct." That is far too strong a statement to make. It is true that the Hindu's conscience is as real as the Jew's or the Christian's, but the Hindu speculative system has covered it with an intellectual crust which makes the appeal to conscience and the sense of sin far less powerful in India than it was when John the Baptist and Jesus preached in Judea and Galilee. The sense of sin as a conflict, dividing man's nature and causing struggle and distress as the dark side wins the victory—that sense is certainly not absent from Hinduism; it reveals itself in the pilgrimages to holy places and the bathings in holy rivers, in vows and tortures of the flesh. It certainly is not wholly absent, but it would not be true to say that it is ever as powerfully present as it is in Hebrew religious experience, in the 51st psalm, or in St. Paul, or as it is in St. Augustine or John Bunyan. Hindu saints frequently express a sense of failure, of weariness, of loneliness in separation from God, but their experience is widely different from that of the Jewish or Christian penitent. I think it is true also to say that a deep sense of their sinfulness has seldom been a power constraining Hindu seekers to submit themselves to Christ. Mr. N. V. Tilak, one of the most notable converts of recent times in Western India, frankly admits that in his own case there was no keen sense of sin in his heart impelling him to Christ, and that he knows it to be similarly absent in the case of many others also. He was drawn to Christ in the first instance by his patriotism

and his belief that only Christ could lift up his people and make them great again. Others are drawn by the beauty of the character of Christ or by the gracious story of His love. But the sense of sin and the apprehension of God's mercy in forgiveness is usually a later growth in their experience. Such a saint as Tukārām, it is true, confesses his sin and has some thoughts in regard to it that suggest the psalmists or St. Augustine. Thus in one poem he says :

I am a man of sin,—
  Thou art all purity.
Yet thou must take me as I am,
  And bear my load for me.

Me Death has all consumed :
  In Thee all power abides.
All else forsaking, at Thy feet
  Thy servant, Tukā, hides.

Again in another poem he echoes the very thought of a mediæval saint who calls the fall, " felix culpa," " a blessed sin," because it became the cause of salvation and of the unveiling of the divine love. But, on the other hand, we have the ideal of dispassion set forth by this same poet in other poems—and I think it is true to say that this negative ideal, this craving for release from re-birth by desire renounced, has at least as prominent a place among the cries of his soul as the more positively ethical ideal has.

Who is he would act the true *gosavi's* part ?
Let him dig the root of longing from his heart.
If he dare not, in his pleasures let him stay—
Folly were it should he choose another way.
For when longing he has slain victoriously,
Only then shall he from all come forth set free.
Yea, says Tukā, does thy heart for union thirst ?
Crush—be sure !—the seed of longing in thee first !

[A *gosavi* is a holy devotee of a god.]

Thus we return to the view that certainly one of the

dominant ideals of sainthood that Hinduism sets before its followers is this of dispassion, of the cutting of the root of desire, of what a Western mystic has called "holy indolence and nothingness." Christ came to bring men life,—life "more abundantly": here the aim is to still the storms of life till it passes into what is like death and silence. Christ purges the soul by the expulsive power of a new affection: Hinduism casts out all affection, making the soul a desert and calling that victory. It claims to cure the ills of life, but in curing them it seems to the observer to do so by the drastic method of calling in the aid of death. It, in the German phrase, throws away the baby with the bath.

Let me illustrate this ideal of the holy life by some examples of the temper it seeks to create and of the attitude to life.

It is not an ideal of love but of an absence of hate. So far it is good, but its good is the enemy of the best. To love is something more than not to hate. In the works of the Marāthā poets there is nothing that so often arouses their enthusiasm and that they describe with such satisfaction as an attitude of indifference to joy or sorrow, to good or evil. In some cases the ideal of being without enemies may suggest, or probably does suggest, to them a positive attitude of friendship and kindness. But for the most part what is praised is an attitude of indifference, a serene and Pharisaic aloofness from the toils and joys and interests and sorrows of the common man. So one of them describes the saint in a series of comparisons as being like a lamp in a house which shines as brightly for the stranger as for the members of the household; like a tree that gives shade equally to the man who plants it and the man who cuts it down; like the sugar-cane that is sweet alike to the man who tends it and to him who crushes it in the press.

So he who deems a friend or foe the same,
Alike unmovèd though the world should blame,
Or though it *grant him* fame.
Whether a north wind or a south wind blow,
It matters not to Meru—even so
To him or joy or woe.

"Meru" is the fabled central mountain of the world, immense, immovable.

Again, another poet expresses the same idea in closely similar language:

Alike are gold or dross to me,
Jewel and common stone the same.
Ah, ne'er my soul can harmèd be,
Walk I in heaven or in the flame.
Since all the universe are we,
Then what to us is praise or blame?

"Since all the universe are we,"—there we have the reason for this attitude revealed. It is not because of the claims of a law of righteousness, nor from desire to enter into fellowship with a God of love and holiness. It is because of his identity with the soul of the universe—an impersonal Absolute which is beyond good or evil, out of the reach of all ethical distinctions. This attitude of one who has passed "above the battle" to a reign of indifference and calm is beautiful and gracious, but its grace is æsthetic and not moral or spiritual. Such "æquanimitas," whether it is found in a Stoic emperor or an Indian sage, has a cold and statuesque beauty which attracts us all the more because of the heats and conflicts of our lives. It is so largely true of us that we

glance and nod and bustle by,
And never once possess our soul
Before we die.

But if the soul that they possess is empty there is no gain from its possession; if "the little farm of one's own mind" is barren and bare he who retreats into it still goes hungry.

This is a sterile ideal that is likely to produce only hard or withered hearts in those who seek to follow it.

I think that we see the influence of this ideal of perfection in weakening the power of personality, in merging the individual in the mass as in the class. It is true, perhaps, that the danger of Jewish and Christian teaching lies in an exaggerated occupation with the self, in excessive individualism. The Jew especially has always been and is still, an individualist; his failure lies in his inability to develop a social consciousness. This is one reason for the tragedy of the Jew. So an exaggerated emphasis upon the inward life, too much occupation with the sense of sin and personal guilt, has sometimes produced gross evils and morbid growths within Christianity. In general the views of life that prevail in the West tend to produce, when carried to excess, overgrown personalities, such as become dominant and aggressive in the social organism, Napoleons, and Kaiser Wilhelms. Its vice is the exaggerated ego. In India on the contrary the danger is from the weakening of the personality, the undermining of the power of self-determination. The effect of this is seen in the power of the caste which merges the individual in his membership of a class and substitutes the class consciousness and class-rule for personal exercise of conscience and will. "The whole of Indian philosophy," says Professor Berriedale Keith, "suffers from the fundamental error of ignoring the will." The beauty of Indian character, it is true, lies largely in the virtues of self-effacement, of submission, of dependence. It has its own arrogance, of course, and its own tyrannies, but these are those usually that a class-consciousness has created. Its beauty is of a peculiarly gracious and gentle type. It is seen both in the infinite patience and endurance of its silent masses and in the waiting and longing for God of its great saints. Over all is the glamour of an eastern

stillness—a stillness so deep that we cannot be confident, whether it is the quiet of a deep content or the final quiet of death.

It is beautiful with the beauty of dream, but this world is a world of wakened life, of struggle and labour, and to turn one's back upon its tasks is failure to fulfil its ends and to discharge its duty. "Self-submergence," said one of the Indian theistic reformers who saw this danger in Hinduism, "should not conflict with devout self-remembrance." Quietism, the tranquillity that is forgetfulness of duty and of the claims of love, has been the chief peril that attends this view of life and its meaning and end. Tukārām claims to have found a peace such that "the threefold fever has passed utterly away." The question is, Did that peace send him back strong to bear and suffer among men and for men? There is certainly a difference in this respect between some of their saints and others. Those that are most fully theistic and least influenced by pantheistic notions and by longings for final escape from life and consciousness, those who dream of a fellowship with God as the goal of their desires, have some conception of the duty of service and of help of others. It must not be affirmed that what Kabīr calls "the music of the forgetting of sorrows" lulled him and others like him to a slothful self-absorption. But, on the other hand, it manifestly did not fill them with "the strength to be sacrificed and save." Nothing testifies with such finality to this lack in Hinduism as does the fact that there is in it scarcely any impulse to intercession for men. The prayers of the saints are for their own needs. When at the outbreak of the present war Hindus joined with others in observing a day of intercession, all they could do at their temples was to have lectures on the causes of the war and the aims of the Allies. There is no room in their scheme of worship for such a thing as prayer for

others. There certainly are some exceptions that one can find to this rule. The compassionate heart of man does find a way to feel for others and to bear the burden of others in spite of theory and system. Tukārām was too true and tender a soul not to have his movements of compassion for others and his desires for their deliverance, and sometimes he expresses them. But it is true to say that these utterances are rare and exceptional. The spirit of their religion, the ideal of a holy life as it rises before them and allures them does not fill the heart with love as the desire to serve and succour others.

Hence, the lack of progressiveness in their civilisation; the contentment to leave evils unremedied. Escape and not reformation is the aim to which their efforts are directed. Their ideal of life's goal may not create the arrogant oppressor, but it certainly does not create the deliverer from oppression. It is tolerant: it does not light the fires of Smithfield or let loose the horrors of war; but it leaves others to do so and does not concern itself with such matters. A cowardly contentment with things as they are—lethargy and sloth and indifference to good and evil—these are the dangers to which this temper of soul, in spite of much that is attractive in it, is apt to lead and has led in India. It does not create the strength of purpose, the steadfastness of character, the enthusiasm for humanity that India so grievously needs if her Augean stables are ever to be cleansed.

We must not, however, fail to note that in the Scripture, the *Bhagavadgītā*, an attempt is made to present a more positive ideal of the way to attain deliverance and redemption from the world. There, higher than the path of knowledge or the path of ascetic practice, is the path that he follows who performs acts indeed, but performs them without desire for fruit, so as to be unattached to them. He who lives so, freed from selfish thought or purpose, making every-

thing he does an offering of love—such a one, cleansed from defilement, returns never again (v. 17). That is certainly a high and worthy ideal in close agreement with that which Christianity sets before us as the aim of our lives. Its emphasis upon the selflessness of work is a great and notable advance upon the merely negative "worklessness" that previous teachers praise. But even here the old ideal looms above the new, overshadowing it and again and again it is set out in this very scripture. So the verses that follow on a description of this supreme path run thus: "The learned look with indifference alike upon a very wise and courteous Brahman, a cow, an elephant, a dog or an outcaste man. They are victorious over birth in this world whose minds abide in indifference, for Brahma is stainless and indifferent, and therefore they abide in Brahma." And so also in many other passages in the same Scripture.

Thus it seems that one error of Hinduism is its failure to realise that in the words of the Western philosopher there is nothing in the world or out of it that is higher than a good will. Holiness is a great love and much serving, and no ideal is fully satisfying and powerfully constraining to those ends as is that which is manifested in Jesus Christ. There is much, as we have seen, that is very beautiful in the Hindu ideal. Strengthened and illuminated by the love of Christ, it should shine forth upon the world with a splendour and a charm such as, perhaps, has never yet been exhibited in Western sainthood. Its error lies in its endeavour to "do better than well," to climb to a region that is higher than love and goodness. The effect is seen in India's degradation, in the spirit of indifference that has left the mass of the people ignorant and oppressed.

N. Macnicol.

"*THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE CHURCH AND THE MINISTRY.*" [1]

A Contribution to the Problem of Christian Reunion.

The volume of *Essays* with which the present paper is concerned is the last of a long line of contributions made by Dr. Swete to theological scholarship and learning in this country, and it admirably closes and crowns an extended life in which the interests of honest research and sound knowledge always held the foremost place. It completes the debt which the world of theological and ecclesiastical learning owes to one who gave it the first adequate edition of the LXX, the best Commentaries extant on "St. Mark" and the "Apocalypse of St. John," two incomparable volumes of essays in *The Cambridge Theological Essays* and *The Cambridge Biblical Essays*, which together with the volume now under discussion constitute a notable trilogy, not to mention a host of works of lesser importance, all of which manifest a wide range of knowledge, an accuracy of scholarship, and a depth of spirituality such as are rarely found combined in a single personality. Dr. Swete was not spared to see the publication of this, his last literary effort, but the whole of the material it contains had passed through his hands, and the Preface, which is one of the most valuable features in the book, was all but complete when death put an end to his

[1] *Essays on the Early History of the Church and the Ministry.* By various writers. Edited by H. B. Swete, D.D. Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1918.

labours. It had been his one great desire to live long enough to witness the completion of this particular undertaking, and the story of the last scene as told by his niece, who watched over his declining years with devoted care, reminds us irresistibly of the death story of another great English Churchman and scholar, the Venerable Bede. Bede lived just long enough to see the final word of his translation of St. John's Gospel into Anglo-Saxon placed on the MS., and then lying upon the floor of his cell and singing the *Gloria Patri*, breathed his last. So Dr. Swete, when it became evident that the end was near and that he was not to see the complete fruition of his labours, provided for the final editing of the *Essays*, laid down his work, and then "stedfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem." It was a beautiful end to a very beautiful life, the life of one who was essentially a Christian scholar, whose death has left the world of sacred learning appreciably poorer.

The origin of this volume of *Essays* is explained by Dr. Swete himself in his *Preface*. On January 30, 1910, Dr. J. M. Wilson, Canon of Worcester, in a sermon preached before the University of Cambridge made a telling appeal for a fresh examination of the questions which "gather round the origin and early development of Episcopacy, and the nature and degree of the sanction which it possesses." Among the questions which called for urgent consideration he suggested the following :

1. Does history show that the Episcopal Churches, Greek, Roman, Anglican, and others are so exclusively the branches of the Catholic Church that we are debarred by fundamental principles from recognising the non-Episcopal bodies as true branches of the one Catholic Church ?

2. Have these Episcopal Churches alone a divinely commissioned fellowship, while others have their ministry from below, from human appointment, and is sacramental

grace consequently given only through Episcopal orders ?

3. What were the nature and functions of the prophetic ministry, a charismatic ministry, performing all the offices of the ministry, including the celebration of the Eucharist, and yet apparently without the sanction of ordination ?

4. What is the historical evidence for or against the probability of the Apostolic Succession as a fact, and what is the history of the development of the dogmas connected with the subject in their bearing on the grace and powers conferred in ordination and consecration ?

5. What were the early conceptions of ordination in the Church ?

6. What were the conditions for what is called a valid Baptism and a valid Eucharist, and how and when was the latter confined to men episcopally ordained ?

The response to Canon Wilson's challenge was undertaken by Dr. Swete at the request of Archbishop Davidson, and for the accomplishment of his purpose he enlisted the services of Canon A. S. J. Mason, Dean Armitage Robinson, Dr. C. H. Turner, Archbishop Bernard, the Rev. Dr. W. H. Frere, and the Rev. F. E. Brightman, all of them representative scholars whose names, to quote the Editor's words, " are a guarantee for a breadth of knowledge and accuracy in detail." The *Essays* do not profess to cover the whole ground traversed in Canon Wilson's appeal, but are confined to the consideration of questions relating to the life and polity of the Church on which light is thrown by the history of the first three or four centuries. The volume contains six essays, one by each of the contributors mentioned above. The first two, *Conceptions of the Church in Early Times* (Mason) and *The Christian Ministry in the Apostolic and sub-Apostolic Periods* (Armitage Robinson) cover the ground from which have sprung the problems connected with the claims of the Catholic Church and the Episcopate. The third essay,

Apostolic Succession, gives an exhaustive and learned discussion of the history of this crucial doctrine and of the kindred subject of non-Catholic Orders. The fourth, *The Cyprianic Doctrine of the Ministry* (Bernard), traces the great development in the theory of the Church and the Ministry which is associated with the name of Cyprian. The two remaining essays, *Early Forms of Ordination* (Frere) and *Terms of Communion and the Ministration of the Sacraments in Early Times* (Brightman), discuss the light thrown upon the primitive conception of the Ministry by the earliest forms of ordination, preserved in the "Church Orders," upon the ministration in the ancient Church of the great Sacraments, and upon the terms of Church membership and lay-communion that were imposed.

No book ever appeared at a more opportune moment than this. The idea of religious reunion has for some time been making a strong appeal to the minds and hearts of thoughtful Christians, and the appeal has been substantially reinforced by the experiences of men in the field of war, where representatives of the various Christian bodies have been brought into such intimate contact with each other as to emphasise very strongly the evils of religious disunion and the imperative need of closer fellowship and co-operation. It is becoming increasingly felt that the present situation is a crying scandal and a serious hindrance to the progress of the religion of Christ and that the time has arrived when every effort should be made to heal the rents and breaches in the Body of Christ, so as to exhibit to the world a Church which is not merely a congeries of separated and competing communities, but a united Brotherhood, bound together by the cords of Christian love, generous in its appreciation of every good quality and method, and able in the power of its unity to dethrone the powers of evil and to make itself the one dominating force in

a world which still as a whole refuses to recognize the supremacy of Christ. And further, it is also realized that any effective steps in a movement towards a general reunion must begin with British Christianity, and that the healing of the breach between the Episcopal and non-Episcopal Churches in these islands must form the first stage in the long progress towards a united Catholic Church. The conditions and the atmosphere which now prevail are unquestionably favourable to such a movement. There is a real and palpable yearning for closer communion, and a more earnest endeavour to enter into and understand the various principles and standpoints than has been manifested in the religious life of this country from the Reformation downwards. The most significant symptom of the sentiments that prevail is undoubtedly the Second Interim Report of a Sub-Committee appointed by the Anglican Archbishops and Representatives of the English Free Churches in connexion with the proposed "World Conference on Faith and Order for the promotion of the visible unity of the Christian Church." This report is headed *Towards Christian Unity* and bears the signatures of three Anglican Bishops, Kennion (Chairman), Talbot, and Gore, several well-known clergymen and laymen, and of such representative Free Church leaders as Davison, Garvie, Selbie, Scott Lidgett, and Shakespeare. The conclusions arrived at by this Committee, which represents such a wide variety of interests, are momentous and far-reaching, and ought to form a sound and reasonable basis for further and more definite action in the direction of the reunion of the Churches.

Two facts of fundamental importance are offered for the sympathetic and generous consideration of all the Churches.

1. That the position of Episcopacy in the greater part of Christendom as the recognised organ of unity and continuity of the Church is such that the members of the Episcopal

Churches ought not to be expected to abandon it in consenting to any basis of reunion.

2. That there are a number of Christian Churches, not accepting the Episcopal Order, which have been used by the Holy Spirit in His work of enlightening the world, converting sinners, and perfecting saints.

These conclusions represent unquestionably a substantial and noteworthy advance towards a central meeting point on the part of both sections concerned in the deliberations. To find on the one hand a number of representative Free Churchmen prepared to recognise the place and value of Episcopacy in the life and polity of the Church, and on the other a number of devoted Anglicans who see in the work of the Free Churches the clear fruits of the work of the Holy Spirit, is an omen of the happiest character and is in itself a definite and substantial stage on the road towards the desired end. In view of the general principles formulated in the preceding statement the members of the Committee are of opinion that before any reasonable prospect of reunion can be within sight the following conditions will have to be observed.

1. Continuity with the historic Episcopate must be effectively preserved.

2. That in order that the rights and responsibilities of the whole community in the government of the Church should be adequately recognised the Episcopate should reassume a constitutional form, both as regards the method of election of the bishop as by clergy and people and the method of government after election.

3. That the acceptance of the fact of Episcopacy and not any theory as to its character be all that is asked for.

It will be observed that according to the view of this joint Sub-Committee the reunited Church must be an Episcopally constituted and Episcopally governed Church, but

that this is not to involve any Christian community in the necessity of disowning its past. On the contrary, reunion should enable all to maintain the continuity of their witness and influence as heirs and trustees of types of Christian thought, life, and order, as being not only of value to themselves, but also to the Church as a whole. Every communion would in this way bring its own distinctive contribution not only to the common life of the Church, but also to its organisation, so that all that is true in the experience and testimony of the uniting communions would be conserved to the Church, a procedure that would involve the preservation within the larger unit of the legitimate freedom of the prophetic ministry and of the many customs and institutions which have been developed in the separate communities. It is well to note that the Sub-Committee confined itself to the recognition of facts, firstly the unquestionable position of Episcopacy as the organ of unity and continuity in the greater part of Christendom, which demands that in the reunited Church continuity with the historic Episcopate should be maintained, and, secondly, the correspondingly unquestionable fact that the Holy Spirit is at work in the Free Churches. Any attempt to discuss the origin of the Episcopate historically or its authority doctrinally is emphatically disclaimed. This further duty is left in the hands of the World-Conference when it assembles.

Now it is at this point that we recognise the importance and opportuneness of the volume of *Essays* edited by Dr. Swete. In any discussion concerning the historical origin of the Episcopate and its place and meaning in the life of the early Church these *Essays* must be taken into serious account, and it would not be a matter for surprise to find that they form the decisive factor in determining the issue by placing Episcopacy on a truer and sounder footing than at any period since the Reformation. There has been an

impression abroad that the researches of Dr. Gwatkin and others of his school tended towards the partial dethronement of the Episcopal theory and that, in consequence, the problem of reunion might be very considerably simplified. This prospect was, however, dissipated by a very striking and candid letter written by Dr. Sanday at the height of what is called the "Hereford Controversy," in which he regretfully confessed that the latest historical research represented by Dr. Turner's essay in this volume, which he had read before publication, gave no support whatsoever to the views of Dr. Gwatkin, but that on the contrary the supremacy of the Episcopal theory was more firmly established than ever, and that the prospect of a religious reunion at the expense of repudiating the historic Episcopate was practically hopeless. A study of the volume as a whole entirely confirms the impression left upon Dr. Sanday by one only of its constituents. It is true that the contributors are Anglicans to a man and that they all represent a more or less definitely High Church point of view, but at the same time it is the scholar and not the Churchman that is the more prominent in the *Essays*. It was inevitable that they should approach the subject with a certain amount of bias, but it is difficult to detect any traces of preconceived ideas in their writings, or any signs that they were desirous of utilising the historical evidence at their disposal in favour of any particular theory or theories. The volume as a whole is a remarkable example of honest, candid, and unprejudiced historical research.

The conclusions arrived at by the writers, all of which bear closely upon the conditions of future reunion, are formulated as follows by the Editor.

1. Primitive Christianity recognised no invisible Church on earth as distinct from the visible society of the baptized ; no self-governing power in the local congregation apart from

the authority of the whole Body of Christ ; no assured gifts of grace outside the Catholic communion.

2. Bishop Lightfoot's account of the origin of the Episcopate is reaffirmed, and the theory of a " charismatic " ministry based upon the *Didaché* is found to have no support in St. Paul's Epistles.

3. It was the Gnostic peril of the second century which gave prominence to the principle of Apostolic Succession. The Gnostic claim to a secret tradition derived from the Apostles was met by the Catholic Church by pointing to churches where bishops could show an unbroken succession from Apostolic founders, which guaranteed an unbroken tradition of Apostolic teaching in the Rule of Truth.

4. There was a serious difference of opinion as to the bearing of this principle on the question of non-Catholic Sacraments. *Cyprian* held the nullity of heretical and schismatical Baptism and, by inference, the nullity of Orders conferred outside the Catholic Church. *Augustine*, on the other hand, held that the grace of the Sacraments is not nullified by errors either of life or doctrine on the part of the minister, since it is derived from Christ's institution and power and not from the human agent ; and he included Holy Orders in his canon. It was Augustine's principle that after many years ultimately prevailed in the West.

5. The development of the conception of the Ministry in Cyprian consisted primarily in the recognition of the Episcopate as the key-stone of Catholic unity. The bishop is supreme in his own community and is subject only to Christ, while the bishops of the Catholic Church are a *collegium* which is to the whole Church what the individual bishop is to his own community. There is " no Bishop of Bishops " and " to be a Catholic it is not necessary to be Roman."

6. The " Church Orders " reveal the Church opinion of a much wider circle than that represented by Cyprian. They

show principally the development of the relation between the episcopate and the presbyterate, and reveal how in the earlier stage the bishop is the presbyter distinguished from other presbyters by the power of ordination only, and how in the later stage the presbyter takes a distinctly lower position than the bishop, for whom the special gifts of the Spirit such as distinguished the Apostolate are claimed. The general conception of Holy Orders in these early rites of ordination is that the Church in ordaining to any ministry recognises vocation by election, and then solemnly by prayer and laying on of hands invests the man whom God has called with authority to act as her representative and invokes upon him the special grace which his office requires.

It will be necessary to discuss somewhat in detail the first four conclusions formulated here, as they affect the question of reunion.

I.

The first statement, which is based entirely on Canon Mason's Essay, practically affirms that "Catholicism was a mark of the Church from its earliest beginnings." Our author does not labour the point whether Christ had any intention of founding the Church, although he is inclined to think that the evidence, though scanty, tends to establish that conclusion. He is content with the fact that the most important Christians of the first century believed that He had that intention, although it was a matter of comparative indifference to them at what stage in His career the Lord had founded the Church, whether during His earthly Ministry or later through the agency of the Holy Spirit, so perfect and complete for them was the unity between Christ and the Spirit. That they recognised the Church as a Divine and not a human institution is conclusively shown by the use of the title *Ecclesia*, which in the LXX is the name

of the people of Israel solemnly assembled before God.

In Christian language *Ecclesia* denotes the Israel of the New Testament, i.e. the assembly of the Covenant People of the New Testament, or, in other words, of Christendom, and the notion is that of an assembly of this people before God and with God. This conception of the Christian Church as the New Israel is universal in the New Testament, in St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. James, and survived among Christians as part of their tradition as may be seen from the writings of Clement of Rome. Justin Martyr, Odes of Solomon, Clement of Alexandria, and from the prologue to Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*. The use of this conception and the ascription of the title *Ecclesia* to the Church also proves that the Church was regarded as the visible and historical community of Christians. There is no trace in early Christian documents of any notion of an invisible Church of the Elect such as was afterwards entertained by Augustine, Wiclif, and Luther, nor of any opposition between the true Church of Christ and the visible corporate society of Christians. Some expressions in the Second Epistle of Clement, Hermas, and Clement of Alexandria might give colour to this view, but when the language in each case is interpreted in the light of the general conception of the Church entertained by the particular writer it is found that the difference contemplated between the ideal and the actual Church is not one of identity but of condition. Thus Hermas compares the incomplete with the complete edifice, and in Clement of Alexandria the heavenly Church is the invisible and perfected part of the same sacred society of which the Church on earth is the visible part. Nowhere in early Christian literature do we find that the Christians of these ages were conscious of a difference between the Church as a religious conception and the Church as a working institution.

Canon Mason also contends that the Church was Catholic

in idea and principle from the very dawn of its history, from the very fact that the visible fellowship of believers was always regarded as the true Church of Christ. There were Churches as well as *the* Church, but the local Church, whether in a city like Corinth or assembled in a house like that of Prisca, came to bear that name not because it was a complete organisation in itself, but because it was ideally an assembly representing the entire Divine Society. The Church is not the result of the grouping into one whole of numberless local communities, but each local Church is the manifestation of the one Ecclesia, the assembly of all Christendom. Hence the assertion that is so often made and is a commonplace, e.g., in Dr. Lindsay's memorable book on *The Church and the Ministry*, viz. "that all separate Churches of Christ were independent, self-governing societies," appears to be no longer tenable. The relation of the Churches to the Church undoubtedly became clearer in process of time than it was at first, but Canon Mason confidently affirms that at no period can any sign be discerned that the Churches were conceived of as independent and self-contained entities, and he is supported in this view by Dr. Turner. However large a liberty of local development was allowed by the Apostolic founders the liberty was invariably bounded by a sense of duty not only to the founder himself but to the rest of Christendom. The relation of the local Church to its founder is clearly illustrated by that of the Church of Corinth to St Paul, and the *Didaché* is no less emphatic upon the unity and universality of the Church. The use of the epithet "Catholic" to designate this mark of the Church emerges as early as the letters of Ignatius, although its primary significance at this time is that of "universality," the ideas of orthodoxy and conformity which are now more closely associated with the term being later additions, which grew, however, automatically and naturally out of the earlier

sense. And further, the idea of the possibility of the existence of Churches which were not Catholic was never entertained at this period. The question at issue was not that between a Catholic and non-Catholic Churches, but between parties both of which claimed to be the Catholic Church. The Marcionite and Montanist was just as insistent upon his claim to be regarded as a Catholic as the most orthodox Christian of his day. Catholicism, therefore, held the field from the beginning of Christian history, and at no period was the Church other than Catholic in idea and conception. If Canon Mason's view is accepted, Catholicism was not a later growth due to the action of Hellenistic influences or to the base imitation of the Roman form of government, as has been assumed in many quarters, but was inherent in the being of the Church from its very birth and was the one dominating force and principle of its life and polity.

Closely associated with the principle of Catholicism and explaining its power was the belief that in the Church and nowhere else would man be sure of finding the Spirit of God. While it is true that the earliest Christians did not deny that the Spirit could be operative beyond the circle of the Christian Church, the latter was invariably regarded as the special sphere of His manifestation. Thus Irenaeus writes : " Where the Church is there is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God is there is the Church and all grace " (*Haer.* iii. 24). This language does not, however, imply, as has been often thought, that any knot of people who professed to have the Spirit had a right to consider themselves a part of the Church, for in the very paragraph preceding the foregoing quotation he writes : " This gift of God (the Spirit) was entrusted to the Church that all the members might receive it and be made alive ; and none are partakers of it who do not assemble with the Church, but defraud themselves of life." So intimate was the connexion between the Spirit

and the Church that it became natural to assume that life-giving Sacraments were not to be looked for outside the pale. Irenaeus and Tertullian denied the possession of them to heretics and Cyprian to schismatics who were not strictly heretical. At this period no efficacy was attributed to the Baptism or the Eucharist of separated bodies, although, as we shall presently see, the validity of heretical and schismatical sacraments came to be the subject of a long and momentous controversy and the outlook was changed mainly owing to the influence of Augustine.

On the question of the authority inherent in the Church, Canon Mason writes: "Nothing was further from the mind of all early Christendom, whether Catholic or otherwise, than the idea that each Christian was an independent unit responsible only to God for what he did and for the views he expressed." Throughout the New Testament with all its vindication of spiritual liberty, we have the duty of the individual to the community and of the community to the individual emphatically expressed. Submission on the one hand, vigilant oversight on the other, are demanded everywhere, beginning with the earliest Epistle of St. Paul (1 Thess. v. 11 f.). In the New Testament discipline is generally in the hands of the community at large, but from the beginning the officers of the Church must have taken a leading part in all such disciplinary action, and in the course of time the management of discipline passes wholly into the hands of the bishops. (For a confirmation of this statement our author refers to 3 St. John 10, which, in the prevailing state of uncertainty as to the authorship of this Epistle, hardly substantiates his point). But the theory remained the same, and there never was a time when the community exercised the power of discipline apart from its leading members. St. Paul in particular emphasised his authority as an Apostle (2 Cor. x. 8), and there are New Testament

passages in abundance which demand obedience and respect for the office-bearers of the Church. The tone of authority is as audible in the Epistles to the Thessalonians and Corinthians as in the Pastoral Epistles, in the Catholic Epistles as in those of Clement and Ignatius. "The mild anarchy of early Christianity is a factor fiction of modern imagination." Canon Mason will have nothing to do with Hort's contention that the Apostles neither had nor claimed authority over the Church except what he called "moral authority," which was the result of the spontaneous homage of the Christians among whom they laboured, and that Scripture contains no trace of a formal commission of authority for government from Christ Himself. To my mind there is more to be said in favour of Hort's view than our essayist is prepared to allow, and I find this particular section in which he deals with the question of the authority and rule of the Apostles the least convincing in the whole of the essay. The authority of the Apostles in the matter of doctrine rests on sounder grounds. Here they insisted upon the maintenance of a definite body of teaching, which became a sacred deposit to be faithfully guarded and to be kept in its unsullied purity. The conflict with Gnosticism brought this duty into the very forefront of the Church's life, and it became the idea which dominated Christian thought during the whole of this period. It receives its most characteristic expression in Irenaeus, for whom the Apostolic doctrine as it abides in the Apostolic Church and is safeguarded by Apostolic Succession is the one ruling conception. Not that Irenaeus believed in a transmission from bishop to bishop of the power of finding out the truth by personal inspiration. When he writes: "Obedience is due to the elders of the Church who have succession from the Apostles—who along with the apostolic succession have received according to the good pleasure of the Father the sure gift of the truth (*charisma veritatis*),"

what he means is that the truth is received by tradition and not evolved from an inner consciousness. It abides in the Apostolic Church and not in the line of bishops who govern it, but the bishops are the representatives of their Churches and the responsible guardians of their traditions. Irenaeus' view as illustrated here was soon adopted on every side. Tertullian based his *Praescriptio* against the heretics on it and Hippolytus and Origen were equally insistent upon it. To Clement of Alexandria the succession which guaranteed the purity of the tradition was rather that of specially qualified teachers and not of those in episcopal office, but even he believed as firmly as Irenaeus that the episcopate was instituted by the Apostles. Cf. "This is the gnosis which has come down to us by unsullied tradition from the Apostles by a succession consisting of a few steps" (*Strom.* vi. 61. 3), and he insists as urgently as any of his predecessors upon the necessity of adhering to the Apostolic tradition preserved in the Church alone. The great phrase which in various forms resounds through the writings of the period is the "Rule of Faith" (*Regula Veritatis*). It includes the baptismal Creed, the canonical Scriptures, and more, for it connotes the teaching of the Church as a whole, the Catholic Faith—generally with a reference to the Holy Trinity. It is always the faith as known and taught in the universal Church, which is the same everywhere. While it is true that the unity of the Church in doctrine and practice was never actually complete the truth and the dignity of the conception remains. Practical unity was difficult owing to the distances which separated one Church from another and to the lack of easy and rapid communication. Differences of practice existed and all Churches did not think alike on every subject. The East differed from the West in its method of calculating Easter, but there was no laxity in fundamentals. That there was a real unity which bound every section of the

Church into one consistent and generally well-defined entity is shown by the experiences of Ignatius, who on his last journey from Syria to Rome found the Christian Church the same in essentials at every stopping place; of Hegesippus, who journeyed from Palestine to Rome, interviewing as many bishops as he could and hearing the same doctrine, the unerring tradition of the Apostolic preaching, from them all; and of Abercius, for whom the Apostolic faith formed an unfailing passport and who found himself at home in the Eucharist of every Church.

Canon Mason's impression of the primitive Church and its conditions may be summed up in his own words.

"Alike at Rome and at Alexandria, in Africa and in the East, men believed in a great spiritual community founded by Christ, through His Spirit working in His Apostles, to which all the promises of the Old Testament were attached. This community was necessarily unique. In it, and in it alone, the gifts and graces of the Spirit of Christ were to be looked for. In spite of human imperfections it was guided and permeated in every part by the Spirit. Nor was this community an intangible thing. It was a reality of experience, embodied in a practical discipline. The society was well known and unmistakeable. Its doctrine was everywhere the same; its worship with rich diversity of forms central round one Eucharistic memorial. It had an organised hierarchy for worship and for the pastorate of souls. The hierarchy maintained union between the local branches and did so in the name and by the authority of Christ. However far back the history is traced no date can be assigned, however roughly, for the appearance of Catholicism in the Church. The Church was Catholic from the outset."

This is a picture which has many noble and attractive qualities, but the impression it leaves on my mind is that the lines are somewhat too rigidly drawn and that it is too in-

elastic to be entirely true to life and to the spirit of Jesus Christ. There are many statements which might be justifiably questioned, and it is doubtful whether the author has taken sufficiently into account the varieties and differences of local usage which unquestionably existed in the early Church. In spite of the appeal to history throughout the Essay some of the positions maintained have neither been fully argued nor adequately established. Taken by itself Canon Mason's contribution does not seem to take us far on the road towards reunion, but we must bear in mind what the author himself lays down at the beginning of his *Essay*, that his object is to discover what the Church was considered to be by the Christians of the first days, not whether they were right in their answers or whether these answers are now applicable or not. Nowhere is the slightest attempt made to insist that all the conditions that he conceives to have prevailed in the Early Church must of necessity have their place in the reunited Church of the future. If the door opening towards reunion is not very widely opened it is at any rate neither bolted nor barred.

II.

The main interest of Dean Armitage Robinson's Essay on *The Christian Ministry in the Apostolic and Sub-Apostolic Periods* consists in his onslaught on the theory with which great play has been made in many quarters, that in the early Church there was a twofold Ministry, a " charismatic " and an " official " ministry, the one composed of Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers, owing its authority to the possession of special spiritual gifts, and the other of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons, whose authority was more external, following upon election to office and ordination. This theory owes its origin to the discovery of the *Didaché* and its publication in 1883. The effect of its appearance was instantaneous, and

it was generally hailed as a most important find and began immediately to exercise a strong influence upon opinion as to the true history of the origin and growth of the Christian Ministry and to produce a very marked change in the views held by prominent scholars on the subject. Sanday gathered from it that " spiritual " functions as such belonged in the first instance to the Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers, i.e. to the " charismatic " type of official, and that these functions included not only the preaching of the Word but also the administration of the Sacraments. Bishops or Presbyters did not primarily exercise " spiritual " functions and the Christian Church services were normally conducted by prophets and teachers, and only in the second line was this done by the bishops and deacons. It was Harnack, however, who gave the chief impulse to the new theory in a masterly edition of the *Didaché* published in 1884, and it was largely due to his influence that it obtained such wide prevalence. According to Harnack the *Didaché* represents a period when what he was the first to call a " charismatic ministry," composed of Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers, was on the point of passing from its ancient and supreme authority and its place taken by an " administrative ministry," composed of Bishops and Deacons, who had hitherto been chiefly concerned with such duties as the administration of the gifts and property of the community, the charge of the poor and needy, the exercise of hospitality to visitors and strangers, and the representation of the Church to those without. The former was a ministry of direct Divine appointment, belonged to the whole Church, and was only in part and occasionally localised, while the latter was only the local executive of a particular community, composed of officials chosen by that community to transact its business in the manner described above. The *Didaché* marks a crisis when the " charismatic " ministry was showing signs

of decay and when the functions of teaching and ruling were on the point of passing over to the local authorities of the community. Harnack and those who followed his lead contended that the *Didaché* represents the full development of a process of which the first stages are plainly discernible in the New Testament, and that it proves beyond a doubt that the history of the origin and growth of the Christian Ministry is to be explained on the following lines.

1. Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers form the triad of the Christian Ministry in the earliest period. Bishops, Priests, and Deacons have no connexion with these, though some of the functions of the former class pass over to the members of the latter class.

2. Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers were what they were in virtue of a " charisma " or special endowment of the Holy Spirit, the direct gift of God, not mediated in any way by man, marking its possessors out for their ministry beyond all challenge. The " charisma " was essentially a gift of teaching, a *Lehrgabe*, a power to " declare the word of God," which was the ultimate law of the Christian Church, and those who possessed this gift were the authoritative rulers of the Church.

4. Whereas Bishops, Priests, and Deacons were at the outset a purely local institution, Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers moved freely from one community to the other, were recognised everywhere on the ground of their " charisma," and thus formed the most important bond between the many communities of the universal Church and were the main cause of the general uniformity of its development.

Since 1884, however, the *Didaché* has, with the process of time and a closer study of its contents, tended to decline in value as evidence for the condition of the Church at that period of its history. There is now prevailing a strong current of opinion in favour of the view that it does not

represent primitive Christianity as a whole, but only some isolated and exceptional type of community, possibly a Palestinian community, which was remote from the main stream of the Church's life. Two of the contributors to the present volume, Dr. Turner (*Studies in Early Church History*, p. 31) and Dean Armitage Robinson (*Journal of Theological Studies*, xiii. 339–356) had already expressed the view that the importance and significance of the *Didaché* had been very much exaggerated, and Dr. H. J. Wotherspoon in his delightful book on *The Ministry in the Church*, published in 1916, had thrown considerable doubt upon its authority. He held that it was probably late and certainly local in character, telling us only what was doctrine and practice in some small side-tracked Church which may have been unduly influenced by Judaism and in consequence supplying no trustworthy evidence for the doctrine and practice of the Catholic Church. In Dr. Wotherspoon's opinion the theory of the "Twofold Ministry" disappears with the discredit of the *Didaché* and Dr. Armitage Robinson gives it the *coup de grâce* in this *Essay* and shows convincingly that it has no foundation in history.

1. He maintains that the theory of a "charismatic" ministry of Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers belonging to the Church in general and exercising authority over any community which they might visit or in which they might choose to settle down, superseding the local officials who yet wait in the background ready to inherit the highest honours when "charismata" became rare and at last altogether cease, while exceedingly attractive in itself and offering an intelligible account of many churches in which the development towards the monarchical episcopate was for some time delayed, breaks down entirely when the evidence on which it has been made to rest is carefully cross-examined. The advocates of the theory linked the relevant passages in the

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Didaché with two passages in St. Paul's Epistles, viz. 1 Corinthians xii. 28, " And God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, then miracles . . .," and Ephesians iv. 11, " And he himself gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers . . .," and on the strength of this combination of St. Paul and the *Didaché* asserted that Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers held a definite position apart from all other members of the Christian Church and in a definite order of precedence, that they were directly appointed by God for the service of the whole Church in virtue of their possession of a " charisma " which gave them personal authority, status, and precedence. These two passages, we are told, with their emphasis in the one case on " God hath set in the church " and in the other on " He Himself gave (i.e. Christ)," confirm the " charismatic " character of the early ministry, seeing that these ministers are of God's appointment and the gift of Christ and not the choice of man. But the Dean points out that the original triad is in the second passage extended by the insertion of " evangelists " and " pastors," and that even on the showing of Harnack and his friends the latter term probably represents the local ministry, the presbyter-bishops of Acts xx. 18, who " feed the church of God." He strongly contends that the passages do not bear the construction placed upon them and that the evidence is far too slender to justify the assumption that the triad of Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers formed a separate ministry. To begin with, there is but slight support in the New Testament for the recognition of teachers as a special class, and the collocation of " pastors and teachers " in Ephesians iv. 11, where both terms naturally describe functions rather than status, makes it probable that " teachers " is a term connoting functions and not a definite position. Again, the discrepancy between the lists

in the two passages quoted is difficult to understand if the triad of Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers were occupying the supreme and definite position claimed for them in this theory, and we should have to explain how this ministry of Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers had undergone a development when *Ephesians* was written and then have fallen back into its original form later at the period of the *Didaché*. But as a matter of fact the triad is not found even in the *Didaché*, and it is only by a combination of two classifications, viz. " apostles and prophets " and " prophets and teachers," that it is arrived at. The actual triad occurs nowhere except in 1 Corinthians xii. 28, and it is exceedingly doubtful whether the Apostle's language here justifies the marking off of the first three items in the list so as to give this triad a special character different from the remainder. It was a natural tendency to stop the exact enumeration at the third item, and suggestive illustrations of a similar practice are found in Genesis xxii. 17–19 and in St. Matthew xxii. 25. The Dean is prepared to agree that Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers were regarded by St. Paul as holding the first place of honour in the Church, but protests that there is no evidence that they ever stood as a triad apart, as an exclusively spiritual aristocracy with authority to rule the Church. He does not regard the *Didaché* as entirely trustworthy in its picture of primitive Church life. It is in direct conflict with St. Paul in forbidding the criticism of the message of a prophet who had been recognised as such, and it is probably equally unworthy of trust in other directions. It is an isolated and eccentric document, and does not provide sound evidence for the general conditions which prevailed in the Church at the time.

MAURICE JONES.

(*To be concluded.*)

THE TWO TEMPTATIONS OF A HARD TIME.

"And thine ears shall hear a word behind thee saying, This is the way, walk ye in it, *when ye turn to the right hand* and *when ye turn to the left.*"—ISAIAH XXX. 21.

THE promises of God have this in common—we feel how very good it would be were they fulfilled in us. For the promises of God are indeed the responses from the side of God to certain deep necessities, arising it may be from our very nature, or arising out of the circumstances in which from time to time we find ourselves. And so it comes to be that we have promises from God to us on every level of human requirement. In this region also "there is first that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual." The blessing of the Old Testament, says Bacon, is prosperity; adversity is the blessing of the New. "Man doth not live by bread only," our Lord declared. But man needs even bread: and we have many a promise from the side of God that if we will bestir ourselves and resist all leanings to laziness or to over-reaching and greed, there will always be bread enough in the world. But man's true needs arise, his characteristic dangers and liabilities only begin to appear, after he has been fed. And so the promises of God soon rise above the level of our merely animal necessities and help comes to be offered to us from the side of God in view of certain profound requirements, certain subtle instabilities, certain fears, a certain tendency to wildness, or to excess, or to collapse—possibilities these which disclose themselves only as man proceeds. For, the higher the hill the deeper the valley; and it is as man proceeds, as he leaves himself in certain lowly matters behind, as he launches out upon his more proper life, as a creature with reasoning

powers, with emotions and memories, and with that inveterate sense of responsibility which from time to time masses above his head the dark clouds of retribution lit up in moments by lightning-flashes of shame and even horror, —it is as man proceeds, that he comes to know his own sore and his own grief. Whereupon his deeper, more sensitive nature cries out for things more urgent than food; and in those promises of God which culminate in the gift of Christ Jesus to all human souls, we have, as we believe, the response of Heaven to man's later and deepening necessities.

But in the case of every promise from the side of God, from the lowliest to the loftiest, this is always present as its sign,—we perceive in a moment that it gives an answer to some deep cry, that it brings a solution to some perplexity, or it puts to flight some impending fear. In short, we feel how good and blessed a thing it would be for man were the promise fulfilled.

Well, here is one of those late promises of God such as man comes to realise his need of, far on in his history. Perhaps it is only after man has acquired an intellectual and moral life strong enough to urge him out upon the life of freedom, and only after he has been caught in the cross-currents of that uncharted sea, only after he has tried and has failed, only after he has found himself out and is now disposed to misgiving and humility—perhaps it is only then and in consequence of such secret embarrassments and defeats, that he has the hearing ear and the understanding heart for such a deep promise as this.

For what is the precise meaning of this promise? What kind of deliverance, what kind of relief, what kind of security, or—and this is perhaps the true line of inquiry—what kind of safeguard, the safeguard, that is to say, against what kind of dangers,—would this promise bring, were it

fulfilled? "Thine ears shall hear a word behind thee saying, This is the way, walk ye in it, when ye turn to the right hand or when ye turn to the left." It is a promise, that is to say, from the side of God, that He will give, to those who serve Him with integrity, a private and unmistakeable guidance, direction, control: that He will enable men to use their freedom safely, because their openness to God will impose upon their freedom that very control and government without which mere freedom may lead a man or a nation into turbulence and excess, and later into the reactions of fear and panic.

Interpreted in such terms, the promise is one which ought to interest and attract us in these days when, not knowing what lies before us, we wish to endure what has befallen us and to meet the coming tasks of life with an ordered mind, not repudiating the proved wisdom of former times, and yet not afraid of changes if changes seem to be demanded.

In offering us an inward principle which shall guide us and keep us pointing the way of our true welfare, I am not quite sure which of two possible meanings, within the obvious general meaning, the words precisely bear. Do the words—which speak of a voice dealing with us when we turn to the right hand or when we turn to the left—mean that it is this very voice which inclines us at one time to the right, at another time to the left? That there are times when we know we must take a turn (as we say), and that, when we are not sure which way we ought to turn, this inward pursuing voice will, in the moment when we must make the decision, so operate upon events or upon our own minds that we shall feel impelled to take one way rather than the other, and shall find later that we chose wisely?

Though on the whole I rather think that that is not the

very meaning, nevertheless that is a meaning which would be well worth expounding. We do well indeed to declare and to believe that the honourable way through life is best described as a straight way. But we must never forget that that is the language of metaphor. What we mean by such language is not that a man must go through life in a mathematically straight line, never altering his course, never learning new wisdom, never swerving to the one side or to the other, though by so doing he might create or might preserve some desirable balance in the opinion or practice of his time or of his own class. No: when we say that the honourable way through life is a straight way, we mean that beneath the surface, face to face with his own conscience and with God, an honourable man practises no subterfuge or crookedness, but takes action according to those unseen but personal demands. When we say of the true way through life that it is straight, we mean that a true man does not trifle with his own soul. We do not ask of such a man that he shall always go ahead, climbing over mountains, when by man's infinite labour there is already a way round the mountains; or that he shall plunge into some morass, as though God were always bound to work a miracle to rescue such a man from the consequences of his own want of sense. No: all that we mean when we say of the honourable course through life that it is straight is, that the honourable man at every step deals straightly with himself and with God. Because life is what it is, a place where on our journey we come upon cross-roads, it is a most precious promise indeed that as we stand at such points of debate, we may have, each for himself, something to which we may listen, and so be saved from continual delays and discussion with ourselves and, as might well be, from wrong decisions. And certainly there is no finer sign of manhood to come upon in another, or to discover

signs of in ourselves, than the power to perceive at the first challenge of any situation how precisely one ought to act. Face to face with the varying issues which life presents to us, to be able to take the line which turns out to have been the fine line, and this smoothly, instinctively, as though one could not have done otherwise, to be unanimous with oneself at the cross-roads and unafraid,—that is, indeed, to be free.

And yet I rather incline to think that something else, though something with no very important difference, is intended. At least I am more interested at this moment in another interpretation which is equally competent. It is indeed a most desirable condition to have reached, when, face to face with some need for immediate decision, we perceive at the very moment which of two or more ways is the way we ought to take. For surely, to repeat it, there is no more miserable condition than that in which we *never* find ourselves ready to act, but must waste time and lose the occasion and exhaust ourselves with conflicting arguments, and give an opportunity for all kinds of lower motives to put in their pleas—all because we have not within us a settled and accepted principle which, face to face with moral alternatives, perceives the only way, and points a finger with such swiftness and authority that we know it to be for us the finger of God—something, that is to say, which, like an incorruptible magnetic needle, points inevitably to the Pole.

And yet, I repeat, I rather think that what this promise of God has in view is a somewhat different necessity. For if there are times and occasions in life when it is our wisdom and our duty to turn to the right hand or to turn to the left, there are other times and occasions when it is our wisdom and our duty *not* to turn either to the right hand

or to the left, but to hold on, to continue, to persist on some way, which, on some earlier day, and with all the facts before us, we perceived to be God's only way for us. In short, if there are times and occasions in life when to turn to the right hand or to the left is a *duty*, there are other times and occasions when to turn to the right hand or to the left is a *temptation*, and I rather think that this is what the promise of God has in view.

If such be the case, then what the text is dealing with is not those hours or situations in life when left to ourselves we might not know our way: the text is dealing with those hours or situations—not less frequent and more serious in the long run—when away down in our hearts we know very well the way we ought to take, for it is the way by which we have come; but because we are tired or are disappointed, or are afraid, or have lost moral energy, or have been allowing ourselves to drift from our own integrity, we are now looking about us, to the right hand or to the left hand, and are searching for reasons, justifications, pleas, which all the time we know to be mere excuses, for abandoning the straight and onward line.

Certainly a day comes in the history of every fine obedience, in the history of every erect spirit, and in the history of every community of the spirit—such as a state, or a Church, when we tire of the strain, and unless something comes immediately to our rescue, sending over us it may be a wave of shame, we are ready to yield to the inertia of our own nature, to swerve in one direction or in another before the difficulties or dangers of the straight-going, forward-reaching way. We may give some fine name to the course which we propose to take; we may try to banish our own uneasiness by reminding ourselves that after all we are but men, that life is life, that Rome was not built in a day, that we must not think to screw our poor human nature beyond a point—

and that point one settled long ago by the good sense of average men. But all the time, we know, or we ought to know, that what is happening within us is that we have tired of the effort, that we have become stale, that we have lost heart and freshness and power; nay, we know that what has really happened within us is that our heart has gone out of the business. We do not propose publicly to turn our back upon our former and, as we suspect, our higher and better self. We do not propose determinedly to return by the way on which we have come so far. But we would not mind now turning slightly to the right hand or to the left hand, and settling down—as compared with the eagerness and conflict of a spiritual obedience—settling down in some quiet place. This mood of reaction may be brought on by the very passing of time, by life, by the wearing of the years: or it may be suggested to us by the aspect of things in this world,—the slow progress of man, the apparent moral unconcern of Heaven, the contempt which life seems to show for ideals: or it may have been embraced by us in some wave of anger, of personal resentment because of something which we have suffered at the hands of men: or it may have been a sad conclusion to which we have come in consequence of some miserable failure of our own—shaking our confidence in ourselves and in man. It is a very real mood, one which is most apt to descend upon us in the mid-time of our life. Perhaps we should rather say that it is a mood which may descend upon us at any stage of life, but a mood from which we are less likely to protest and to recover once our youth is past. It is to this mood that Isaiah here addresses himself, promising a safeguard against it in God, declaring, that is to say, that only in God, in God conceived as personal and immediate and near, has man an abiding Reason and

Resource against the benumbing tendency of life and time.

Beneath the surface, the people to whom Isaiah spoke were in very much the same situation as are people like ourselves to-day who have an inherited and traditional belief in God—in His power, in His goodness, a belief which, if in the days of our ease we did not sufficiently honour and make manifest, at least we did not repudiate or deny. We can read between the lines of the history of that time, that the situation was having upon those people precisely the same general influences as it has already had upon many in our day, and as it threatens to have upon us all. For, in any time like that time or like this, people who—to use the phrase—*have religion*, are apt to behave in what beneath the surface is really the one way or the other just as the text describes: they are apt to turn to the right hand or to turn to the left. In general terms, our position is like theirs. when Isaiah spoke to them. What was going to happen to their country, no one could say. Their enemies occupied a great part of their land. City after city had fallen. The whole strength of that enemy rested upon qualities and motives and upon an interpretation of life which the Jews, like Christians of to-day, were explicitly forbidden to entertain. Nevertheless, they, acting on *their* principles, which to the Jews as to ourselves are obnoxious, so far had triumphed. And, I say, serious people could not but think about it all, just as serious people to-day cannot but think about it all. Thinking about it, they saw in front of them two possible lines of solution; just as thinking about the state of the world to-day serious people are tending to fall into two camps. Isaiah declared that both solutions were wrong, were ultimately rooted in unbelief; just as I believe the truly Christian reading of present-day events would pronounce both wrong and cowardly and ultimately rooted in unbelief.

To put the matter in a phrase, they proposed *to turn to the right hand* or *to turn to the left*. Isaiah declared that if they rested their whole case on God, they would turn neither to the right hand nor to the left, but would hold on.

Now, in the presence of such catastrophes, such delays, such disappointments and fears as confront us to-day, these are still the two directions which men's minds are apt to take—the one or the other. On the one hand, we are apt to let our faith give way to panic, thus becoming superstitious:—that is how I should interpret the "turning to the right." And on the other hand there are those who are equally apt to let their fears shake them from *any* personal and lofty confidence, and hurry them into mere anger and revolt and unbelief: that is how I should interpret the "turning to the left." Both attitudes, Isaiah declares, are wrong; ultimately both alike imply the denial of God. For superstition as truly as its opposite really denies the God of the Old Testament and of the New. For superstition equally with avowed unbelief denies that this world is governed by law, by intelligence, by wisdom, by God. The one and the other alike simply give up the whole business, and abandon the good fight of faith. In a real sense, the one and the other alike protest, like Thomas, that unless they see, they will not believe. And as in those old days Isaiah condemned them both, so in later days and through all time, the Lord of our faith, Christ Jesus, condemns them both. For both indeed—superstition and avowed unbelief,—alike sin against light, sin, that is to say, against the deepest instruction of man's moral nature. Both ask for evidence above what God may be pleased at any particular moment to give. Both demand physical signs and ask that events and circumstances shall compensate them for their fidelity; therein taking the very ground

that I should be taking were I to demand some reward, beyond the approval of my conscience, for remaining an honest man.

In all this, I trust I may have been led to light up a matter and to bring home to ourselves things which, it may be, we were not aware of, but are now aware of since they have been suggested. In my own view, what God is asking of us all in these days is that we shall think seriously. I believe that if we think seriously, we shall see that in a time of total dislocation like this present time, these are still the two tendencies which tempt our own soul. On the one hand there is the tendency to turn to the right. This is the tendency to lose our bearings, whereupon, in order to escape confusion, we rush into superstition, reactions, imbecilities even, becoming impatient of reason and of moral principles, because these seem slow and ambiguous in the welter of our time. That is one temptation, a mean short-cut which invites us. The other temptation, the turning to the left, is that, in a monstrous time like this, because evil appears to go unchecked, because great crimes seem to cry in vain to Heaven, because cruelties continue to be perpetrated before which we had thought the sun would have veiled its face in shame and grief, but the sun does not veil its face; because of the apparent silence or helplessness of God; because of the absence of physical miracle; —we may in anger or in weariness blow out the feeble, flickering, but still surviving light of our finest insight, of our deep moral protest, of that Faith of ours which yet had its source in One who still believed in the rightness and finality of His own intuition, and in the invincible Goodness of God, though men at the moment were driving nails through His flesh, and though friends who had promised to stay by Him had fled, and though He was only thirty-two, with life all before Him and worlds of love

and guidance to give to mankind,—and yet called on thus to die : this, I say, is the other temptation, to give up God and hope and our confidence that a way will yet be found for the triumph in this world of the best.

Face to face with both of those tendencies,—the tendency to turn to the right hand, and the tendency to turn to the left, face to face with the tendency to superstition, and the tendency to a godless, sunless, hopeless view of things, stands that consistent appeal of the whole word of God, culminating in the Cross of Calvary, the appeal that man shall not permit himself to be corrupted or to be dismayed. Both of those tendencies alike lean back upon atheism. Both alike deny the supremacy of the Spirit. Both alike are aspects of the sin against the Holy Ghost. Both alike ask for signs, for proofs, for compensations. Both demand comfort and satisfaction of a kind which the Cross of our blessed Lord should make every honourable man ashamed to ask.

For surely it was days like these very days through which we are passing, and moods like those very moods to which because of these days we are meanwhile subject, that our Lord had in view when He justly challenged and rebuked and summoned those who should ever name His Name or be baptized with His baptism ! " The servant is not greater than his lord." And again : " As I am in the world, so are ye in the world."

For what more do we want than to know that we are taking the Great Way through life—that way on which they are marching who believe that the best is that which is inevitable, is that which beneath everything even now *is*, and beyond everything will one day be acknowledged and supreme ? If God should be pleased to slacken the sheer strain of our faith, if He should be pleased to make a blessed rift in the dark masonry of the clouds through

which rift we see for one moment the flaming ramparts of the city of our faith and of our desire, we shall praise Him as with cymbals. But if God be pleased still to give us the bread of adversity and the water of affliction; if He still means to try what spirit we are of,—whether we are no better than an unworthy lover who cannot endure in honour the loved one's silence or his absence; if He still means us to refresh our souls and to recover our faith not in signs or in tokens or in reassuring events, but in the sheer goodness and authority of our Faith itself, and in the fine society, of which our Lord is chief, to which this stern and straining obedience introduces us; if that is God's calling for us men and women of to-day, shall we not try to be worthy of His faith in us? And in order to this, shall we not remember the tens of thousands who under our very eyes have given their lives for something which *they* did not see fulfilled, who rest now in unvisited tombs? And shall we not recover ourselves by falling back in spirit, in imagination, in faith upon Him, the Captain of our salvation, who, when the soldiers had completed their coarse work, and the world had done its worst, and Heaven had given no public sign, whispered loud enough for His mother and His friends to hear and to be consoled for ever by the memory of it: "Father"—and died.

For what are such instructions as these but the paraphrase, precise though given in our necessarily difficult and plaintive speech, of that appeal to our final sense of honour towards the human race, and honour towards Christ, in which more and more clearly I discern to-day the entire intention of the word of God: "Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking into Jesus, the Author and Finisher of our faith;

who for the joy that was set before Him endured the Cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God. For consider Him that hath endured such gain-saying of sinners against themselves, that ye wax not weary, fainting in your souls."

JOHN A. HUTTON.

AN EXPERIMENT IN TRANSLATION.

How much freedom is allowable in rendering the New Testament into English? It is a difficult question, and will be differently answered, according as stress is laid upon this or that requirement—faithfulness to the letter of the Greek, sympathy with its spirit, care for old associations of thought and language, or power to suggest new thoughts and awaken fresh interest. The Authorized Version has become our Vulgate, and is not likely to be bettered or replaced: it has beauty, and spiritual insight; we have grown up with it, and we cannot bear to see it altered. The Revised Version embodies the nineteenth century idea "Back to Christ." It will be useful when the clergy cease to learn Greek. But it will no more satisfy Christian devotion than a return to primitive Christianity would remake the Christian Church. Various attempts have been made to render the New Testament into modern English. In so far as they have used commoner and more colloquial words they have come nearer to the κοινή of the New Testament writers. But they have been written, for the most part, with too little care for association, or sense of style: indeed our generation has almost lost the power to write good English.

If the attempt is to be made again—as is very much to be desired—the reasons for past failure must be carefully weighed, and a clear understanding be arrived at as to the aim in view. What we need is a rendering as true to the best text and the best scholarship as the Revised Version, as simple and beautiful as the Authorised Version, and at the same time a real translation, turning the Jewish ideas and metaphors, the meanings and associations of the Greek words, into our own living thought and language.

If this is to be done successfully, not only the rendering of the Greek text must be considered, but also the form in which it is presented. Some experiments of this kind have already been made—the use of a wide page, instead of two narrow columns, the arrangement in paragraphs instead of verses, the omission of chapter-headings and cross-references, the provision of maps and of illustrations. But these are comparatively small matters : a more important change might at least be considered. Ancient authors, editors, and printers had their own conventions: manuscripts, generally speaking, had no inverted commas, and no references ; a passage quoted from another author need not be acknowledged ; a diagram might be expressed in words, a map by a description of routes and places ; footnotes and appendices were incorporated in the text. Modern editions of ancient authors have generally kept these conventions as they found them. But it would be well worth while to take up a suggestion made by Professor Myres in reference to Herodotus,[1] and to bring out editions of some of these books in which all extraneous matters were placed in footnotes or appendices, quotations indented or italicised, and maps and diagrams provided instead of, not in addition to, the passages which they represent. Might not the same plan be applied, with great profit, to the New Testament ? Westcott and Hort's text already marks quotations from the Old Testament by a different type. Might not an attempt be made to print St. Matthew and St. Luke with their quotations from St. Mark similarly distinguished ? Might not notes like Mark vii 3–4, 19*b* ; John iv. 2, 9*b*, and the Greek equivalents of Hebrew names, be printed at the foot of the page ? Might not Luke's Preface be printed as such, and the genealogies be placed in an Appendix ?

[1] Royal Geographical Society's Journal, 1896, p. 606.

The main object of the present paper is to suggest and illustrate an experiment which goes a little further in the same direction. A Greek dramatist was able to place the names of the speakers in the margin of his text. But an Evangelist who fell into dialogue, or into a dramatic vein had recourse to the clumsy expedient of "He said to them," "And they answered him, saying," written *in extenso* as part of the text. Modern literary convention is not so stiff; and it is at least arguable that the best way to reproduce these dramatic passages is to print them in dramatic form. The two experiments which follow are made upon the fourth Gospel, whose dramatic temper and possibilities have often been recognised. The two passages selected, from the ninth, eighteenth, and nineteenth chapters, lend themselves specially to this method of translation. In both, the abrupt and unmarked changes of scene make the ordinary form of rendering difficult to follow. Both are in almost continuous dialogue form; and such comments as are added are in the nature of stage directions. In both the constantly repeated "he said" and "they said" makes an ordinary translation monotonous.

In the renderings which follow, no alteration whatever has been made in the order or wording of the text, except that once or twice a stage direction has been put into the present tense; and nothing at all has been added, except the headings to the scenes, and the word "off" in xix. 12.

I.

The Blind Man.

Scene I. *Jerusalem, outside the Temple. Jesus passes by, and sees a man who has been blind since his birth.*

The Disciples. Who was it that sinned, Rabbi—this man, or his parents, so that he was born blind?

Jesus. It was neither because this man sinned, nor be-

cause his parents did, but in order that God's works may be clearly shown in him. So long as daylight lasts, we ought all to do His works who sent me; for a night is coming in which no one can work. (*He spits on the ground, makes clay of the spittle, and lays it upon the man's eyes.*)

Jesus (*to the blind man*). Go and wash in the pool of Siloam.[1]

SCENE II. *A poor street in Jerusalem.*

The blind man has gone, and washed, and returns with his sight restored.

His Neighbours (*and those who used to know him by sight as a beggar*). Is not this the man who used to sit and beg?

Some. Yes, it is.

Others. No, it is not; but it is like him.

The Blind Man. I *am* the man you mean.

The Neighbours. How was your sight restored?

The B. M. The man called Jesus made some clay, and anointed my eyes with it, and told me to go to Siloam and wash. So I did. And when I had washed my sight returned.

The N. Where is this Jesus?

The B. M. I don't know.

SCENE III (*A few days later*[2]). *The meeting-place of the Sanhedrin.*

The man who had been blind is brought before the Pharisees.[3] *They re-examine him as to how his sight has been restored.*

[1] Siloam means "sent."—ED.

[2] [This seems to suit the narrative best; and the Sanhedrin would not meet on a Sabbath.]

[3] On the day when Jesus made the clay, and restored the blind man's sight, there was a Sabbath.—ED.

The B. M. He put clay upon my eyes, and I washed myself, and now I can see.

Some Pharisees. This fellow you speak of cannot come from God, because he does not observe the Sabbath.

Others. But how can a sinful man do such signs as this ?

(*The two parties begin to disagree.*)

Both parties (*to the B. M.*) What is *your* opinion of him, considering that he has restored your sight ?

The B. M. He is a prophet.

SCENE IV. *The same a little later.*

The Jewish Authorities refuse to trust the evidence for the man's blindness, and for the restoration of his sight, without first summoning his parents.

The Jewish Authorities. Is this your son, whom you assert to have been blind ? And if so, how is it that he can now see ?

The Parents. We are sure that this is our son, and that he was born blind : but how it is that he can now see, we have no idea ; or who restored his sight, we have no idea—really we have not. Ask him. He is of age. He will speak for himself.[1]

SCENE V. *The same, a few minutes later.*

The Jewish Authorities recall the man who was blind.

The J. A. (*to the B. M.*). "Give glory to God," and not to man ; for we are convinced that this Jesus is a sinner.

The B. M. Whether he is a sinner or not I have no idea ; but one thing I am sure of : once I was blind, now I can see.

[1] "He is of age. Ask him." The parents spoke in this way because they were afraid of the Jewish Authorities, who had already passed a resolution that, if any one acknowledged Jesus to be the Messiah, he should be excommunicated.—ED.

The J. A. What did he do to you ? How did he restore your sight ?

The B. M. I have told you already, but you did not attend. Why do you want to hear it all again ? Can it be that *you* want to become Jesus' disciples ?

The J. A. (*abusively*). You are his disciple ; we are disciples of Moses. You can take it from us that God spoke to Moses. Where this fellow comes from, we have no idea.

The B. M. Why, that is just what is so surprising ! You do not know where he comes from ; and yet he has restored my sight. We all know that God does not listen to sinners, but only to those who are devout, and do His will. At the same time, no one ever yet heard of sight being restored to a man born blind. It follows that, unless this Jesus had come from God, he could not have done anything.

The J. A. Do you dare lecture *us*—you who were born and bred in sin ? (*They turn him out.*)

SCENE VI. *The Blind Man's home.*

Jesus has heard of the Blind Man's expulsion, and comes to see him.

Jes. Can you trust in the Son of Man ?

The B. M. Only tell me who he is, Sir, and I will trust in him.

Jes. In your blindness you saw him : and now he who speaks to you is he.

The B. M. Lord, I do trust in him. (*He does obeisance to him.*)

SCENE VII. *In the Temple.*

Jes. It was to pass sentence that I came into this world, so that those who have lost their sight may recover it, and those who can see may become blind.

Some Pharisees (those with Jesus, overhearing him). Do you mean to say that *we* are blind?

Jes. If you were merely blind you would not have been to blame: but you are always saying that you can see: therefore your sin is unremoved.

II.

The Trial before Pilate.

Scene I. *The Government House at Jerusalem: Exterior. Jesus is brought from the house of Caiaphas into the Government House. It is early morning. The Jews do not themselves go in, so that they may avoid defilement, and be able to eat the Passover. Pilate accordingly comes out to them.*

Pil. What charge do you make against the prisoner?

The Jews. We should not have handed the fellow over to you, unless he had been a criminal.

Pil. Take him yourselves, then, and sentence him under your own law.

The Jews. No, for we have no power to inflict capital punishment.[1]

Scene II. *The Same: Interior.*

Pilate comes back into the Government House and summons Jesus.

Pil. So *you* are the King of the Jews!

Jes. You do not say that, I suppose, of your own accord? No doubt others suggested it to you about me?

Pil. Am I a Jew, to choose such a king? It was your own nation and chief priests who betrayed you to me. What is your crime?

Jes. My kingship does not belong to this world. If it had belonged to this world my servants would have used force to prevent my betrayal to the Jews. No, my kingship has no worldly origin.

[1] Thus fulfilling Jesus' prediction of the way in which he was to die.—Ed.

Pil. You really claim to be a King, then ?

Jes. You may call me so if you will. For this one purpose I was begotten, and have come into the world—to testify to the Truth ; and every man who belongs to the Truth listens to my voice.

Pil. What is Truth ?

SCENE III. *The Same : Exterior.*

Pil. (*coming out again to the Jews*). I cannot find any ground for a charge against him. Now, you have a custom by which I release one prisoner for you at the Passover. Would you like me, then, to release Jesus the King of the Jews ?

The Jews (*crying out again*). No, not this Jesus, but Jesus Barabbas ![1][2]

SCENE IV. *The Same : Interior.*

Pilate takes Jesus, and has him scourged. The soldiers then plait a crown of thorn-twigs, and put it on his head, and throw round him a cloak of royal purple. They keep on going up to him, and saying, Welcome, King of the Jews ! *and striking him on the side of the face.*

SCENE V. *The Same : Exterior.*

Pil. (*coming out again*). Look ! I am bringing him out for you, so that you may realise that I cannot find any ground for a charge against him. (*Jesus comes out, wearing the crown of thorns and the purple cloak.*) There is the man !

The Chief Priests (*and their servants, seeing him, and crying out*). To the cross ! To the cross !

Pil. Take him yourselves, and crucify him : for I cannot find any ground for a charge against him.

[1] Jesus Barabbas was a robber.—ED.

[2] [Making use of the reading of Syr. Sin. in Matt. xxvii. 16.]

The Jews. We have a law, and under that law he is guilty of death, because he claimed to be a son of God.

(*When Pilate hears this statement, he is even more afraid to do what they ask, and goes back into the Government House.*)

SCENE VI. *The Same : Interior.*

Pil. (*to Jesus*). Where do you come from ? (*Jesus does not answer.*) Have you nothing to say to me ? Do you not know that I have authority either to release you or to crucify you ?

Jes. You could have had no authority over me, unless it had been given you from heaven. He who betrayed me to you is more to blame than you. (*At this point Pilate begins to think how he can release Jesus.*)

The Jews (*crying out, off* [1]). If you release this man, you are no friend of the Emperor. Any one who claims to be a king is guilty of treason. (*Pilate listens to what they are saying.*)

SCENE VII. *Outside the Government House : a place called the Pavement.* [2]

Pilate brings Jesus out, and takes his official seat. It is the Eve of the Passover. The time is about 6 *a.m.*

Pil. (*to the Jews*). There is your King !

The Jews (*crying out*). Away with him ! Away with him ! To the cross !

Pil. Am I to crucify your King ?

The Jews. We have no King but the Emperor.

(*Pilate hands Jesus over to the Jews for crucifixion. They take him. He goes out, carrying his cross.*)

J. M. THOMPSON.

[1] [Either so ; or else another scene between Pilate and the Jews, outside the Government House, has to be supplied.]

[2] Gabbatha in Hebrew.—ED.

THOMAS SCOTT.

A Study in Conversion.

It was one of the practices of piety in Evangelical households, which owed their religious fervour to the movement inaugurated in Scotland by Thomas Chalmers, to read aloud on Sunday evenings a commentary on the Holy Scriptures. The present writer can remember this going on in the home of his childhood. A big, solemn-looking volume would be produced, when all the members of the family had been assembled, and the head of the house would read a few verses of the biblical text, then the commentary on these ; then more verses and more commentary ; till as much as a whole chapter would be completed. The commentator, he well remembers, was one Haweis, an English divine, and the commentary consisted of a paraphrase, not infrequently rather commonplace and tedious ; but each section wound up with " practical remarks," which were pithy and sensible ; and memory still recalls the relief with which these resting-places were reached in the course of the journey.

The great commentary of this type on the Scriptures is that of Matthew Henry, which is vast in extent and, in certain respects, a work of genius. But between that of Henry and that of Haweis there was published and, for a considerable time, held sway a similar work, in six quarto volumes, from the pen of Thomas Scott. This happened to catch the rising tide, in favour of Bible-reading, created by the Evangelical Revival, and, for a time, it commanded a miraculous circulation. At one stage in its history it was proved in the Law Courts that its publishers had already received from the sale almost two hundred thousand pounds. It was prized in Evangelical households in both the United

Kingdom and America ; and even so enlightened a critic as Sir James Stephen spoke of it as a work which placed its author on a pinnacle of fame and would carry his name down to succeeding generations. It is to be feared, however, that the tooth of time has remorselessly eaten away the reputation due to this achievement. While Matthew Henry's *magnum opus* still asserts its place in the land of the living, many a preacher, when well-nigh asphyxiated with the learned dust of other commentaries, turning to it in the confident hope of alighting upon something nutritious and sappy, the volumes of Scott will be asked after in vain even in the remoter corners of Christendom where old books linger out their existence the longest.

Thomas Scott had to his credit several other volumes, which, in their day, made not a little noise in the world, several of them being of a highly controversial order. But his chances of immortality are centred now in a single small volume, in which he has narrated his own conversion. It bears the title of *The Force of Truth*. It was published in 1779, very soon after the occurrence of the experiences which it narrates, and, even if it were less remarkable than it is as a record of the experiences of its author, it would be worthy of attention in the history of English theology on account of the deep debt to it acknowledged by John Henry Newman. In *Apologia pro Vita Sua* the head of the Catholic Revival speaks of Scott as a writer who, at an early stage, made a deeper impression on his mind than any other and to whom he almost owed his soul. " I so admired and delighted in his writings," he adds, " that, when I was an undergraduate, I thought of making a visit to his parsonage, in order to see a man whom I so greatly revered. I hardly think I could have given up the idea of this expedition even after I had taken my degree ; for the news of his death in 1821 came upon me as a disappointment as well as a

sorrow. I hung upon the lips of Daniel Wilson, afterwards Bishop of Calcutta, as in two sermons at St. John's Chapel he gave the history of Scott's life and death. I had been possessed of his *Force of Truth* and *Essays* from a boy; his Commentary I bought when I was an undergraduate. What, I suppose, will strike any reader of Scott's history and writings, is his bold unworldliness and vigorous independence of mind. He followed truth wherever it led him, beginning with Unitarianism and ending in a zealous faith in the Holy Trinity. It was he who first planted deep in my mind that fundamental truth of religion. With the assistance of Scott's *Essays*, and the admirable work of Jones of Nayland, I made a collection of Scripture texts in proof of the doctrine, with remarks (I think) of my own upon them, before I was sixteen; and a few months later I drew up a series of texts in support of each verse of the Athanasian Creed. These papers I have still. Besides his unworldliness, what I also admired in Scott was his resolute opposition to Antinomianism, and the minutely practical character of his writings. They show him to be a true Englishman, and I deeply felt his influence; and for years I used almost as proverbs what I considered to be the scope and issue of his doctrine, Holiness rather than peace, and, Growth the only evidence of life."

The principal dates in Scott's life may be given at this point. In 1747 he was born at Braytoft, Lincolnshire; ordained in 1772, he first held the curacy of Stoke-Goldington and Weston-Underwood in Buckinghamshire, which he exchanged in 1775 for that of Ravenstone in the same neighbourhood; in 1780 he became John Newton's successor at Olney, where he was brought into fellowship with the poet Cowper; in 1785 he removed to London, to be chaplain of the Lock Hospital, a famous Evangelical centre at the time; and from 1801 till his death in 1821 he was

rector of Aston-Sandford. To these dates may be added one more : in 1799 he was appointed the first secretary of the Church Missionary Society, an office in which he has had many distinguished successors, but which was in his time unpaid.

Of the period before his conversion the account given by himself is the reverse of attractive ; and in it there are few gleams of the light which lighteneth every man coming into the world. At the time of his confirmation, indeed, there were some quickening movements in his spirit, and subsequently certain spiritual anxieties were awakened by the appearance of delicacy in his bodily constitution ; but these did not amount to much more than fears of death and hell ; and his attempts to commence habits of prayer and other reformations were so futile and soon over that he contracted a deep persuasion, which remained with him ever afterwards, of the inability of the natural man to reform himself. Sir James Stephen, whose knowledge of the subject may be judged to have been trustworthy, hints that there was some grave delinquency, connected with an early attempt to become a medical practitioner ; and, after that, the young man was condemned to nine years of farm-labour, which was anything but to his taste. He aspired to something higher, and the ministry of the Gospel seemed to be the easiest form of ambition's ladder. Accordingly he made sufficient progress with the learned languages to secure ordination, and, after becoming a clergyman, he exhibited not a little diligence in the same direction, though as yet his studies had little of a theological bent. He was never a scholar in the technical sense, yet, in subsequent years, when occasion arose, he could produce essays on the interpretation of Scripture, on the punishment of crucifixion, on the Hebrew points, on the authority of the Septuagint, and on an omission in the Arabic Testament—these being among the titles

of pieces in the tenth volume of his collected works. He gives himself as his motives for adopting the clerical profession a desire for a comfortable existence, the opportunity for abundance of leisure to read books, and, above all, the chance of literary distinction and immortality—reasons which at that time were quite respectable, as any one can inform himself by reading the terms in which Cowper, in his poetry, satirised the much less creditable motives and ambitions of the mass of the clergy.

Scott had fallen in with a Socinian commentary on the Scriptures, which he had read with avidity, because, he says, it enabled him to think lightly of his sins, as these did not, according to the teaching of this work, expose him to everlasting punishment—a remark which recalls the difference perceived by St. Augustine between his early religion, Manichaeism, and Christianity—that the former never made him uneasy in the practice of the sins of the flesh to which he was addicted. But Scott's suddenly adopted views puffed him up with a pleasant sense of his own ability and originality, and his early preaching was remarkable for nothing so much as contemptuous attacks on the hidebound doctrines of the orthodox, and specially on the narrowness of those among the clergy who were then known as Methodists, because they had adopted the views and practices of the Evangelical Revival. In making these attacks it is not improbable that he had specially in view the Rev. John Newton, then rising to the leadership of the Evangelical party ; for this clergyman was at the time a near neighbour and much in the mouths of the public. However, the youthful orator was not so carried away with his own eloquence as to be unaware that it was discreditable to a clergyman of the Church of England to be a Socinian ; so he concealed his views from his superiors, and was aware in his inmost soul that he was a hypocrite.

The turning-point in Scott's life was a gross breach of ministerial duty. A man and wife among his parishioners were dying, and he was aware of their illness; but he did not visit them, it being his rule in such cases only to visit when asked to do so. But he learned that his neighbour, Newton, had been visiting the poor couple repeatedly, though to do so cost him a walk of several miles each way. After one of the patients had died, Scott called, but only to feel how little he had to say to a dying person. The sense of shame with which this overwhelmed him shook his foundations; and he had to confess to himself that, however inferior the preaching of his Evangelical neighbour might be to his own, at least his practice was superior. All through the experiences which ensued the professional point of view was more prominent than the personal. He was not so much moved by anxiety for his own salvation as by the desire to be an honest clergyman, able to perform the duties of his office to those providentially placed under his charge. For this reason his account of his conversion has been of special use to the members of his own profession, not a few of whom have learned from his example to look upon their sacred calling in an entirely new light.

Scott did not, however, all at once yield to the impressions made upon him by his own misconduct. He was of a proud disposition, and his first instinct was to justify himself. Accordingly he attempted to fasten a correspondence on Newton, whom he hoped to convince of the error of his ways, writing to him half-a-dozen or more letters, in which he fancied he had proved how superior were his own opinions to those of his neighbour. Newton's conduct on this occasion creates a favourable impression of his mind and character; for, while acknowledging courteously the receipt of the polemical missives, he avoided controversy. He perceived that the Spirit of God was at work in the soul of the

heated debater, and he left Him to perfect His own work.

Thus thrown back on himself, Scott came to the resolution, that he would shut himself up with the Bible and from it alone wrench the secret of the truth. He appears to have taken it for granted that this was the ultimate standard, and he read it over and over again from Genesis to Revelation, endeavouring to grasp its message as a whole. From it, then, he would find out whether the Socinian scheme, which he had adopted, was really true, or whether Newton's Gospel was to be believed, or whether the truth lay in the golden mean between these two extremes. He began to keep a diary, as a record of the progress he was making with his self-imposed task. He accumulated the deliverances of Scripture on all the most important topics which came up for consideration, till he had before his eyes the joint testimony of all parts of the Word of God on all the questions agitating his inquiring mind. This is a method of incomparable value, because the passages on the most vital subjects are numerous and solemn, and their cumulative effect is overwhelming. There could hardly be a better plan suggested to anyone troubled with sceptical doubts. But, being a preacher, Scott was able to supplement it with another. When he came upon a text which seemed to gather up the teaching of the entire Scriptures on any point, he would preach on this verse a great sermon, in which were embodied the results of long inquiry and meditation; and every preacher knows how the preaching of a discourse of this kind may mark an epoch in the history of his own thinking.

This investigation was continued for three years with unabated perseverance, and by the end of that time there had shaped itself in the mind of the inquirer a clear and consistent system of what he believed to be true. He used no recondite methods of exegesis and was determined to call no man master. But he found the Bible itself to be its own

interpreter. The statements on the most important points were so numerous and unmistakable that he could have no doubt whatever what was the intention of the divine Author, and about every doctrine of the Gospel there was some classical passage, stamped conclusively with the image and superscription of Him who is the truth. The partial statement of one portion of Holy Writ was perfected by the supplementary statement in another ; and, if sometimes the conclusions to be drawn from the joint testimony of all the parts was dubitable, this could be taken as a sign that the point in question was unessential. There had not yet dawned on the minds of such searchers after truth the perception that the Bible is a progressive revelation, in which there are many different stages and types of doctrine, this being the discovery of what is now known as Biblical Theology—a science only developed during the last hundred years. To Scott, as to the other thinkers of the same age, the sacred book was a unit, and the message from every part of it was the same. What he was in search of was not how much, or rather how little, Abraham or Isaiah knew, or what were the peculiar ideas of Peter, Paul or John, but what was the Gospel of the living God ; and he was sensible, month after month and year after year, of ascertaining this more and more convincingly and comprehensively.

One touching result of this Scriptural preaching was that inquirers began to come to him in spiritual anxiety ; and it deeply moved him to realise how little fitted he was to act as a spiritual guide. But the love of his work began to gain upon him ; and he established in his parish first one and then another fresh centre of preaching.

He did not continue so entirely self-taught out of the Bible alone as he had at first intended, because other books also offered assistance from time to time. Thus, the *Pastoral Care* of Bishop Burnet directed his attention to the standards

of his own Church—the Prayer Book, the Thirty-Nine Articles and the Homilies. In the first of these he was specially arrested by the Ordination Service, in which he discovered that he had, at ordination, committed himself to beliefs and vows with which neither his theology nor his practice corresponded. The others he had not even read ; and, when he now read them, he could not but admit that, on their very face, they abounded with statements which contradicted the opinions in which he had gloried. So keenly did he feel this that he refused an offer of promotion in the Church, because to accept it would have involved a fresh subscription to the Creed. Ridicule has been cast upon him because he did not feel the same sensitiveness about his two previous subscriptions ; but he was a cautious Englishman, and he was probably by this time pretty well aware of the direction in which conviction was carrying him.

Several standard divines of his own Church helped him at particular steps of his progress. Thus he mentions Dr. Clark as having assisted him to rise from Socinianism to Arianism, this being for him not only an upward step but a preparation for a step higher still, though he remarks, not without humour, that this divine had influenced others in the opposite way—to step down from orthodoxy to Arianism. At a critical moment some friend gave him a present of a number of standard works in English theology, and, wherever he turned in these books, he found his preconceived notions contradicted and the new views which were forcing themselves on his attention confirmed. The divine of all others, however, by whom he was most influenced was the judicious Hooker ; and he was wont to say, when his own mind was ultimately made up, that there was not a single one of his new beliefs which he could not prove from this authority. This was a favourite contention of the Evangelical leaders, when they had come to full consciousness of themselves—

that the religion for which they stood was that of the symbolical books and of the reformers of the Anglican Church, and that their opponents were so ignorant both of religion and theology as to be unaware how contradictory their habits and opinions were to the best minds of the past.

It is not difficult to trace the course of the revolution wrought in the mind of Scott in the manner above indicated, although to himself at the time the new views came as exciting surprises, and even yet it is difficult to read without emotion the progress of the honest man from stage to stage.

The shock of conviction of sin, arising from the neglect of his dying parishioners, led the way to deep and prolonged humiliation, as he confessed to himself that, though a clergyman, he had been living a prayerless life and habitually indulging in known sin. From this point it was easy to make the transition to justification by faith alone, and here Hooker helped him greatly by his earnest and conclusive statements on the impossibility of any child of Adam attaining to righteousness through works of his own. If, however, through the work of Christ sinners could be justified, then Christ must be a very different being from the ordinary children of men; because in proportion to the work must be the dignity of the Workman. From the dignity of Christ to the personality and divinity of the Holy Spirit, and so to the doctrine of the Trinity, he made the transition very much by the same path by which, in the Early Church, the logic of the Christian faith was realised by Fathers and Councils. The doctrine of election was the last element of the Evangelical faith to obtain the mastery of his mind; and, indeed, it does not lie clearly in the path along which he had been advancing. But it is incontestably in the Bible; and from Witsius' work on the Covenants he learned how it can be employed as a practical proof, for the encouragement of weak and doubting Christians; and so he apprehended it

also, or rather was apprehended by it, and thus completed the circle of his new beliefs ; though he never could assign to election quite the rank which he gave to the greater doctrines of his creed.

While many of those who have narrated their own conversion have expected to make an impression on their readers by the suddenness and miraculousness of their experiences, Scott, on the contrary, depended for the impression he hoped to make on the slowness of the process by which he arrived at his conclusions and the absence of excitement from his mental operations. He had no dreams or visions to record, but told a plain tale of close and severe investigation into the truth by logical methods. His great argument was, that he had gone straight to the Bible itself for light, and had at every step invoked the divine blessing on his undertaking. In fact, he became a man of prayer, while thus engaged in the pursuit of truth, and the acquisition of his new views exercised the most desirable influence on his character, making him both a holy and a happy man. It was out of the exuberance of newly found conviction that he wrote his autobiography, and he confidently appealed to his readers to agree with him that a system of belief obtained in this manner must be the truth of God. The stringency of this conclusion might form the subject of an animated discussion in a debating society, but it certainly carries a cogent appeal to the mind of the average man ; and there is every reason to believe that the example of Scott has persuaded many, especially among the clergy, to go and do likewise.

James Stalker.

HINDUISM AS MYSTICISM.

The word mysticism is one of those vague and comforting words that seem to satisfy people without being understood, and perhaps satisfy them all the better just because they are not clearly understood. It has had a great vogue of recent years, partly due to a genuine return from the wilderness of a barren rationalism to inwardness and experience in religion, partly to the recrudescence of superstition that has characterised recent times. It describes, however, a real element, sometimes leading to good and sometimes to evil, that is found in all genuine religious life, but that is found more markedly in some types of feeling and thought than in others. It is found in unusual richness in India for, I think, two reasons. One of these is that India shows us a people that have, it may be claimed, more earnestly occupied themselves with the search for God and more passionately longed for God than, perhaps, any other people. Therefore if mystical experience be understood as meaning the experience of direct and immediate intercourse with God or the longing for such experience, it is to be expected that it will be found in special abundance among such a people. The second reason why mysticism is a marked characteristic of Indian thought is that Indian thought has always, for whatever reason, been possessed with a passion for final unity. It has demanded always that its thinkers should not pause in their pilgrimage of thought till they reached an ultimate One and passed into its silence. Thus two types of mysticism are to be found in India. There is the devotional mysticism that obeys the pull of the heart and that will not be stayed until it rest upon the heart of God. This it shares with the Hebrew saints and psalmists and with many Christian saints. The

other, the intellectual quest for an all-inclusive unity, is more peculiarly India's own. The Hebrew had the first, the thirst of the heart for God, the living God : he had not this other, the desire to breathe the thin air where the Absolute is believed to dwell. In the Hebrew, as some one has said, " the lead of thought, the metaphysical *flair*, is entirely wanting." The Hindu, on the other hand, is incurably metaphysical.

The worth of any mysticism, its spiritual and moral value, depends upon the character of the goal to which it looks and which it desires to reach. It is only a method, a way, a movement, often a storm, of the soul. Its effects may be good or evil according to the ideal vision that beckons it on. Accordingly we find that Indian mysticism is of every moral quality, sometimes hideously degrading, sometimes beautifully ennobling, sometimes moving the heart to compassion, sometimes emptying and paralyzing it. It is a quest for reality, a desire to escape from mutation and disappointment to something stable and satisfying, a surge of the soul towards the Infinite—and as such it has never ceased to compel the soul of India. One of its earliest and most moving expressions is to be found in the famous prayer of the Upaniṣad, " From the unreal lead me to the real ; from darkness lead me to the light : from death lead me to immortality." That passion and aspiration has expressed itself in many fashions in Indian religious exercise and Indian religious speculation and the prevailing type and texture of religion is in consequence what we may properly term mystical.

There is not perhaps much that is characteristically Indian in the animistic mysticism which we find still flourishing in the land to-day as it has flourished through all the centuries. There is a crude kind of " mystical union " in that possession by the god which is to be seen in many a

temple in India, as it is to be seen in most low forms of religion. In connexion with the worship of the village goddesses, the "Mothers," and of such an aboriginal god as Khandoba, god-possession is of frequent occurrence. It is supposed to bring an increase of vital force to the possessed one, and one may see him suddenly dash with extraordinary speed up the flights of stairs that lead to the hill-top where Khandoba's temple stands, or again seeking to demonstrate his divine vigour by breaking chains in the temple precincts. Sometimes he prophesies, the god speaking through him. The condition is induced by the beating of a drum or by ecstatic dancing, producing often an appearance of unconsciousness when his soul is supposed to leave the body and become united with the god.

Again we see hypnotic states induced by means of the constant repetition of the name of a god. In a legend that is told of an Indian saint he is said to have gone on repeating the name of Rāma till white ants built their nest about him, and still from the midst of the ant-hill the name came, as he went on repeating it in a condition of *samādhi* or trance. The prevalence of such trance-conditions in India is no doubt derived from primitive sources, as also are the practices of Yoga, which are, no doubt, of very ancient origin. By means of postures and breathing exercises it was believed that power was obtained over the senses, and thereafter followed meditation and the concentration of the mind upon some single object until with the coming of a state of ecstatic unconsciousness the *yogi* was believed to draw near to God. How far these practices are related to what is called Shamanism among primitive peoples and how far they belong to a higher region of mental exercise it is not easy to say. The results that are claimed for them, such as the power to become invisible, to travel cross-legged through the sky, to touch and feel with the hand the sun

and moon (William Blake, the poet Mystic, said he could touch the sky with his stick), if literally understood, as they usually are, would class them with magic rather than mysticism. Evelyn Underhill distinguishes between these by affirming that "magic wants to get, mysticism wants to give." The *yoga* ritual certainly often agrees with the definition of a magical rite as "a tremendous forcing-house of the latent faculties of man's spiritual nature." We can understand that these trance conditions, without giving any fellowship with God, induce a sense of enlargement and power unknown to the waking consciousness. Suggestions flow into the quiescent mind, though they are not likely to be of the character of a revelation of the divine. The diligent practice of these means of concentrating and strengthening the mind—what is called in Sanscrit "one-pointedness"—is more commonly found in India than anywhere else in the world and, if it does not lead to any increase of knowledge of God, it gives at least a control over the movements of the mind that is of value. Of course, on the other hand, these practices are very commonly made use of to deceive and have nowhere been so exploited and abused as in India. "Samādhī or trance," says Professor Har Dayal in the *Modern Review*, as quoted in Dr. Farquhar's *Crown of Hinduism*, "is regarded as the acme of spiritual progress. How strange it is that the capacity for swooning away should be considered the acme of wisdom! It is very easy to lose consciousness if one has strong emotions and a feeble intellect. To look upon an abnormal psychological condition produced by artificial means as the sign of enlightenment was a folly reserved for Indian philosophers."

There are other crude methods of obtaining union with the deity that are to be found among the many survivals of primitive worship that India still shows to us. There

is, for example, marriage of the worshipper to the god with its consequence that the girl so married can marry no one else. There may be different causes for this practice, which we see in higher forms in the spiritual nuptials of mysticism, but no doubt one impulse behind it was that of getting into closer fellowship with the source of all life. The desire to promote the fertility of the fields, to obtain more fulness of life, is apparently one of the motive powers in primitive religion explaining much that later became overlaid with other ideas. The worshipper wishes to obtain the *mana*, the strength of the god. A group of stones, daubed with red, in nearly every village represents these, often nameless, givers of strength. This is often indicated by the fact that close by are the putting stone and the Indian clubs and the wrestling-pit of the village athletes. Again the same desire for communion is seen in the drinking of the blood of the animal, or, when no animal is sacrificed, as is the case in most worships in modern India, the eating of the cocoa-nut offered before the idol. It is common to see during any festival the crowd scrambling for pieces of cocoa-nut scattered among them after being presented to the god. They have little enough idea of getting anything but something good to eat on a day of festival and enjoyment, but behind all these things is the desire to obtain the life of the god. That motive is no doubt even present in the Sākta worship when they "drink, drink, drink, until they fall on the ground in utter helplessness." For we remember that William James says that "the drunken consciousness is part of the mystic consciousness."

Thus it appears that "mysticism is part of our ancestral heritage, of our submerged and savage past." It is not necessarily gross because it has a gross origin: it is not necessarily unspiritual because it springs from physical roots. The fact, as Dr. E. Caird used to say, that the child

is father of the man does not mean that the man is merely a larger child. "As the psyche grows," says Miss May Sinclair, "this desire (for life, for physical strength, for the *mana* of the god) grows with it . . . ; it grows into a consuming passion; it passes beyond physical bounds; and the Love of Life becomes the Love of God."

When we turn from these crude movements of the blind soul to the mystical quest for union with the Absolute we seem to have travelled far enough from the childhood of the world. Man has become old and weary and his idea of power and where power is to be sought is very highly "sublimated" and very far from being primitive. The god of the primitive worshipper is a very full-blooded being and his gifts are strength and children and enlarged life. But in the region of the thought of the sages of the Upaniṣads we are breathing a very different and a far more rarefied atmosphere. But still it is the desire to climb to the divine heights that is the motive, the desire for illumination, for peace, for life even if it be a life that is indistinguishable from death. Other thoughts have come to make the way of the seeker harder than it was in earlier ages. Because of the doctrine of transmigration and *Karma* the goal of peace is seen to be attainable only by deliverance from life. And further, beyond the confusions of polytheism, the multitude of gods, there must be a final One, and the Indian thinker cannot be content until he reaches that far land where He dwells, even if he has to lay aside his personality in order to reach Him. This Ultimate or Brahman is that-which-alone-absolutely-is, permanent, immutable, free from all "becoming," unattached to the finite, and beyond the reach of the "here" and the "now." That on the one side; and on the other a self which, somehow, holds of that unapproachable reality, which has in it an "unsundered something" which essentially is reality. The

coming together of these, so separated by a world of impermanence and illusion, is the attainment of peace and union.

This is accomplished by the Indian sages by the method of denying the reality of all else except the real that is Brahman and the real that is the soul, and by identifying the two. It is a mark of all mysticism to contemn all material things: the consuming passion for the ultimate seems to reduce to ashes all else than that incombustible reality. But here, as in so much else, India goes all the way and, in at least its most influential thinking, declares all but Brahman to be illusion and dream. And so, as a consequence, we have an attainment of union which is absorption and plunges the soul into the abyss of unconsciousness. "That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it."

Is this goal of silence, of "emptiness and nothingness," the true mystic goal? In India, as elsewhere, the mystic seeker finds it hard to make up his mind as to how to answer this question. He wants final oneness and will not be content with less, but he wants also communion and fellowship, which requires that personal identity remain. The thinkers are mostly of the former sort: they will have no half-way house. Whatever happens they will go the whole way and pay the whole price. When Vāskali asked the sage Bāhva what the Atman was, the sage gave no answer. And a second time and a third, when asked, he remained silent. Then, when asked once more, he said, "Do you not understand that I have answered you. That Atman is silence."

Pantheism is always a peril in the way of the mystic seeker after union and there is too much pantheism here to satisfy us as to the religious and moral worth of the relationship that he attains. Those distinctions are

obliterated which are necessary for a moral life and personal religion. A "holy man" sitting by the wayside in his saffron robe, when asked how many gods there are, replied, "Two," pointing to his two eyes. That is to say, he himself is God. This, though it has its parallel even in what calls itself Christian mysticism, has passed beyond into a region where the religious and moral life cannot persist. The same religious attitude, as Miss May Sinclair points out in her *Defence of Idealism*, is described almost in the very words of the Upaniṣads by Julian of Norwich: "I it am: I it am: I it am that is highest: I it am that thou lovest: I it am that thou enjoyest: I it am that thou servest: I it am that thou longest for: I it am that thou desirest: I it am that thou meanest, I it am that is all." This is an attainment that it is difficult to reconcile with the claims of ordinary morality and religion.

All this is, in fact, too intellectual, too metaphysical, to be of great value for religious ends. Mysticism is in most danger when it is most intellectual, when it turns its back upon the needs and claims of the heart. It is true of much in the Upaniṣads that it is seeking to discover the relations of man with the universe rather than his relation with God. An intellectual unity seems to be the most all-inclusive that man can imagine and an intellectually conceived being to be the one least partaking of the temporal and so nearest to the nature of that which is above time and thought and being itself. To Indian mystics especially it seems that only, as Boehme, a speculative mystic of the West puts it, "by stopping the wheel of the imagination and the senses" that He, of whom all that can be said is, "Neti, neti," "He is not, He is not," can be reached and known. All this belongs, therefore, more to metaphysics than to religion. But in the broad lines of its aspiration —its craving for an ultimate unity, a craving often filled

with deep emotion, its discontent with the finite, its conviction that what is deepest within is most akin to what is highest above, its affinity with mysticism is unquestionable. The "four marks," indeed, which William James has propounded as distinctive of the mystic state and which are certainly applicable to many phases of mysticism, viz., ineffability, poetic quality, transiency and passivity, are to be found here and demonstrate the kinship of the philosophy or religion of the Upaniṣads with mystic religion.

When we turn to the devotional mysticism of India, which is comprised in the general term of *bhakti*, we are in a sphere which, while thoroughly Indian in its characteristics, is much closer to the common religious heart of the world, and indeed furnishes some of its most intense and passionate examples. Its saints feel as the mystic thinkers do the passion for final oneness, but they feel still more the passion for fellowship with God. It is the strength and the conflict of these two desires that gives a "troubled intensity" to their utterances. In the Christian and Hebrew saints the poignancy of their lyrical cries for God comes from the frustration of their desire that their sense of sin creates. There is not that sense of sin in the Indian saint, and yet for him, too, a deep restlessness lies around his rest. There is struggle and despair and a division of desire for the Indian saint as for the saint of the West. It is not, however, that "when I would do good, evil is present with me"; it is a conflict between the desire of the One and of the two. The Indian saint has to make a difficult choice between deliverance from "the pang of separation" and possession of the blessed consciousness of love satisfied. From this soul-struggle come some of the most touching and beautiful lyrical utterances of the Indian poets of *bhakti*.

While the mysticism of the Upaniṣads was sometimes too cold, that which we find here is sometimes warm with a too earthly passion. This is especially so when it centres round the name of Krishṇa and is stimulated by the gross suggestions that his story supplies. In the case of the other figure to whom especially this worship is rendered, namely Rāma, this is much less frequently a fault, and that is so also where Viṭhobā (though Viṭhobā is identified with Krishṇa) is the god that is loved and adored. The prevailing method of mysticism is love, and in the whole *bhakti* movement this is the accepted means by which the worshipper and the object of his worship are brought together. For the worship of these gods, who are viewed as gracious and friendly, there seems no reason why renunciation should be required, and yet here also the fact that behind them the shadowy Brahman still looms divides the worshipper's mind between joy in the world and in the experiences of common life and rejection of them as unreal. Kabīr's poems give many examples of this vacillation. His instinct, and that of most of the *bhaktas*, turns away with dislike from the Yogī and the ascetic, those murderers of the joy of life. "The Yogī dyes his garments," he says, "instead of dyeing his mind in the colours of life." Again, "The home is the abiding place; in the home is reality; the home helps to attain him who is real." And yet, on the other hand, he says, "Do not go to the garden of flowers! O friend, go not there; in your body is the garden of flowers." What we see about us in the world is "the sport of the Unattainable One": the shadow of unreality falls across the joy of life. But on the whole for Kabīr and Tukārām and most of this school the mood of acceptance of the world and its gifts predominates. Both these poets in closely similar language remind themselves that God cares for and sustains them.

Unwearied He bears up the universe.
How light a burden I!
Does not His care the frog within the stone
With food supply?

The bird, the creeping thing, lays up no store.
This Great One knows their need!
And if I, Tukā, cast on Him my load,
Will not His mercy heed?

For the most part they would both agree with Sir Rabindranath Tagore when he says, "Deliverance is not for me in renunciation. I will never shut the doors of my senses." And yet, on the other hand, Kabīr says, "The gate is locked, but within there is fragrance": and Tukārām:

Lo in the empty world apart
I hearken, waiting Thy footfall.

Even on such human and tender hearts as Tukārām's and Kabīr's lies the spell of Brahman and the *via negativa*, so that they too would set forth on "a flight of the lonely soul to the lonely God."

Yet the desire for a fellowship of affection is inextinguishable in the hearts of these seekers. God is the "mother's house," that place of rest and love, to which the married girl looks back with so much longing from her husband's house, this world of sorrow.

As the bride looks back to her mother's house
And goes but with dragging feet,
So my soul looks up unto Thee and longs
That Thou and I may meet.

As a child cries out and is sore distressed
When its mother it cannot see,
As a fish that is taken from out the wave,
So 'tis, says Tukā, with me.

In how many pictures they present this inextinguishable desire for "God Who is their home"!

How the lotus all the night
Dreameth, dreameth of the light!

As the stream to fishes, Thou—
As is to the calf the cow.

To the faithful wife how dear
Tidings of her lord to hear!

How a miser's heart is set
On the wealth he hopes to get!

Such, says Tukā, such am I,
But for Thee I'd surely die.

This, is, says Kabīr,

the music of the meeting of soul with soul:
It is the music of the forgetting of sorrows:
It is the music that transcends all coming in and all going forth.

That is the stuff out of which true mysticism, east or west, is woven.

Again, as a means to that communion, "self-naughting" is as fully recognised as necessary by these saints as it was by the author of the *Theologia Germanica* or St. Catherine of Siena. But there is a difference between the Eastern and the Western mystic in the content of the self, the "I." In India, as we would expect from all the history of its thought, this *ego* is somewhat thin and metaphysical, not the sin-burdened "I" that it is to Christian thought. And yet one can hardly doubt that on the lips of Kabīr and Tukārām it is not merely personality that the saint feels is coming between him and God but a rebel selfhood. It is not easy to judge of the moral value of their longing for freedom from these bonds: here again the *Karma*-transmigration doctrine has an influence making their thought different from that of the Christian and certainly of less ethical value. But that we have here a more truly religious aspiration than in the case of the "Thou art That" of Upaniṣad metaphysics, there can be no doubt.

The unstruck drum of Eternity is sounded within me; but my deaf ears cannot hear it.
So long as man clamours for the *I* and the *mine*, his works are as naught:
When all love of the *I* and *Mine* is dead, then the work of the Lord is done.

Here "love of the I" and the reference to its "clamours" betray a real feeling of alienation from a God who requires obedience, a feeling that is of the same stuff as the Christian's sense of sin. So it is also in many of the songs of Tukārām.

My self I've rendered up to Thee;
I've cast it from me utterly.

Now here before Thee, Lord, I stand,
Attentive to Thy least command.

The self within me now is dead,
And Thou enthronèd in its stead.

Yea, this, I, Tukā, testify.
No longer here is "me" or "my."

That certainly seems to describe an attitude of humility and self-surrender, and

Still to the lowly soul,
He doth Himself impart,
And for His dwelling and His throne
Chooses the humble heart.

The mystic symbol of the bridegroom and the bride is as commonly employed by these saints as it was by Ruysbroek or Samuel Rutherford, but here it has not often passed through a flame of holiness that has cleansed it and that can keep it clean. When Krishṇa is the "sole male" and "all besides are females," there is manifestly a danger lest gross and sensual suggestions shall usurp the place of true devotion. Tukārām far more frequently uses the symbol of the mother and her child than this more dangerous one, and when he does use it he often does

not appear to be thinking of Krishṇa as the lover of the milkmaids. Viṭhobā, whom he worships, is usually for him the husband of Rukminī, not the lover of Rādha. It is surely a devout heart that sits waiting and longing for the god of his affection and cries—

> Says Tukā, Blest shall be the day—
> Ah, soon may it betide!—
> When One shall come from Pandhari
> To summon me, His bride.

The question of mystic thought betrays itself in these saints, though it does not cause such a paralysis of effort as in the case of those who seek to lose themselves in the ineffable and actionless Brahman. The Indian sages have certainly not been among the " great actives " of mysticism. But as with the mystics of the West, so with the mystic temper of India, its safeguard against the temptation of a slothful self-absorption will be found when it possesses at the heart of its devotional fervour the figure of the Lord Jesus Christ. For it is by its deep desire for divine communion that Indian religious thought will surely make one of its most precious contributions to the interpretation of Christ. It has already begun to make it in the person of the Christian poet, N. V. Tilak, one of the foremost among India's poets to-day. Fellowship with God is a subject of which he sings with much beauty and variety of language in hymns that are sung throughout the whole Marathi Christian Church.

> As the moon and its beams are one, so, that I be one with Thee,
> This is my prayer to Thee, O God; this is this beggar's plea.

It will be a great and precious gift if the Indian Church is able in days to come to teach us how to enter more fully into the secret of the presence of God. Then quietism will pass into a strength for service that is not shallow or fussy,

and the passivity of the ancient *rishis* will be transformed by the faith and the love of Christ into a " wise passiveness."

[*Note.*—The translations from Kabīr in this article are from Sir Rabindranath Tagore's *Hundred Poems of Kabīr.*]

N. Macnicol.

SAYINGS OF JESUS FROM MOSLEM SOURCES.

Almost every one knows that there has been in recent years a striking addition made to the written teaching of Jesus in the form of a couple of pages from a lost book of sayings of His which have turned up in the excavation of the Egyptian city of Oxyrhyncus. They have attracted a good deal of attention, first, on account of their intrinsic value, which is not slight; second, because of their critical value, constituting as they do the verification of the suspicion that there was, in the early Church, a collection of the ethical and spiritual sayings of Jesus, which have for ages been lost sight of, and might have been supposed to have altogether disappeared; some had, indeed, gone so far as to maintain that the absence of such a book was a sufficient proof that it never existed.

The Christian world has not been very enthusiastic over these recovered scraps, but it has not been unkindly. There is a natural and proper suspicion of new biblical or semi-biblical matter. Yet one of the new sayings about the cleaving of the wood and the lifting of the stone has already been consecrated in verse to the musical needs of the Labour Movement, and finds a place in the Fellowship Hymn Book. Whether the sayings receive a welcome or not (and the case is much the same as that of the recovered Odes of Solomon which also have had a doubtful reception from the faithful),

the fragments are here to stay, and they find a place among other scanty Greek fragments from early Patristic sources, like the saying in the Epistles of Ignatius that " He that is near me is near the fire, and he who is far from me is far from the Kingdom."

They might be labelled collectively, these and those, as the extra-biblical Greek remains of the teaching of Jesus, and it would be a very tiny little Greek book, as yet, though it may any day swell to a much larger dimension.

Now those who are interested in such survivals and collections will perhaps remember to have sometimes seen added to these Greek sayings another sentence which was not Greek but Arabic. It was said to come from a Mosque in India, and it informed us that Jesus said (it is the very introductory formula of the sayings from Egypt), that " This world is a bridge : pass over it, but do not take up your residence upon it."

As far as I know, this was the first and for a long time the only contribution [1] which the East has made to the teaching of Jesus, outside the pages of the canonical writings. When we reflect upon the very scanty limits within which the primitive Christian records are confined, we may well be surprised that nothing definite has come to us from Palestinian tradition or from the Syriac literature to add to the biblical account. The one saying from India to which I have referred might well have set us thinking and enquiring. Indeed, it became apparent to oriental scholars that, if Syria had nothing to say on the subject, and Egypt had nothing except among Greek-speaking peoples, the Arabic literature showed signs of saying a great deal ; not indeed in the pages of the Koran, but outside of that bible also, in the voluminous literature of the saints and sages of Islam. As

[1] Add the Persian story of the dead dog whose teeth were, Jesus said, like pearls.

regards the Koran, indeed, every one knew that there were some references to Jesus, taken chiefly from the Apocryphal Gospels of the Infancy, and their tales of how the child Jesus made mud-sparrows, and set them flying in mid-heaven.

But there were few traditions about Jesus that told of His teaching, its matter or its manner, and we may conclude that although Mohammed picked up a good many biblical and associated traditions from odd quarters, he did not come across anything that was comparable with a book of Sayings of Jesus. An enquiry that was almost fruitless with regard to the Koran showed signs of being fruitful elsewhere in the Moslem literature. An American professor printed six sayings of Jesus from a Persian source in 1908, and Dr. Zwemer in his *Moslem Christ* printed in 1912 eight such sayings, which he took from a collection of apocryphal Moslem legends, made by one of the Jesuit fathers, named Sheykho, at Beyrout two years previously. Professor D. S. Margoliouth drew attention in the *Expository Times* for 1903–4 to seventy-seven sayings attributed to Jesus in the mystical writers of Islam, with especial reference to Al Ghazzali.

Dr. Mingana, also, discovered a rich mine of such quotations in an Arabic MS. in the John Rylands Library, three of which he published in the *Expository Times* for May, 1916, and now we have the first instalment of a collection of three hundred such sayings made by the Arabic Professor at the University of Madrid, Professor Asin et Palacios, and published in the series known as *Patrologia Orientalis*. It is a splendid piece of gleaning, made chiefly from the ascetic writers, especially those known as the Sufis, the real saints of Islam, and in particular from the writings of Al Ghazzali, who is almost the only instance of an *orthodox* Sufi, and held in the highest esteem as the prince of Moslem doctors. We shall hear more of Al Ghazzali before long, for he is a mystic of the first water. For the present,

he comes in as one of the chief contributors to the Moslem sayings of Jesus.

As we said just now, this collection, from which we shall presently make some extracts, is gathered from the ascetic and mystic writers of Islam, who reinforced their doctrine, for which there is little enough in the way of encouragement in the Koran, by an appeal to the authority and teaching of Jesus. This they could not have done if Jesus had not, for them, appeared in the light of an ascetic, or, at least, a mystical teacher. That sets one thinking at once. Was Jesus really what the Indians call a Sadhu,—a wandering, homeless person whom the love of God had bewitched away from the follies and futilities of ordinary life, at war with its pleasure and superior to its pains? Our own current interpretation of Jesus has always minimised the ascetic element in His teaching, and has made little of its mystical side. He could not be a true ascetic, for He did not wear a hair shirt, like John, nor cultivate a minimum diet. If He did not marry, He did not despise women, nor alienate children, as an ascetic commonly does, and if He said some things about the abandonment of the world and its dearest relations, and imagined the path to heaven as strewn with ejected right eyes, and amputated right hands and right feet we never took Him literally as some eastern ascetics are said to have done. It is, indeed, one of the glories of *our* interpretation of Jesus that He at least was not a monk nor anything like one. Quite other appears to have been the view of the Sufi saints and confessors, as we shall see when we come to look at some of the sayings that they have conserved about Him, or evolved from their inner consciousness as things which He ought to have said (perhaps did say in part).

So much by way of preliminary and by way of warning against expecting an increase of historical matter for Dr. Glover or the next writer of the life of Christ.

First of all, there are, as we should expect, a number of sayings that are either taken from the Gospels or are obvious modifications of things that stand in the Gospels. For instance, when we find it stated that Jesus (upon whom may God give peace) said :

> Do not hang your pearls upon the necks of pigs, for wisdom is better than a pearl, and he who scorns it is worse than swine,

we are clearly in the neighbourhood of Matthew vii.

The quotation implies that pigs despise pearls, which shows that it is not a complete saying. For the way in which pigs despise pearls is by trampling upon them, which cannot be done with a necklace.

The writer has explained that the pearl that is in danger of being slighted and must not be vulgarised is the Divine Wisdom. This is an esoteric touch which is involved in the Gospel teaching and may very well have belonged to the Gospel. Thus we have found nothing fresh in one sense, and in another sense we have found it.

When we find Jesus credited with a series of similitudes concerning the hypocritical professors, we shall at once recognise kinship with passages in the Gospels. " Wise men, says Jesus, who are not good men, are like a stone, which has fallen on the mouth of a stream : they do not drink themselves, nor do they allow the stream to flow over the land which has been sown." This is a very good illustration, at all events, of the saying in Matthew xxiii., where Jesus accuses the Pharisees of closing the Kingdom of Heaven against men, not entering in themselves, nor allowing others to enter in. The passage quoted has further illustration of the theme, and concludes by saying that the people who are denounced are like " Sepulchres, whose outside appears like a habitable house, but inside is full of dead men's bones." The writer has a parallel also to the case of a white-washed drain-pipe, which answers to the biblical words " full of all

uncleanness." The parallel in Matthew is, then, capable of being further illuminated by the Moslem reference. We need not decide definitely whether it represents a longer or a variant parabolic teaching of Jesus.

Sometimes the saying appears to be a quotation *plus* an early expansion or exposition of it.

For example, we shall all be at home in the following:

> Consider the fowls, they do not sow nor reap nor gather into barns, and yet God (may He be exalted) sustains them from day to day.

What shall we say to this that follows?

> But and if ye say: our stomachs are bigger than theirs: Consider the camels, how God (may He be exalted) has designed these created things for their support.

Is that part of the original teaching? If so, it comes under the heading of Humorous Touches in the Teaching of Jesus.

Now let us go on to illustrate the statement which we made, that these Moslem saints regarded Jesus as one with themselves in the contempt of the world and in scorn of its wealth and vain glory. For them, Jesus was the typical poor man.

> The Messiah (may God fill him with blessings and peace) said, I indeed love poverty, I hate wealth.
>
> *And no form of address was more pleasing to Jesus than when any one said to him, O Poor Man!* (No. 18 of Margoliouth.)

This is pretty strong, I will not say stronger than the Gospel. St. Francis would arise and denounce me if I did. We may have undervalued the Christian tradition, as to the poor man to whom the Kingdom of Heaven belongs. We remember that the earliest Christian heresy (if it was a heresy) is that of the Ebionim, or poor men; the Fathers, not understanding the meaning of the word, said they were the followers of a certain Ebion, and that they had poor thoughts of Jesus theologically. It seems that Ebion may really have existed, and that he was, in fact, the founder of the Faith

whose disciples used to address him, acceptably to himself, as Ebion. St. Francis knows what I am trying to say, because he believes it all ; I am only an amateur, a picker up of mystical crumbs !

Here is another saying that looks in the same direction :

The Messiah said : Have no regard to the riches of the Gentiles, who are of this world, for the dazzle of their riches will take away the light of your faith. (No. 63 of Margoliouth.)

What makes me think this saying is genuine is not merely its evident spiritual value, but the fact that it is expressed in biblical language. What has a Moslem to do with " riches of the Gentiles " ? but it says in Isaiah, " Ye shall eat the riches of the Gentiles," and Jesus appears to be contradicting the prophecy and setting it on one side. It must be true. Is it not much the same thing as the Cardinal once said to the Pope, as they watched the waggons of treasure rolling into the Vatican, " The time is past, Holy Father, when the Church could say, ' Silver and gold have I none.' " And the Pope said wisely and sadly, " Past also is the time when the Church could say, Arise and walk."

Sometimes these Moslem saints take Jesus to the point of caricature, by representing Him as belonging to the " Do-Without-Society " in grotesque and impossible terms. The " Do-Without-Society " is the one to which the philosopher belonged, who, walking down the street that corresponds to Regent Street in ancient Athens, remarked : " How many things there are that we have no need of ! " The War lords are taking us down the same street to-day. Here is my grotesque illustration.

Jesus the Messiah used to carry with him nothing but a comb and a water-jug ; one day he saw a man combing his beard with his fingers, so he promptly threw away the comb ; afterwards he saw another man taking water to drink with his hands, so He straightway threw away His water-jug. (No. 65 of Margoliouth.)

I am able to prove, from archæological considerations, that the earliest comb of the human race had five teeth, and answered to the five fingers; but I am not prepared to accept it as a final symbol of social evolution, and to initiate a reaction against it. However, to continue the theme of the scorn of the world and its multiplicity.

Jesus said: O company of my apostles! Discharge to the utmost the duties of religion, and be content with the cheapest things in this world, just as the people of this world are content with the minimum of religious observances if so be that they may get the complete possession of this world.

This is a little more balanced than the previous judgments, inasmuch as it lays the stress upon a right contentment. John Bunyan, who was as keen a pilgrim as any whom he ever planned, thought contentment a great grace, and makes his bright-faced shepherd lad sing:

I am content with what I have
Little it be or much,
And, Lord, contentment still I crave,
Because thou savest such.

For unworldliness generally take the following striking parable (No. 48 of Margoliouth):

Once upon a time the world came to Jesus in the shape of a toothless old hag, all bedight with ornaments. Jesus said: How many husbands have you had? The old dame replied, More than I can count. Said Jesus, Are they all dead, or have they all divorced you? Nay, said she, I killed them every one. Jesus said, Alas for thy surviving husbands! Have they not taken example from those that are gone, seeing that thou hast destroyed them one by one? And how have they not been ware of thee?"

This is a little sermon on the text "Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world." It is, at any rate, the kind of discourse that might have been offered in an early Christian meeting, when ethics still had the right of way against theology.

Sometimes in these sayings we catch the ordinary Moslem

appeal, to the fears of hell on the one side, and to the joys of Paradise on the other; the same as in certain ages of the Church has been the popular and prevailing Gospel: (the Franciscans and the modern evangelicals largely practised it. It gave us the *Dies Irae* and some other less noble forms of teaching). Sometimes, however, the genuine Sufi doctrine is apparent, where the love of God eclipses all the lower motives, the fears of doom, and the hopes of reward. Here is the parable in which the truth is told:

"Jesus once passed by a crowd of devotees, who were so aflame with devotion that they seemed like old and worn-out wine-skins. He said to them, Who and what are ye? They said, Servants of God are we. He said, Wherefore do ye serve? They said, God has terrified us with the fear of hell. We are afraid of hell. He said, God is held to protect you against your fears. Going further on, he came to others yet more devout, and he said, Wherefore do ye serve? They said, God hath made us to desire Paradise and whatsoever things He hath prepared in that place for His friends. We are hoping for that. He said, God is held to bestow on you that which ye hope for. Passing on, he came to others who were addicted to the Divine worship, and He said, Who and what are ye? They said, We are lovers of God, who serve him neither for the fear of hell nor for the desire of Paradise, but only for His own love-sake, and in order that we may glorify His glory. He said, Ye indeed are the friends of God. It has been ordered that I abide among you. So He abode among them."

This is one way of saying that Jesus was a Sufi, and the model of all Sufis. We have touched the point where the Quietists and the Sufis meet together, and where Madame Guyon and Francis Xavier walk the same street with Al Ghazzali to the same sanctuary. You may hear them singing in soft undertones:

> My God! I love thee; not because
> I hope for Heaven thereby.

Like the virgin whom St. Ivo of Chartres met, they have water to put out the flames of hell, and fire to burn up the delights of Paradise, that men everywhere may serve God out of pure love.

Rendel Harris.

"THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE CHURCH AND THE MINISTRY."

(*Continued.*)

2. Our essayist also denies that the two Pauline passages in question support the idea that Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers had received direct Divine appointment. Comparing 1 Corinthians xii. 28 with the parallel passage in verse 18 of the same chapter which reads, "But now hath God set the members each one of them in the body, even as it pleased him," we realise that what the former passage implies is not that Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers are as individuals appointed to their respective functions by God, but rather that in God's due ordering of the Body there are persons qualified to fulfil these necessary functions.

"In the second passage the *αὐτός ἔδωκεν*, if it stood alone, would undoubtedly emphasise the thought that the persons mentioned were direct gifts of God, to the exclusion of any idea of human intervention by way of selection and authorisation. But the right exegesis of the passage disposes of this contention. The Apostle is speaking of the grace given to each member of the body according to the measure of Christ's bestowal. The Ascended Lord, he says, is, as the Psalmist said, the giver of gifts to men (*ἔδωκεν δόματα*). He proceeds in Rabbinic fashion to comment on the text from the Psalm; "ascended" implies "descended"; he that descended, he it is that ascended" (*αὐτός ἐστιν καὶ ὁ ἀναβάς*). Then he proceeds in like manner to comment on *ἔδωκεν δόματα*:

"And he it is that gave (and these are his gifts) some apostles, some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers." It is plain, therefore, that αὐτός does not here mean "himself" and that ἔδωκεν is a reminiscence of the quotation which he has just made, and does not emphasise the Divine appointment of particular persons to the offices of apostles, prophets and so forth."

3. The proposition that it was the gift of teaching that gave authority to the triad to rule the Church of God is also strenuously objected to. It will be remembered that according to the theory under discussion "those who speak the word of God" are marked off as a superior class from ordinary members of the Church who hear them and obey. They are a divinely appointed class of interpreters of the will of God that stand apart and above in exalted supremacy. The Dean allows that this was true of the original Apostles and of St. Paul, but fails to find any evidence outside the *Didaché* that Prophets possessed any such prerogative, while the claim asserted even in the *Didaché* does not include teachers. The only possible confirmation of the idea in the New Testament is Hebrews xiii. 7. "Remember your leaders, who spoke unto you the word of truth," which it would be natural to interpret as a command to hold in affectionate memory such departed leaders as for their ministry of the word deserved permanent gratitude, were it not that the occurrence of the technical phrase "They who speak the word of God" with a special connotation in the *Didaché* seems to give colour to the view that these men were "leaders" in virtue of their "speaking the word of God." But Dr. Armitage Robinson very pertinently reminds us that the very passage in the *Didaché* upon which so much stress has been laid comes in a section of the document which is not Christian at all but is a part of a Jewish work entitled the *Two Ways*, which has been incorporated in the *Didaché*.

It has, therefore, no real connexion with Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers at all, being simply one of the many precepts which describe "the way of life." This cuts the ground entirely from under the assumption that in the passage in *Hebrews* "those who speak the word of God" was a recognised description of the official leaders of the Church, and the term must, therefore, drop out of the category of technical Christian phraseology and with it the view that the gift of teaching (*Lehrgabe*) was the primary ground of authority in the primitive Church.

4. What above all raises the ire of the Dean is the use of the term "charismatic" as the specific title of the ministry of this supposed triad of Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers. It was "made in Germany" some thirty years ago and bears all the marks of most of the articles manufactured in that country. He offers convincing proofs that in St. Paul's mind every function of the Body of Christ, any power whatsoever of helping the whole, is a *χάρισμα*, a manifestation of that grace with which the Body is endowed. Cf. Romans xii. 6 f., where the order in which the "charismata" are mentioned gives no clear guidance as to precedence and where the Apostle easily passes from functions to persons who exercise functions. So again in 1 Corinthians i. 4–7 both "charis" and "charisma" are the prerogatives of the whole Church, and in 1 Corinthians vii. 7 the latter term is used with reference to marriage and non-marriage. In 1 Corinthians xii. the list of "charismata" includes all the special energies which had become the causes of rivalry and contention for precedence in the Church of Corinth. In all these passages, then, St. Paul uses "charisma" of any and every manifestation of grace (*χάρις*) in the members of the Christian Church, whether it be the great gift of prophecy or the humble gift of "shewing mercy with cheerfulness," and there is no shadow of support for the contention that the

office of an Apostle, Prophet, or Teacher could be described as "charismatic" in contrast to that of a Bishop, Priest or Deacon. It is high time, says the Dean, that the word "charismatic" in this connexion were altogether abandoned. If the term is to be used at all it is just as applicable to the Bishop, Priest, or Deacon as to the other triad, because it is inconceivable that St. Paul could have supposed that any one of the former group could fulfil his function if no "charisma" were his to enable him. Every ministry in the Church, whether that conferred by the direction of the Spirit, calling whom He would to be Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers, and ministries conferred by the Church, whom it elected and whom Apostolic men appointed for it bishops and deacons was "charismatic," and spiritual grace was as truly bestowed in ordination as in any other fashion.

5. Finally the statement that Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers belonged to the universal Church, while Bishops, Priests, and Deacons belonged to the local community which they were appointed to serve is examined and definitely rejected. While it is obvious that the ministry of the Apostles was not locally limited, the Dean is of opinion that the idea that Prophets had a similarly wide range of function would never have presented itself had the notion not been suggested by the *Didaché*. There are, it is true, in the New Testament a few instances of prophets going from one Church to another, but they do not justify us in thinking that this was the ordinary procedure. On the other hand, to imply that the local ministry was not a gift of God to the whole Church and to depreciate it in comparison with the prophets and other teachers who sprang up within the bosom of the local community, but might be recognised for their gifts in other communities which they might elect to visit, is beyond anything hinted at in the New Testament. But to proceed further and to contend that Prophets and

Teachers were persons of authority who had the right to address local communities in the name of the Church, a view unknown before the discovery of the *Didaché* and hardly to be justified even from that document, is, to the mind of Dr. Armitage Robinson, directly mischievous.

To sum up the Dean's argument: the hard and fast distinction implied in Harnack's theory breaks down, and it cannot be proved that a ministry consisting of Apostles, Prophets, and Teachers with a personal preëminence and a recognised claim to honour, with a right to be called "charismatic" as against Bishops, Priests, and Deacons and exercising a universal jurisdiction in the Church as against a local, ever existed. A preëminence was unquestionably associated with the Apostles. Prophets there were and might be spoken of next in importance to the Apostles, but they were not a sharply defined class. Teachers there were, composed of those whose superior knowledge and education enabled them to give useful instruction, but the New Testament gives little sanction to the idea that there was a definite class who bore this as their official title. There was a real distinction between what may be called the "prophetic" and the "episcopal" ministry, consisting in the fact that the prophets were not appointed by human instrumentality, whereas bishops and deacons were, but to apply the term "charismatic" to the one type and deny it to the other is entirely to misrepresent St. Paul's language and to give rise to entirely false deductions.

If the Dean's arguments are sound, and it is difficult to see where he has gone wrong, there goes by the board a theory to which much of the recent literature dealing with the origin and history of the Christian Ministry owes its very soul. Dr. Lindsay, e.g., looks at the subject exclusively from this angle. His pages positively bristle with references to the distinction between the local ministry and the prophetic

ministry, the existence of a twofold ministry at the very beginnings of Church organisation, the position of the "charismatic" ministry as bearing rule over the whole Church of God in virtue of its possession of the "ministry of the Word," and he ascribes to the "charismatic" ministry and the position it occupied the honour of being the one distinctive feature in the reorganisation of the Church in the Apostolic and sub-Apostolic periods. To him and to others the subsequent supremacy of the Episcopal Ministry was a departure from if not an actual perversion of Apostolic precedent. Some writers even go so far as to see not in Catholicism but in Montanism, with its emphasis on "Christian prophecy," the true heir of Apostolic tradition and practice. Dr. Armitage Robinson and Dr. Wotherspoon, if their conclusions are correct, and I must confess that I see no reason to question them, have completely demolished this "mare's nest."

The remainder of this *Essay* is taken up with a discussion of Lightfoot's familiar account of the origin of the early ministry, published as far back as 1868. The Dean considers that later research has not brought out any new facts and that the great Cambridge scholar's theory of the origin and development of the Episcopate still holds the field. He suggests, however, two considerations which had not presented themselves to Bishop Lightfoot which would account for the manner in which Episcopacy was matured and the Catholic Church consolidated. Intercourse between Churches would tend to throw responsibility upon a single individual representing the interests of the community and speaking and writing in its name, while travel and the exercise of hospitality would necessitate the placing of the disposal of the funds of the community in his hands. And again, the growth of the Eucharist as the principal liturgical service of the Church would be a still more important factor

in developing a single office of supreme importance.[1] The Dean is convinced that, although new theories have come and gone and are still coming and going, thirty years of acute research and criticism have produced nothing that is really new. A threefold ministry still emerges which has proved itself capable of satisfying the wants of the Christian Church from the second century to the present day. The functions of ministry have not always been distributed in exactly the same proportions between bishops, priests, and deacons, but the whole framework, with its powers of adaptation by no means exhausted, remains, the permanent gift of the Divine Spirit to the Church.

This is a statement full of promise and provides ample working-room for the suggestions of the Sub-Committee already referred to for the re-consideration of the Episcopate in practice if not in actual principle. The historic threefold Ministry still stands for unity. It grew out of the need of the preservation of unity when the Apostles were withdrawn, and it is impossible not to agree with the Dean's dictum that it is inconceivable how unity can be re-established on any other basis. He qualifies this statement by adding that any particular doctrine of Apostolic Succession need not be held by all Christians alike. It is the principle of the transmission of ministerial authority that makes for unity, while the view that ministry originates afresh at the behest of a particular Church or congregation makes for division and subdivision.

III.

The reader will turn with most eagerness to Dr. C. H. Turner's *Essay* on *Apostolic Succession*, and for more than one reason. He is, to begin with, a layman, and, therefore,

[1] See an article by the present writer in EXPOSITOR, August, 1916, on "The Christian Ministry in the Apostolic Church."

possibly less likely to be influenced by sectional views than his clerical co-essayists, and is besides the foremost authority of the day on this particular subject, as those who are acquainted with his brilliant contribution to the first volume of the *Cambridge Mediaeval History* on "The Organisation of the Church" and his *Studies in Early Church History* will readily acknowledge. Finally, the subject itself is the crucial point in the controversy and upon it the main importance of this volume hinges. The *Essay* is divided into two sections: *Apostolic Succession: A. The original conception; B. The problem of Non-Catholic Orders.* In the first section Dr. Turner traces the growth of the idea of "Apostolic Succession" from its first beginnings in the second century down to the time of Eusebius in the fourth. In the earliest stage its primary purpose was to emphasise the formal connexion that existed between the Episcopate of that age and the Apostles of the first age of the Church. Its origin was fundamentally due to the crisis brought about by the presence of the Gnostic peril in the second century. The early Gnostic leaders, Basilides, Valentinus, and Marcion, asserted a real connexion between themselves and the original disciples of Christ by means of a secret tradition of a higher and more advanced teaching imparted by the Apostles to such of their converts as were capable of assimilating it. Against this claim the orthodox Christians of the second century set up the threefold witness of the Apostolic Creed, the Apostolic Scriptures, and the Apostolic Succession, the possession of which entitled them to consider that they and they alone were the authorised representatives of the Gospel of Christ in the world and that the Body of which they were members was the only adequate vehicle of His teaching and the expression of His Spirit. It was no imaginary danger with which the Catholic Church was confronted at this period, for although Gnosticism was separated as a

whole from the Christianity of the Apostles by a deep and impassable gulf because of its fundamental doctrine of the essential evil of matter, with its corollaries, Docetism and the rejection of the Old Testament Scriptures, it professed to solve problems which possessed a supreme attraction for the thoughtful minds of the day and was able to make a serious bid for the religious leadership of the Roman world. The Church's response to the Gnostic challenge took the form of an appeal to historical facts. The Christian tradition belonged to the Church only because the Church had been as a matter of history the channel which had conveyed the tradition from its source in the Apostles down to that day. And this claim to the exclusive possession of the genuine Christian tradition rested on a threefold basis, as we have seen, on the possession of the Apostolic Creed, the Apostolic Scriptures, and the Apostolic Succession. A creed of some kind as a Baptismal Formula unquestionably existed very early in the Church, and scholars have been able to reconstruct in almost verbal exactitude the Creed which the Roman Church professed about the middle of the second century. It is also beyond doubt that it was the pressure of Gnosticism that led to the formulation of the Canon of the New Testament, a process which was due to the conviction of the Church that it possessed, at least in the four Gospels and the Epistles of St. Paul, a *corpus* of authoritative Christian documents of equal validity with the Scriptures of the Old Covenant. But documents grow old and Creeds become rigid and stereotyped, and both may in time come to be regarded as the products of a dead past, so that if the " apostolic " principle was to be kept in touch with the pulse of the Church as it beat more and more fully in each successive generation it must be rooted in a living organism. So arose the claim that the Faith was not to be looked for in books and formulas only, but in the fellowship to which the books

were committed and of which the formulas constituted the test of membership. To the appeal to the Apostolic Creed and the Apostolic Scriptures was added the appeal to the Apostolic Succession.

It was essentially an appeal to historical facts as against the Gnostic claim to a succession of disciples through whom the true doctrine was *secretly* handed on from one generation to another. The succession which the Catholic asserted admitted of verification by every man, because it had been part and parcel all along of the history of the community. The bishop of any Christian Church is the head and representative of his flock and has been regularly and openly put in possession of the *cathedra* or teaching chair, in succession to a predecessor who had in turn been recognised in his time as the one proper possessor of the chair—and so right back to the foundation of the particular local church. The church might either be an Apostolic Church in the fullest sense, i.e. a church whose first bishop had been installed by an Apostle, or, as in the great majority of cases, a church, founded as an offshoot of the missionary energy of some older church, which would trace its genealogy back beyond her own foundation through the successive bishops of the mother church until an apostolic origin was predicable of any church. Thus, to give an illustration, the Church of Canterbury would trace its apostolic succession from Archbishop Davidson through Archbishop Temple and all his predecessors back to St. Augustine, from St. Augustine back to St. Gregory who sent him, and from St. Gregory back through the succession of bishops of Rome to the apostolic founders, St. Peter and St. Paul. It is also important to note that the appeal was never to a single line of succession only, and that the emphasis was always laid on *the consent of all.* Even the Church of Rome was not regarded as in and by itself a final witness. The really binding force of the argument from " succession "

lay in the fact that if the presumption derived from the tradition of any individual church were questioned, the Churchman could at once fall back on the agreement of this individual church with other individual churches. The Church was Catholic as well as Apostolic, and it was not one line of descent but many which linked the Church of Irenaeus and Tertullian with the Church of the Apostles, so that it was not "Apostolic Succession" but "Apostolic Successions" which made the ultimate guarantee of the security of the deposit of the Faith.

A bishop before he could be recognised as being in the succession from the Apostles had first to be lawfully chosen by the particular community to occupy the vacant *cathedra* of its church, and secondly to be lawfully entrusted with the *charisma* of the episcopate by the ministry of those already recognised as possessing it, or, in other words, two conditions had to be observed,—a right relation to the local church of which the bishop claimed to have been constituted the head, and to the whole Church, of the Episcopate of which he claimed to have been constituted a member. He must have received by ordination the *charisma* of the episcopal office; but in addition to being genuinely ordained to the office of a bishop he must also be the lawful occupant of a particular *cathedra* in the communion of the Church and represent a body of Christian people. If he were not at the head of a community, but outside the Church altogether in communion with heretics or schismatics of any description, he was *ipso facto* outside the succession and could carry neither the truth nor the fellowship that came down from the Apostles: only they were in the true succession who were "continuing stedfastly in the Apostles' teaching and fellowship" (Acts ii. 42).

The history of the conception is traced by Dr. Turner in detail during the two hundred years that followed the days

of the Apostles. In the early Apostolic period itself there was no thought of "succession" because for the primitive Christians the Church had no future in the world of time; but as the years rolled on and the Master's return tarried and the Apostles died one by one a new situation arose, and it became necessary that the rich tradition of the first age should be gathered up, set in order, and permanently safe-guarded. The idea of "succession" was in existence before it found formal expression, and the phraseology of the theory, but not the term itself, appears before the end of the first century in the letter of *Clement of Rome* to the Church of Corinth, where it is set forth in very clear terms. "Jesus Christ was sent from God, the Apostles from Jesus Christ, the first presbyters and deacons from the Apostles" (xlii. 1–4). Clement also asserts that even if the first holders of office were dead and the Apostles who had appointed them were dead also, the Apostles had foreseen that the ministry would become a subject of contention and had made provision for the continuation of the work. After the original ordainers and the original ordained there would be other men to be found and ordained to the ministry, other men of note to prove and ordain them, and the whole community would express its assent to each ordination, so that no element should be lacking to ensure its complete and permanent validity (xliv. 1–3). It is true that the only succession of which Clement speaks in so many words is the succession of presbyters to their predecessors in office in the local Church, but the principle of "succession" of a divinely constituted hierarchy in which every link is indissolubly bound to the one before it is perfectly clear. A well-defined class of men will exercise the function which in the first generation had been exercised by the Apostles, or, in other words, the ordained will be the ordainers.

Hegesippus is the first writer, as far as we know, to use

the verb διαδέχεσθαι of one bishop succeeding another, and he also uses διαδοχή for the list of episcopal successions. He drew up a list of the Roman bishops down to Anicetus and called it a διαδοχή (this is probably the list which is preserved in Epiphanius, *Haer.* xxvii. 6, which begins with St. Peter and St. Paul and ends with Anicetus). He also drew up other lists or " successions " which he used as evidence to drive home the argument based upon the agreement of the teaching of the various churches with one another and with the Scriptures. Hegesippus does not seem to have utilised the epithet " apostolic," but Dr. Turner is of opinion that the summaries of his book and its argument as given by Eusebius go far to prove that he regarded the place and functions of the Apostles in the same light that Clement, Ignatius, and Irenaeus did, and that he must, therefore, have conceived the successions as being fundamentally the successions of the Apostles. This writer is important in this connexion because he brings evidence, in addition to that provided by Irenaeus, of the place which the argument from the succession held in the Christian thought of the day. Irenaeus represents opinion in Asia Minor and in Gaul, Hegesippus speaks of Palestine and Rome, and the idea is, therefore, not the invention of Irenaeus, although he is the first to give it classic expression.

The views of *Irenaeus* concerning " apostolic succession " are set forth in his great work *Adv. Haer.* III. ii.–iv., IV xxvi. 2–5, and xxx. 1–xxxiii. 8, and it is on these passages that Dr. Turner's sketch of the theory which is given above is primarily based. Irenaeus is not only very insistent upon the exclusion of heretics from the succession, but extends it even to orthodox bishops whose lives give the lie to their profession. A bishop ejected from his bishopric, whether on the ground of faith or of morals, ceased from that moment to possess any episcopal character and his ministerial acts are null and void.

Tertullian again speaks in as precise and clear a manner as Irenaeus on this question, and his language in his treatise *Adv. Marcionem* shows that the argument from the " apostolic succession " was part of his regular equipment in the Gnostic controversy.

Hippolytus is the first to speak of bishops as being not only in the succession from the Apostles but as being themselves " successors of the Apostles," from whom they received the *charisma* of the high-priesthood and teaching office. By the time of *Cyprian* in the third century the succession from the Apostles had become a commonplace in the Christian thought of the day, although there is at this point a tendency to change the accent. The Church now takes the place of the churches, and the bishop is rather *a* bishop of the Church at large than *the* bishop of his own community. The common relation of the episcopal order to the Church tends to assume bigger proportions, while the individual relation of each as representing and expressing the tradition of a particular group of Christian people tends by comparison to retire into the background. This marks the beginning of a long and far-reaching development, in the course of which an integral element of the doctrine in its original form, viz. the relation of the bishop to his own people, and consequently their indirect share in the apostolic succession dwindled and disappeared.

Eusebius. In Eusebius the succession is not doctrinal as with Irenaeus, nor sacramental as in the modern conception, but is primarily historical. He takes consequently a much wider view of successions than the writers whose motives were primarily doctrinal, and, therefore, exclusive, and emphasises successions of teachers in a school or university, of theologians in the Church generally, and even the succession of one generation of churchmen to another. And yet the " successions " that really matter to

Eusebius as to Irenaeus, Tertullian, or Origen are the successions of the bishops from the Apostles, for it is the successions in the principal sees that form the framework of both his great historical works. There is also a marked difference between his method of using the idea of " succession " in the case of bishops and the way he treats the same idea in the case of heads of philosophical or catechetical schools. The phraseology of succession is employed with more regularity and more variety with reference to bishops, and nowhere else is the succession traced back constantly to a fixed starting point and with careful insistence on the number of steps intervening between the starting point and each fresh name. It did not much concern him who was the first Emperor or who started the line of a catechetical school, but it is vital that the successions of Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, or Jerusalem could be traced back to the authority of the Apostles of Christ and to the first generation of the disciples. In every case the historian is careful as a historian to note at the head of the line the name of the particular Apostle or disciple to whom the first ordination was due, but for subsequent appointments he prefers to number the individual bishops not, say from St. Peter or St. Mark, but from the Apostles. But in whatever sense the bishops are the successors of the Apostles, the office of the Apostles is not identified with the office of their successors. Neither in Eusebius nor in Irenaeus are Apostles counted as units in Episcopal lists. This is true, however, of Cyprian, an earlier writer than Eusebius, who uncompromisingly identifies the episcopate with the Apostolate, a practice which prevailed in the West, but not in the East, from the fourth downwards, and especially with reference to the Church of Rome. The modern view that is popular in some Anglican circles that the Episcopate inherited by direct succession all the prerogatives and powers of the Apostolate apparently finds no

support in the literature of the first two centuries of Christianity, a fact of no slight importance when the principles of Christian reunion come to be discussed and formulated.

In the second section of the *Essay* we have a most lucid and illuminating discussion of the problem of "Non-Catholic Orders," with its corollary, the question whether sacramental gifts, by which under the Christian dispensation the Divine life is imparted, can be validly (however irregularly and improperly) ministered apart from the unity of the body of Christ. Two different views prevailed in the Church in the third and fourth centuries, represented by Cyprian and Augustine respectively.

Cyprian held that the Spirit is given to the Church and that without the grace of the Spirit the Sacraments are nothing. Baptism, which is the sacrament of initiation into God's covenant is meaningless except as an initiation into the Church, in which the purpose of redemption is worked out. If Baptism without the Church is null the other Sacraments which presuppose Baptism are necessarily null also. Those who have received them have received nothing.

Augustine, on the other hand, contended that the Sacraments derive their reality not from the minister, who is nothing except an agent, but from Christ as the only source of grace and power, and His power is the same everywhere. Neither error of life nor error of faith can fetter the fulfilment of Christ's promises: and, therefore, though the Sacraments be administered by wicked men within or by heretics and schismatics without they are in either case really and completely administered. It is the disposition of the recipient that matters; where this disposition is wrong they are received incompletely. To be outside the Church is to be in a state of disobedience to God's will, and the grace of a sacrament to any one who is consciously outside will only come when his disobedience is at an end. The sacrament

was there all the same and cannot be repeated. And the argument holds good for all sacraments: if a man has received Holy Orders at the hands of schismatics or heretics, still his Orders are real and he can no more be given another ordination than another baptism.

It is not necessary to follow Dr. Turner through his learned statement concerning the course of the "re-baptism" controversy, how the Cyprianic position on the sacrament of Baptism was given up by its strictest upholders in the West after the outbreak of Donatism, and how the baptism of schismatics and heretics came eventually to be acknowledged as valid by the whole of Western Christendom, although the East held out for centuries against the practice. What is of supreme importance in view of the question of reunion is that there was a complete change of outlook from the narrower theory that prevailed in the days of Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria and that this momentous revolution was brought about because other and more vital motives than the interests of Church order were allowed to have their full sway. It was the existence of grave practical difficulties that led the Church in the West to adopt the more tolerant attitude in the interests of unity and peace, and the action of the Church in this matter in the third and fourth centuries gives the clearest guidance to those who are in our own day to be entrusted with the task of leading the Church once more into the paths of unity and Christian brotherhood. It was the paramount influence of Augustine which brought matters to a head, and it was he who extended the argument for the reception of heretical baptism to the reception of heretical orders. The task with which the Church was confronted after the outbreak of the Donatist schism was that of reconciling large masses of separated Christians, whose separatedness was often as much due to misunderstanding as to conscious heresy, and who were, in

any case, not responsible for the acts that had helped to cause the separation. Augustine laid down two conditions as essential before a settlement was feasible: mutual goodwill between the parties and a permanent decision concerning the status of the heretical lay people and ministry, both of whom were now ready to conform. Hence arose the need not only of receiving the Donatist laity as baptized members on an equality with the Catholic laity, but also the Donatist clergy by a similar recognition of their Orders. To Augustine the one thing needful was the desire on the part of the sectaries for reconciliation, showing that they possessed the supreme grace of charity, and this should be met by no less charity on the part of the Church. The *attainment of the great object of unity should not be imperilled by laying too exclusive a stress on the prerogative of Catholic Orders.* Although Augustine in his writings on the Donatist controversy lays no stress on the theory of " succession " he elsewhere enforces the great weight and antiquity of the successions in the Apostolic Churches, emphasising in every case the fact that the succession goes back to the Apostle, on whom, as representing the whole body, the Lord had promised that He would build His Church. But let it be noted that with Augustine as with Irenaeus the apostolic succession is from holder to holder, and not from consecrated to consecrated. The theory of " Apostolic Succession " was a living reality in the Church all through the period under review, although not in the narrow and mechanical sense that it is conceived in some circles to-day, as implying that only through episcopal ordination and through the transmission of grace from the Apostles by episcopal ordination can true sacramental grace be found in the Church. There is nothing in Dr. Turner's *Essay* which gives the slightest colour to the language that is found for instance in Dr. Lindsay's book, pp. 278–280, where the doctrine is represented as

being nothing more than a legal fiction due to the fact that the great men who built up the Western Church were almost all trained Roman lawyers. The cause of reunion will not be advanced by ignoring or perverting clear facts. The "Apostolic Succession" was a doctrine which held a foremost place in the thought of all Christendom. For Clement of Rome it was a principle of order, for Irenaeus the guardian of the faith, for Eusebius the guarantee of the truth of the history that he relates. What Augustine did was not to destroy the theory, but to dethrone it from its pride of place and to show that there were occasions and causes when other motives came into play and other interests rose superior to it, and when the principles of unity and charity should reign supreme. So he applied to Confirmation and Orders the principle already adopted in the West with regard to Baptism and asserted that for the continuance within the Church of the ministry of a schismatical or heretical Clergy nothing more was needed than their reconciliation to the Catholic body and the sanction of Catholic authority.

It may be helpful to mention here that Dr. Turner in the Appendix to the *Essay* gives the originals of all the relevant passages quoted in the contribution itself.

The parallel between the situation in the present day and that which prevailed in the age of Augustine is a remarkable one. Now as then we are confronted with the separation from the main body of the Church of very considerable groups of Christians who are in no degree responsible for the acts which caused the original severance; now as then there is a markedly keen desire on both sides for reunion. But there is one crucial point of difference between the situation as it exists now and the situation that prevailed in the fourth century. The Church of that age knew nothing of any consecration or ordination except by bishops, and there was no question of accepting non-Catholic sacraments save

where what was done outside the Church was done in the same manner and with the same genuine belief in the meaning of the act as it was done within the Church. In that respect the situation is decidedly worse now than it was then, because the separated Churches have in most cases repudiated episcopacy and often hold a different and inadequate view of the sacraments.

And yet I fail to see why the principles of Augustine should not prove a solvent even of the present serious difficulties. The Church of that age, acting under his guidance, had the courage to change its outlook and practice in matters which to preceding generations of Churchmen were of vital import, and it allowed itself to be swayed by the higher motives of unity and peace and to recognise that Church rules were subordinate to these. The recommendations of the Sub-Committee to which we have had occasion to refer more than once would seem to provide a broad and practical basis for further action. The policy advocated there is that of reconciliation by the acceptance of the main traditions of Catholic Christianity. It is frankly recognised that the future of the Church lies in Catholic unity, but combined with this is a generous acknowledgment of the presence and work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Free Churches. Augustine, with all his tenderness towards the mass of unthinking schismatics of his day, was just as clear as Irenaeus or Cyprian that some essential grace was lacking to those who were definitely outside the Church, and that what was wanting was the crown of Christian virtues, the gift *par excellence* of the Spirit, and that until unity brought charity in its train other gifts and graces were as it were held in suspense. If charity, unity, and brotherhood are allowed to play the parts allotted to them in Augustine's appeal and in the response of the Church of his day to that appeal it should not be beyond the wit of earnest Christian-thinking men to fashion out of this

chaos of a disunited and competing Christendom a re-united Body of Christ, knit together in the bonds of Christian love, strong in the strength of the Spirit of God to bring the world to the feet of Jesus Christ.

The remaining *Essays* which are found in the volume do not call for extended notice, as they are not specially pertinent to the purpose of this paper. Their purport and conclusions have been summarised in the opening pages of the article.

In appraising the value of these *Essays* it must be steadily borne in mind that they are limited in their scope to the examination of facts and their interpretation. What has been done in them is to make plain the principles and institutions which, taking their beginnings in primitive times, were accepted by the Church, or at least by the Church in the West, down to the sixteenth century. "What attitude the Church should take towards bodies of Christian people who have either definitely rejected them or have drifted away into another line of things is for those to determine who are called to the harder task of guiding faith and order" (p. xvii).

Before the Christian world to-day there lies the insistent task of reconciliation, and the least that we can be called upon to do is that we pray with all the earnestness that is in us that those who are to be entrusted with the guidance of this momentous movement towards unity may be endued with all the wisdom and all the charity that God the Holy Spirit alone can give them.

MAURICE JONES.

JOHN AS PREACHER OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

The parable of the Penitent Younger Son of Matthew xxi. 28-32, attached by our first evangelist to Jesus' counter-question to those who challenged His authority as to the authority of "the baptism of John," is by some regarded as a briefer form of that commonly designated the Prodigal Son (Luke xv. 11-32), because both are aimed at the self-righteous religious leaders who showed only resentment when publicans and sinners gladly welcomed the message of repentance. Be this as it may, the verse which makes the application in Matthew xxi. 32 = Luke vii. 30, is a Q *logion* of exceptional importance because of its bearing on the peculiar significance given by the Second Source [1] to the ministry of the Baptist. In this verse both Matthew and Luke present an emphatic rebuke of the Pharisees and scribes who murmur at Jesus' proclamation of forgiveness to the publicans and sinners and association with them (Matt. xxi. 32 = Luke vii. 30; cf. Luke xv. 1-2). These repentant wanderers will be like the penitent younger son of the parable, says Jesus, more acceptable to the Father than the self-righteous elder son, who said, I go, and went not. Matthew's form of the *logion* is certainly the more original:

Verily I say unto you, The publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of God [2] in advance of you. For John came unto you bringing

[1] It is important for the sake of accuracy to distinguish the "Second Source" employed in common by Matthew and Luke in addition to Mark, from the common material not found in Mark, most of which was no doubt derived by them from this source, but which certainly does not represent its whole content. The "double-tradition" material may be designated Q in accord with recent practice. The source itself may better be designated S.

[2] In four other instances besides this our first evangelist refrains from

a way of justification (ἐν ὁδῷ δικαιοσύνης), and ye did not believe (ἐπιστεύσατε) him. The publicans and harlots were they that had faith (ἐπίστευσαν); but you did not even afterwards when ye saw it turn again (μετεμελήθητε) to believe his message (τοῦ πιστεύσαι αὐτῷ).

Our third evangelist has transformed this interesting testimony of Jesus to the significance of the reformatory movement of the Baptist into an editorial comment of his own, attaching it in Luke vii. 28-30 to the well-known Q discourse on the Stumbling of Israel at John and Jesus, the two messengers of the divine Wisdom:

> And all the people, when they heard him, and the publicans, justified (ἐδικαίωσαν) God, because they had been baptized with the baptism of John. But the Pharisees and the lawyers rejected God's counsel on their behalf, because they had not been baptized by him.

The Lukan adaptation has value among other reasons because of its catching up of the word "justified" (ἐδικαίωσαν), thereby connecting the paragraph *ad vocem* with the sequel (ver. 35), where after reference to Jesus' association with the "publicans and sinners," the discourse closes with the *logion*:

Matthew xi. 19*b*.	Luke vii. 35.
But Wisdom was justified (ἐδικαιώθη) by (ἀπό) her works (*var.* children).	But Wisdom was justified (ἐδικαιώθη) by (ἀπό) all her children.

In reality the historical occasion of the saying must of course be that given it in Matthew xxi. 28-32. The point made is that the spectacle of the "turning again" of the publicans and harlots at "the baptism of John," should have been to the Pharisees a reminder of the promise of the coming of Elijah as "restorer of the tribes" before the great and terrible Day of Jehovah, according to the prophecy of Malachi iv. 5-6, a prophecy based upon the

his usual alteration of "kingdom of God" (Q and Mark) into "kingdom of heaven."

great scene of Elijah on Carmel "turning the hearts of Jehovah's people back again" (1 Kings xviii. 37). In reality it had meant nothing to them. They did not even "repent" afterward and "believe," when they saw this great "sign of the times." For John with his warning to this evil generation was a "greater matter" than the warning of Jonah to the Ninevites. Its obduracy both to this sign of Jonah [1] and to the winning message of Jesus, a "greater matter" than the "wisdom" of Solomon, ensures that in the judgment the Gentile Ninevites and the Queen of the South will be justified when it is condemned. As a reference to this supreme "sign of the times," therefore, the parable of the Penitent Younger Son is most appropriately attached by Matthew to the scene of Mark xi. 27–33, where Jesus answers the challenge of the Sanhedrin for His authority to purify the temple, with the counter-demand: Whence had the Baptist authority for his purification of Israel?

The key-words in this group of sayings are "Repentance" (Heb. "turning again," i.e. of the heart), "Faith" (*πίστις*) and "Righteousness," or "Justification" (*δικαιοσύνη*). To complete the picture we only need add to it the contrasted figures in the kindred parable of the Pharisee and the Publican (Luke xviii. 9–14), which ends:

> Verily I say unto you, this man (the publican) went down to his house "justified" (*δεδικαιωμένος*) rather than the other.

In the translation given above of the principal passage (Matt. xxi. 32) we have made use of the just and scholarly comment of W. C. Allen, based on an observation of Wellhausen, that—

[1] Matthew and Luke have conflicting interpretations of "the sign of Jonah." Mark declares it simply the denial of a sign. The Q context indicates that Jesus meant the Baptism of John as a fulfilment of the promised sending of Elias to effect the turning again of Israel before the great Day of Jehovah. See Bacon, *Sermon on the Mount*, 1902, p. 232 f.

ὅδος here, like the Hebrew דֶּרֶךְ and the Aramaic אוֹרְחָא, means not so much the path trodden, as the manner, custom, method. To come with the way of righteousness is to come as the representative and teacher of righteousness, and of her methods. "John came with the way of righteousness" means "John came, and what he taught was good," he represented and stood for the manner of life which righteousness demands.

This is very well and very helpful as regards the peculiar use of the preposition ἐν to mean "with," "bringing," which is probably to be explained by an underlying Aramaic בְּ, just as ἀπό instead of ὑπό is similarly explained in the connected saying "Wisdom was justified by (literally 'from') her children." It is also helpful to be reminded that "way" (ὅδος) in such a connexion unquestionably stands for the Aramaic and Hebrew term for "teaching," as in the well-known early document known as the "Two Ways," which underlies the "Teaching of the Twelve," and as primitive Christianity was known as the "Way" (Acts ix. 2, xix. 9, etc.). Even in modern Arabic a religious sect or teaching is called a *tarik*, i.e. a "way." It is therefore correct and helpful to render the first words of the clause "John came to you ***with*** the way." But why speak of this new way brought by John and accepted by the publicans and sinners as a new way of *righteousness*, when the whole context and the parallels already cited prove that the object in mind was "*justification*" "in the judgment," wherein the evil generation as a whole will be "condemned"? What the Baptist brought and the publicans and harlots welcomed was a way of *justification*. The publicans and harlots received it by "repentance" and "faith." The Pharisees murmured not because John "stood for the manner of life which righteousness demands," but because he offered "*justification*" on these extra-legal terms.

There was in fact nothing new in the "righteousness" which John preached. The revolutionary element in his movement was that—

The law and the prophets were until John. Since that time the kingdom of God is preached and men of violence take it by force (Matt. xi. 12 = Luke xvi. 16).

Publicans and sinners were crowding in where scribes entrusted with its keys neither entered themselves nor suffered others to enter. The point of Jesus' reproach against the Pharisees was not that they objected to John's *ethics*, but that they murmured at his offer of "baptism unto remission of sins" to publicans and harlots on the basis of mere repentance and faith. Their own behaviour meantime was like that of their representative in the parable of the Penitent Publican. This man could only cry, "God be merciful to me a sinner," and yet he went down to his house "justified" rather than the other.

We are of course accustomed to think (quite unwarrantably) of Paul as originator of the terminology of "Justification," because his great epistles are so largely taken up with the battles of justification "by faith" as against justification "by works of law." It is true also that this particular form of the apposition, employing the phrase "works of law" for obedience to Mosaic precept, in particular the ritual ordinances, is distinctively Pauline. But it is very far from the truth to imagine Paul as originator of the term "justification" (δικαιοσύνη) and its cognates to signify acquittal before the judgment seat of God. Unless we very much mistake the testimony of the Second Source Paul cannot be looked upon as originator even of the term "Justification by faith," though its opposite in Q is not so much "Justification by works of law" as "Justification by descent from Abraham." Publicans and sinners are here "justified" for their repentance and faith. The evil and adulterous generation that demands a sign is "condemned in the judgment" by Gentiles such as the Ninevites and the Queen of the South.

Our English versions oscillate between "righteousness" and "justification" as a translation of the Pauline term δικαιοσύνη, with a strong tendency to use "righteousness" when Paul really means "justification," as for example when the Apostle is made to speak of "the 'righteousness' which is from God" or which is "witnessed by the law and the prophets." The "witness" in question is certainly God's promise of pardon and grace, more specifically, as Paul's explicit statement assures us, the common doctrine of all who preached the cross of Christ, that "he died for our sins according to the Scriptures." The reference is unmistakably and admittedly to the Isaian doctrine of the vicarious death of Jehovah's suffering Servant who "justifies many, bearing away their iniquities." But the Isaian use of the Hebrew terms rendered by δικαιοῦν and its cognates is almost invariably in the sense of the divine pardon and acquittal, the "vindication" Jehovah is about to bring to His suffering people, whose punishment has already more than expiated its guilt. The penitent remnant are now to be proved before all the nations Jehovah's witness (martyr) and Servant, His bleeding agent for the world's conversion and redemption. This vindication and exaltation of the Servant is the "glad tidings of peace" (with a reconciled God)[1] which is the message of the great prophet of reconstruction at the close of the Exile. It is a pity that the English versions should think it necessary to refer to it as Jehovah's "righteousness" which is near to come, instead of Jehovah's *justification*, or *vindication* of His people, in their pardon and restoration to His favour.

Israel's cry: "Hear me, O God of my 'righteousness'" (Ps. iv. 1) is not the appeal of the self-satisfied Pharisee, but the entreaty of the widow that implores the Judge of

[1] Isa. lii. 7, lvii. 19.

all the Earth day and night for *vindication* against her adversaries. The "righteousness" of Israel that Isaiah promises shall "go forth as the noonday, and her salvation as a burning lamp, which all the Gentile nations behold" (Isa. lxii. 1–2) is not *sanctification*, but *justification*. It is, as the context proves, public restoration to the divine favour, as a bride once esteemed widowed and forsaken but now decked with garlands by Jehovah's hand "as when a young man marrieth a virgin."

The language of our third evangelist, particularly in those portions of his Gospel which are derived from the Second Source and which transparently reveal their Aramaic or Hebrew background, must not be regarded as Pauline; but it is in very high degree *Isaian* language. A single glance at a Greek concordance will show how pre-eminently true this is of the term δικαιοῦν and its cognates. It is far more common in Luke than elsewhere. In particular those elements of Luke which we have reason to believe derived from the Second Source (whether from the independent testimony of Matthew, or from intrinsic affinity with other elements thus independently attested) display the Isaian phraseology and conception of the "justification" of the humbled, penitent and obedient people of God in very high degree.

Moreover just because it is a "justification by faith" (πίστις) in the sense of humble, obedient trust, it is free from all national or racial limitations, extending also to "the Gentiles," to whom it is the very mission of the Servant to bring forth "teaching" and "judgment" (Isa. xlii. 1–4).

Such justification by faith is the reward of Jehovah's suffering witness, son (υἱός), and Servant (παῖς), in the sublime poem of Wisdom of Solomon ii. 1–iii. 9, which, after describing His humiliation unto death, concludes :

God made trial of them and found them worthy of Himself,
As gold in the furnace he proved them,
And as a whole burnt offering he accepted them.
In the time of their visitation they shall shine forth,
And as sparks among stubble they shall run to and fro.
They shall judge nations and have dominion over peoples,
And the Lord shall reign over them forevermore.
They that trust on Him (πεποιθότες ἐπ' αὐτῷ) shall understand truth,
And they that have faith (πιστοί) shall abide with Him in love;
Because grace (χάρις) and mercy (ἔλεος) are given to his chosen (τοῖς ἐκλεκτοῖς αὐτοῦ).

Such "justification by faith" is given to the "beloved sons" (*οἱ υἱοὶ οὓς ἠγάπησας*) in a later chapter of the same poem, a connecting link between Deutero-Isaiah and the Servant doctrine of the New Testament, when in Wisdom xvi. 20–29 the feeding with the manna in the wilderness is made a lesson of humility and faith, as in the well-known chapter of Deuteronomy. In Deuteronomy viii. 2–3, 16 Moses reminds Israel that Jehovah—

led thee these forty years in the wilderness that He might humble thee, to prove thee, to know what was in thine heart whether thou wouldest keep His commandments or no. And He humbled thee and suffered thee to hunger and fed thee with manna which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know; that He might make thee know that man doth not live by bread only, but by everything that proceedeth out of the mouth of Jehovah.

This is of course the basis for the Q parable of the Temptation of the Son. But long before in Wisdom of Solomon xvi. our Alexandrian-Jewish poet had utilised the same theme in the interest of the Isaian ideal of the Servant. The manna in the wilderness was given to teach Israel *faith*:

That Thy sons whom Thou lovedst (*οἱ υἱοί σου οὓς ἠγάπησας*), O Lord, might learn
That it is not the growth of earth's fruits that nourisheth a man,
But that Thy word preserveth them that have faith in Thee (*τοὺς σοι πιστεύοντας*).[1]

[1] Sap. xvi. 26.

Realising as we must from these pre-Christian examples the existence in Judaism itself of a growing doctrine of justification through the "grace and mercy" of God to a people humbled and taught obedience and faith by the things which it suffered, its "faith" tested in the fire and made perfect, we shall not feel it needful to appeal to Paul as if no other than he could be responsible for the terminology of "justification," "faith," "repentance," which we encounter in the tribute of Jesus to the Baptist now before us. It stands by no means alone in the Second Source. The testing of the Son in the Temptation story is a testing of *faith*, in the same two classic forms as in the Book of Wisdom, a faith that is proved first by humble dependence upon God for daily bread, and second by obedience even to the death of martyrdom, asking no angelic deliverance but "faithful" (πιστός) even unto the death of the cross. The story of the Believing Centurion (Matt. viii. 5–13 = Luke vii. 1–10) whose "faith" puts to shame unbelieving Israel proves how far the particularism of Israel's national ideal is in this source transcended. The anecdote belongs with the radical anti-particularism of the Baptist's Preaching (Matt. iii. 9 = Luke iii. 8)—

> I say unto you, God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham,

and the condemnation of the faithless generation in the judgment by Gentile cities, Ninevites and the Queen of the South. We have no less radical dismissal of claims based on Jewish prerogative in the Warning to Prompt Repentance (Luke xiii. 23–28 and parallel), where the "workers of wickedness" appeal to their intimacy with the messianic Judge as one who walked[1] their streets and with whom they had banquetted, but are bidden "Depart, it matters not to me

[1] Syr. cur. reads "walk" as the sense requires against the common reading "teach."

whence you come." Great is their dismay to find themselves shut out while many "come from east and west and north and south" to recline with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and all the prophets at the banqueting table of the kingdom of God.

Present limitations forbid detailed statement of the reasons which compel us to attribute to the Second Source the quotation of Isaiah xlii. 1–4 in Matthew xii. 18-21, based as it is, like the Q quotations generally, on an independent rendering of the Hebrew text; whereas our first evangelist himself relies on the Septuagint. Manifestly the lines are wholly unsuited to the application made of them by the canonical evangelist to the Markan statement that Jesus "commanded the demons that they should not make him known" (Mark iii. 12). Its intrinsic significance connects it on the contrary with the scene of Jesus' baptism. Nothing else save the descent of the Spirit upon him and the testimony of adoption by the Voice from heaven can have originally prompted the quotation :—

> Behold my Servant whom I have chosen,
> My Beloved on whom my soul has set its choice.
> I will put my Spirit upon him,
> And he shall proclaim judgment to the Gentiles.
> He shall not strive nor cry,
> Nor shall any hear his voice in the streets.
> He will not wholly break off the crushed reed,
> And the smoking wick he will not quench,
> Until he have brought vindication to its triumph,
> And on his name the Gentiles shall hope.

The procedure to restore this quotation to its real affinity is very simple. Merely omit the paragraph drawn from Mark ii. 23–iii. 12 to which it is now appended, and this exquisite description of the Mission of Jehovah's Servant falls into line with its own kindred material. It follows the great Q section on the Stumbling of Israel at the Messen-

gers of the Wisdom of God (Matt. xi. 2–30 = Luke vii. 18–35, x. 12–15, 21–22), the key to the evangelic conception of the Second Source, from which most of our material has been drawn. It becomes needful now to review it as a whole.

The discourse begins with the Question of John's Disciples which Jesus answers by pointing to the fulfilment of the Isaian prophecy of the Servant in his own works of mercy and healing and his proclamation of "glad tidings to the poor." The author passes to a Denunciation of Israel's Rejection of the Messengers of the Divine Wisdom by way of a return message of Jesus to John: "Blessed is he that shall not be stumbled in me." He then proceeds with a description of the Baptist's mission of Warning to Repent placed in antithesis to Jesus' own "gospel" of Healing and Forgiveness. The object of the whole is to convict Israel of a degree of guilt surpassing that of the heathen world because it has rejected the redeeming grace of the divine Wisdom in both its forms, a warning of judgment more signal than Jonah's to the Ninevites and a pleading of Wisdom more winning than that which drew the Queen of the South to the feet of Solomon. Save for the penitent publicans and harlots, a remnant of Wisdom's children by whom her effort is "justified," Israel has behaved like sulky children playing in the marketplace, satisfied neither with the funereal strains of John's ascetic warning to repent, nor with the wedding song of Jesus' "glad tidings to the poor." The section closes (Matt. xi. 25–30 = Luke x. 21–22) with the hymn of Thanksgiving for the Election of Babes and the offer of the Revelation of Sonship to all weary and heavy-laden souls.

I praise thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth,
That thou didst hide these things from the wise and learned,
And didst make the revelation unto "babes";
Yea, Father, for such was Thine election decree.

All revelation is given to me by my Father;
And no man acknowledgeth the son save the Father,
Nor doth any have the knowledge of the Father save the son,
And he to whomsoever the son is moved to reveal Him.

Come to me, all ye that toil and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest.
Take my yoke upon you and learn of me;
For I am meek and lowly in heart,
And ye shall find rest for your souls.

In this Wisdom-hymn (for the metrical form proves it an excerpt in Q) Israel the Servant-son presents his message, knowledge of a redeeming Father, to a heavy-laden world. When by the mere removal of intrusive material drawn from Mark we find this Wisdom-hymn of Q immediately followed by the Isaian song of the Election of the Servant in Matthew xii. 18–21, it is hardly needful to inquire further whence the Septuagint-using evangelist borrowed this Hebrew-text quotation from Isaiah xlii. 1–4. We need not assume that Matthew found it at precisely this point in the source. The quotation would seem most apposite to Jesus' adoption as Servant-son (παῖς) at His baptism, when Jehovah "put his Spirit upon him"; but it also contemplates the nature of His ministry of healing and comfort to the contrite and broken in spirit, and looks forward beyond this to a triumphant extension of the glad tidings of hope to "the Gentiles." It is thus as well fitted to stand at the end as at the beginning of the story; but all its affinities are with that source which presented the career of Jesus under the aspect of a fulfilment of the Isaian-Wisdom ideal of the rejected and suffering Servant-son (παῖς θεοῦ), the witness for Jehovah who brings the Gentiles to "justification" (Isa. liii. 11) by the revelation of His Father—God.

Not the least striking feature of this pre-Pauline gospel of justification by faith for Jew and Gentile, is the fact that John the Baptist and Jesus appear in it as independent

messengers of the divine Wisdom. John is still far from being reduced, as in Mark and the later evangelists, especially the fourth, to the rôle of a mere advance agent of Jesus, pointing all comers to the Greater than he, and using baptism merely to foretoken the Christian rite. In these *logia* John is the greatest born of women, a prophet and more, Elias that should effect the Great Repentance as Malachi foretold. But he is *not* the Markan Elias that anoints the Messiah and makes Him known to Israel as rabbinic legend foretold.[1] That is a later adaptation. In the older Q material the Baptist knows of Jesus' career only as he hears the report of it from others, and like others he wonders, and is ready to "be stumbled." He is "less than one that is but little in the kingdom of God," and yet the type and culmination of those "prophets" whom the Wisdom of God sends to forewarn of the penalty of sin, as Jonah was sent to the Ninevites. John's message marks an epoch, it throws down all human barriers to the kingdom, that Wisdom's children, publicans and harlots, yes, and believing Gentiles, may enter it by repentance and faith. But in the Q material he remains unconscious of that higher mission which follows his own, a mission of the Servant-son surpassing Wisdom's great representative of the past by as much as John himself surpasses Jonah. His gospel involves a sweeping abolition of all prerogative of birth, demanding of Pharisee and publican, Jew and Gentile alike, repentance as the one condition of his baptism of preparedness for the coming of the Judge. It brings "a way of justification," a way by which penitent publicans and harlots "entered in" to the kingdom, while self-righteous Pharisees did not even repent after they had seen the sign. In a sense, therefore, he can be said with our third evangelist (Luke iii. 18) to have "preached 'the gospel' to the people."

[1] Justin, *Dial. with Trypho*, viii., xlix.

It is a "gospel according to John" of justification by faith for Jew and Gentile; but John and his disciples alike remain without knowledge of the true mission of Jesus, and of the gift of the Spirit (Acts xix. 1–7).

Students of the New Testament who apply historico-critical methods, particularly those who have attempted reconstruction of the Second Source, and have scrutinised its relations to Paul, cannot have failed to notice how wide are the ramifications of the subject as soon as we begin to trace through its phraseology the connexions of this important Q *logion* on the Baptism of John. The terms "repentance," "faith," "justification," are key-terms for all elements of this source, and must be interpreted with reference to it and to its connexions with Isaiah and Lyric Wisdom. Present limitations forbid a following up of these ramifications, but enough has been suggested for others to take up the clue. At least it will be already apparent that the figure of the Baptist in the Second Source differs widely from that which begins with Mark to take its place. To judge from the testimony of Josephus, from the curious reference to Johannine "disciples" in Acts xix. 1–7, and from the few extra-canonical traces of "baptist" sects it is far more authentic and historical. The great and widespread influence of "the baptism of John" has been eclipsed by the greater luminary that came after. But the Second Source carries us back to a point of juster, more appreciative view. When its scattered data are brought together we see John depicted through the mouth of Jesus as greatest of the prophets, as Elias the "restorer of the tribes," who turns the heart of the Father to the children and the children to the Father[1] in the Great Repentance, thus opening the kingdom of heaven to all penitent believers whether Jewish or Gentile. In the Second Source this

[1] So Mal. iv. 5–6 in the reading followed by Ecclus. xlviii. 10.

supreme message of the Wisdom of God through the prophets is a pre-Christian gospel according to John of "justification by faith."

B. W. Bacon.

THE REVOLUTIONARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GOSPEL.

1. The famous saying, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's" has often been taken to mean that Caesar can take all that he wants, and that God is sufficiently served with the remainder. Let us examine the boundary which was drawn by the Roman government in order to see how far the proclamation of the Gospel was found by the Roman lawyers to involve necessarily a conflict with the powers that were. The fact that such a conflict took place justifies the inquiry upon which we are about to engage.

2. It is one of the indications of the early date of our records that such a question was put in its proper historical setting. After the death of Tiberius in 37 A.D., not Tiberius indeed, but each Roman emperor who followed him, was deified by a vote of the senate after his death. The exceptions were rare, and Domitian, to whom celestial honours were refused beyond the grave, at least enjoyed the title of Lord God during his lifetime.[1] The Trinitarian controversy thus takes a deeper meaning when we remember that Arius' theology placed the divinity of our Lord on a level with that of the Roman Emperor, and that even deceased Christian rulers down to the time of Valentinian enjoyed the title of *divus*.

Julius Caesar was deified in his lifetime, and after his

[1] Martial, V. viii. 1.

death was solemnly enrolled among the gods as Divus Iulius. This official act receives its justification from the panegyric of the historian of the Roman republic. "He worked and created," says Mommsen, "as never any mortal did before or after him." Or again, according to the same high authority, "when he looked back on his life, [he] found doubtless erroneous calculations to deplore but no false step of passion to regret"; for "Caesar was the entire and perfect man." [1] It shows a certain modesty on the part of Augustus that he set some slight limitations to the worship which was paid to him during his lifetime, although the religious instinct of his courtiers outran the discretion of the emperor. Horace, in his capacity of poet laureate,[2] assured Augustus that when he had completed his conquests on the eastern and western fronts, he would be regarded as *praesens divus*, i.e., God with us, Immanuel. Such teaching falling upon the diseased minds of the later emperors, led to the blasphemies against which the individual Christian, though not always the Church, bore witness.

3. That we are dealing here with a deep-rooted human instinct is shown by the recurrence of similar phenomena when throughout the ages similar conditions presented themselves. So long as the papacy existed side by side with the empire, the supremacy of the secular prince was confined to temporal matters. But to discard the authority of the pope, whether in Germany or England, meant at first the subjection of religion to the civil authority. In Lutheran Germany the *jus episcopale* was transferred to consistories appointed by the civil ruler, and the prince became *episcopus episcoporum*.[3] In England Cranmer introduced a "theory of ecclesiastical authority which resolved all its spiritual as well as temporal powers into the royal

[1] Mommsen, *History of Rome*, Bk. V. c. xi. [2] *Odes*, III. v. 2.
[3] *E.B.*, *s.v.* Lutheranism.

supremacy." [1] And indeed Cranmer did not shrink from the logical consequences of this hypothesis: according to which the king was indeed represented as the highest channel of sacramental grace. Professor Pollard quotes with approval Michelet's comparison of Henry VIII. to a new Messiah.[1] And so far as the Lutheran conception of monarchy takes up into itself supremacy in spiritual things, it involves, in Michelet's phrase, the setting up of rival Messiahs, in a word, of Antichrists. Although the term is in the New Testament confined to the Johannine epistles, the notion and the name of Antichrist seems to have been more widely current than would at first sight appear. Hence the clue to the interpretation of "Antichrist" is to be found in regarding it as a general name. There was no need to go beyond the use of the plural in 2 John 7. The word might indeed mean "an opponent of the Messiah," but it seems best to understand "a rival Messiah." In that case we have here a close parallel to the "false Christs" of Mark and Matthew. We must therefore surrender the notion that there is only one Antichrist. "The Antichrist," says Renan, "has ceased to alarm us." No! He will always threaten so long as human courtiers, whether of autocrats, oligarchs or democracies, exalt earthly sovereigns to the throne which deity alone can fill. It is part of the tragicomedy of life that the marionettes who in later Rome wore the tiaras and robes of empire took seriously the blasphemous phrases of poet laureates like Horace, or of hard-up tenants of Grub Street like Martial. For monarch and poet alike played upon the natural instinct of man to abase himself before his temporal superior. In this respect at least Luther and Cranmer show up poorly against Calvin and Knox, Fisher and Thomas More. Luther grovelled before Henry VIII. He wrote to the

[1] *E.B.*, *s.v.* Henry VIII.

king : " I fear to raise my eyes in your majesty's presence . . . I am but dregs and a worm." [1] It was at such hands that the German princes received the titles which, so far as titles can, lifted them to rivalry with Christ : titles which they still enjoy. Nor in this respect was Cranmer better fitted than Luther to play the man. The spiritual claims of Henry were continued indeed under his successor, but they were surrendered under Mary and never formally resumed. Yet whether the ruling power be a monarch or an oligarchy or a democracy, there will always be found persons ready to imitate the courtiers of Herod and to acclaim in its utterances " the voice of a god." The preface to the A.V. in comparing James I. to the sun came dangerously near the limits of blasphemy. The proverbial phrase, " *vox populi vox Dei* " deserves also to be weighed in the balance.

4. But there has been at least one great prince who disdained such pretensions. For various reasons the personality of Tiberius has remained an enigma. He perplexed his contemporaries. Posterity has not yet said the last word about him. To live apart from the tendencies of an age has usually meant to incur its censure. And the gossip which attributed incest and cannibalism to the primitive church, did not spare the private morals of Tiberius. The historian who views the public conduct of the emperor takes note of the fact that under him the imperial provinces were as a rule better governed than those over which the senate exercised control, and that the unpopularity of Tiberius in Rome and Italy went along with his efforts to remove the abuses of which the imperial capital, like its successors, was the fertile soil. In Judaea the imperial procurator Pontius Pilatus was prevented from offending the religious prejudices of the rabbis : a

[1] Hallam, *History of England*, vol. I. c. ii.

policy which was rendered the easier by the refusal of Tiberius to allow divine honours to be paid to himself. An emperor who shared with the senate the government of the state, and disdained the blasphemous flattery of his subjects, rendered the position of the pious Jew a comparatively tolerable one even in presence of this foreign domination. Hence the famous reply of our Lord, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's," was possible under Tiberius precisely because the Caesar in question, like the mediaeval emperor, was theoretically at least a temporal and not a spiritual prince.

5. When from these historical considerations we turn to the fourth Gospel, we are again impressed by a veracious touch. The hint of the Jewish authorities that Pilate, if he released Jesus, showed himself no "friend to the emperor"—notice the technical phrase *amicus Caesaris*—was just calculated to alarm an official who remembered the suspicious atmosphere of the court, and the readiness of the emperor in his later years to listen to the delators. On the other hand the answer of the chief priests, "We have no king but Caesar," is made comprehensible by the attitude of Tiberius towards the religious susceptibilities of the Jews. But the servility of the Romans which repaid with slander the dignified reserve of Tiberius rendered divine honours to the mad emperor Gaius who followed him. And the Jews stood out from the rest of his subjects in refusing to worship a mortal. Only the death of Gaius saved the temple at Jerusalem from being profaned by a statue of the emperor. Hence the tradition of the fourth Gospel has preserved aright the memory of a state of things which passed away on the death of Tiberius,[1]

6. Over against the worship of a temporal sovereign, the Christians set the worship of a spiritual sovereign, and in

[1] John xix. 12 ff.

such a way that it was impossible for them to be regarded as merely neutral in face of the deified Roman emperor. For the Christian the spiritual King was already come. For him, then, there was a new allegiance. And so far as the structure of the Roman empire was bound up with the divine honours of the emperor, to that extent the Church was a revolutionary body. In the same way there is war to the end between the Church and every theory of life which exalts either oligarchy or democracy above the spiritual sovereign. The exaltation of the Lutheran prince has been followed by the deification of the oligarchy in the person of the superman. The gospel of the superman preached by Count Gobineau, and further proclaimed by Nietzsche, inspires the actions which at this moment are being condemned by the Christian conscience. Those who have read Gobineau's *Renaissance* and Nietzsche's *Thus spake Zarathustra*, understood only too well the enigma of the present desolation of the world. But the Christian philosophy of history which guides us to-day forbids the anticipation that the uncontrolled supremacy of democracy will satisfy the spiritual needs of man. The Beatitudes, as Luke reports them, limit the reign even of the poor by the figure of the spiritual king. It will be our next business to answer the question : how did the Messiah gather round Himself the qualities of this ideal ?

7. It would be a fascinating but scarcely profitable task to inquire to what extent the monarchy of David was coloured by his contact with the Philistines and other non-Semitic peoples such as the Cherethites. The brilliant and almost contemporary records of 2 Samuel ix.–xx. are older than parts of the Homeric poems. The Hebrew writer need not fear the comparison. What is more important for us is that David had a Babylonian secretary, Shavsha. The Jewish monarchy, like that of other small

contemporary states, was a reflection of the great kingdoms, Babylon and Egypt. But this reflection was not always ungracious. The comparison of the king to a shepherd occurs, for example, in the inscriptions of Sargon II. before the end of the eighth century B.C. That Homer should use the title ποιμένα λαῶν regularly of Agamemnon shows that at a much earlier date, probably in the time and circle of David, the use of the term as a royal title was already widespread. David was not prevented from harbouring the ideas of Psalm xxiii. Passing down the ages, we find the Messiah described as a shepherd in the Psalms of Solomon,[1] a title which would belong to him in his kingly office. An interesting parallel is found in the Book of Enoch : [2] "the prince and ruler of the sheep." Hence the title of the Good Shepherd applied to our Lord is to be interpreted in part as a Messianic title of a very long standing. And we must not allow the sometimes sentimental use of the metaphor to conceal for us the royal authority which belongs to the name. The love of the Good Shepherd is also strong.

Let us apply our results to the parable in the fourth Gospel.[3] Here the Messianic idea fails to be understood not because of ignorance but simply through the fact that the hearers do not belong to the kingdom. "Ye believe not because ye are not of my sheep."

But this ignorance was not universal. According to John many believed on Jesus as the Messiah. On the other hand, the Jewish authorities are represented as recognising the character of the Messianic claims of Jesus, although they did not accept them. Hence the tenth chapter of the fourth Gospel supplies an explanation of the attitude of "the chief priests and the scribes," which is in complete accordance with the narrative of Mark.[4] The

[1] xvii. 45. [2] xxxix. 46. [3] John x. [4] Mark xiii.

picture of the Shepherd is not less apocalyptic than the figure of the Son of Man.

Our result does not entirely harmonize with some recent speculations. When Bousset [1] affirms that the Messianic ideal was inadequate to satisfy the consciousness of Jesus, we may well agree with him, but not for the reasons which he alleges. In fact it was precisely the pastoral office of the Messiah that furnished Jesus with some of His most characteristic expressions.

Again, the Messianic secret is treated in the fourth Gospel much in the same way as in the Synoptics. Certainly there are many points of difference here between the fourth Gospel and the others. But that difference should not be allowed to blind us to the resemblances. If we recognise the Messianic character of the parable of the Good Shepherd, we shall be prepared to find other Messianic elements in the fourth Gospel. As we do so the abstract and speculative character of this Gospel is countered by touches of historical realism which are not to be referred with so many critics to the stock-in-trade of the clever historical novelist. It is no longer possible to postpone the fourth Gospel to a time when millenarianism had ceased to be the prevalent attitude of the Church. Why does the fourth Gospel, then, differ—as undoubtedly it does—from the Synoptics in its presentation of the figure of Jesus? Not because Jesus is the abstract Reason of the Father. We have already got rid of that misinterpretation. Nor are we going to allow Schmiedel to get out of his difficulties by saying that "the spiritualised representation which is characteristic of the fourth Gospel could not have been possible to the Jesus of the Synoptists." [2] The problem of the relation of the Synoptists to the fourth Gospel wants restating. Critical research has not been wasted, as we have learnt

[1] *Jesus*[3], 80. [2] *E.Bi.* 2531.

to mark the subtle differences of historical and literary presentation. But we have not yet entirely harmonised the actual agreement. The contribution to the solution of the problem which is here offered, is so simple that I hesitate to make it.

8. For my own part, I am content to take the phrase of the author. For the word Christ, I substitute the equivalent and original word Messiah. But I am not an Aramaic-speaking person. What does Messiah stand for? It stands for the anointed king. But the emphasis should rest on the word "King." And therefore I shall take the liberty of distinguishing this special sense of the word by the employment of a capital letter. If for the word Christ we substituted Messiah and occasionally King, the translation of the New Testament would gain in vividness.[1] Speaking for myself, the Messiah in suggestiveness takes precedence of the Christ. I find that Milton, according to the concordance, uses the title "Messiah" twenty times in his poems, and "Christ" only once. Another incidental circumstance which deserves to be noted, is the influence of Handel's oratorio, "The Messiah," the libretto of which combines impressively the traits of Jesus and the King. Poetry and music thus follow the hint given in the fourth Gospel, which alone of the books of the New Testament has preserved the title by which Jesus was actually known to His contemporaries. In the like spirit early Christian pictorial and plastic art fixed upon the figure of the King. A mosaic panel of the head of Christ in the monastery of St. Luke, Phocis, is perhaps the most affecting and sublime representation of the "Rex tremendae majestatis" which has been preserved. Our study, therefore, is not without

[1] Tyndale (John i. 41) translates "Christ" by "anointed." Abbott remarks: "The Christ," *i.e.*, "the Anointed," would mean little or nothing to most Gentiles unless one added something connecting the title with God."—*The Law of the New Kingdom*, 495.

profit for the understanding of Christian art. On the other hand the failure to grasp the actual meaning of the term "Christ" led Farrar to compose his *Life of Christ in Art* without any attempt to set the royal significance of his subject in the foreground.

9. When we remember that in the Aramaic-speaking communities of Jews, "Messiah" at once suggested the ideal King, we must revise our translation of the Pauline and other epistles. Only by so doing can we return from the epistles to the Gospel with a proper understanding. The investigation thus disclosed before us is so large a matter, that I will be content here with a single reference. "The King in you, the hope of glory," [1] strikes the note of a ruling inner principle. The effects of such a principle are traced in a work which I have just had the advantage of reading, *Man's Supreme Inheritance.*[2] The author traces the salutary effects upon mental and bodily health which follow from the subjection of human habits to self-government. In thus referring to Mr. Alexander's book, I do not bind myself to accept all his hypotheses or all his conclusions. But he helps me to understand how the figure of the interior King has worked miracles of healing throughout the whole Christian history. The Messianic passage, at the end of the eleventh chapter of Matthew, anticipates the Pauline statement. "Take my yoke upon you" conveys the promise of refreshment for the mind, in the form of a royal pronouncement. Ζυγός is used also for the rule of the Messiah in the Psalms of Solomon.[3] Our present topic has a bearing upon Indian religion. The notion of the king to whom one owes devotion seems to have been taken over by the Bhakti teachers from the

[1] Col. i. 27. I do not suggest more than the partial substitution of "King" for "Christ." Nor does the term denote the individual as exalted. The self departs as the "King" comes.

[2] By F. Matthias Alexander. [3] xvii. 32.

Nestorians. History repeats itself: Ishvara, in Mrs. Besant's Hindu Catechism, is an echo of "The Christ that is to be" in Tennyson's *In Memoriam*.

10. We will now proceed to glean some conclusions. In the first place, the "fold" and "the kingdom" are in many passages of the Gospel synonymous terms. The metaphor of the fold thus mediates between the ideas of the kingdom and the Church. Peter, for example, and John speak of the "fold" and the "flock" and avoid the word "Church." Luke is acquainted with both the earlier and the later phrase. Paul never makes use of the notion of the flock or indeed of the shepherd in the spiritual sense except in the doubtful case of Ephesians. The distribution of the pastoral metaphor among the early Christian literature, therefore, does not entirely coincide with what we should have expected from some current theories about the fourth Gospel and the date of Peter's first epistle.

But when we speak of the kingdom and the fold in relation to the primitive Christian community, we are not to regard these phrases as denoting something fixed; to use a convenient metaphor, they are snapshots of a living movement. We have already considered the economic and less important side of this movement.[1] The Messianic suggestiveness which is conveyed by the metaphors of the kingdom and the fold is at a higher level. The Roman populace indeed was content with a bread ration and the hippodrome. The Jew lived in expectation of something more. As the success of Jesus became more apparent, many of His countrymen seized upon the prophetic analogies which so readily offered themselves, not only from Isaiah and Daniel, but from Zechariah. The Servant, the Son of Man and the Shepherd, as well as the King floated before their eyes. Thus the form of the ideal community in the

[1] Expositor, June, 1917.

gifted Jewish mind changed with the form of its chief, as the rainbow cast by the sun is different for each observer according to his point of view. In like fashion, the form of the Christian community need never be entirely determined by the past. The new wine in its turn becomes old. Hence the contact of the Western Church with India has not only been of importance for the whole Indian mind,[1] but the Indian mind will also react upon and modify the Western Church.

11. The significance of the Gospel, therefore, consists largely in its continual freshness. The coming of the King which the Gospel announces is a recurring event. Hence the gospel of Mark takes precedence of the other three in so far as it is mainly directed to this coming. For, strictly speaking, among the Synoptists Mark's is the only gospel which directly claims the name: "the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus the King." The freshness of Mark's style goes along with the production of an entirely novel form of literature. Mark is the first writer of the New Testament to announce in literary form the Advent of the King. Matthew, in the Greek form of his Gospel, presents us with a second Genesis. Luke writes the third gospel as the first book of a Greek history. And they take over bodily into their respectively Hebraic and Hellenistic forms of composition the material offered by Mark. John (here as always I venture to use the name of the apostle without prejudice either for or against his immediate authorship) John closely reproduces the form of Mark. And it is in accordance with the whole temper of the fourth Gospel that we should interpret it in a Messianic sense rather than by reference to the threadbare categories of Greek philosophy in its later forms.[2]

[1] *The Renaissance in India*, Andrews, *passim*.
[2] Expositor, May, 1916.

12. It is in accordance with the kingly office of Jesus (although the notion of an envoy does not absolutely involve this suggestion), that the name "apostle" was given to the Twelve when they were sent out to announce the Gospel. And if we take the apostolate along with the purpose of the mission, we are bound to recognise the royal significance of the act of Jesus in sending out the disciples. This royal significance was recognised by Peter in the famous declaration.[1] Hence the term chosen, ἀπόστολος, may fairly be translated "ambassador." It is unfortunate that in John[2] the translation "apostle" should be relegated by the revisers to the margin, except that the Aramaic form of the passage in question contained a play upon the root "to send" which is not reproduced by the Greek, but is rendered by the English version.

One would have liked indeed more definite information as to those times at which Jesus separated Himself from the Twelve, and taught alone. We have still less knowledge as to the contents of the apostolic message. The fourth Gospel, for example, takes little or no notice of the teaching of the apostles alongside of Jesus. When He spoke, they were silent. When they were sent away by Him, they would repeat His words with the utmost exactness. They were living Epistles, i.e., royal Despatches.

13. When now we turn to the other early Christian literature, we find that (with the exception of the second book of Luke's history and the Revelation), the whole of it consists in documents which for the most part are more correctly denominated Despatches rather than Letters. In the Septuagint ἐπιστολή is used chiefly of official communications from the Persian Court. In Acts ix. 2 the word is used of official communications from the High

[1] Mark vii. 29, "Thou art the King."
[2] xiii. 16.

Priest. And therefore the form of the Despatch is rather to be paralleled with the documents of the imperial and local chancelleries of the Roman empire than with purely literary productions. Hence it is impossible to agree with Deissmann that the Epistles of Paul and the first Epistle of John are real non-literary letters.[1] Nor can we follow van Manen in regarding the Epistles as "mere treatises for instruction and edification."[2] They are coloured largely with the idea explicitly stated by Paul: "we are envoys on behalf of the King."[3] We are not indeed excluded from seeing the personal touch in the Epistle to the Galatians. But obviously authorship becomes quite a different matter when we regard the official and therefore possibly impersonal character of most of the Epistles. Their titles will rather denote their source than their authorship. Their origin is far more remote than the letters of Greek literature. Once more we gain especially from Semitic sources, and we trace the Epistle back through the usage of the Persian court to the Babylonian correspondence of a remote past.

14. Hence the form of the Epistle involves an authority which does not belong to the mere letter. The Epistle so to speak is the Gospel at one remove. The phrase, *βασιλικὸς νόμος*,[4] therefore, should be compared with such phrases as torah Yahweh,[5] the law of God. The law of the King is the law of the Messiah. And we may fairly ask how far the precepts given in the Epistles were to be understood as ultimately coming from our Lord. The fact already noticed, that the Apostles were sent out after receiving instruction, would lead us to infer that in the Epistles also to some extent they closely repeated the precepts of Jesus.

15. When we turn to the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist, the very word "sacramentum" accords with

[1] *Light from the Ancient East*, 239 f. [2] *E.Bi.* 3480.
[3] 1 Cor. v. 20. [4] James ii. 8. [5] 1 Chron. xvi. 40.

the Messianic intention which is for the present our main clue. Let us take from "sacramentum" the meaning of "the oath of allegiance." Baptism was a token of reception into the kingdom. And the declaration of belief which accompanied baptism was a declaration of loyalty to the King. "Jesus is Lord," [1] corresponds to the oath of allegiance to the emperor, which was taken by the Roman soldier. And the translation of μυστήριον by "sacramentum" almost certainly arose in North Africa among the Roman soldiers who were converted to the new allegiance. At any rate the old Latin translation of the Gospels used by the author of the tract *De Montibus* has "sacramentum," where *a* and *d* and the *Vulgate* have "mysterium." Cyprian himself confirms us with his saying, "totum fidei sacramentum in confessione Christi nominis digestum." [2] To go to another quarter, the saying of Polycarp at his martyrdom, "can I blaspheme my King?" agrees with the Messianic definition of sacramentum.

Not less brilliant is the light which we thus find thrown upon the Eucharist. It is increasingly recognised that we cannot separate the Last Supper entirely from the common meals at which Jesus previously presided. Dr. Abbott assembles many important passages.[3] But instead of saying with him that reigning is an aspect of shepherding,[4] we must invert his statement. That Mark, when he described a miracle of feeding, should say of the multitude that they were, in the eyes of Jesus, as sheep without a shepherd, prepares us for the kingly attitude which tempted the crowd to seize Him and compel Him to declare Himself. The Eucharist was in its beginnings a royal act. It is possible, therefore, that the omission of the words of Institution in the fourth gospel, is intended to throw the origin

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 3. [2] *Ep.* xxx. 3.
[3] *The Law of the New Kingdom*, 376. [4] *Op. cit.* 256.

of the Eucharist at least as far back as the miracles of feeding.

16. We have traced the formation of a society which has many of the external forms of a kingdom. Such a kingdom was partly reconcilable with the rule of Tiberius. But in proportion as after Tiberius the Roman emperor laid claim, along with other monarchs, to divine character, the conflict with the imperial authorities always threatened to become acute. Yet the extent of this conflict has been much exaggerated. Compared with the great Jewish rebellions of 66 and 132, the Christian resistance to the imperial religion involved comparatively little suffering. Not till the middle of the third century was the new religion made the object of systematic persecution. Origen, writing shortly before, could say that those who had died for the Christian faith were few and easy to count.[1] To quote Origen again, Jesus brought in " a commonwealth according to the Gospel."[2] But this commonwealth came into conflict with the secular state on the single point of the claim of the monarch to be regarded as divine. Jesus Himself did not immediately arouse the suspicions of the Roman government. In fact we may deduce from the evangelical precepts the rule that the Christian life is possible under any form of social and political constitution with the one reservation which we have noticed. " Greek and Jew, barbarian, Scythian, slave or freeman," as such, are capable of the divine grace. Hence it is not the function of the Christian community to attach any political conditions to the Gospel. Therefore it is only through the indirect effects of the Gospel that it can be described as revolutionary. To the earliest critics, the Christian became suspect precisely for his quietism, his withdrawal from any share in public life. When we compare this attitude with

[1] *c. Celsum*, iii. p. 116 (Spencer). [2] *c. Celsum*, ii. p. 92.

the political activity of the Jews, which during a century expressed itself in repeated insurrections, it seems almost certain that Flavius Clemens and Domitilla, the former as shown by his "contemptissima inertia," were Christians.

The same problems arising from the relation of the Christian to the state and to national customs recur to-day. We may enliven what seems at first sight a merely antiquarian interest by putting a question to which the reader in the light of what has been advanced may furnish his own reply. The problem raises some fundamental issues of which we may trace the developments. Is it the business of English missionaries to India (who take with them our strong though unexpressed feelings of caste), to demand from their converts a surrender of the traditional native castes, which in their origin are one with the presumed superiority of the western races to the Aryan and Dravidian peoples of India? The Gospel, in its first proclamation, was indifferent to the caste distinctions between circumcised and uncircumcised,[1] Greek and Jew,[2] slave and freeman.[3] So far, then, as caste in India is an intrinsic element of the social structure, it is doubtful whether the proclamation of the Gospel necessarily involves the destruction of caste. In the primitive Church there were Jews, like James the brother of Jesus, who continued to observe the Jewish law. And the institution of slavery existed alongside with the Christian Church until the memory of persons now living. Further than this, the Indian Christian, as it appears, finds himself, when he comes among Europeans, the object of caste distinction not less marked than the caste distinctions which he is sometimes taught that he must surrender.[4] The problem is similar when we examine the contact of the white races with the yellow races

[1] Acts xi. 3.
[2] Acts xxi. 29.
[3] Ep. to Philemon 16.
[4] *Renaissance in India*, 173.

in Asia, and with the negroes in Africa and America. But we are thrown back upon the characteristics which lie beyond race. *We must transcend the theory of evolution.*

17. Since I began this paper, I have undertaken to deal elsewhere with a fundamental question which is not without importance for the whole conduct of our inquiry into the language and significance of the Gospel. It will be enough here to record briefly one or two considerations.

When human beings are considered as subjects of the divine grace, the notions of evolution and progress lose their ordinary meaning. There was a moment in the history of man considered as an animal, when for the first time he could enter into communion with God. The Jewish thinkers who turned their thoughts upon this moment rightly represented it as the moment of man's creation. And it is difficult to imagine how they could have better presented this fact than in the opening chapters of Genesis. The reception of the divine grace is completely incommensurate with the ordinary experiences of human beings. "The Spirit does not give by measure." [1] Hence there can be no question of development or of progress in the usual meanings of these terms. There is no evidence that the spiritual susceptibility of man to-day is higher than among the Israelites when as yet they were nomads and according to Paul were not unaccompanied by the King. On this rock the notion of evolution from the side of man is shivered to atoms. "Ye must be born," says the King.[2] In the grievous record of human experience light is flashed across abysses of misery and blindness from one beacon to another.

When we extend our view to the reflections of the spiritual life in literature generally, the same facts present themselves. From time to time and not continuously nor by

[1] Expositor, May, 1916, p. 364 [2] *Op. cit.* p. 364.

way of improvement the divine light shines, fitfully and in accordance with an undisclosed plan, now on this person or group and now on that. Without prejudice to the real value of other literatures, we may recognise in the canonical scriptures the most conspicuous instance of such an illumination. And in those same scriptures the Gospel shines the most vividly. Hence when we speak of the revolutionary significance of the Gospel, we must understand that the Gospel records the most conspicuous break in what to the superficial glance seems to be the uniform onward movement of human society.

FRANK GRANGER.

A NEW COMMENTARY UPON PHILIPPIANS.

THE "Westminster Commentaries" start from the Revised Version of the English Bible, and appeal "both to theological students and to the clergy, as well as to the growing number of educated laymen and laywomen who wish to read the Bible intelligently and reverently." Dr. Maurice Jones has just edited *The Epistle to the Philippians* for this series. It is fifteen years since the epistle was critically edited in English, by Professor H. A. A. Kennedy in *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, so that the field is not overcrowded. Dr. Jones has written honestly and carefully for his audience. To those who know little or no Greek, this edition will be welcome, and more advanced students of the text will at once recognise that the exegesis is based upon a thorough study of the original. The editor hopes that his readers will find what he himself has found, a mental and spiritual tonic for war-days in the cheerfulness and undaunted trust which breathe from the pages of *Philippians*. But, even when that cloud has passed, the commentary will have elements of permanent value.

More than half of the book is devoted to the Introduction. There are four special problems started by *Philippians*, and each is handled at length. (i.) The origin of the epistle is considered to be Roman. Dr. Jones does not waste time and space in refuting the arguments for Caesarea as the place at which Paul wrote *Philippians*, but he discusses the recent plea for an Ephesian imprisonment as the situation for its composition. Rightly he dismisses it (pp. xxv.–xxxv.), as based upon too many speculative assumptions. The epistle was written from Rome towards the close of the two years' confinement. This is, of course, the opposite of Lightfoot's view, which put *Philippians* early

in that period. (ii.) He agrees with Lightfoot, however, in refusing to see any reason in iii. 1–2 for suspecting that two separate notes have been joined together. (iii.) The problem of "the bishops and deacons," in i. 1, is solved by supposing that their mention is specially due to the "financial" matters in the epistle, though Dr. Jones inclines to connect them, as presidents and assistants, with the Eucharist. But there is no mention of the Eucharist in *Philippians*. (iv.) The "christological" passage, in ii. 5–11, is interpreted mainly on the lines of Dr. E. H. Gifford's exposition (lxxii.–lxxxi.); it is the one section in the Introduction which makes the reader realise the handicap of an English instead of a Greek text as the basis of the argument.

The paraphrases on the text, prefixed to each section in the commentary, are a useful feature. Few things are so difficult to do; few things are so helpful to the reader when they are well done. They make the following notes more clear, and they prevent any impression of scrappiness. Dr. Jones has evidently given much thought to this part of his work. It is admirably done, although one feels that the descriptive headings, which are added, often overlap the paraphrases.

The notes raise some more or less important matters of interpretation which deserve a word of notice.

On i. 1 ("servants of Christ Jesus"), he notes that δοῦλοι "here carries with it no thought of the forced service of the slave. The service of Christ is essentially the offering of a willing obedience." This is correctly put; but it would make matters more clear to bring out the close association of δοῦλοι with κύριος (ver. 2). Κύριος is the correlative of a community of δοῦλοι who worship and obey Him as their Head.

i. 8 is practically a parenthesis. It might almost be

put within brackets, in order to bring out the sequence of 3–7, 9–11.

On i. 29 (*ὑμῖν ἐχαρίσθη*) Dr. Jones writes: "faith in Christ implies suffering for Christ, which is the Christian's choicest privilege." Which is implied in the use of *χάρις* already (ver. 7).

On ii. 4 *μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστοι σκοποῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἑτέρων ἕκαστοι*, the editor remarks that this "may mean either 'regarding others' qualities as being better than your own,' or 'consulting the interests of others as well as and before your own.'" In either case there are two contemporary illustrations of the language, which the critical editors seem to have missed; Musonius Rufus (ed. Hense, p. 72: *εἰ μὲν γὰρ φῂς, ὡς τὸ αὑτοῦ σκεπτέον μόνον, ἀποφαίνεις τὸν ἄνθρωπον λύκου μηδὲν διαφέροντα*), and Galba's remark (Tacit. *Hist.* i. 15), "pessimum veri adfectus venenum, sua cuique utilitas."

ii. 8, "Being found in fashion as a man." In the introductory paraphrase, this becomes: "Yet He was not mere man, but the representative man, though in outward guise and manner of life He was man and nothing more." But is this notion of "representative man" relevant to *σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος*, or implied in the foregoing *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*? Dr. Jones argues, in the commentary, that *ἀνθρώπων* brings out "the fact that Christ in his humanity represented mankind in general." Surely it is no more than an antithesis to the preceding "divine" (*θεοῦ, θεῷ*). *Ὁμοίωμα* is almost equivalent to *σῶμα* or (as here) to the parallel expression *σχῆμα*. It is so used in Romans viii. 3, where, however, Paul raises the further problem of sin and the flesh. Elizabethan English furnishes a partial parallel to this Hellenistic use of *ὁμοίωμα*, which held it free from any idea of unreality. Thus, in Shakespeare, "likeness" is practically "form"

or "shape," as when Benvolio conjures Romeo to appear ("I conjure thee . . . that in thy likeness thou appear to us!"). It is really to confuse Paul's meaning to interpret his language here by the modern kenotic theories. Such an idea as the interpretation of Christ's self-emptying "as self-limitation with respect to such divine attributes as omnipotence and omniscience" is "as foreign to Paul as are the problems it is supposed to solve. Probably he had nothing more definite in his mind than the idea of glory, the glory that is the garment and evidence of deity." [1]

ii. 12: κατεργάζεσθε—as Paul himself was doing (iii. 12–14). He never regarded faith as ethically indifferent or as automatically guaranteeing a life of goodness. The next phrase ("for it is God who worketh in you") Dr. Jones paraphrases thus: "Yes, but remember that it is God after all who is your strength and stay." But there is more than that in the warning. It is meant not only to encourage faith but to put down any conceit of self-reliance. "The essentially British heresy, the Pelagian—that men can save themselves by the exertion of their own will, and do not need the calling or grace of God—is also the essentially practical one—an extremely healthy heresy, to my thinking, and one half of it quite true; for indeed the will of a man to do his best is like the staunchness of masts and trim of sails in a good ship, without which the rudder is of no avail;—but the other half of the wisest man's creed in this matter, that 'it is God that worketh in us, both to will and to do of His good pleasure,' is the essentially Christian half;—and as such, fought for by the French orthodox bishops, against the strong, saucy, and plausible British heresy, in a most impatient and diligent manner." [2]

[1] Professor Morgan, *The Religion and Theology of Paul* (p. 66).
[2] Ruskin, *Valle Crucis* (i.).

On the difficult expression in iii. 15 (" Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded "), Dr. Jones writes : " St. Paul is here speaking in the spirit of irony." But is this necessary? Surely, in view of a passage like 1 Corinthians ii. 6–iii. 1, he might mean that the τέλειοι in the Philippian Church were those who had been initiated by the Spirit into the higher knowledge of God's nature, the πνευματικοί or mature Christians who were capable of receiving advanced teaching (σοφία). Besides, the usage of Philo and the Stoics proves that τέλειος here carries on the thought of progress suggested in iii. 13–14. The τέλειος was one who was on the right road, with the true end of life before his eyes, and constantly making progress. Thus Epictetus (*Enchiridion*, 51) observes : " You are no longer a child but a mature man (τέλειος). Well, if you are careless and idle and always putting off the day when you are going to attend to yourself, you will unconsciously be making no progress, you will remain uneducated while you live and when you die. Consider then, at once, that you are bound to live as a grown-up man (τέλειος), who is making progress. Whatever seems noblest to you, let that be a law never to be broken."

This also throws light on verse 16 (" only, whereunto we have already attained, by that same rule let us walk "). Dr. Jones takes τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν to mean, " keep to the course, keep to the line." But the alternative rendering (" let our steps be guided by such truth as we have already attained ") seems preferable. The apostle has just promised that " God will reveal " anything still obscure to the imperfectly trained. He now lays down the condition for receiving such a revelation, viz., that faithfulness to the light we already possess is the surest means of gaining fuller light.

On iii. 21 (" who shall fashion anew the body of our

humiliation, that it may be conformed to the body of his glory, according to the working whereby he is able to subject all things unto himself "), Dr. Jones points out that " St. Paul has no sympathy with those who take the low view of the body and its functions that was characteristic of the Stoic and other philosophies." This is true. The apostle implies that the body is neither to be abused (iii. 19) nor to be treated as if it were irrelevant to the spiritual life. But he goes on to suggest more. The body requires transformation. The apostle shrinks from the idea of a disembodied immortality, as in 2 Corinthians v. 1 f., and he also connects the notion of δόξα (" the body of his Glory ") with ἐνέργεια. Of the three terms, δόξα, πνεῦμα, and κύριος, the two former generally express for Paul the divine nature of the risen Lord, but, while πνεῦμα usually connotes the power, δόξα sometimes, as here, expresses the power as well as the fulness (iv. 19) of it.

On iv. 4 Dr. Jones sets aside Professor Souter's view that χαίρετε means " farewell." " The somewhat peculiar repetition of the injunction in this passage is quite intelligible if we take the word in the sense of ' rejoice,' but if it meant ' farewell ' it is difficult to account for." I agree that " rejoice " seems the more adequate rendering. And yet we have the double χαίρετε in Aesch. *Eumenides* 1014, as "*farewell*" and "*fare ye well.*"

For " whatsoever things are honourable " (iv. 8), Dr. Jones suggests, " whatsoever things are admirable," or " august, majestic, dignified." This would suit the context, for σεμνά is opposed to frivolity and vulgar flippancy. But any definition of this kind requires to be safeguarded by the reminder that σεμνά has nothing to do with the stiff, pompous, Pharisaic bearing of a Malvolio, which can speak and " think nobly of the soul," but which frowns superciliously upon the lighter side of life.

The greeting in iv. 21 ("salute every saint in Christ Jesus") becomes intelligible in the light of contemporary usage. Such greetings were a regular form of courtesy and respect at the close of a Greek letter, and, as we see from complaints in some of the papyri, any failure to "greet" a person in the particular circle addressed was liable to be resented. The *πάντα* is to be taken in view of Paul's language from i. 4 onwards. It is as if he meant to suggest, by this stress on "all," that he made no differences between one and another, that he had no favourites and recognised no cliques. Dr. Jones, like Professor Kennedy, takes *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* with *ἀσπάσασθε*, as if it meant "Christian greetings." But Paul is ending the letter as he began it. He opened by addressing the Christians at Philippi as *πᾶσι τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* (i. 1), and that is probably the meaning of iv. 21. *Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* goes with the preceding *πάντα ἅγιον*. There were *ἅγιοι* or people claiming that title, at Philippi and elsewhere, who abjured Jesus as Messiah.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE LETTER OF JAMES, C. III.

THE central problem of the third chapter in the Letter of James is the *Wheel of Begetting: τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως* (iii. 6). It is "a fantastic ring"; nor is its fascination less because it has caused readers to wonder what relations it has to the process of life and death, and what to choral loveliness from Euripides. The tendency in interpretation now is to deny the latter music to the wheel, if such it was, and to allow it an evenness in tone, as it grinds

on, which is thought to be in keeping with the Morality of the Letter.

But sure conclusions have not been found yet as to the quality of tone in the whole document. If there is difficulty to catch the tone of the whole, how then can the note of the wheel be caught? For even such a fundamental question is still being asked concerning the Letter: Is it Christian or Jewish? This wheel, however, may have its own voice; and that, if it can be disclosed more clearly than the present expositions permit, might serve to lend some new values to the chapter in which it is a prominent feature.

Since the early seventies of last century, and Hilgenfeld's discovery that Simplicius [1] in commenting on Ixion's wheel used a phrase that looks to be identical with what is in the Letter of James: τῷ τῆς μοίρας τροχῷ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως, commentators have been uneasy about the possibility that in the phrase was an Orphic reference. Dr. Hort, for instance, added other illuminative passages chiefly from Proclus; [2] and in which the common mutation of κύκλος for τροχός was made. His interest in this line of search is further illustrated by a catena of like passages which the editor of his commentary has been able to put together [3] from the great scholar's manuscripts. Though this possibility of exegetical help seemed to haunt his mind he found some reasons why he could not give it hospitality. Since the acceptance of Orphism in the Letter would make its writer teach an alien doctrine of salvation, and that the statement in the Letter twice associated with the wheel of a "setting on fire" (καὶ φλογίζουσα τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γεέννης) introduced,

[1] *Comm. in Aristot.: De Caelo*, ii. 91 B.

[2] Hort, *The Epistle of St. James* (ed. J. O. F. Murray), 1909, 72–73; cf. Mayor, *The Epistle of St. James*, 1892, 108.

[3] Hort, 106–107.

it would seem, elements foreign to Orphism but native to the thought of the Jacobean document. Indeed any relations of Wheel and of Fire do not arise as a rule in studies of Orphism ; and for the reason that Orphic literary material does not offer the juxtaposition. Miss Harrison has glanced once at this possible association, when she suggested that a real wheel might give place in the rites to " a circle drawn round the neophyte " ; and when the fine meshes of her net brought in as attestation a passage from the eleventh century writer Psellus which retained a memory of the conjoined apparatus in a similar Bacchic rite.[1] There is no direct evidence as yet that this was done in Orphic ritual. Thus, from these chief points of contrast comes an increasing tendency among commentators against the appearance of Orphism in the Letter. And it is not to be wondered at if such an extraordinary demand, that it should express Orphism, is literally made upon the writing. For whether it is thought to be Christian or Jewish or Judæo-Christian, a concert of Orphism plus either of the three would be strange in the New Testament. Is there necessity laid upon the Jacobean text that it should bring exegetes to a blind alley if they affirmed Orphism, or to the ways of a Wonderland if they interpolated the *Genesis* narrative between the spokes of this wheel? If the first has brought them to a standstill, the second has given them quaint velocities and progress. Neither mode finds the original way through. Let it be supposed, however, that the three names which arise from present endeavours in interpretation on this part of the Letter—that is to say Orphism, Judaism and Christianity—are not more than suspicions of tone in statements with more than one voice. They may still lead to the search for how and where the writer

[1] Miss Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 1908, 590, 1.

heard a triple-toned speech which caused much of this third chapter. The names then might be found either in their true order or in new forms.

The first reason for taking what would seem to some to be the old and unprofitable way is that there is a factor in the most ancient commentary on James iii. 6 which has not yet been given its due rank. The commentator is of course Isidore Pelusiotae, and the comments are found in two of his letters. The familiarity of the literary medium may incline to the belief that what is said is familiar. But scholars were writing letters long before Isidore's time, and therefore very long before the twentieth century scholar's time, in which matters of learning had allusive or direct expression. Isidore's comment on James may also want a commentary. The simple statement, even in a letter, of one who knows much can have its infolded knowledge. Thus when Isidore writes [1] that Time (*χρόνος*) is wheel-like and so is the time of our life (*τὸν χρόνον τῆς ζωῆς ἡμῶν*), and for illustration quotes James iii. 6, the ground has no novel features. And as if to confirm that impression, he repeats what commentators claim to be the obvious truth: *ὅτι δὲ τροχὸν τὸν χρόνον ἐκάλεσε διὰ τροχοειδὲς καὶ κυκλικὸν σχῆμα.* There is a tiny alteration to be noted here; for Isidore has now made *τροχός* and *κύκλος* to be equal to one another. Further, he goes on to quote the Psalmist's words,[2] which are translated commonly from the Hebrew as: "Thou crownest the year with thy goodness," in the Septuagint version: *εὐλογήσεις τὸν στέφανον τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τῆς χρηστότητός σου.* Isidore has now brought *στέφανος* into line with *τροχός* and *κύκλος*. Once more, and as if to bind the three together, he writes:[3] *διὰ τοῦτο πῆ μὲν στέφανον ἐνιαυτοῦ πῆ δὲ τροχὸν*

[1] *Lib.* ii, *Ep.* clviii.; *P. G.* lxxviii. 613 A–B.
[2] Ps. lxiv. (lxv.) 11. [3] *Lib.* iv., *Ep.* i; *P.G.* lxxviii. 1049A.

γενέσεως ἐκάλεσεν ἡ Γραφή· κύκλου γὰρ καὶ στεφάνου καὶ τροχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα. The repetition in a letter of the synonymity of the three terms as they represent the encircling flow of life does give a certain warrant to the standard comment on Isidore's interpretation. Knowling's treatment of this matter in his book on the Letter [1] is to the point:

> "It is not therefore surprising," he writes, "that in what has been called the earliest commentary on this verse of St. James, Isidore of Pelusium, ii. 158, should explain the words before us of the temporal course of life which is likened by St. James to a wheel because like a wheel it revolves in a circle. So again elsewhere, iv. 1, in commenting on the same expression, Isidore remarks that the shape of a circle, of a crown, of a wheel is the same, and the Scripture speaks in one place of the crown of the year, and in another passage of the wheel of life."

This collocation of the three terms, however, entices to the opinion that more than biblical knowledge led to their union. For the general scheme of Isidore's comment is at least as old as Arnobius. This early Apologist [2] has a passage in which he expounds *the year as a fixed circuit of time*, and hence there can be nothing divine in what is completed by the passing of days. Then the argument can be applied to Saturn, he continues. For if time is meant by this name, as the interpreters of the Greeks consider, so that Kronos (i.e. the god) is Chronos (i.e. Time), then there is no such a god as Saturn. For who is silly enough to say that time is a god, when it is but the measure of a certain space in the wheelwise process of Eternity (quod mensura cujusdam est spatii in continua serie perpetuitatis inclusi). Thus Isidore's view of the year could have been inspired by the first line of Christian apologists, since Arnobius was not the only one of them to use this style of reasoning.[3] But are there any other reasons for think-

[1] Knowling, *The Epistle of St. James*, 1904, 75.
[2] Arnobius, *Adversus Gentes*, iii. 29 (*P.L.* v. 977A).
[3] Compare Athenagoras, *Apol.* xxii.

ing that Isidore saw Chronos blur into Kronos as he watched the *Wheel of Begetting* go round? That was what Arnobius saw, and because he could not think the image without remarking its Orphic relations. Is there a pale imitation of this act in Isidore's group of names: τροχός, κύκλος, and στέφανος?

The presence of this third in a series of names which are said to stand for Time (Chronos) is arresting. For the three are equivalents in Orphism whose heart is Kronos. The Orphic status of the first two has been recognised by commentators on the Letter. This has been shown already. But στέφανος has not yet been brought into their company, though Isidore might have promoted the need to do so Now the most beautiful relics of early Aegean religion, the Orphic Tablets, charm their readers into doing what has been left undone. Of these Tablets there is one known as *Campagno Tablet* (*a*) [1] which preserves the sad and gay music of humanity:

> "I have flown out of the sorrowful weary Wheel (κύκλου)."
> "I have passed with eager feet to the Circle (στεφάνου)."
> "I have passed with eager feet from the Circle desired (στεφάνου).
> Happy and Blessed One, thou shalt be God instead of mortal."

There is more music in this inscription on gold. For the moment these lines are enough to hear. They establish the Orphic lineage of the terms which make up Isidore's collocation. Yet neither of the Tablets lends any interpretative help for the troublesome element of "fire." Thus Orphism, as such, leads to the usual *impasse*. But like the Orphist it is possible for exegetes to fly out of the seeming

[1] Miss Harrison, 585, and Prof. G. Murray's edition of the Tablets in that book, 667; Kaibel, *C. I. G. I. S.*, 641. The latest commentator on the Letter, Ropes, *Epistle of St. James*, 1916, 239, quotes the first line from the Tablet, but only for κύκλος. His conclusion on the whole problem is that the Orphic resemblances of the language "may well be a mere accident."

invariable procedure of their "sorrowful weary wheel"; and also to be able to retain the Orphic relation of their *Wheel of Begetting*.

Was there, in the time and region of the Letter of James, a form of religious thought which was not so Orphic or Jewish or Christian that it could be called by either of these names; but which, because it combined those three factors, was inimical to the standpoint of the Letter? Syrian Ophitism is just that form of religious thought. The Celsus document [1] upon it is surely the full demonstration of the fact. An item from its ritual apparatus will place its Orphic factor; for Celsus could not avoid giving prominence to the Ophist's use of κύκλους ἐπὶ κύκλοις. These wheels or wheelwise realms of being, are seven in number; and at the gate of each is a god in whom, or about whom, the Syrian Ophite blended his triplicate thought. The gods, or hypostases of the one God, embody what the initiate would attain on the several stages or circles of being. When he reaches the highest or seventh circle, he appeals to the god *who has fearlessly crossed the barrier of fire* (ὑπερβὰς φραγμὸν πυρὸς ἀφόβως) to dissolve him also, and to make him in the image of and according to the likeness of the guiltless. The appeal is proffered in the power of the god's own symbol, the Tree of Life. Upon this symbol Celsus remarks later that the Ophites used it because their διδάσκαλος, who was nailed to a cross, was a worker in wood. What Celsus has described here is the initiate's manner of passing through the circle of being ruled by the fire which could burn up the last traces of the life he had climbed, circle upon circle, to surpass. The Orphic conjunction of circle and fire can be said to have been made out. There is sufficient in the citations from Celsus

[1] Origen, *Contra Celsum*, vi. 31 ff. The opinions expressed on Ophitism are based on a re-investigation of this document.

to represent the presence of the two other factors. The fact of their presence is perhaps most simply to be realised by drawing attention to the place which the Ophites gave in their religion to the *Ascensio Isaiae*.[1] The whole of the passing upwards of the prophet would fit curve to curve with the Orphic scheme as it is expressed in the seven ascending circles of being. The peculiar theology of the *Ascensio* is a first century Judæo-Christian type. The Antichrist element in the little book is also of the same date.[2] But are there later Ophitic features in the Celsus document? Some may be later. They appear to be few. The new touchstone for first century Judæo-Christian religion, which has been discovered in the *Odes of Solomon*, makes this plain. Therefore there are Syrian reasons from the time of the Letter why the τροχός τῆς γενέσεως—the wheel or circle or wheelwise realm of begetting [3]—and its related fire should have reality given to them. This fire, which the Letter says was lit by Gehenna, would appear in the Jacobean conjunction because of the actual or pictorial representation of Gehenna (τὴν Γέενναν) in at least one of the Ophite circles.[4] The Syrian Ophite had his literal fire of hell from which escape was made in the final 'circle of begetting.' Then the Letter's unusual use of the image of the Tongue in such a context would have something of the following value: It is not the passing through of any last wheel or circle of begetting with its

[1] Epiphanius, *Panar. Haer.* lxvii. 3. See Scott, *Ophitism* (Hastings' *Ency. Rel. and Ethics*, ix.) 501 for a sunmary in part of the arguments for primary or pre-Marcionite Ophitism.

[2] On the literary unity of the *Ascensio* see Burkitt, *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses*, 1914, 45 ff.

[3] For this use compare Plato, *Repub.* 525 B.: ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν τε καὶ οὐσίαν.

[4] Origen, vi. 25: ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου κτέ. Celsus has preserved either a general map of the Ophite spiritual world, or the plan of the circles. The latter seems more likely. Thus Gehenna would have its part in the Seventh circle.

ritual fire, but rather the ascents that men make which form the fiery process of their spiritual begetting.

What other chief points in the third chapter of James might this line of interpretation enlighten? Has it no such service to render to this chapter's concepts of Man and of Wisdom? These go together in the Letter with the concept of the Tongue. A test of what help for the understanding of the Tongue and the Wheel and the Fire will then be made if light, from the source used, can be thrown on the meanings of matters joined to them. The concept of the perfect man (*τέλειος ἀνήρ*, iii. 2) and the wisdom view (*ἡ σοφία*, iii. 15) may be taken in turn. The perfect ma in the Letter, is the man who makes the right ascents. He comes into the liberty of the guiltless life through these true and controlled ascents.[1] The chief aim of Ophitism was also to produce perfect men (*τελείοις ἀνθρώποις*).[2] This is to be learnt from the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus. How did a man reach the condition? Through Water, which is the wet substance of begetting (*τῆς γενέσεως*), and *Fire*, which is the principle and desire of begetting (*ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν*).[3] The Ophite initiate came to the circle where he passes through the waters, the very substance of the kosmos as the Celsus document declares,[4] before he reaches the fire. That he may come to the condition of a perfect man (*τέλειος ἄνθρωπος*)[5] the initiate must pass through the gate of the circlewise realms of being which lead finally to that one ruled by fire. The perfect man here becomes such on the plan of a syncretic ritualism: the perfect man in the Letter becomes such by the Christian

[1] Compare James iii. 17–18.

[2] Hippolytus, *Philosoph.* (ed. Mill) v. 8 (111).

[3] Hippolytus, v. 8 (110).

[4] Origen, vi. 31.¶

[5] Hippolytus v. 8 (111), v. 8 (115). For the Egyptian Gnostic use of this term see *Pistis Sophia* (ed. Schwartze, 1851), 125.

ethic. The first is a perfect man according to a practice of wrong ascents, the second is one by the principle of right ascents.

What then of the Wisdom which is not "from above, but is earthly, of the mind, demonlike"? (iii. 15). At the start of his upward journey the man, who would become a perfect man according to Ophitism, makes reverence to the God unto and into whom he aspires. In his formulae is the blend of religious language and colour which has been noted already. One of the God's names or functions is Sophia.[1] Now what is divine in name and attribute in Ophitism are objects for attainment to the aspiring perfect man. The initiate's going upwards was also an advance in that Wisdom. If then the third chapter of James is reacting against Syrian Ophitism, could its writer have chosen epithets more sharp than these—"earthly, of the lower mind,[2] demonlike"—to define his attitude towards that religion? For Hippolytus has kept an ancient Ophitic comment on the begetting (ἡ γένεσις) of its perfect man which describes the process as: "spiritual, heavenly, from above."[3]

VACHER BURCH.

[1] Origen vi. 31: πρώτην δύναμιν, πνεύματι προνοίας καὶ σοφίᾳ τηρουμένην.
[2] Compare Hort, 84.
[3] Hippolytus, v. 8 (115): ἡ πνευματικὴ, ἡ ἐπουράνιος, ἡ ἄνω.

VARIANT NUMBERS IN THE GOSPELS.

We are told by the author of the Gospel according to Matthew that the sum which Judas Iscariot received from the chief priests for the betrayal of his Master was thirty pieces of silver (xxvi. 15 ; xxvii. 3). Not one of the authors of the other Gospels mentions this sum, nor does St. Luke in the Book of Acts. When we recall that St. John thinks it worth while to record the number of fish taken in one catch on the Sea of Galilee (xxi. 11), that both Mark and John state that the money value of the ointment poured over Jesus was 300 pence (Mark xiv. 5 ; John xii. 5), and that all four authors put down the exact quantity of broken pieces which were taken up after the feeding of the 5,000 (xiv. 20 ; vi. 43 ; ix. 17 ; vi. 13), it does seem all the more strange that only one of them should have taken the trouble to mention the terms on which their Master was at last given over into the hands of His enemies. No doubt we shall be told that this figure is recorded by Matthew alone because it fulfils an ancient oracle (Zech. xi. 12), and the citation of old prophecies is a feature of his Gospel. But this explanation is ruled out by the fact that this is not the only place in which the number "thirty" is found in one authority and omitted by another. In the description of the great tree seen by Nebuchadnezzar in his dream (Dan. iv. 12 in the English version), the Greek translators have the statement that its branches were in length "about thirty stadia." Also in the story of Bel and the Dragon (v. 27) the version of Theodotion reads "and Daniel took pitch," but that of the LXX "and Daniel took thirty pounds of pitch." We may be sure that the omission or insertion of the number thirty in these pas-

[1] From the Alexander Robertson Lectures, delivered at Glasgow University, 1918.

sages and its omission or insertion in the Gospel narratives are all due to the same cause, whatever that cause may have been.

There can be little doubt that the earliest Gospel was written on papyrus,[1] and that it was composed in Hebrew or in Aramaic. It makes little difference which term we employ. In the Aramaic papyri discovered at Assouan, as on the inscriptions, numbers are denoted by special signs or cyphers. The Hebrew, however, appears to have preferred to employ the letters of the alphabet to indicate the numerals, as is done on the coins, and as is still done in printed Hebrew Bibles and other books. The same method of writing numbers is found in the Greek papyri also. In these, numbers are indeed in the case of literary compositions written out in words, but in legal and business documents they are represented by the letters of the Greek alphabet. Even, however, in Biblical fragments they are sometimes expressed by letters also. In the collection of *Oxyrynchus Papyri* edited by Drs. Grenfell and Hunt, no. 2, a fragment of the first chapter of Matthew, the number "fourteen" in verse seventeen is written ΙΔ. Its date is about the year 300. Similarly in no. 1073, a fragment of the Old Latin version of Genesis, chapters v. and vi., the ages of the patriarchs are expressed in Roman numerals, for example, 700 by *dcc*, and so on. In no. 1230, containing Revelation v. 5–vi. 8, of the early fourth century, "having seven horns and seven eyes, which are the seven spirits of God," the number seven is expressed by the small letter ζ, and so probably the numbers four and three in v. 6 and vi. 6. The thing denoted by the numeral, whether it be years or shekels or bushels, is in the literary papyri written out in full, but in legal and business documents denoted by a special symbol. One of the most remarkable instances of a letter which is to be read

[1] Milligan, *The N.T. Documents*.

as a numeral standing alone, without any appellative being attached to it, occurs in a conjectural reading of one of the Sayings ascribed to Jesus which have been discovered—*Oxyrynchus Papyri*, no. 1, logion 5—

[ΛΕΓ]ΕΙ [ΙC] ΟΠ]ΟΥ ΕΑΝ ΩCIN
[Β ΟΥΚ] Ε[ICI]N ΑΘΕΟΙ ΚΑΙ
[Ο]ΠΟΥ Ε[ICI ECTIN ΜΟΝΟC
[ΛΕ]ΓΩ ΕΓΩ ΕΙΜΙ ΜΕΤ ΑΥ
Τ[ΟΥ]

Oxyrynchus, No. 1, logion 5.

'Wherever there are two they are not without God, and wherever one is alone, I say I am with him." The words "two" and "not," which are supplied conjecturally, can find room only if the number be indicated by a single letter, and there appears to be nothing else which will fit the space. The conjecture is that of Professor Blass, and is accepted by the editors, Drs. Grenfell and Hunt, as the only one possible.

The same method of indicating numbers is found in the text of the Greek Bible. Thus in Judges xiv. 10 the LXX add to the Hebrew the words "seven days" (ζ' ἡμέρας), but the most familiar example is the number of the beast in Revelation xiii. 18, where there is a variant reading (616 for 666) due to the use of letters instead of words. Occasionally a scribe would read a letter as a numeral when it was not intended to be so taken. Thus in the Greek text of Leviticus xxvii. 5 the assessment to be put upon a girl who "makes a singular vow" is fourteen shekels, instead of ten as in the Hebrew, the Greek scribe having taken the δ, of the following δίδραχμα for the number four, and so read δέκα τέσσερα. Again, in 2 Chronicles xvi. 13 for the Hebrew "and (Asa) died in the forty-first year of his reign" the Codex Vaticanus has "in the thirtieth." The translators apparently mistook the *l*

of the following Hebrew word *lmolchō* for the number thirty, which it also denotes.

This brings us back to the point from which we set out, the question why it is the other evangelists do not mention the thirty pieces of silver of which the first Gospel alone retains any record. The omission is to be explained in the same way as the Vatican reading of "thirtieth" in 2 Chronicles mentioned just above. The phrase used in Matthew xxvi. 15 runs, "and they weighed unto him thirty pieces of silver." "Silver" in Hebrew or Aramaic would be *keseph* or *kaspo*; the word "pieces" would not be expressed (Gen. xx. 16; xxxvii. 28, etc.); and the thirty would simply be the letter *l*. The letter *l*, however, is used in late Hebrew and in Aramaic as the sign of the accusative case. The Aramaic *lkaspō* could therefore be read equally well as "thirty pieces of silver" or simply as "silver" or "the silver." St. Matthew read it in the former way, the rest of the narrators in the latter. This also is without any doubt the explanation of the variant versions of the LXX and of Theodotion in the verse of Bel and the Dragon cited above; and in the passage from the Book of Daniel the "about thirty stadia" of the Greek is to be traced to the same source. The Hebrew text of this verse is difficult, but it contains the letters *kl*, and the translators took the *k* to mean "about" (as in Judges xx. 31, etc.) and the *l* to stand for thirty. The translators frequently forgot about this use of the letter *l* to mark the direct accusative. Thus in Ezra viii. 16 the English version, following the Greek (1 Esdras viii. 43), render it "for." "Then sent I for Eliezer" instead of "Then sent I Eliezer." (The "sent" in the next verse should be "made them go out.") The same thing occurs in 1 Maccabees iv. 24, where the "gave praise unto heaven" of the R.V. should be "blessed Heaven," that is, "God."[1]

[1] Cf. R. H. Charles, *Apocrypha*, etc. *ad loc.*

The substitution of a dual for a plural or a singular is a not uncommon slip in the Greek version of the Hebrew Bible. The former was the more likely, seeing that the forms of the dual and plural were identical in the written Hebrew. Hence in Zechariah i. 8 for "the myrtle trees" in the plural the LXX have "the two mountains": for "his sons Isaac and Ishmael" they have "his two sons I. and I.," Genesis xxv. 9, and similarly "the two handmaids," in xxxiii. 2. In v. 3, 6, on the other hand, the Greek text has 200 for the Hebrew 100. This may be due to the dual ending having been indicated by a mark of abbreviation only, but it may also be due to a confusion of the numerical value of the letter *r* which in Hebrew is 200, in Greek 100, and similarly with the other numerical values in which the two alphabets vary.

There are a number of places in the Gospels in which a dual in one takes the place of a singular in another. In the story of the herd of swine the first Gospel (viii. 28) states that Jesus was met by *two* demoniacs, the second (v. 2) and third (viii. 27) by *one* only. According to Matthew xx. 30 there were two blind men healed near Jericho, according to Luke xviii. 35 and Mark x. 46 one only, and the three narratives seem to describe the same incident. In the narrative of the resurrection the women in two of the accounts see only one angel (Matt. xxviii. 5) or one youth (Mark xvi. 5 f.) at the sepulchre; in the other two there are two men (Luke xxiv. 4) or two angels (John xx. 12). The narratives are not mutually contradictory, but they do not suggest one another like the saying in Matthew x. 29, "Are not two sparrows sold for one farthing?" which in Luke xii. 6 takes the form, "Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings?"

There does not appear to be any way of reconciling these discrepancies or accounting for their origin on the basis of the Greek text alone, and we are forced to look for the

disturbing element in the Hebrew or Aramaic archetype. A good example is found in Matthew xi. 2, where the A.V. reads John sent "two of his disciples," but the R.V., following the oldest uncial MSS., sent "by his disciples." The parallel passage in Luke vii. 19 has "certain two of his disciples" (δύο τινὰς τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ). The word τινάς, however, is omitted by the Codex Bezae. The variation might be explained as due to a confusion of the Greek between δύο (two) and διά (by), not in the uncial MSS., in which they are not very similar, but while the text was still in the papyrus stage; but more likely the different Greek expressions are alternative renderings of a common Hebrew or Aramaic text. In the Semitic languages the direct object is often made the instrument of the action; for example, Lamentations i. 17: "Zion spreadeth forth her hands," literally, "with her hands." This is done specially with the verb "to send" in Arabic. The Semitic original would then run literally "sent by his disciples." The word for "by" is the single letter *b*, but this letter has also the numerical value 2. The one Greek reading translates it "by," the other "two."

Perhaps the most curious variation connected with the number 2 occurs in the warning to Peter; that before the cock crew he should deny his Master thrice (Matt. xxvi. 34; Luke xxii. 34). In Mark xiv. 30 this takes the remarkable form, "before the cock crow *twice*, thou shalt deny me thrice." This is the reading of A, B and C (second hand); but ℵ, C (first hand) and D omit the word "twice." But we are not here left to the mercy of the manuscripts. The passage forms the text of a very old papyrus in the Collection of the Austrian Archduke Rainer (no. 541 in the *Fuehrer* edited by Karabacek). Wessely, in the descriptive notes to the Greek papyri in the collection, regards this fragment as a translation of sayings of Jesus drawn up by the apostle Matthew in Aramaic, and so more primitive than the

canonical Gospels themselves. A discussion of this remarkable document will be found in the *Mittheilungen* to the Rainer Papyri, I. 53 ff. and II. 78 ff. by G. Bickell.

ΦΑΓΕΙΝΩCΕΞΕΘoΥCΠΑ
ΤΗΝΥΚΤΙCΚΑΝΔΑLIC
ΤoΓΡΑΦΕΝΠΑΤΑΞΩΤoN
ΠΡoΒΑΤΑΔΙΑCΚoΡΠΙC
ΥΠΕΤΚΑΙΕΙΠΑΝΤΕCo
oΑΛΕΚΤΡΥΩΝΔΙCΚoΚ
ΠΑΡΝ

Rainer Papyri, No. 541.

" (Jesus said after they had) eaten according to custom, A(ll you this) night shall be offend(ed according to) the writing, I will smite the (shepherd and the) sheep shall be scat(tered. On Peter saying—literally, sayin)g Pet., Even if all, no(t I. He said, Not) twice shall the cock cr(ow before you d)en(y me thrice)."

This version of the saying has been defended on the ground that in Palestine there are two hours of the night at which the cocks crow. On the other hand the old authority on such points, *The Land and the Book*, maintains that the cocks crow all night long (chap. xliii. at the end). But the only question which concerns the present purpose is, How did the " twice " get into the text of Mark and of the papyrus, or, if genuine, how did it come to fall out of the other two sources ? It is difficult to think of anything that would account for either accident happening. Perhaps a scribe copied the first three consonants of the word for cock (*tarnegol*) twice, and the *trn* was taken for the Aramaic word for " two." Another suggestion which occurs to one is that the Hebrew for " before," which is either *terem* or *bterem* indifferently, gave rise to the variation, a translator taking the *b* of *bterem* for the numeral 2—" the cock shall not crow

twice (*b*) before (*terem*) thou deny me thrice "—just as the Greek translator of Genesis xxv. 9, cited above, and elsewhere, appears to have taken the *b* of the Hebrew word for "sons" for the numeral 2 as well as the first letter of the word. It lends some support to this suggestion that a similar misreading would account for the cases mentioned above in which we have a dual in one Gospel answering to a singular in another. The Hebrew words both for "to meet" and for "to see" are sometimes construed with the accusative (Exod. v. 20; Gen. i. 4, etc.) and sometimes with the preposition *b* (Gen. xxxii. 2; xxxiv. 1, etc.). In the latter case it was always open to the Greek translator to read the preposition as the numeral 2, the verb then taking the direct accusative. This may have happened in the case of the apparitions at the sepulchre, and in the narrative of the herd of swine referred to above. The case of the healing of the blind at Jericho is more difficult, as, besides the question of the number of men (two or one), there are other discrepancies. It has to be noted, however, that in Hebrew and the related languages similar events are related in the same words. A good example of this in the Old Testament is found in the two occasions on which David spared the life of Saul (1 Sam. xxiv. and xxvi.), which were lately regarded as two accounts of one incident. The two narratives in the Gospels, therefore, may not refer to the same event.

We have seen above that a Greek copyist could mistake an initial δ for the numeral 4. A corresponding slip would be very much more likely to occur in Aramaic, as in it the fourth letter of the alphabet, besides having the numerical value 4, is also very widely used as a relative and possessive particle, occurring, indeed, on almost every line. This might account, for instance, for the omission by all the narrators other than John to mention that there were *four*

soldiers at the Cross, and that Jesus' garment was divided into four shares.

One cannot but be struck with the way in which in the Gospels the same number has a tendency to recur in the same neighbourhood, for example the number 18 in Luke xiii. 4 and 16, and there only. It is also noticeable how frequently, when a number is given in one Gospel and omitted in another, the letters representing that number would occur in their proper place in the text, if it were translated back into Hebrew or Aramaic. For example, in Matthew ix. 20— the woman who had been afflicted twelve years—the last letters of the word (*dayeb*) which probably would be the word used and which would immediately precede the number twelve, would be *yb*, of which the numerical value is 12. It is true that in this case the number is found in all three accounts, but in St. Luke's it is found also in the immediately preceding verse (viii. 42) as the age of Jairus' daughter, and in Mark it occurs lower down (v. 42), but not in Matthew, who does not mention the age of Jairus' daughter. The Greek text of Luke, moreover, seems to mean that the woman had been diseased *from the time she was twelve years old*. An extremely curious variation occurs in Mark iv. 20, " bring forth fruit in thirty and in sixty and in a hundred " (similarly Matt. xiii. 23), for all which Luke viii. 15 has " bring forth fruit in *patience*." The expression " in patience " in Aramaic would contain the letters whose numerical values are 30, 60 and (in the Greek notation) 100.

In those cases in which the numbers given in different Gospels may appear to be quite irreconcilable, as, for example, between the *third* hour of Mark xv. 25 and the *sixth* hour of John xix. 14, it is always open to suppose that one of the numerals represents the error of a scribe or translator. Such slips are very common in the Greek Old Testa-

ment, as compared with the Hebrew. Perhaps the number which is most frequently misread is the "eight" in connexion with the word "year" on account of the resemblance of these two words in Hebrew. In regard to the discrepancy just cited—that between 3 and 6—instances of nearly the same thing will be found as between the Hebrew and the Greek, or between the different MSS. of the Greek in Genesis ii. 2 ("6th" for the first "7th"), Judges xix. 8 (A "3rd," B "5th"), 2 Chronicles xxix. 17 (3rd for 1st), and Daniel vii. 1 : cf. also 2 Chronicles xxix. 17 (A 16th for 13th, as Luke iii. 1, 15th for 13th ?) : Daniel i. 1 ; x. 1, and so on.

From all that has been said it would appear that divergent numbers occurring in the Gospels do not necessarily throw doubt upon these narratives as a whole, but may well be mere scribal errors which arose in the process of translating into Greek from the underlying Hebrew or Aramaic archetype.

T. H. Weir.

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

I.

The Pauline Material.

No passage is more central for a comprehension of St. Paul's religion than Philippians iii. 8–11. In his description of the crisis which rent his life in twain, he sets on the one side the real privileges and prerogatives he had clung to as a Jew, and on the other, "the surpassing value of knowing Christ Jesus," his Lord, for whom he had willingly sacrificed everything else. His ultimate relation to God is involved in this profound experimental knowledge of Christ, which means for him communion with the exalted Lord, and a personal apprehension of His experience of suffering as Redeemer so intimate as to bring him into harmony with Christ in the inmost sanctuary of His being. Obviously we are here face to face with the most fundamental religious relationship. It would be hazardous to attempt to analyse it into its elements. For thought, feeling and will are so completely fused together in this "knowing" that it represents the entire energy of the Apostle's inner life, working at its maximum of intensity. We instinctively compare the passage with Galatians ii. 20: "I have been crucified with Christ, so that it is no longer I that live, but Christ lives in me, that is to say, my present life as a man (ἐν σαρκί) I live by faith, faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me." On the

basis of this comparison we can scarcely make a distinction between faith in the one case and knowledge in the other. Perhaps it might be said that the later passage lays the emphasis on "knowing" rather than on faith because in the period when it was written Paul's mind was driven by circumstances to reflect upon interpretations of God and the universe which competed with that which had satisfied him in Christ. But the idea is current in his thought at an earlier date. In writing to the Corinthians he thanks God for "diffusing the fragrance of the knowledge of Christ" (2 Cor. ii. 14) by him in every direction, and his unforced reference to the enrichment of his readers at Corinth by Christ in all knowledge (γνῶσις), in the first Epistle (i. 5), reminds us that he was always at home in this circle of conceptions. There is nothing more precarious than a painful search after stages in the movement of the Apostle's mind. We are on safer ground in looking for illumination to the particular environment in which the idea under review has its setting.

It has to be noted that usually when Paul speaks of knowledge, he regards God as its object, but God as revealed in Christ. One of his most significant utterances is 2 Corinthians iv. 6: "It is the God who said [at creation], Light shall shine out of darkness, who shone in my heart, to illumine it with the knowledge (γνώσεως) of the glory of God in the face of Christ." So that whatever the Apostle says about knowledge must be interpreted in the light of his contact with Christ. We emphasise the fact, because it has an important bearing on a subsequent section of our discussion.

What does Paul mean by *knowing* God? Before we attempt to examine that question, let us briefly notice the terms he uses. The most frequent are the verb γινώσκειν and its corresponding noun γνῶσις. There are one or

two instances of the verb ἐπιγινώσκειν, and more than half a dozen of the noun ἐπίγνωσις, most of which belong to the Imprisonment Epistles. It is difficult to find any clear distinction between the simple and the compound words, although in a few of the examples Dr. Armitage Robinson's suggestion that the compounds imply direction to (ἐπί) a special point, or the singling out of a special aspect of the object, has a good deal in its favour.[1] We agree with him that there is no conclusive evidence for Lightfoot's ascription to them of the notion of a complete or perfected knowledge, as contrasted with one less mature, although one or two early Christian writers possibly imply the idea. Hence the use of the compound rather than the simple noun or verb can scarcely be said to affect the exegesis in any essential fashion. Paul also uses *οἶδα* in a few passages. But a study of them shows that to all intents and purposes it is synonymous with γινώσκειν. We shall find at a later stage that these linguistic facts tally with the use of the same group of terms in the LXX.

In proceeding to deal with the question stated at the opening of the former paragraph it soon becomes evident that we must distinguish between various *nuances* of meaning in Paul's statements regarding *the knowledge of God*. Perhaps we should begin with cases in which the object of the knowledge is clearly defined. One of these has already been mentioned, 2 Corinthians iv. 6, where the "glory" of God is that which is known. Here δόξα denotes, as usually in Paul's writings, the actual manifestation of the Divine nature. Closely akin is Ephesians i. 18, in which ἐπίγνωσις θεοῦ means an inward illumination leading the soul to grasp "the hope of God's calling," "the riches of the glory of his heritage," "the surpassing greatness of his power toward us." This relation of know

[1] See the excursus in his *Ephesians*, pp. 248–254.

ledge to the Divine generosity takes a large place in the Apostle's mind. God is known by His unstinted benefits. Paul's converts, e.g., have come to discern (ἐπιγινώσκειν) "the grace of God in very deed" (Col. i. 6). The contact with God which Christians have reached through the Spirit has for its aim "that we might know (εἰδῶμεν) God's generous gifts to us" (1 Cor. ii. 12). All these gifts, of course, belong to His redemptive purpose, and the clue to that purpose is none other than Christ. So that we are quite prepared to find the Apostle giving utterance to his yearning that the hearts of his readers "may be instructed in love, resulting in a rich and fully convinced apprehension, a knowledge of the mystery of God, i.e. Christ, in whom all 'the treasures of wisdom' and knowledge 'lie hidden'" (Col. ii. 2, 3). Hence the supreme attainment for which he prays on their behalf is that they "may have power to grasp in fellowship with all God's people what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge," that they "may be filled with the whole fulness of God" (Eph. iii. 18). Whatever else the knowledge of God may mean for Paul, this is its crowning achievement. It is a discernment and appropriation of Christ's immeasurable love. The process seems inexhaustible, so inexhaustible that the Apostle dares to identify it with the reception of the Divine life in its complete content. Thus he can sum up the Christian ideal as "attaining to unity of faith in and knowledge of the Son of God" (Eph. iv. 13). The remarkable affinity of faith and knowledge is as evident here as in the passage from Philippians with which we started.

Everything that has up till now been said about Paul' conception of *knowing God* may be described by the term "experimental." Of course it involves reflection on the supreme facts of God's revelation in Christ, but the spiritual

value of the facts is paramount. Indeed all that Paul affirms about the knowledge of God has for its presupposition the presence and the guidance of the Divine Spirit. "The merely animal (ψυχικός) man," says the Apostle, "does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, for to him they are nonsense, and he cannot know them because they can only be investigated spiritually. It is the Spirit-possessed man (πνευματικός) who can investigate all these things" (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). But it would be a profound misconception to think of the spiritual nexus to the Divine, which Paul calls "knowledge," as a condition of inward rapture to which its possessor surrenders himself. That was never the Apostle's attitude towards spiritual endowments. His prayer for the Colossians is "that you may be filled with the knowledge of God's will in the shape of every kind of wisdom and spiritual grasp (συνέσει), so as to live worthily of the Lord, . . . bearing fruit and increasing in every kind of good activity by means of your knowledge of God" (Col. i. 9, 10). With this may be compared Philippians i. 9: "This is my paayer, that your love [a practical activity exercised in mutual service] may still more and more abound in knowledge (ἐπιγνώσει) and every kind of sensibility αἰσθήσει), enabling you to have a sense of what is vital (Moff.), so that you may be pure and avoid injury to any one in view of the day of Christ." Thus, to know God, in Paul's sense, is not to be initiated into a mystic secret. It is to possess an all-sufficient equipment for moral life. It is to have at one's disposal the material for coming to right decisions on the perplexing situations which may arise. These provide a test for the Spirit-possessed man.

Here we are confronted by the religious conditions of the Church at Corinth, which call forth so many of Paul's utterances on the subject of knowledge. In attempting to grasp his thought in this connexion, we must be on our

guard against the expectation of a carefully rounded scheme into which we can fit his ideas without leaving any gaps. What he says about knowledge will have to be interpreted in the light of its relation to other aspects of the spiritual life, to the special standpoint of his readers and its perils, to the various shades of feeling that stir the Apostle's spirit as he deals with perplexing situations among these immature Christians.

Perhaps we ought to approach this part of our discussion by examining some of his more general statements, which place the more special and technical in their proper perspective. Paul recognises a knowledge of God which is predominantly intellectual. Thus, in Romans i. 19 ff., he accuses the Pagan world as a whole of misusing its spiritual opportunities. It was possible to reach a perception of the greatness and the glory of God from the phenomena of Nature. Men could not fail in some measure to reach that impression (ver. 21, *γνόντες τὸν θεόν*), but they did not allow it to operate in their hearts and consciences. They were not led by it to glorify and give thanks to God, i.e. to come into right relations with One disclosed as great and good. It is instructive to compare with this the statement of 1 Corinthians i. 21, that "the world through its *σοφία* (its rational capacity) did not come to know God as manifested in "his Divine wisdom." This is not a real contradiction of Romans i. 21. It merely reminds us that Paul here uses *γνῶναι τὸν θεόν* in the sense in which he spoke of "glorifying" and "giving thanks to" God in Romans i. 21. And the passage goes on to declare that God has taken a new method of drawing men to Himself, that of His revelation in Christ. No longer are men pointed to the wisdom which reveals God in Nature. Christ Jesus has become the *σοφία* of God to men, the disclosure of His character and His purpose for the universe (1 Cor. i. 30). Here we are prepared

for the lines along which the Apostle expounds the attainment of the knowledge of God. "How does a man know human things?" he asks, in a remarkable passage which we paraphrase, "is it not by means of his inner life (πνεῦμα), his self-consciousness [a phrase which, of course, Paul could not have used, but which really represents what he meant]? In the same way, how can Divine things be grasped except by the Divine life (πνεῦμα)? Now that is the life which we have received, in order that we might know (εἰδῶμεν) what God has freely bestowed upon us" (1 Cor. ii. 11, 12). That is to say, God desires to be known in this intimate fashion by men, and communicates His own life to them to make the attainment possible. The Apostle varies his form of statement in a very profound direction. "If a man loves God," he says, "he is known by Him" (1 Cor. viii. 3). God discloses Himself in response to love. "Canst thou by searching find out God?" asks an Old Testament questioner (Job xi. 7). The heart of the child alone is able to understand the Father, who yearns to reveal Himself. The position is characteristic of the Apostle. "In that former time," he writes to the Galatians, "when you had no knowledge of God, you were enslaved to beings who were not gods at all, but now having come to know (γνόντες) God, or rather to be known (γνωσθέντες) by God, will you go back to these weak and beggarly elemental spirits" (Gal. iv. 8, 9)? God Himself takes the first step in this wonderful relationship.[1] That fact must finally determine its character. It can have no room for pride or self-complacency of any kind. If it remains true to its origin, it must foster, on man's side, a spirit of lowliness and love.

We are perhaps now in a position to appreciate the

[1] Cf. Philo, *De Cherub.* 115 : γνωριζόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ γνωρίζομεν, but note the difference of atmosphere in the two passages. Here it is metaphysical, in Paul purely religious.

secondary applications of γνῶσις which appear in the Corinthian Epistles. As the result of that intimate fellowship which for Paul makes up the content of "knowing" God, a new outlook arises upon the plan of life. As we have already seen, this has endless consequences for conduct. One of these, and perhaps that which is most closely related to the original conception, is a new spiritual insight into the principles of right action, designated γνῶσις in an almost technical sense in the Letters to Corinth. This usage is indeed not peculiar to these documents. The Apostle's words in Romans xv. 14 give a clue to the significance of the term: "I have a strong personal conviction in your case, my brethren, that you do abound in goodness of heart, amply supplied with knowledge (γνώσεως) for every situation, quite able to warn one another." Here is a noteworthy combination: goodness (ἀγαθωσύνη) in the special sense of a generous disposition towards others, spiritual insight adapted to all sorts of cases, and consequently the desire and the ability to give guidance to those who need it.

Plainly this particular spiritual endowment was highly prized in the community at Corinth, and largely exercised. That would be due to their mental characteristics, and to the environment which tested their Christian vocation. The opening sections of 1 Corinthians hint at the emphasis which they placed upon σοφία, an emphasis apparently fostered by the style and qualities of the preaching of Apollos. It is by no means easy to catch the precise distinction which Paul makes between σοφία and γνῶσις, when, in dealing with the variety of spiritual gifts bestowed upon Christians, he says: "To one is given through the Spirit the utterance of wisdom (σοφίας), to another the utterance of knowledge (γνῶσεως) by the same Spirit" (1 Cor. xii. 8). But some light is shed upon the meaning of σοφία by Colossians

i. 28 and iii. 16,[1] in both of which passages *σοφία* qualifies the phrase *νουθετοῦντες καὶ διδάσκοντες*, "warning and teaching." That suggests a quality of skill in the guidance of the spiritual life, a power of apprehending the will of God and impressing it on others. Possibly the delicate shade of meaning which separates it from *γνῶσις* may be elucidated by Colossians i. 9, where *σοφία* is combined with *σύνεσις πνευματική*, "spiritual grasp." Lightfoot (*ad loc.*) aptly suggests that *σύνεσις* is an application of *σοφία* to details: "*σύνεσις* apprehends the bearings of things." This seems to be borne out by the LXX rendering of *Proverbs*. Thus, e.g., in ii. 6: "The Lord gives *σοφίαν* [= Heb. חָכְמָה], and from his presence come *γνῶσις* [דַּעַת] and *σύνεσις* [תְּבוּנָה]." Again, in viii. 9: "All things are plain *τοῖς συνιοῦσιν* [לַמֵּבִין] and straight to those who find *γνῶσιν* [דַּעַת]." In these passages *γνῶσις* and *σύνεσις* can scarcely be distinguished, and in the first it appears as if *σοφία* were the generic term, the principle, while *γνῶσις* and *σύνεσις* stand for special applications of it. One is therefore inclined to think that *σύνεσις πνευματική* here is virtually equivalent to *γνῶσις* in the Corinthian passages, that the latter means an application of the divinely-inspired *σοφία* to details, and that the high estimate placed by the Christians of Corinth on *σοφία* is carried on in their attitude towards *γνῶσις*. This would accord with the typically Greek predilection for tracking out the fundamental principles of thought and action. The new religion would be enhanced in the eyes of many in so far as it provided definite criteria for problems of conduct. These problems would confront them with increasing complexity as they continued to live in a Pagan environment. We

[1] Adopting the punctuation of Weiss and Tischendorf, who place a colon after *πλουσίως*, and take *ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ* with the clause following.

need hardly wonder that they came to take a special delight in their newly-found instrument.

In 1 Corinthians viii. we have a remarkable instance of the exercise of this highly prized gift by members of the Christian community. "In the matter of sacrificial meat," they say in their communication to Paul, "we know that we all possess γνῶσις" (viii. 1). Here is a crucial case in which principle must assert itself. Why torment conscience over food consecrated with Pagan rites? How can food be affected by an idol? An idol is nothing at all. There is only one God (viii. 4). "The earth is the Lord's and all its fulness" (Ps. xxiv. 1 quoted in x. 26). What spiritual hurt can come from one of God's creatures, wholesome for bodily nourishment? Their spiritual insight has led them beyond superstitious scruples. Have they not the right to disregard these? Is it not their duty to be loyal to the principle that meat offered to idols is in no essential aspect different from ordinary meat? Will not consistency here be for the edification of the rest of the community? "Every one does not possess γνῶσις," replies the Apostle; "beware lest this boasted right of yours become a stumbling-block to the weak. . . . If one of these see you who are endowed with γνῶσις taking a meal in a Pagan temple, will not that weak brother's conscience be 'edified' into eating sacrificial meat? In that case the weaker man is ruined by your γνῶσις, your brother for whom Christ died" (viii. 7, 9–11). Here lies the peril: "knowledge puffs up, it is love that edifies. If any one presumes to have attained a grade of knowledge, he does not yet know in the way he ought to" (viii. 1, 2). Their pride in γνῶσις defeats its own object. Even the spiritual insight which gets down to broad principles of action must always be regulated by love. A cold logic of consistency conflicts with the flexibility of the Christian ethic. Therefore, says the Apostle,

" if I have the power of prophesying and grasp all mysteries and γνῶσις in its entirety, and if I possess faith capable of removing mountains, and yet have no love, I am nothing " (xii. 2). He has no intention of disparaging γνῶσις, but it must be adjusted to the other Christian gifts and graces. In any case it has palpable limitations. In this respect it stands on the same level as the gift of prophecy or the gift of tongues (xiii. 8). They all belong essentially to the immature life of the present. They presuppose a real contact with the Divine Spirit. Indeed γνῶσις is one aspect of that profound intimacy with God which is the very heart of religion. But under earthly conditions, this can, from the highest point of view, be only partial. " At present I know in fragments : in the future life I shall have that direct knowledge which God has of me : it will be vision face to face " (xiii. 12).

For more than one reason, the fact already mentioned is worthy of emphasis, that Paul classifies γνῶσις with the definite charisms of the Christian community. In that connexion it denotes, as we have seen, a secondary aspect of the knowledge of God in Christ which is the profoundest reach of Christian experience. The gifts with which it is grouped are suggestive for its significance and background. Thrice it is linked with utterance (λόγος, 1 Cor. i. 5, 2 Cor. viii. 7, xi. 6), perhaps because, in order to fulfil its function, it must be worthily communicated. In a still more illuminating context (1 Cor. xiv. 6) it stands in the series, " a revelation (ἀποκάλυψις) or a γνῶσις or a prophecy or an instruction (διδαχή)." To these Paul subordinates the power of speaking with tongues, because it is unintelligible to the brethren and therefore unedifying. In a similar grouping (1 Cor. xiii. 2) it is combined with the gift of prophecy (as here) and with the knowing of (Divine) mysteries, and at the close of the discussion it takes its place

with prophecies and tongues as all destined to pass away. On the basis of these contexts, some scholars have assigned to this endowment of γνῶσις an ecstatic character. That hypothesis, however, seems to have little foundation. It springs partly from the careless habit of confusing "supernatural" and "ecstatic" in the consciousness of Paul. The "instruction" with which it is associated has no suggestion of uncontrolled emotion or of semi-consciousness. Even the uttering of prophecies is by no means represented as involving an ecstatic element. Indeed the Apostle strongly contrasts the man who "speaks with tongues" with ὁ προφητεύων. The former "utters mysteries by the Spirit." Ecstasy is the very essence of his activity. The latter "speaks to men in the way of edifying, exhorting and consoling" (1 Cor. xiv. 3). Paul's attitude to this type of gift is most instructive. He has no hesitation in admitting its value. For him it means an expression of spiritual vitality. Its source is the Divine πνεῦμα. But this, like every other kind of spiritual treasure, is contained "in earthen vessels" (2 Cor. iv. 7). Its use is apt to be marred by human imperfection. It is exposed to the influence of pride, self-will and emotional excess. Even spiritual illumination is not an end in itself. It is there to inspire moral action. And the ideal of moral action is love and service (cf. Gal. v. 6, 22 ; 1 Cor. xiii. *passim*). Hence there is no contradiction between Paul's high estimate of γνῶσις as a spiritual equipment, and the freedom with which he criticises it in definite situations. For Christians are responsible for the use they make of the capacities entrusted to them.

Paul's conception of γνῶσις, therefore, must be interpreted in the light of its special environment. This suggests a brief reference to the prominence of the noun ἐπίγνωσις in the Colossian and Ephesian Epistles. We

have already observed that it is difficult to distinguish clearly between this compound and the simple word. It ought, however, to be said that so high an authority as the late Professor Moulton was disposed, on the whole, to find the idea of attainment (not Lightfoot's conception of "perfect knowledge") in ἐπιγινώσκειν (*Prolegomena*, p. 113). Yet one cannot discover confirmation of this in the use of these compounds (repeatedly) in the LXX, where they seem interchangeable with the simple forms.[1] In any case, this is not the main point which concerns us here. Paul's thought, in the Epistles of his Imprisonment, is working on the perilous situation which has arisen in various Christian communities of Asia Minor. There claims have been put forward on behalf of a "philosophy," whose theory of God and the world assigns a merely secondary, if any, place to Christ. These propagandists affect a superior insight (Col. ii. 23) to that of the Christian converts. They have dabbled in visionary experiences (Col. ii. 18), and the worship of elemental spirits (Col. i. 8, ii. 18). Probably as a preparation for their ritual they have practised a rigid asceticism at appointed times and seasons (Col. ii. 16, 21). But their entire religious standpoint, with the observances it involves, belongs to a level utterly lower than Christ (Col. iii. 1 f.). Therefore, as against their plausible misrepresentations (Col. ii. 4), the Apostle desires above all else for his readers a real knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) of the Divine will, finding expression in every kind of wisdom and spiritual grasp (Col. i. 9). He wrestles in prayer for them that they may reach an apprehension

[1] For the nouns see Prov. ii. 5 f., Hosea iv. 6 ; for verbs, Ps. lxxix. 6, Wisd. xii. 27, Sirach xxxvi. 5. It is just possible, however, that, owing to the special situation in the communities of the Lycus valley, Paul sought to enhance the conception of a true and all-sufficing knowledge of God as opposed to the specious claims of the false teachers by using the compound ἐπίγνωσις.

(ἐπίγνωσιν) of the Divine secret, which is none other than Christ Himself, the sole clue to the interpretation of God's relation to the world and to humanity (Col. ii. 2 f.). This is involved in the new life on which they have entered. It means a renewal "in the likeness of the Creator," resulting in ἐπίγνωσις, a penetration into the real spiritual facts, of which the sum and substance is: Christ everything and everywhere (Col. iii. 10, 11). Echoes of the same concern for their attainment reach us in *Ephesians*. There also, following the great paragraph in which he reminds his readers of how the grace of God had been richly bestowed upon them in the form of wisdom and insight that they might discern the secret of the Divine purpose now revealed —the summing up of all things in Christ—Paul speaks of his supplications to the Father to bestow upon them the Spirit of wisdom and revelation for the knowledge (ἐπίγνωσιν) of Himself (Eph. i. 8–10, 16–17). This is precisely the aim expressed in Colossians. His yearning is that these newly-won converts should not miss the all-embracing purpose of God for the universe. Here is a conception of knowledge which may be called higher than that which he has to regulate in 1 Corinthians. Yet they are both integral elements of the fundamental religious relationship which he designates "knowing God."

II.

The Background of the Conception.

When we proceed to inquire as to the origin of this conception which has so important a place in Paul's religious thought, we are told without hesitation by many modern investigators that he derived it consciously or unconsciously from his Hellenistic environment. Let us examine the hypothesis more closely, for it is typical of many put forward to account for similar phenomena.

Sometimes, in such an inquiry, it is advisable boldly to have recourse to the obvious. We may therefore ask: Is it necessary to suppose that Paul borrowed the conception of "knowing God" from any particular quarter? In its fundamental significance must it not have been for generations in the air? Must it not have been used at an early stage of reflexion to describe men's efforts to grasp the Unseen? It would necessarily pass through a variety of phases. Perhaps the formulation of it presupposes some considerable moral development in the community, while that remained the religious unit. At such a stage it will primarily mean an apprehension of God through certain recognised media, the phenomena of Nature, ancestral traditions in a more or less purified form, laws and regulations for worship and conduct regarded as a revelation of the Divine will, solitary individuals of unique spiritual power or magnetism who seem to be the spokesmen of the Divine voice. But the content of the idea inevitably expands and deepens. This will especially appear in connexion with the growth of individualism in religion. It may take long before such a movement is widely diffused over a definite area. But once the process has begun, no amount of degeneration or formalism can completely undo it. Its more mature stages mark a crisis in the history of religion. Such a crisis had been reached long before Paul became a Christian. Long before this the conception of "knowing God" had got past the region of sense-impressions, or revelations mediated either by a code or an inspired individual. It had come to mean an awe-inspiring relationship, the personal touch of the human soul with the living One.

The development may be roughly traced in the Old Testament, and, as the Apostle seems generally to have used the Greek translation and to have been influenced by its

renderings, let us briefly investigate the more important facts as disclosed by the LXX. As far back as the middle of the eighth century B.C., in *Hosea*, the religious relation of the community to their God is described in terms of knowledge. "They have not known (ἐπέγνωσαν) the Lord," says the prophet (v. 4): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge (ἐπίγνωσιν), I also will reject thee" (iv. 6): "I desire loyal affection [ἔλεος = חֶסֶד] rather than sacrifice and the knowledge (ἐπίγνωσιν) of God rather than burnt offerings" (vi. 6): "There is no truth nor loyal affection nor knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις) of God in the land" (iv. 1). So also, when the people return to God with a shallow repentance, their cry is: "Let us know, let us follow on to know the Lord (γνωσόμεθα, διώξομεν τοῦ γνῶναι τὸν κύριον) . . . and he shall come unto us as the rain" (vi. 3). But the same conception expresses the deepest insight of Hosea into the Divine heart. "I will betroth thee to myself in faithfulness, and thou shalt know (ἐπιγνώσῃ) the Lord" (ii. 19, 20). Here is set forth the closest conceivable communion between the people and their God. The prophet in all these passages uses the verb יָדַע or the cognate noun דַּעַת, which frequently stands for knowledge, "not as acquisition and mastery, but as impression, passion. . . . It is knowledge that is followed by shame or by reverence." It is "feeling, character and conscience. Again and again he makes it parallel to loyalty, repentance, love and service" (G. A. Smith, *Book of Twelve Prophets*, I. pp. 322, 325). Perhaps the most remarkable feature in Hosea's attitude is his conviction that this intimate relation to their God which is to become possible for the community is to be God's own doing, a precious gift from Him (see ii. 19, 20 *supra*). And so at this early stage in the history of Israel's religion we have an extraordinary anticipation of Paul's standpoint in Galatians iv. 9, 10:

"Having come to know God, or rather to be known by God." "Revelation and discovery," as Professor Gwatkin says, "must be the same process viewed from different standpoints."

The same type of conception appears in *Isaiah*. It is very significant that in the description of the Messianic King (xi. 2), knowledge (γνῶσις) and godly fear (εὐσεβεία) are combined as part of his spiritual equipment, and in the light of Paul's grouping it is no less noteworthy that that combination is preceded by "the spirit of wisdom and understanding" (σοφίας καὶ συνέσεως). But the prophet's outlook goes beyond this inspired personality. "The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord (τοῦ γνῶναι τὸν κύριον), as the waters cover the sea" (xi. 9). One of his chief complaints against the community, like Hosea's, is their lack of knowledge. In i. 3 and v. 13 the object is not expressed, but the LXX reads, in the one case, Ἰσραὴλ δέ με οὐκ ἔγνω, and in the other, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς τὸν κύριον, showing the natural interpretation.

It is of special importance to consider the attitude of *Jeremiah* to the idea under discussion, because "all his thoughts," as Professor A. B. Davidson puts it, "are coloured by the religious relation to God of which he was himself conscious" (*H. D. B.*, ii. 576*b*). This being so, we might expect that any far-reaching religious conception would be deepened by the reflexion of such an experience, and that is what we actually find. There are indeed more general statements such as we have noted in Isaiah, e.g. iv. 22 and xxii. 16. But we come closer to the prophet's heart in his definition of religion (ix. 24): "Let him that glorieth glory in this that he understandeth (συνίειν) and knoweth (γινώσκειν) me, that I am the Lord which exercise lovingkindness, judgment and righteousness on the earth." Here is something more than the earlier absorp-

tion in the nation as the religious unit: here is an individual relation to God, a personal discovery of what He is. But, as in Hosea, the discovery is correlative to the Divine revelation. "The new thing," says Stade, "in Jeremiah's Messianic Hope is that the knowledge of God, which regulates the right relation of Israel to Jahweh, . . . is a gift of Jahweh" (Stade-Bertholet, *Bibl. Theol. d. A.T.*, I. p. 274). The most memorable expression of this aspect of the relationship is in xxxi. 33 (LXX, xxxviii. 33 f.): "I will put my law in thine inward part, and in thine heart will I write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people: and they shall teach no more every man his neighbour and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord (*γνῶθι τὸν κύριον*): for they shall all know (*εἰδήσουσι*) me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them: for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin will I remember no more." We could scarcely obtain a more profound glimpse of the inner meaning of knowing the Lord. For it is based upon forgiveness, the most wonderful of all the Divine activities. To understand God as the Forgiver is to fulfil the fundamental conditions of communion with Him. When we recall the evidence of the impression made upon Paul by Jeremiah's experience (e.g., Gal. i. 15; 1 Cor. ix. 16 f.), it is no rash hypothesis to trace it in this case also.

Some remarkable phenomena are to be found in the Priestly Document (P). In five separate passages, the verb יָעַד, used of the meeting of Jehovah with His worshippers in the Tabernacle, is translated in LXX by *γνωσθήσομαι*. Kittel conjectures that in Exodus xxv. 22 the translators read יָדַע for יָעַד, and that possibly the same thing is true of xxix. 42 and xxx. 6, 36, but makes no such suggestion on the same usage in Numbers xvii. 19 (xvii. 4 in LXX). It is scarcely likely that in all these passages

they were guilty of confusion of readings. The more probable alternatives are that they either found יָדַע in their Hebrew text, or felt that the idea of God's self-revelation involved in יָעַד was adequately rendered by *γνωσθήσομαι*. It is noteworthy that in the other instances of יָעַד in P, which have no connexion with this special religious meaning, there is no trace of confusion. Perhaps at this point one may refer to the early narrative in 1 Samuel iii. 7 (assigned by Kautzsch and others to second half of eighth century B.C.): "Now Samuel did not yet know the Lord (*πρὶν γνῶναι θεόν*), neither was the word of the Lord yet revealed (*ἀποκαλυφθῆναι*) unto him." Here knowledge and revelation are directly associated. It is needless to recall the close relation between *γνῶσις* and *ἀποκάλυψις* in the Pauline Epistles.

The evidence of the Wisdom-literature is illuminating. In it we discover how the deeper idea of the knowledge of God may pass over into the secondary sense of insight into the moral and spiritual principles of conduct, resulting from the former attainment, a situation closely parallel to that which we have traced in Paul. This is well illustrated by the definition of *σοφία* in 4 Maccabees i. 16: "Wisdom is the knowledge (*γνῶσις*) of Divine and human things." An apt instance is Proverbs ii. 5 ff.: "[By seeking wisdom] thou shalt understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge (*ἐπίγνωσιν*) of God. For the Lord giveth wisdom (*σοφίαν*); out of his mouth cometh knowledge (*γνῶσις*) and understanding" (*σύνεσις*). Here, as we saw above in dealing with the Pauline material, *σοφία* is used in the generic sense, with its applications in the form of *γνῶσις* and *σύνεσις*, as in Paul. A further aspect of the idea occurs in xxx. 3 (xxiv. 26 in LXX), where the Greek text differs from the Hebrew in reading: "God has taught me wisdom, and I have come to attain (*ἔγνωκα*) the knowledge (*γνῶσιν*)

of the holy," a text which G. Beer (in Kittel) prefers to the Massoretic. With this may be compared Wisdom of Solomon x. 10: "He showed him the kingdom of God, and he gave him the knowledge of the holy" (γνῶσιν ἁγίων). Knowledge of the holy must mean "of the unseen things of God," an idea found in Wisdom ii. 22: "They did not know his [Siegfried reads θεοῦ] mysteries" (cf. 1 Cor. ii. 9). The mark of the righteous man is that "he claims to have the knowledge of God and names himself the servant of the Lord" (Wisd. ii. 13). When we recollect the frequent reminiscences in Paul of the Wisdom books, we are not surprised at the points of contact which reveal themselves. We might easily fill in this Old Testament outline more fully. But enough has been said to justify Professor A. B. Davidson's conclusion: "What Scripture (i.e. O.T.) means by the knowledge of God is an ethical relation to Him: and, on the other side, when it says that God knows man, it means He has sympathy and fellowship with him. All Israel's history is filled with this reciprocal knowledge" (*O.T. Theology*, p. 78).

In placing Paul's statements about knowing God side by side with the evidence collected from the Old Testament, it is impossible to ignore the links which connect them. And the fact that the most important data belong to the prophetic writings corroborates a conclusion which may be drawn from Paul's religious thought as a whole—that as a Christian he re-discovered the significance of the prophets in the light of Jesus Christ. But this same light affected those truths of experience which he clothed, as here, in the language of those inspired teachers of his nation. The result was a deepening of their significance for the human soul, an intensifying of their reality. In Christ there was made possible an incomparable intimacy of relationship to God, involved in His profound message of the

Fatherhood of God and its correlate, the Sonship of believers

When we attempt to examine the parallel conception of the knowledge (γνῶσις) of God in Hellenistic religion, with a view to ascertaining its relation to the thought of Paul and of the Christian communities which he founded, we are confronted by various preliminary problems. The sources from which we derive our information are exceedingly difficult to appraise. They belong to a period notable for its religious syncretism, and thus contain a blend of ideas and experiences associated with manifold strata both religious and philosophical. The majority of the documents have come down to us in very imperfect form, and attempted reconstructions have been extremely arbitrary. Some of the evidence is mixed up with the crudest magic, as, e.g., in the so-called Liturgy of Mithra. Some of it contains an extraordinary amalgam of doctrines from the Middle Stoicism, as religiously re-moulded by Posidonius, with Platonic and Peripatetic elements, the mixture being probably to some extent influenced by Hellenised Egyptian religious conceptions,[1] as, e.g., in the *Corpus Hermeticum*. Statements are recklessly made even by competent scholars regarding this Hermetic literature, as if it represented a more or less homogeneous phase of religious thought which reveals the characteristic features of Hellenistic religion. There are, no doubt, some prominent ideas which recur. But any careful student of the documents becomes aware of numerous contradictory elements pieced together. In view of the bold and often baseless assertions of Reitzenstein, popularised by Bousset in his *Kyrios Christos*, a special debt of gratitude is due to Mr. Creed for his valuable

[1] This question requires a far more thorough investigation than it has hitherto received. There must be a *via media* between Zielinski's purely negative attitude and the *obiter dicta* of Reitzenstein, reiterated without examination by adherents of his position.

analysis of the *Corpus Hermeticum* (*Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. xv. pp. 513–538), a discussion which has not attracted the attention of New Testament scholars as much as it deserves. We are convinced by independent study of the documents that Mr. Creed has established his main positions: (1) the baselessness of Reitzenstein's only plausible argument in favour of an *early* date for his chief document, the *Poimandres* (*CH* i.), namely, the alleged dependence upon it of Vision V. of the *Shepherd of Hermas:* (2) the influence of Genesis (in LXX) both on *Poimandres* and No. III. of the *CH*, and probably of New Testament writings on *Poimandres* and Nos. VII. and XIII.: (3) the close affinity of Nos. II., V., VI., VIII., IX. and XII. with the *Asclepius* of Pseudo-Apuleius, and the view that these documents "are little more than popularised Greek metaphysics, coloured by astrology": (4) the entire lack of evidence for a reference in No. XVIII. to Diocletian and his colleagues, a hypothesis by which Reitzenstein attempts to date the collection as a whole: (5) the fundamentally "literary" character of all the documents in question.

In effect, we have no evidence enabling us to date these writings even approximately. The bulk of them quite probably was written, as Mr. Creed believes, "in the third century A.D., or not earlier than the end of the second." Of course that does not rule out the possibility that the religious ideas embodied in them may go back to a much earlier period. But it puts us on our guard against the precarious constructions which Reitzenstein, followed by Bousset and others, has raised upon the data. Similar considerations hold of the Liturgy of Mithra. There may or may not be Mithraic elements in it. Leading authorities differ on that question. In any case it contains a quaint mixture of Egyptian magic, astrological religion, and the mysticism which came to be associated with the

latter, probably under the influence of Posidonius. Here again a later date is far more probable than an early one. And we are once more reminded how hazardous it is to trace the influence of the conceptions embodied in such a document, say, in the Pauline Epistles.

We are far from denying the existence of a pre-Christian "Gnosticism" which embraced elements from mythology, Hellenic and Oriental, from the later phases of Platonism, Peripatetic thought, and Stoicism in their popularised forms, from astrology and magic particularly as cultivated in Egypt. But recent writers have been curiously blind to the fact that the Gnostic coteries which as early as the closing years of the first century took shape within the Christian Church and rapidly increased in popularity, assimilated numerous ideas from Paul and the Johannine literature, which must have exercised a profound influence on similar communities outside, more especially as they had so many fundamental doctrines in common. Thus such statements, e.g., as that of the Valentinian School quoted by Reitzenstein from Irenæus (*Die hellenist. Mysterienreligionen*, p. 131), which is fundamentally a mosaic of reminiscences of Paul, and the Sethian teaching preserved in Hippolytus (*op. cit.*, p. 130), which echoes various New Testament passages, reveal the kind of material which was sure to become incorporated in Pagan speculation. We are therefore quite entitled to find in Hellenistic documents of the early centuries A.D. traces of Christian-Gnostic influence.[1]

Bearing these cautions in mind, let us very briefly glance at the place occupied by the idea of the knowledge (γνῶσις) of God in Pagan documents of the Hermetic type, and in earlier sources which reveal the trend of Pagan religion

[1] So also Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland*, pp. 71, 147. The subject deserves careful examination on a broadly conceived scheme.

immediately before and after the appearance of Jesus and the founding of the Christian brotherhood.

Norden has instructively pointed out that the conception of "knowing" God or the gods is practically non-existent in pure Hellenic literature (*Agnostos Theos*, p. 94). He is able, however, to adduce an interesting passage from Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 153: "By the sight of these things [i.e. the processes of nature] the mind receives from them a knowledge (*cognitionem*) of the gods, from which piety springs, and with this is associated justice and the other virtues, which are the source of a blessed life resembling that of the gods." There is little doubt that here Cicero echoes Posidonius, and the same may be said of Seneca, *Epist.* 95, 47: "He who knows (*novit*) God, worships him." A long period probably separates the Hermetic writings from Cicero and even from Seneca. When we reach these we discover that the knowledge (γνῶσις) of God takes a prominent place in those portions of them which are expressly religious. Certain interesting features of this γνῶσις θεοῦ may be noted. Some of these occur in a prayer of the (Latin) *Asclepius*, the Greek form of which Reitzenstein discovered in the magical Papyrus Mimaut (third century A.D.). "We give thee thanks, O most High, for by thy grace we received this light of knowledge (τῆς γνώσεως). Having been saved by thee, we rejoice that thou didst reveal thyself to us wholly, we rejoice that while in our mortal bodies thou didst deify us by the vision of thyself. Be pleased to keep us in the knowledge of thee." The intimate relation of this piece to the *Corpus Hermeticum* is plain from a comparison of it with I. §§ 26, 32: "This is the happy end for those who have attained γνῶσις, to be deified. . . . Hear my prayer, as I beseech thee that I may not stray from that γνῶσις which is our true being (οὐσία)." This vision of God is conceived and described

in an extraordinarily realistic fashion in No. XIII. (XIV.) of the *Corpus*, and also, set in a grotesque frame-work of astrology and magic, in the Liturgy of Mithra. We cannot stay to dwell upon the parts played in it, in the one case, by the Divine Powers, by God who is pre-eminently τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ἕν, but also τὸ νοητὸν φῶς or ὁ νοῦς, and by the rational energy (νοητικὴ ἐνέργεια) of the aspirant: in the other, by the spirits of the elements, assisted by all manner of physical actions on the part of the suppliant. The vision literally deifies the beholder and is often designated γνῶσις. It is a Divine gift, a regeneration (παλιγγενεσία) which alters the substance of the man, drawing him out through his earthly body by way of the planetary spheres into the realm of Nous, so that he becomes in essence Divine. The alteration of substance is sometimes described as being produced by the illuminating power of γνῶσις. This desire for self-impartation belongs inherently to the nature of God. "Holy is God, who wishes to be known and is known by his own" (*CH.*, I. § 31). Hence He freely communicates (χαρισάμενος) γνῶσις, "that having come to know (ἐπιγνόντες) thee, we may rejoice" (Prayer of Pap. Mimaut).

Reitzenstein is of opinion (*H.M.R.*, p. 126) that the conception as well as the term γνῶσις "has been adopted from Oriental, scarcely, indeed, from Jewish, usage, and that from the beginning there is connected with it the sense of an immediate union [with God] . . . as that is brought about by worship and especially by its highest expression in mystic initiation." The term "Oriental" is used by writers of Reitzenstein's school even more loosely than "Hellenistic." What does it actually stand for? Does it mean Babylon or Persia or Syria? If so, let the evidence be set forth which justifies its use in the connexions in which it is introduced. Or does the word primarily involve that

phase of religion which finds its most typical realisation in the mystery-cults of the Græco-Roman period? But surely this would be a *petitio principii*. Were the Orphic θίασοι or the Pythagorean brotherhoods the products of Oriental forces? Can we clearly separate "Oriental" from Hellenic or other influences, say, in the Mysteries of Eleusis, or those of the Kabeiroi, or, at a later date, those of Isis-Serapis? But, further, why should a sharp distinction be drawn here between "Oriental" and "Jewish" except to evade the possibility of consequences unfavourable to a definite hypothesis?

We are disposed to go back to the line of argument already followed in this discussion. It has been suggested above that the conception of "knowing God" was one which would naturally arise at a particular stage in religious development. May not the absence of the idea in pure Hellenic literature be due to the fact that there had not yet emerged a sense of *spiritual* communion with the deity? There was the external approach of state-worship, the awe of the worshipper in presence of the image in the temple, the frenzy of the votary demanding a sort of physical union. Later came the philosophical attempt to conceive an abstract, all-embracing Principle. Should we not expect to find some evidence which associates an early phase of the idea of the knowledge of God in the Græco-Roman world with a religious thinker like Posidonius, who aspired to a new kind of relation to the Divine? It is not enough to attempt an explanation of the facts by pointing to his birth in a Syrian town. The yearning for spiritual communion with God is not a racial peculiarity. Hindu, Latin, Teuton, Jew, have all been possessed with it. When the soul becomes supremely conscious of a Divine Presence or Power or "Person" to whom it is akin, then it craves a knowledge which transcends the intellectual. In the period with which we

are dealing, religious individualism was being diffused over the Græco-Roman world. As in every age, it might be found in varying combinations. It might coalesce, as in the case of Posidonius, with a marked type of mystical aspiration. It might also appear in alliance with bizarre rites of magic, as the magical Papyri testify, or with philosophical speculations on cosmogony and the all-encompassing Nous, as in the *Corpus Hermeticum*. And the knowledge of God which it craved would correspond in its character. Indeed it may be affirmed that the conception of γνῶσις will depend on that of the God to be known. Hence when the Mystery-type of religion became influential, this high knowledge would tend to be regarded as esoteric, a secret communicated through mystic ritual. That feature has left its impress on the idea of γνῶσις in the Hermetic writings. So has the influence of astrological belief, which at some points can scarcely be distinguished from magic. But both of these traits are characteristic of much of the Gnosticism which first formed coteries within the Christian Church from the close of the first century onwards, and then, in separation from it, diffused, more especially in Egypt and Asia Minor, a theosophy blended of Pauline, Johannine and Pagan elements. One has little doubt that many of the alleged instances of Paul's dependence on Hellenistic religion demand the converse explanation.[1]

What is usually forgotten by those who derive the Apostle's conception of γνῶσις from Hellenistic sources is that for him God is primarily "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." There is nothing esoteric or metaphysical in the knowledge of such a God. It depends neither on initiation nor on apprehension of the all-pervading Νοῦς and its powers (δυνάμεις) nor on journeys of the soul through

[1] A patent instance is the use of 1 Cor. xv. 34 in *Poimandres*, § 27; see the present writer's *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, pp. 165-167.

the planetary spheres. It is reached through faith in Jesus Christ and that alone. The truth to which he most frequently ascribes the term "mystery" is the revelation of God's purpose, long kept secret, that Gentiles are called into relationship with Him on the same footing as Jews, and this he proclaims in every market-place. For Paul, moreover, γνῶσις does not produce deification. The life which he lives as a man redeemed by Christ, and possessing "the firstfruits of the πνεῦμα," is still a life "in the flesh." Nor is γνῶσις for him "something absolute," as Reitzenstein describes it. Rather is it essentially "partial" (ἐκ μέρους), and in certain aspects of it shall pass away. It abjures all the quasi-magical methods of Hellenistic religion. It is given to the soul which surrenders itself to Jesus Christ as Saviour. But this surrender is no mere desire to comprehend "the All," to attain the realm of *Nous*, as in the Hermetic documents. Its motive is the constraining power of the love of God in Christ the crucified. The person thus inspired by a passion of gratitude can no longer live for himself but for the Redeemer who died for him and is alive for evermore. It is this passionate devotion which can truly grasp the Divine. "If a man love God, he is known by Him" (1 Cor. viii. 2), and to be known by Him, as we saw from the Old Testament evidence, begets a reciprocal knowledge.

We have tried to show that the real background of St. Paul's conception of the knowledge of God, as in the case of most of his religious ideas, was the religion of Israel, and more especially the prophetic expression of that religion. Whether he was fully conscious of this or not, the idea was, so to speak, in his blood, and it only required the great crisis of his conversion to breathe into it fresh vigour and energy. But it was the function of a skilful teacher to make it prominent in communities in which it was already

current as a factor of religious value. It seems highly probable, as we have already seen, that various developments in Hellenistic religion had brought the "knowledge" of God into the foreground. For some it might have a philosophical, for some a mystical, for others a magical connotation, and in certain instances strange blends of these might appear. But just as, at a later period, the writer of the Fourth Gospel dared to use a term of the current popularised philosophy, the Logos, in a highly original fashion, to draw the attention of his contemporaries in Asia Minor to the historical manifestation of God in Jesus Christ, so Paul did not hesitate to choose a religious conception familiar to the Old Testament, which might be associated with ideas already prevalent in Hellenistic religion, to describe and commend the highest reach of spiritual experience. He trusted for its liberation from any misleading elements to the channel through which it was mediated, which was none other than Jesus Christ Himself.

H. A. A. Kennedy.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

(I.) In Dogmatic Theology.

The conception of God as triune has, throughout the history of the Church, been regarded as not only of value, but as even essential to Christian theology as a whole. The conception arose indeed as a requisite for the interpretation of alleged facts and utterances, of happenings in history, and not as a contribution to speculative philosophy which concerned itself with the relation of the One to the many, of God to the finite world of sense; and from the Patristic age onwards, theologians have seen in the Trinitarian dogma the safeguard of the whole Christian theory of Divine revelation, of redemption and sanctification. The adequacy of the conception, in the form in which it has been defined by the Church, to this theological purpose, not to speak of its value for philosophy whether ancient or modern, seems to be a matter of doubt; and reasons for that doubt will be submitted in the present article. In a subsequent essay, following lines laid down in previous articles on Infinity, Perfection, Eternity and Human Personality, I will offer tentative suggestions towards further development which seems to be called for.

As a revelation doctrine, the Trinitarian doctrine of God was necessitated by belief in a Divine Incarnation. The Deity already attributed to our Lord when St. Paul wrote his Epistles, and the cosmical significance of Christ upon which that Apostle enlarges, require some such distinction within the Godhead as finds definite expression in the Logos-doctrine of St. John. So also do the utterances of our Lord, and the language of St. John, which refer to Father, Son, and Spirit *as if* they were three Subjects, each with a knowledge, a will, and a sphere of activity

(however shared) of His own. To express adequately the impression which the Founder of Christianity made upon His generation, to give validity to the claims which He made for Himself, to explain His self-consciousness, it is necessary, if we take the sources of our knowledge concerning Him to be in the main trustworthy, to adopt a Trinitarian conception of God. The explicit formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, thus implicitly contained in the alleged facts on which the Christian religion is based, proceeded, as we know, tentatively and gradually, before its scientific statement became definite and complete. That such a statement of common belief would eventually have been elaborated by the Church in the absence of all eternal stimulus to definition, may be considered certain; for reasoning men cannot remain indefinitely long in possession of a vitally important religious belief accepted from authoritative tradition without thinking out its implications, its relations to knowledge and the conduct of life. But as a matter of fact, scientific formulation on this question, as upon others, was rendered quite inevitable by the emergence, within and without the Church, of views, the consideration and the refutation of which involved the thinking out, and the clear unambiguous expression, of the Church's implicit belief. The only other alternative was to withdraw from controversy, to leave the enemy in possession of the field, and to seek refuge in unreasoning and unreasoned faith. But to educated Christian believers, from St. Paul onwards, who recognised that a religion which does not satisfy the reason cannot in the long run retain the adherence of thinking men, this policy would doubtless seem disastrous. At any rate it was rejected, though in the time of the Apologists the ignorant, who were naïvely monarchian, disliked the transition from undefined belief to definite thought. Christian theology consequently came into being.

And each development of doctrine was not due to love of subtle distinctions, inordinate or irreverent curiosity, desire to score points against adversaries, or even to any kind of purely intellectualistic motive. One cannot attribute the dogmatic zeal of an Athanasias, or of a Nestorius, for instance, to anything but unfeigned belief that rejection of the phrases for which they so strenuously contended involved loss of the vitally religious elements, the soteriological or redemptive aspects, of Christianity.

Thus the fact that early Christian theologians, while compelled to seek to know the things that had been freely given of God, is compatible with the fact that they never attempted to prove the doctrine of the Trinity to be a necessity for thought, or to prove it by philosophically motived arguments. That, on the other hand, they did point out that the demands of reason in their day were met and satisfied by the distinctively Christian conception of God, is true. But they did not argue that the doctrine was true because it alone satisfied reason; they rather argued that it satisfied reason because it was true. They derived it not from philosophical grounds, but from the facts in which it was revealed. Philosophy did but furnish the notions and the terms instrumental to its definite expression. This will need to be borne in mind if to-day we find that those terms and categories are partly obsolete or meaningless, and if one may doubt whether they did not lead to the surrender—so far as intellectual formulation is concerned—of the plain implications of the language of Scripture which they were expressly employed to make unambiguous. However, the early Fathers believed themselves to have found that what they had accepted as a revealed mystery, and what especially the Jewish Christians already felt to be an obscure complication of their inherited pure monotheism, contained both an answer to problems

with which Greek philosophy had grappled in vain, and also a condition of rationally maintaining, with the Jew, the unity of God. "The unity which derives the Trinity out of its own self," says Tertullian, "so far from being destroyed, is actually supported by it." Of all patristic writers the Apologists came nearest to being intellectualists: because, of course, their business was largely to meet the Greek philosopher on his own ground; but how far they were from being purely rationalistic philosophers in their speculation concerning the Trinity, is shewn by their taking over from tradition the belief in a third Person in the Godhead, for Whom they had as yet no place or need—as they had for the Logos—in their philosophical teaching concerning the Deity and His relation to the world.

We need not here recur to the philosophical problems of antiquity, and their development from the Eleatic School to Plato and Aristotle, which the Apologists and other Fathers had in view when they pleaded for the superior rationality of the Christian conception of God. Monarchianism was repudiated, not for its philosophical difficulties, but because it was incompatible with the implicit contents of the historical Christian revelation.

But there are other forms of Monarchianism than the form condemned in Sabellianism, according to which the three Divine Persons were but temporal rôles played by one God lacking eternal self-differentiation. The orthodox Trinitarianism as expounded in the Nicene and Cappadocian theology, in John of Damascus and in the Schoolmen as typified by Aquinas, and in post-Reformation literature, with scarcely an exception, down to the present day, is as Monarchian in every sense, save one, as Sabellianism; and, apart from the doctrine of the Incarnation (on which it is entirely grounded) seems to be perfectly capable of being embraced by a modern Unitarian. The sole point

in which orthodoxy differs from Sabellianism is that the distinctions—the Persons—in the Godhead are conceived by the Church to be eternal, intrinsic, and necessary as such; whereas in the heresy just named they are purely temporal, contingent, and indeed merely temporary. In both cases they are equally impersonal in the *modern* sense of 'personality' as applied to human beings. There is one self-consciousness not three self-consciousnesses, one will not three wills, one spirit or subject not three spirits or subjects, in the triune God. And so far, there is no difference in the doctrine of God between Trinitarianism and Unitarianism. Whether the orthodox doctrine, which throughout its history has been so anxious to preserve the monarchian or severely monotheistic standpoint, really abides by the revelation facts from which it set out, and really possesses any of the theological, economic, religious, and philosophical values which it has claimed, are questions which call for discussion.

We may enter upon this discussion by briefly glancing at the several successive determinations of orthodox Trinitarian doctrine which may be regarded as salient and authoritative, with a view to ascertaining their theological and philosophical value.

The Nicene theologians established the oneness, that is the numerical identity as distinguished from the qualitative likeness, of the essence or substance of the Father and the Son, and the *eternal* derivation of the Son out of the essence of the Father. The latter doctrine distinguished orthodoxy from Sabellianism, and both the latter and the former differentiated it from Arianism. What exactly the οὐσία of Nicene theology signifies, in terms of current categories, it is extremely difficult to say. If the word denoted a generic concept, the abstract conception of Deity as shareable, possibly, by several Divine Beings, then of course

one *οὐσία*, in the numerical sense of 'one,' would be compatible with the supposition that the three Persons were individual Subjects. This sense of *οὐσία* is generally asserted not to have been that in which the Fathers used the term. The word is rather given a meaning which is not abstract, but concrete; a meaning different from that of *φύσις* (characteristics or traits) and is said to have denoted "the very being of God"—which is an indefinite concept—or that underlying principle in virtue of which God is what He is, which again lapses into a possibly generic idea. But, leaving these difficulties of interpretation aside, the Divine *οὐσία* was regarded as existing whole and undiminished in each of the three Persons, though how this could be reconciled with the doctrine of eternal hypostatic distinctions—the *proprietates* or *ἰδιότητες* of later teaching—ancient orthodoxy never made clear: different *proprietates* would seem to imply, so far, differences of *οὐσία*, for diversity of attributes points to diversity of underlying substance. However, the Athanasian doctrine was intended to rule out the idea of three Divine Subjects; and in so doing it implied that the quasi-tritheistic language of the New Testament was but figurative speech. Tertullian calls the 'Persons' relations or aspects; and though he names them 'substantive,' the relations and aspects are but adjectival.

When *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* came to be distinguished, and the *proprietates* of the hypostases to be emphasised, in the Cappadocian theology, we at first observe, in the teaching of Basil, a tendency which pointed in the direction of a real distinction between the Persons. Basil introduced the relation *κοινὸν—ἴδιον*, and was put in a difficulty to save himself from admitting that the common *οὐσία* was a generic abstraction, or else a *quartum quid*. He resorted to the old doctrine that the Father is the sole source of

the Godhead : a doctrine which seems to have arisen from transferring language applied in Scripture to the incarnate Son, to the eternal and intrinsic relation of the second Person of the Trinity to the first, and which presents grave difficulties not only for orthodox theology itself but also for philosophical interpretation of the Trinitarian dogma. If the relations of Fatherhood (or *ἀγεννεσία*) and Sonship (or *γέννησις*) be not determinations of the *common* *οὐσία*, it is difficult to conceive how the Father, *qua* Father or first hypostasis, can 'beget' the Godhead of the Son, or how one hypostasis can be derived from another hypostasis. It is by this questionable element in the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, partly, that the Cappadocian Fathers saved the unity of the Godhead ; other devices, equally unsatisfying to modern thought, such as Gregory of Nyssa's Platonic realism, were also used. And indeed the Cappadocians—especially Gregory of Nyssa—do not seem to have been at home with the ideas which they contributed to the definition of the doctrine in question. Even as conceived by Basil, the hypostases were too separate for their inherited 'monarchianism'—if one may so call the ancient emphasis on the Divine unity. Accordingly we find already in their writings the tendency to merge the hypostases, and the *ἰδιότητες* (aseity, begottenness, procession) which the hypostases possessed, into one another, so that the hypostases came to be regarded merely as properties or relations. The Cappadocians endeavoured to cling to the view that the *οὐσία* was determinate in itself, and at the same time to regard the *ἰδιότητες* as its determinations. This is logically impossible. And, as usual throughout the history of the doctrine of the Trinity, we find thoughts played with which inevitably lead on to the idea of a Divine Society ; these thoughts, after some vacillation between monarchian and tritheistic tendencies, discarded for renewed insistence

on the Divine unity; and an implicit or explicit appeal to the inscrutableness of the whole mystery. Whenever an individual, such as Philoponus, exchanges the Platonic logic for the Aristotelian, we get explicit tritheism formulated; but such occurrences have been extremely rare, and such teaching has always been promptly condemned as shocking.

In the age of the great Cappadocians *τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως* acquired currency as a technical phrase to denote and explain the Divine hypostases and, at the same time, their *ἰδιότητες*. Its ambiguity, when used for both the hypostases and their distinguishing characteristics, met a felt want and served to hide away difficulties, such as have already here been hinted at, with which no Church doctor was then philosopher enough to cope. The Persons thus came to be conceived as determinate ways of subsisting on the part of the numerically one *οὐσία* or Divine subject. Now a 'mode' suggests some distinction other than that of the addition of a new substantial entity—like a posture, to use Bishop South's analogy. Modes are thus adjectival, not substantive; and so, by common adoption of *τρόποι τῆς ὑπάρξεως* to designate the connotation of 'Persons,' the Church sanctioned the resolution of the Divine Persons of the Trinity into mere adjectives—either attributes or relations of the one Divine Subject to Himself. If so vague a phrase can be said to fix anything, it may be said that it fixed the orthodox doctrine of the Eastern Church with regard to the Persons of the Trinity, and fixed it finally in the form in which it was assimilated, through John of Damascus, by Aquinas.

Western theology, from Tertullian onwards, followed the same general trend, making the Persons to be adjectives of the One God. When Augustine substituted 'one God the Trinity' for one 'God the Father,' he gave expression

to an idea which, if developed, might have led to profound alterations in the Church's doctrine, and to most important developments, from the philosophical point of view. But this promise he did not fulfil. He retains the doctrine that the Father is the sole fountain of Deity, which at once annuls all fruitful meaning in the phrase 'one God the Trinity.' The doctrine of περιχώρησις, or *circumincessio*, already implicit in the Nicene teaching, was so formulated by Augustine as not to imply the mutual interpenetration of distinct subjects possibly more 'pervious' than human selves are, or the joint activity and co-operation of distinct agents with different wills united by moral harmony, but as implying that the agencies of Father, Son, and Spirit are numerically one and identical. Also his psychological analogies used to illustrate the meaning of the Trinity, reduce the Persons to modes of consciousness, so that God is triune only in the sense that a human being may be regarded as triune.

Thus, long before it received express formulation at the Lateran Council of 1215, the doctrine of the *Una Res* was the teaching of the great Doctors of the Church. Each Person is the whole Godhead; each is as much the *Summa Res* as all together. The οὐσία is numerically, not merely qualitatively, one; the powers and properties of any one of the hypostases—His thoughts, volitions, and agencies—only excepting the *proprietates* of aseity, generation, and procession, are the powers and properties of each of the others. The Persons are eternal modes, τρόποι ὑπάρξεως: modes of eternal and intrinsic being as distinguished from the Sabellian modes of revelation, but still modes. The orthodox idea of the Trinity is essentially modalism. But it was claimed by Church writers that a mode, which cannot exist by itself or be self-subsistent, essentially includes in it (and not merely implies) the entity or *res* of which it is

a mode—a curious piece of medieval logic; so that each Person can be said to include the whole Godhead. Setting out from the pure unity, it would seem that there is no way to real distinctions, to other than modal Persons. The Nicene Fathers failed to shew how three can be one; the Schoolmen, as we shall see, failed to shew how one can be three: for neither ancient nor medieval orthodoxy were the Persons members of a class, self-subsistent subjects.

From Abelard onwards, the Schoolmen are inclined to identify the Persons of the Trinity with the three major attributes, Power, Wisdom, and Love. Aquinas is generally represented as having taught this doctrine. But these three 'essential attributes,' according to him, are but 'appropriated' to the three Persons, with 'fittingness,' in order to manifest the Persons to our minds. He does not teach that each of these attributes is, or even belongs to, one separate Person exclusively; indeed Aquinas regards these attributes as not really distinct in God. These views come very near to implying that the hypostatic distinctions are the creation of our subjectivity; though that was not the great Summist's intended meaning. The distinctions really subsist, but are not several realities. In fact the Persons are expressly defined by Aquinas to be relations as subsisting in the Divine nature: they are Paternity, Filiation, Procession, i.e., relations of God to Himself. Nothing can be more impersonal, in the modern sense of the term, than a relation; and in explicitly resolving the Persons of the Trinity into relations Aquinas, who thereby gave definite expression to the idea after which the ancient Church had been tentatively groping, revealed how essentially monarchian (unitarian) and modalistic was the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.

The enormous distance between the language of Scripture on which the doctrine of the Trinity is grounded, and the

teaching of Aquinas in which the thought of the Church may be said to reach its climax of development and definition, is truly staggering. This will be realised by any one who attempts to re-write relevant passages from the fourth gospel, paraphrasing them into the dogmatic and technical language of Aquinas. The New Testament, if the Church's Trinitarian doctrine be accepted, must be regarded as a mass of the most extravagantly figurative hypostatisations. It becomes a serious question whether the doctrine of the Trinity with which we are left possess any religious value, or even any theological value. All philosophical value, such as will later form a subject for our discussion, certainly vanishes. It would be easy to shew, also, that the doctrine, in the form in which the Church has been content to formulate it, is full of self-contradictions: nowhere are these more obvious than in the *Summa* of St. Thomas. And it is quite plain that many expositions of the doctrine furnished by competent theologians of the modern and the recent periods, especially such as seek to point out its religious, theological, and philosophical value, depart from the purely relational and modal characterisation of the Divine Persons such as is presented, as we have seen, in the theology of the authoritative Doctors of the Church from Tertullian or Athanasius to Aquinas. This fact implies that the officially authoritative doctrine is too severely Unitarian for many modern minds: but those who are given to 'thinking out' have seldom expressed their discontent, which perhaps is mostly subconscious, and have not indicated the lines along which the traditional doctrine is to be reconstructed; while popular writers who cling to orthodoxy and yet allow themselves to speak of God as a Social Being, are generally too superficial to feel the need of radical reconstruction.

Such phrases as have been suggested as alternatives to

the traditional 'modes of being,' with a view to expressing the orthodox connotation of 'hypostasis' or 'Person' in the Trinitarian sense, have not proved helpful. Thus Dorner offers 'eternal points of mediation'; but the words convey no meaning. And when this theologian quotes, apparently with approval, the view of Athanasius that God is only self-originating (whatever that may mean) and self-conscious by means of the triad, while all the members of the triad are to be regarded as perfect in that all the Divine attributes belong to each of them, and at the same time denies self-consciousness to the Persons severally, he would seem to involve himself in self-contradiction. A hypostasis that is impersonal in the sense of lacking self-consciousness does not seem capable of possessing the Divine attributes; for possession of the attributes would seem necessarily to presuppose self-consciousness. Ancient and modern theologians alike, so far as I have observed, who have regarded the Christian idea of God as a contribution to philosophy, have always found it necessary to speak, as do the Scriptures, of the 'Persons' *as if* they were severally endowed with self-consciousness, though predicating personality in the full sense only of their unity. But inasmuch as to attribute self-consciousness to the Father, to the eternal or pre-existent Son, and to the Holy Spirit, severally, seems to imply what is called tritheism, the Church, or rather its authoritative representatives (whether councils or individual Doctors) has always shrunk with something like abhorrence from such a step. As Dr. Sanday has recently observed, the traditional meaning of 'Person' or 'hypostasis' seems to be mode of being, which serves as ground or basis of special function, but just stops short of 'individual.' "The little less, and what worlds away!" There seems at first sight to be force in the qualification '*just* stops short'; but when we try

to think what precisely can be meant, we are as much baffled as by Dorner's phrase, "points of eternal mediation." It is a grave question whether 'stopping short' at all can leave a Trinitarian doctrine which is not devoid of all value, and whether the 'as if,' referred to just now, must not be done away with. Popular religious thought has leaped the 'tritheistic' precipice, though it would doubtless be perturbed if charged with having performed the feat; so indeed has all thought, unthought-out, of God as a Social Being. Careful theology will be slow to take deliberately a step so momentous, against which so much inherited sentiment is opposed and which obviously leads to new difficulties. But many perhaps will now feel that the time is ripe for consideration of the step and of the consequences which it would entail. And, to return to a topic which was occupying us just now, it is becoming plain that the phrases in which orthodox thought has sought to make a permanent halting-place on the hither side of the precipice are wholly unsatisfying. Some such phrases have already been instanced; a few more may now be mentioned.

Theologians imbued with Hegelian philosophy have described the second and third Persons of the Trinity as 'God going out of' and 'God returning to Himself.' But these phrases can merely be figurative expressions for what are sometimes called the 'moments' of self-consciousness, that is the necessary elements which analysis distinguishes in self-consciousness rather than separable or successive stages therein; and even so they would be more abstract than 'modes of being.' Similarly, when we are told that in the Son the Father 'objectifies Himself,' and in the Spirit 're-subjectifies Himself' or 'restores Himself from self-diremption,' it is only asserted in obscure language that God is self-conscious; and the Son and Spirit, so described, are as impersonal as the relations into which

Aquinas resolved the Persons. The question of the Divine Self-consciousness is rather a philosophical problem than one with which dogmatic theology, proceeding from the facts of a historical revelation, is concerned, and therefore does not belong to the scope of the present article, which is rather a discussion of the adequacy or inadequacy of the traditional dogmatic statements of the triune nature of God, and their value for dogmatic theology as a whole.

These statements, it has been hinted, are inadequate; and now that implications have been clearly brought to light, their inadequacy as an interpretation of the Scriptural data can be more plainly indicated.

We must be careful not to use for the purpose of Trinitarian doctrine statements in the New Testament which are primarily if not exclusively concerned with the incarnate Son. As Moberly emphasised in his *Atonement and Personality*, there are many predicates which may be assigned to the incarnate Son which are inapplicable to the pre-existent Logos, and *vice versa*. But besides the prologue of the fourth Gospel there are other passages which refer to the pre-existent Christ—the Logos of St. John or St. Paul's Christ of cosmic and pre-Incarnate significance, which imply intercommunion between Him and the Father, and therefore imply two subjects of self-conscious experience. And the conditions which limit the applicability of New Testament statements concerning the Son to the doctrine of the intrinsic and eternal Trinity do not apply at all in the case of similar statements—whether of our Lord or of apostles—concerning the Holy Spirit. But the Spirit, though not always clearly differentiated from the Son, is always represented as a self-conscious subject. His 'knowledge,' etc., might, in accordance with the orthodox doctrine, be numerically identical with the Father's knowledge, etc.; but intercession, which is attributed to

Him, as it is also to the ascended Christ, surely implies a relation between *two* numerically different subjects. Moreover the orthodox doctrine of the Person of Christ according to which His Divine nature or the Logos was the 'centre of His personality'—or, as we should now express it, the subject of His experience—frees the theologian who abides by this Christological doctrine from the conditions and limitations to which reference has been made, and necessitates the use of many statements concerning the Son as incarnate in his determination of the doctrine of the intrinsic Trinity. This, however, is not a point to press, as recent Christological thought has moved in some respects from the traditional lines. But if the New Testament is to form the basis for a doctrine of the Trinity, it may surely be said that the modalistic interpretation of the Trinity which is embodied in the Church's authoritative theology is far from doing full justice, not only to particular passages, but also to the whole trend of its *prima facie* meaning. It would seem, in fact, that a choice must be made between explaining away such portions of the New Testament as suggest necessity for the idea of a triune God, so that they may be taken as figurative personifications, or else advancing from so modalistic a conception of the Trinity as has hitherto prevailed in theology to one which takes with all seriousness the suggestion that the Godhead is comparable to a society of distinct subjects. This latter idea, as we have seen, has been tentatively and hesitatingly approached by a recent theologian here and there; but so long as the language of orthodoxy is retained, implying that the Divine Persons are merely intrinsic relations of one Divine subject to Himself, nothing but internal contradiction can be the outcome of such attempts to represent God as social. It belongs rather to philosophy to inquire whether God can be conceived as personal, in any sense that

can be serviceable to religion, without being regarded as a society of subjects; and in a subsequent article such a philosophical inquiry will be undertaken. Meanwhile the doubt may be expressed whether any less 'tritheistically' inclined conception will suffice to support the idea of an incarnation of God in Christ, if 'incarnation' is to mean more than mere 'immanence' differing only in degree from that which is involved in creation, providence, and inspiration. The Unitarian's objection to Christianity centres in rejection of the Deity of Jesus Christ, and consequently extends to any such doctrine of God as seems to be exclusively called for by the theory of an incarnation. But, apart from the incarnation of Deity in Christ, there would seem to be nothing in the doctrine of the Trinity which has taken shape through a long process of development, such as to give the strictest Unitarian ground for rejecting it. It is as modalistic as he could desire. And it should follow that the doctrine, as hitherto defined, must be inadequate for a distinctively Christian theology.

F. R. Tennant.

PSALM CX.

THE one hundred and tenth psalm is interesting for many reasons—its reference to our Lord's priesthood, the use made of it by St. Paul to define the duration of Christ's mediatorial kingdom, and the argument based on it in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Still, important as these questions are, quite as great interest has always been shown in the employment of the Psalm by our Lord to present an insoluble problem to the Jewish authorities: "David himself said by the Holy Ghost, The Lord said to my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool. David therefore himself calleth him Lord; and whence is he then his son?" The first conclusion we may draw from this is that the Psalm at that time was unhesitatingly ascribed to David. If the Jews could have disputed this, they would certainly have done so. If we accept this, the second conclusion follows that the most obvious reference of the Psalm is to David's son, Solomon. "David calls him Lord; whence is he his son?" Yet, so far as we are aware, no one has ever suggested that Solomon is the subject of the Psalm. It is the aim of this article to prove that the Psalm was written either by David himself or by some one in his immediate circle, with reference to Solomon. In doing this it will be our endeavour to discuss the question on purely literary and critical grounds and only to use the interpretation in the New Testament as evidence of the traditional explanation.

At one time it seemed probable that there would be a consensus of critical opinion in favour of assigning the Psalm to the age of the Maccabees. The exact person referred to was not quite certain. Hitzig and Olshausen thought of Jonathan, while Dr. Cheyne with greater probability selected Simon. Still this was a detail which in no way affected the

credibility of the theory, Two objections have, however, been urged against it which appear fatal. In the first place the Psalm refers to a Jewish king who received the additional honour of the priesthood while the Maccabees were priests first and princes afterwards. In the second place the Psalm is evidently based on some prophetic utterance regarding the subject of the Psalm, and in the time of the Maccabees' prophecy had long been dead.

Grätz avoids the second of these difficulties by connecting it with Joshua the son of Josedech. He argues from Zechariah iii. 1 that another branch of the Aaronic priesthood disputed Joshua's claim to the high-priesthood. Hence this Psalm was written by an adherent who zealously took the side of Joshua. The contention was so sharp that the prophets themselves were divided, Haggai taking the side of Zerubbabel, the descendant of David; Zechariah the side of Joshua, the descendant of Aaron. Accordingly we are able to understand the language of the Psalm by comparing the precisely similar language of Zechariah vi. 12, 13. This theory successfully avoids the second of the objections urged above, but it leaves the first untouched. Moreover, as Dr. Briggs points out, the author of the Psalm knows nothing of a dominion in the future or postponed, or of a period of humiliation for the king and people. The date must therefore be earlier than the Assyrian invasions. In addition there is the phrase, "after the order of Melchizedek." Grätz indeed translates it "according to my promise, my king for righteousness," but this seems a desperate expedient.

The mention of the Assyrian invasions at once suggests Hezekiah. This was the ordinary Jewish interpretation in the time of Justin and Tertullian, and no more suitable occasion could be suggested for verses 5 and 6 of the Psalm than the destruction of Sennacherib's army. Still it leaves the reference to Melchizedek quite unexplained. As Justin

pointed out to Trypho, Hezekiah was not a priest in the past and is not an everlasting priest now.

Many writers, including Delitzsch, Perowne, Jennings and Lowe, hold that the Psalm was written by David and directly refers to the future Messiah and not to any contemporary king of Israel. Perowne rightly urges that this must have been the traditional interpretation in the time of our Lord or His opponents would have had some answer ready. On the other hand Dean Kirkpatrick points out that, if we could regard the Psalm apart from the New Testament interpretation, we should unhesitatingly say that it was addressed by a prophet to the reigning king. Dr. Driver brings forward three additional arguments: (1) "My Lord" is the title habitually used in addressing the Israelitish king; (2) Messianic prophecies always have their starting-point in actually existing institutions; (3) the subject of the Psalm is a victorious Israelitish king triumphing over earthly foes.

These considerations appear decisive and hence there seems a general tendency at the present time to make David the subject rather than the author of the Psalm. Orelli thinks it was written by Nathan or another contemporary prophet, and depicts the glory of the new kingdom; and Dean Kirkpatrick suggests that the occasion was the transference of the Ark to Mount Zion. The suggestion is a very attractive one, but the objections appear as fatal to this theory as to the assignment of the Psalm to the time of the Maccabees. In the first place David ordinarily employed the services of Zadok and Abiathar to perform priestly functions, and there is no suggestion that it was ever expected that he would unite in his own person the offices of king and priest. In the second place the eternity of the rule of the monarchy described in Psalm cx. seems to necessitate some connection between it and the promise to David contained in 2 Samuel vii. But, if we admit this, then the declaration in the Psalm

must refer not to David but to his descendant, for the language in 2 Samuel is free from the slightest ambiguity: "When thy days shall be fulfilled, and thou shalt sleep with thy fathers, I will set up thy seed after thee, which shall proceed out of thy bowels. . . . and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever."

It is surprising that the Psalm has not generally been connected with Solomon, for this theory satisfies every condition and is exposed to no real difficulty. By a contemporary the prophecy of Nathan would be supposed to refer simply and directly to Solomon. Not till later would it be realised that that monarch did not fulfil it. If Orelli is justified in thinking that the Psalm commemorates the glory of the new kingdom, the eternity of that kingdom was connected, not with David but, with his son. If Ewald could feel confident that the king referred to must be David, "for king and kingdom appear here at the highest stage of greatness and glory," we must remember that in the earlier part of the reign of Solomon both king and kingdom appeared even more glorious. Such passages as 1 Kings iii. 12, 13 leave no room for doubt on this point.

Moreover such a reference would explain nearly every detail of the Psalm. The prophetic utterance with which it begins would find its interpretation in 2 Samuel vii. 4, 8, 17, 28. In addition Psalm lxxxix. 19 reminds us that even in exile the idea was continued that the promise with regard to Solomon was made in vision and prophecy. Verse 28 of the same Psalm would explain the phrase "sware" in Psalm cx., which indeed is merely the interpretation of 2 Samuel vii. 28. If in the opening verse of the Psalm Jehovah commands the king to sit on His right hand, we are assured in 2 Chronicles xxix. 23 that "Solomon sat on the throne of Jehovah." The idea that the young king would unite in his person the twofold prerogative of the rulers of Jerusalem and be both king and

priest may easily have been suggested to the writer by Solomon's constant superintendence of the details of worship in connexion with the building of the Temple. The statement that his rule would be eternal is merely the echo of what would be considered to be God's promise with regard to Solomon in 2 Samuel vii. 13, 16, 25, 29. The wide extent of his dominions, alluded to in verse 6 of the Psalm, was noticed by his contemporaries (2 Kings iv. 21, 24) and has impressed the imagination of posterity.

The only difficulty in the way of making Solomon the subject of the Psalm is the mention of war in verses 5 to 7. Dean Kirkpatrick (on Psalm ii.), however, points out that the difficulty is more apparent than real. The subject nations may have made the accession of the young king an occasion of revolt. Moreover there are actual indications that his reign was not uniformly peaceful. He made great military preparations (1 Kings iv. 26, ix. 15 f., xi. 27), and actually engaged in war (2 Chron. viii. 3).

We have left it uncertain whether the Psalm was composed by David himself or by some prophet who was contemporary with him. On the whole we consider it most probable that the Psalm was composed by some prophet in the earlier part of the reign of Solomon. A psalm composed by one who had been in David's immediate circle would naturally by the time of our Lord be ascribed to David himself and the reference to Solomon would give added point to the question: "David calleth him Lord; and whence is he his son?"

H. H. B. Ayles.

TRANSMIGRATION AND KARMA AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN LIVING HINDUISM.

THE most powerful elements in Hinduism, are in the region of ideas, its pantheism or monism, in the region of conduct and religion, its doctrines of transmigration and *karma*, and, in its social relationships, the system of caste. I propose to consider the one of these that perhaps is most profound and far-reaching in its influence upon the character and life of the people, and has been so throughout many centuries—the belief in transmigration and *karma*. As I have said elsewhere, "the whole Indian development is so dominated by it that Hinduism is in many respects simply an adjunct of this view of life and its destiny." To illustrate its place in the variety of Hindu beliefs I have made use of a comparison employed by Professor William James in another connexion. The *karma*-transmigration doctrine lies in the midst of the efforts of the Hindu soul to formulate a theory of the universe "like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume; in the next some one on his knees praying for faith and strength." In another "a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated. . . . They all own the corridor and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into one of their respective rooms." It is desirable accordingly, if we are to understand the Hindu type of mentality, that we should have a clear understanding of this doctrine and of its influence in their lives. It inevitably affects profoundly their whole outlook and we cannot understand the faith of the devout theist on his knees in prayer or the efforts of the social reformer or the pride of the Brahman and the sub-

mission of the outcaste unless we take into account this background of all their belief and practice.

The two-fold conception of *karma* and transmigration does not appear to be an inheritance from early Vedic times. There is no trace of it in the Vedic Hymns. It is in the Upaniṣads that we find it first referred to. There it is definitely stated that "as a man acts, as he conducts himself, so will he be born." It is probable that the primitive idea of the continuance of human existence in animals and trees was adopted by the Aryan invaders from the aborigines of the land and that their thinkers, applying their subtle minds to it, built up on this foundation the theory of a continuous chain of existences bound together by a law of retribution. They may have laid hold of these ideas—it has been suggested—at the same stage in their thought as is represented in the history of Hebrew religion by the book of Job. The old naïve belief in material recompense in this life for good and evil conduct having proved untenable, they built up this theory as a means of solving the problem. Applying it not only to the present but to the past they drew the conclusion that a man's life now is one of a series of lives that have had no beginning and look forward to no end. There are certain points in regard to this doctrine that must be made clear. In the first place we must realise that good deeds do not any more than evil set a man free from the wheel to which his life is bound.[1] They may have the effect of causing him to be re-born as a Brahman or even as a god, but still the wheel revolves and he is still enslaved to living. Again, every thing that happens or shall happen is inevitable. "How shall there be in this *saṃsāra* (transmigratory process) any uncaused action?" Every moment of man's life is the direct result of some act (*karma*) that he has done: his life is an endless

[1] Cf. James iii. 6: *τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως*, the wheel of birth.

chain of close-linked deeds, all made of the same stuff and all, whether good or evil, it would seem, unbreakable. "As among a thousand cows," says the Mahābhārata, "a calf will find its mother, so the deed previously done will find and follow its doer." Further, as experience of life goes on and as reflection is applied to such a doctrine and its consequences, the whole of life becomes inevitably infected with the profoundest pessimism. Such a bondage must breed despair and the desire, deeper than all else, to find some gateway of escape. But whence can escape come? The reward of heaven is hated no less than the punishment of hell. This is a universal and quite unmoral law. The working out of *karma* is always producing new *karma* to be worked out farther and, in the words of Deussen, the clock of retribution in the very act of running down winds itself up again. Such a thought "hangs like a pall" over all Indian thought and life. It may seem to furnish some explanation of the sorrows and inequalities of life. It certainly offers no mitigation of them and no impulse to the endeavour to relieve them.

We can see, I think, from that account of the theory that it would necessarily resolve itself into a doctrine of fatalism. *Karma*, which simply means "deed," is something done in the unknown past, in "the backward and abysm of time," something that cannot be altered now, and whose consequences can only be endured. Hence the word in common usage comes to mean "fate, destiny." A synonym for it is the "unseen" (*adriṣṭa*), the dark, mysterious shadow that sits and waits for man. What a man is now and does now is something written on his forehead, inescapable. What fate has written on the forehead, says Tulsi Dās, neither man nor God nor demon is able to efface. For the gods too, as I have said, are subject to this law—unless it be that the mysterious Supreme Spirit, who is without

parts and passions, is beyond its reach. To be re-born in heaven is only to tarry for a while in a place of bliss, from which presently one may fall to earthly or to bestial or even lower forms of life and suffering. Life thus is, as one writer has said, "the wage of sin," and the supreme question for the Indian sage is how an escape can be discovered from its agony. In popular language "to cut short the eighty-four," that is, the eighty-four lakhs of births to which they look forward, is the final and supreme attainment, if indeed it can be attained.

The way of deliverance (*mokṣa*) which the seers have discovered for themselves and reveal is one which cuts the knot of the whole process by declaring it to be unreal—illusion. The ultimate cause of this bondage is affirmed to be ignorance (*avidyā*), which is due to the deceitfulness of the world of illusion in which we dwell. Hence comes "desire," "thirst," resulting in action and the fetter closes upon the soul. Thus the way of deliverance is for a man to perceive his freedom by realising that all is unreality save the Absolute Self. Knowing himself to be one with that real he rises above illusion, above bondage and re-birth and all the lower life of action into the sphere of changeless thought. He becomes *Brahman*: he wins deliverance: he is not again re-born.

These things seem to most of us, no doubt, as we read them set forth in a text-book or as we try to follow them in the curious, remote discussions of the Indian sacred books, very far apart from life and its problems and, perhaps we may think, of little relevance to the actual concerns and interest of men and women in India to-day. Let us try to see how they work in the actual life of the people and what consequences they have on conduct and character. The question may be asked, to begin with, Is this doctrine actually believed by the great body of the Indian people?

Do they accept it as their lot that they shall be born and re-born and that they are held in the grip of this law by the acts and desires of each day? There is some conflict in the testimony of students of Indian life and thought in this matter. Sir George Grierson, who has an intimate acquaintance with the people of upper India, affirms that multitudes among them look forward at the end of life to passing, just as a Christian might, into the presence of God. I find too that in Mr. Holland's *Goal of India* a "leading Hindu authority" is quoted as avowing it as his opinion "that transmigration is an academic belief which a Hindu thinks of as applying to other peoples' relatives but never to his own. These, his own relations, he always believes to be in heaven" (p. 82). I can only urge, on the other hand, my own experience. The weight of this belief may lie less heavily upon some parts of India than upon others. In Western India I can testify that among the simplest people of the villages I have found it everywhere accepted. It is true that it is not, I believe, vividly realised by them. I do not believe for a moment that a reason for their vegetarianism (in the case of the vegetarian castes) is that a man fears lest he might be eating his grandmother. The doctrine is not concretely realised by them as implying that they may presently themselves occupy the bodies of plants or animals or that plants and animals about them are exiled souls of men. Its effect upon them is rather negative and paralyzing to all thought of the future or concern with it. They say of the dead, simply, "He is gone." Their imagination does not pursue him farther. But the effect is that no hope of immortality illuminates the future, and still more the past weighs as a heavy and inexorable burden on their lives to-day. This belief lies upon their wills heavy as frost, stilling complaint, indeed, but destroying initiative and effort. It robs the future of

the colours of hope, as well no doubt as, to a large extent, of fear: it leaves it merely drab. And it empties the present likewise of all energy and power of amendment. It is true to say, I think, that over wide areas at least of India this belief is a commonplace in the background of their thoughts and that it has done more than any other doctrine in the land to enervate them and reduce them to lethargy and despair—morally, in a word, to bleed India white.

The practical influence of these ideas is seen on a great scale in the system of caste of which they furnish a justification and support. This system supplies an elaborately graduated scheme which can fit into such a doctrine of carefully adjusted rewards and punishments. A man's spiritual status is supposed to correspond to his rank in the order of caste: his *karma* and his social rank agree and he should accept it as appointed for him and immutable. Thus these doctrines supply a sanction for this system and do much to buttress it in the powerfully entrenched position that it holds in India That this belief is recognised to be no dead and negligible theory but a malign influence in Hindu life, cutting the nerve of effort and leaving no room for worship and religion, is indicated by the fact that the most serious and sincere of the movements of religious and social reform have emphasised their rejection of it. This is so in regard to the great theistic societies of Bengal and Bombay and of their leaders, Ram Mohun Roy, Debendranath Tagore and his son Sir Rabindranath. It is true also of the less well known Dev Samāj in North India, but it is not true of the Arya Samāj, which retains the doctrine though it attacks caste. In earlier times, too, movements of revolt against Brahmanism and caste tyranny, such as that which resulted in the formation of the Vira-Saiva as Lingayat sect, rejected transmigration, perceiving

its intimate relationship with the evils they desired to get free from. On the other hand Theosophy has accepted it as a profound truth and has laboured to reconcile it with effort for the betterment of society. A study, however, of the history of Theosophy will, I believe, show that the contradiction between its theory and its practice in this matter has resulted in moral compromises with such evils as that of caste which condemn the whole movement. To sum up the position in regard to *karma* and transmigration, I think we may hold that its influence is widespread and deep throughout the whole land, a paralyzing influence from which India must be set free if she is to progress at all ; that among the common people it is not clearly defined and is held along with many practices that really are in contradiction with it, but that its influence is continually present in the background of their thoughts as a bondage and an oppression ; that, at the same time, enlightenment and the awakening of conscience and of a sense of responsibility for others is weakening its hold upon the educated classes, so that while they acknowledge it in speech, they do not accept it in all its logical consequences and, fortunately, often deny it by their acts. It is accepted as furnishing an explanation of the inequalities of life : it is accepted also in the thoroughly ethical form of the proposition that " whatsoever a man soweth, that he shall also reap." But the consequences from its full logical application are not deduced and it is steadily losing its power.

The effect of the fact that all life is overshadowed by the *karma*-transmigration doctrine is, on the one hand, as we have seen, that the great majority resign themselves to despair as being bound helplessly by the chains of necessity, and, on the other, that in the case of the thoughtful and earnest few a passionate desire to escape possesses them—to escape at all costs from the agony of life. Sister Nivedita

(Miss Noble) has declared that India has been possessed through all her history, more than any other race has been, by the passion for freedom. There is a measure of truth in that statement if she means, as I suppose she does, the passion to escape from this bondage to the wheel of re-birth. It was this desire that drove Gautama from his home and sent him out into the desert to wrestle with the problem of deliverance. To the Buddhist to attain, to become perfect, is "to break the fetter of becoming." As the sea is impregnated with one flavour, the flavour of salt, so the Buddhist law and discipline is impregnated with but one flavour, the flavour of deliverance. But, whether in Buddhism or in Hinduism, it is, of course, the few, the very few, who have the strength of soul to seek a goal that is so hard to reach. It is reached in both cases by knowledge, by deliverance from ignorance. As the nine fetters (such as the fetters of the efficacy of works and rites, of desire for continued life and so on) are broken, and as "the mists of ignorance roll away," there bursts on the Buddhist saint or *arahant* "the supernal clarity of vision that reveals the lonely pinnacle on which he stands, the climax of a life to which there has been no first birth, but of which there is to be, here and now, the last end" (Mrs. Rhys Davids). This is called in Hinduism, to attain *samādhi*, the condition in which the world and its desires have no longer any control over the soul. It is delivered: it has obtained *mokṣa*. Death need not necessarily come then. The life goes on fulfilling past *karma*, just as a wheel continues to revolve till the past impulse is exhausted though no new impulse is given it. No new *karma* is being done and no necessity for further continuance in the body arises. So presently the flame dies out. The individual has passed into the silence of *Brahman*.

Thus the way to freedom is the extinction of desire: it

is separation from the world and its interests. Needless to say this is a way that few choose. They have to be content to travel onward on a path that seems to them inescapable, journeying from life to life. Thus the fulfilment of the common duties of life is a source of bondage and is viewed as evil. The name for the process of endless birth and re-birth is *samsāra*, and it is common for a man to speak of his wife as his *samsāra*, that is to say, the chain that binds him to the wheel of re-births. If he wishes deliverance he must leave her and turn his back on the duties and responsibilities of life, going out into the desert and becoming an ascetic. The knowledge that brings deliverance is gained by one who turns away from the world and lives in meditation as a *sannyāsī* or monk. All through the history of India there have been and there still are those who leave everything to obtain this deliverance. An instance of this is described in the story of Puran Das in Kipling's *Jungle Tales*.

> He has gone from the council and put on the shroud,—
> (Dost thou hear ? quoth Kabīr) a *bairagi* avowed.

It cannot, however, be held that this longing for deliverance has affected more than a very small minority. The whole belief has, on the other hand, contributed to produce three of the greatest hindrances in the way of India's emancipation, three of the heaviest chains that enslave her. These are her asceticism, the passive acceptance of things as they are, however evil they may be, which is so common a characteristic of the people, and the belief in an inexorable fate. It is seldom that one finds evidence of the joy of release, but Tukārām sometimes expresses it as he does also the pain of the sense of bondage. Here is one of his cries for deliverance :

" All this fearful, this weary coming and going, when will it all end ? " And here also is a cry of joy as he

believes himself—either anticipating a release that he looks forward to or, perhaps, temporarily experiencing a sense of exaltation that he believes to be identification with the Supreme Spirit—as he believes himself to be set free :—

> Before my eyes my dead self lies ;
> O bliss beyond compare !
> Joy fills the worlds and I rejoice,
> The soul of all things there.
>
> My selfish bonds are loosed, and now
> I reach forth far and free.
> Gone is the soil of birth and death—
> The petty sense of "me."

His personal and individual life is merged in the life of the All. The same joy had been expressed many centuries before by Buddhist sages—men and women. So one of the Buddhist sisters cries :

> "O free indeed ! O gloriously free,
> And I in freedom from three crooked things,— . . ."
> From pestle and mortar and my crook-backed lord,
> Yea I am free from re-birth and from death,
> And all that bound mine eyes is hurled away.

From all this we catch certain glimpses of the powerful forces that Hinduism has let loose in the land and that are still governing and moulding the character of the people, as they for centuries have been moulding them—that have largely created also the frame-work of their social life. The whole world is a phantasmagoria of unreality. The universe is like a dancing girl, dancing before a king and deceiving and beguiling him. Shiva is the god that especially embodies and represents this aspect of things : he is the destroyer and reproducer. "He represents the earliest and universal impression of nature upon man, the impression of endless and pitiless change. He has charge of the incessant round of birth and death in which all nature eternally revolves."

I am the god of the sensuous fire
That moulds all nature in forms divine;
The symbols of death and of man's desire,
The springs of change in the world are mine:
The organs of birth and the circlet of bones,
And the light loves carved on the temple stones.

. . . .

Mine is the fountain and mine the force
That spurs all nature to ceaseless strife;
And my image is Death at the gates of Life.

In South India he is frequently represented as Natarāja, the dancing king, the Lord of Illusion. He is a pitiless and inhuman deity, with no forgiveness for the sinner—just as Nature herself is pitiless and unforgiving. All this side of Indian thought is gloomy and despairing. It is this that accounts for the pessimism, the tragic gloom that hangs over so much of the life of India.

N. Macnicol.

THE ORIGIN OF ST. JOHN I. 13.

Dr. Rendel Harris has furnished us with a fresh orientation for the study of the Johannine Prologue, and has sent us all back to it with a greatly stimulated interest. Many and great are the debts of obligation under which from time to time he has placed the world of Biblical and Theological learning, but it is doubtful whether anything has come from his pen of greater and more far-reaching importance than the series of articles which appeared in the Expositor on "The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel," more recently issued in book form by the Cambridge University Press. If the thesis therein set forth with such wealth of patristic and other learning is established it is scarcely possible to exaggerate the effect it will have not only upon

the exposition of the Prologue and other New Testament passages but also upon our Christological conceptions in general. For myself, while unable to accept all the details of Dr. Harris's exposition of the Prologue, I am of the opinion that he has amply demonstrated that its origin is to be sought in the Sapiential literature, and that there lies behind it a hymn in praise of Sophia. This latter hypothesis resolves a number of problems which cluster around the Prologue and is taken as proven in the present article, the purpose of which is to make a small supplementary contribution.

Perhaps a word or two may be permitted as to the genesis of this article. Studying the Prologue in the light of Dr. Harris's brilliant suggestions—how the text glistens as he takes us from point to point !—I was struck with the fact that his reconstruction of the Sophia-hymn contained no analogue to verse 13. The omission impressed me all the more inasmuch as the very chapter of the *Wisdom of Solomon* in which Dr. Harris discovers the counterpart of the statement in verse 12 that the Logos confers upon those who welcome Him the right to become children of God seemed to me to contain a passage which might easily and naturally be regarded as the origin and inspiration of words in the Sophia-hymn which would correspond to verse 13. I was sure that there must have been some reason for the omission which was hidden from me, and it was with considerable misgiving that I ventured to write to Dr. Harris acquainting him with the idea which had occurred to me and asking his opinion regarding it. In his kind and generous reply he approved of my suggestion, giving it as his opinion that the case which I had sketched could be made out, and urging me to put my " discovery " in an article for the EXPOSITOR. Be it understood, however, that my letter to Dr. Harris contained only the bare suggestion

as to the source of verse 13, and that nothing in this article beyond that has received his imprimatur.

Before we come to verse 13 a word may be said on the last clause of verse 12—*τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ*. Dr. Harris's restoration of the intermediate form of the Prologue contains nothing answering to these words. Was there nothing in the Sophia-hymn corresponding to them ? It is quite possible that it contained some reference to the *name* of Wisdom, for in Sirach vi. 22 we read :

σοφία γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς ἐστιν,
καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς ἐστιν φανερά.

The sense of *ὄνομα* here is very close to that in verse 12 of the Prologue : " her name expresses her essence " is the paraphrase of Box and Oesterley [1] ; and it is interesting to note that the second line is occupied with the same circle of ideas that we find in verses 11 and 12 of the Prologue, where it is said that while some of those to whom the Logos came welcomed Him, the most part did not. Moreover, the thought of putting one's trust in God is frequent in the Sapiential books, as, for example, in Wisdom xii. 2 :

. . . ἵνα ἀπαλλαγέντες τῆς κακίας πιστεύωσιν ἐπὶ σέ, Κύριε,

and in a hymn in honour of Wisdom there would be nothing strange in the transference of the idea from God to Wisdom ; so that we may with some confidence believe that the Sophia-song contained some such words as :

τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς.

But to come to verse 13. The suggestion made in my letter to Dr. Harris was that its origin was to be sought in the opening sentences of the seventh chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon. This great chapter contains several analogies to the Prologue and other Christological passages in the New Testament. It is of interest to note that verse 10

[1] Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha*, vol. i., p. 336.

(of which Dr. Harris makes no mention) contains a striking confirmation of his brilliant interpretation of the latter clause of verse 5 of the Prologue. It will be recalled that he bases that interpretation upon the last verse of Sap. Sol. vii., and maintains that "the darkness which masters the light is the darkness which comes on at the end of the day."[1] Now in verse 10 we have the same thought expressed in highly poetic fashion:

καὶ προειλόμην αὐτὴν ἀντὶ φωτὸς ἔχειν,
ὅτι ἀκοίμητον τὸ ἐκ ταύτης φέγγος.

"And I chose to have her rather than light,
Because her bright shining is never laid to sleep."

As has already been said, Dr. Harris discovers in this chapter the source of the counterpart of verse 12 of the Prologue. He finds it in verse 27, where we are told that Wisdom "passing into holy souls . . . maketh them friends of God and prophets." "It is this work of Sophia," he says, "in the making of 'Friends of God' (φίλους Θεοῦ) that has prompted the 'Children of God' (τέκνα Θεοῦ) who result from the reception of the Logos."[2] In his reconstruction of the intermediate form he has:

"Those that did receive her became Friends of God and prophets."

Now let us look at the opening verses of Sap. Sol. vii. The writer there impersonates Solomon the wise man, who is made to say that his wisdom is not the outcome of any special advantages of birth or extraordinary natural endowment. His birth was just like that of any one else: the attendant circumstances were normal; he was of common flesh and blood; he possessed no initial advantage over others; his rich endowment of Wisdom came in answer to prayer. This is how he describes his birth:

[1] *Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel*, p. 31.
[2] Op. cit., p. 40.

Εἰμὶ μὲν κἀγὼ θνητὸς ἴσος ἅπασιν,
καὶ γηγενοῦς ἀπόγονος πρωτοπλάστου·
καὶ ἐν κοιλίᾳ μητρὸς ἐγλύφην σὰρξ
δεκαμηνιαίῳ χρόνῳ, παγεὶς ἐν αἵματι
ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἡδονῆς ὕπνῳ συνελθούσης·
καὶ ἐγὼ δὲ γενόμενος ἔσπασα τὸν κοινὸν ἀέρα,
καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὁμοιοπαθῆ κατέπεσον γῆν,
πρώτην φωνὴν τὴν ὁμοίαν πᾶσιν ἴσα κλαίων·

(Verses 1–3).

R.V. renders :

"I myself also am mortal, like to all,
And am sprung from one born of the earth, *the man* first formed,
And in the womb of a mother was I moulded into flesh in the time of ten months,
Being compacted in blood of the seed of man and pleasure that came with sleep.
And I also, when I was born, drew in the common air,
And fell upon the kindred earth,
Uttering, like all, for my first voice, the selfsame wail."

Now if Rendel Harris is right in saying that the compiler of the Sophia-hymn had verse 27 of this chapter in his mind when he wrote the part of the hymn that corresponds with verse 12 of the Prologue, it is by no means unlikely that the opening words of the chapter were in his thought when he wrote the counterpart of verse 13. And if he paraphrased the words of Sap. Sol. vii. 27 into the form which they have assumed in John i. 12 he might easily have passed in thought from the birth of those who receive Wisdom to the begetting of Wisdom herself. And how could he better describe that begetting than by employing the verb γεννάω which Wisdom employs of herself in the LXX of Proverbs viii. 25,[1] and by contrasting her birth with the physical birth of Solomon ? In Solomon's description of his birth we find the expressions σάρξ, ἐν αἵματι and ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρός, and we may well think that in the Sophia-hymn the words τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς were followed by some such clause as ἢ οὐκ ἐξ αἵματος, οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος

[1] See note [1] on p. 40 of *The Origin of the Prologue.*

σαρκὸς, οὐδὲ ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρὸς, ἀλλ' ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐγεννήθη. When the Sophia-hymn was transformed into a hymn in praise of the Logos these words would naturally be applied to the birth of the Logos in the new hymn.

This inevitably reminds us of the ancient "Western" text of John i. 13 which reads ὃς . . . ἐγεννήθη, and it will be worth our while, even at the risk of treading somewhat familiar ground, to glance at the evidence for this reading with these thoughts in our mind. Let us begin with Tertullian, its doughtiest and most explicit champion.

In chapter xix. of his *De Carne Christi* he says:

> Quid est ergo *Non ex sanguine, nec ex voluntate carnis, nec ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo natus est*? Hoc quidem capitulo ego potius utar cum adulteratores eius obduxero. Sic enim scriptum esse contendunt *Non ex sanguine, nec ex carnis voluntate, nec ex viri, sed ex Deo nati sunt*, quasi supradictos *credentes in nomine eius* designet, ut ostendat esse semen illud arcanum electorum et spiritalium, quod sibi imbuunt. Quomodo autem ita erit, cum omnes qui credunt in nomine domini communi lege generis humani ex sanguine et ex carnis et ex viri voluntate nascantur, etiam Valentinus ipse? Adeo singulariter, ut de domino, scriptum est: *et ex Deo natus est*; merito, quia verbum dei, et cum verbo Dei spiritus, et in spiritu Dei virtus, et quicquid Dei est Christus; qua caro autem, non ex sanguine nec ex carnis et viri voluntate, quia ex Dei voluntate verbum caro factum est.

The following points should be noted:

(*a*) Tertullian has no doubt whatsoever that the singular is the true reading, and does not hesitate to charge the Valentinians with corrupting the text.

(*b*) He has the singular *ex sanguine*.

There are echoes of the same text in other parts of the *De Carne Christi*. In chapter xvi. there is one which reminds us of the ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρός of the Wisdom of Solomon:

> Ceterum quod ad omnes dictum sit, qui ideo non putant carnem nostram in Christo fuisse, quia non fuit ex viri semine, recordentur Adam ipsum in hanc carnem non ex semine viri factum. Sicut

terra conversa est in hanc carnem sine viri semine, ita et Dei verbum potuit sine coagulo in eiusdem carnis transire materiam.

So in chapter xviii. we are several times reminded of the same phrase from Sap. Sol., as, for example, when we read:

Ergo iam Dei filius ex Patris Dei semine, id est spiritu, ut esset hominis filius, caro ea sola, quae erat ex homini scarne, sumenda sine viri semine. Vacabat enim viri semen apud habentem Dei semen.

Let us now see what other authorities there are for the "Western" reading. The only Manuscript authority is the Old Latin Codex Veronensis (*b*). I do not think that much importance should be attached to the testimony of this solitary manuscript. It would be easy for a Latin scribe (as the singular and plural forms of the relative are identical in Latin) when writing *credentibus in nomine eius qui* to regard the *eius* as the antecedent of the *qui* and to make the verb singular in the relative clause. The length of the relative clause in the present case would render such a slip doubly easy—the marvel is that other Latin MSS. do not show the same error. In the Codex Veronensis, as it happens, the relative and the verb are on two different folios so that conceivably an appreciable length of time elapsed between the writing of the pronoun and the writing of the verb. I transcribe verses 12 and 13 from Buchanan's edition. Fol. 122 ends with:

12 quodquod
autem rece
perunt eum
dedit eis po
testatem fi
lios đi . fieri
credentibus
in nomine
eius 13 qui nō
ex sanguinib.
neque ex uo
luntate car
nis nec ex uo
luntate viri

while Fol. 123 opens with :

sed ex đo . na
tus est.

The remaining authorities we shall take in chronological order. First comes Justin Martyr. In the *Dialogue with Trypho*, chapter 63, the request is made that Justin should prove, among other things, that Christ had submitted to become man by the Virgin. Justin replies that the questions addressed to him had been answered by the passages from the prophets which he had already cited. He will, however, repeat them. He then quotes Isaiah liii. 8, and there follows a reference to Genesis xlix. 11, thus :

Περὶ οὗ καὶ Μωσῆς τοῦ αἵματος, ὡς προέφην, αἵματι σταφυλῆς, ἐν παραβολῇ εἰπὼν, τὴν στολὴν αὐτοῦ πλυνεῖν ἔφη, ὡς τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπείου σπέρματος γεγεννημένου, ἀλλ' ἐκ θελήματος Θεοῦ.

Here we seem to be on the track of a text not far removed from that suggested to us by the opening words of the seventh chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon.

The προέφην refers to chapter 54 of the *Dialogue* where Genesis xlix. 11 is quoted. "That the Scripture mentions the blood of the grape," says Justin, "has been evidently designed, because Christ derives blood not from the seed of man, but from the power of God." [1]

In chapter 76 again we read : "And when Moses says that He will wash His garments in the blood of the grape, does not this signify what I have now often told you is an obscure prediction, namely, that He has blood, but not from men ; just as not man, but God, has begotten the blood of the vine ? " [2]

Justin is fond of appealing to this text from Jacob's prophecy. In the First Apology—chapter 32—he interprets

[1] *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, vol. ii., p. 156.
[2] Op. cit., p. 193.

Genesis xlix. 10, 11 of Jesus. Among other things he says :

Τὸ δὲ εἰρημένον αἷμα τῆς σταφυλῆς σημαντικὸν τοῦ ἔχειν μὲν αἷμα τὸν φανησόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπείου σπέρματος, ἀλλ' ἐκ θείας δυνάμεως . . . Ὃν τρόπον γὰρ τὸ τῆς ἀμπέλου αἷμα οὐκ ἄνθρωπος πεποίηκεν, ἀλλ' ὁ Θεός, οὕτως καὶ τοῦτο ἐμηνύετο οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπείου σπέρματος γενήσεσθαι τὸ αἷμα, ἀλλ' ἐκ δυνάμεως Θεοῦ, ὡς προέφημεν.

This persistent use of the expression ἐξ ἀνθρωπείου σπέρματος clearly implies that Justin is quoting. And we have seen that *viri semen* is of frequent occurrence in Tertullian. It is difficult to resist the inference that the source is to be found in the ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρός of Sap. Sol. vii. 2.

Irenaeus, also, *Contra Haer.* III. xvi. 2, has : "non (enim) ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex voluntate Dei, verbum caro factum est."

Again in III. xix. 2 he writes : "Propter hoc *Generationem eius quis enarrabit* ? quoniam *homo est, et quis agnoscet eum* ? Cognoscit autem illum is, cui Pater qui est in coelis revelavit, ut intelligat, quoniam is qui *non ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri natus est* filius hominis, hic est Christus filius Dei vivi."

It will be noticed that both here and in Justin, *Dial.* 63, the "Western" text of John i. 13 comes in close connexion with the quotation from Isaiah liii. 8.

In V. i. 3 Irenaeus says : "Et propter hoc in fine non ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri sed ex placito Patris manus eius vivum perfecerunt hominem, uti fiat Adam secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei."

The testimony of Ambrose is not very explicit. Twice (*de Noe*, c. 4 ; and *de Spir.*, ii. 7) he quotes the text in the plural, but once, commenting on Psalm xxxvi., he gives it in the singular, applying it, however, not to Christ but to the believer.[1] The significance of the fact that he *does*

[1] The references to Ambrose, Augustine and Sulpicius are taken from Box, *The Virgin Birth of Jesus*, p. 230.

quote the text both in the singular and in the plural will be touched upon later.

Augustine also twice quotes the text in the plural, but once, in his *Confessions* (vii. 9), he applies it to Christ. He is speaking of the works of the Platonists, in which he has found the equivalent of certain parts of the Prologue, and of verse 13, remarks : " Item legi ibi quia Verbum, Deus, *non ex carne, non ex sanguine, neque ex voluntate viri, neque ex voluntate carnis, sed ex Deo natus est.*"

In Sulpicius Severus (Hist. ii.) we read of Christ : " Is enim non conditione humana editus, siquidem *non ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo natus est*, mundum istum . . . in nihilum rediget."

We are faced, then, with this situation : on the one hand we have all the MSS, and versions unanimous—or practically unanimous—for the plural reading, whereas Tertullian, on the other hand, is emphatic that the singular is the correct and original text. And he is not alone : the text which he champions has, as we have seen, some patristic support. But for this one might be tempted to think that the great African was mistaken and through some confusion had come to regard ὃς . . . ἐγεννήθη as the true text. The testimony of Justin shews that the singular reading goes far back, and we have seen that the form of the text implied in his words is not far removed from the text that is suggested by Sap. Sol. vii. 2. What is the solution of this problem ? Can we reject the evidence of all the MSS. and versions and accept the " Western " reading as the original text ? Scarcely. They are abundantly justified who refuse to flout the practically unanimous testimony of the authorities. Orr, for example, remarks that he does " not think of accepting as correct " the " Western " reading.[1] The suggestion I have to make is that those Fathers who read

[1] *The Virgin Birth of Christ*, p. 111.

the text in the singular are quoting from, or are influenced by reminiscence of, the Logos-hymn in the form which it had before its adoption by the Evangelist as the Prologue to his Gospel. The change from the singular to the plural was made by the Evangelist himself. Of course this hypothesis assumes that the Sophia-hymn had become a Logos-hymn before it was taken over by the Fourth Evangelist. Was it included as a Logos-hymn in the Testimony Book ? We have seen that more than once the singular form of the text we are considering comes in close association with Isaiah liii. 8. Some support is given to the theory that the Evangelist was himself responsible for the change by the fact that the Patristic testimony to the " Western " reading is for the most part early. What evidence there is after Tertullian is extremely fragmentary. This is just what we should have expected if our hypothesis is correct. The earlier and superseded form of the Logos-song would before long be forgotten, the form which it assumed in the hand of the Evangelist relegating it to obscurity and oblivion. And is not the fact that Ambrose and Augustine quote the text both in the singular and in the plural some indication that two authoritative forms had existed ?

But are there any grounds for the assumption that the change from the singular to the plural was effected by the Evangelist ? The assumption is by no means unwarranted, for the words, in the first instance applied to Wisdom, would when applied to Jesus naturally be interpreted of His supernatural birth, and the probability is strongly in favour of the view that the Fourth Evangelist does not endorse the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. Much has been said on this subject and we need not do more than glance at it. Let us leave the Prologue out of account and look at the evidence of the Gospel itself. If that evidence makes it unlikely that the writer accepted the doctrine, then it goes

far to justify the suggestion that, having found in the already transmuted Sophia-song words which would naturally be construed of the supernatural birth of Jesus, he changed them and used them to describe the spiritual birth of those who found life through Him.

It is impossible to think that the Fourth Evangelist was unacquainted with the view that Jesus was supernaturally born of a Virgin Mother. He was familiar with the Synoptic tradition, and even if he did not know the early chapters of Matthew and Luke as we have them it is not likely that he was ignorant of the view of the birth which they enshrine. The accounts of the birth in the First and Third Gospels seem to be independent of one another, which shows that the story of the Miraculous Birth was current in Christian circles some time before these Gospels were compiled. We may safely assume that the Fourth Evangelist was no stranger to it. He makes no direct reference to it in his Gospel, a fact which has been construed by some to mean antagonism, and by others has been taken to imply acquiescence.

A notable attempt was made by Archdeacon Allen in the *Interpreter* for October 1905 to prove that the writer of the Fourth Gospel must have regarded supernatural birth from a virgin as the way by which the pre-existent Logos became flesh. He argues that the Evangelist must have been acquainted with the tradition of the Virgin Birth, and with that contention (as has been said) we need have no quarrel. But when he proceeds to argue by a process of elimination that he must have *accepted* the tradition he is on far less secure ground. He makes mention of four conceptions current in the ancient world of the way in which a divine being could appear among men, and adds : " I do not at all suppose that the four conceptions given above exhaust the possibilities of religious speculation, but so far as I know they cover all such conceptions known to us from antiquity.

Which of them harmonises best with the general tenor of the Gospel? I cannot but think that this place should be assigned to the fourth, the method, that is, of birth from a Virgin Mother." This is precarious reasoning. The Evangelist may not have found satisfaction in any one of the four conceptions, and may have preferred to remain an agnostic on the way in which the Logos became flesh. Dr. Percy Gardner is strongly inclined to accept as the view of the Evangelist one of the very conceptions which Allen regards as harmonising less with the general tenor of the Gospel than does the method of supernatural birth, for, speaking of the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus on the occasion of His meeting with the Baptist, he remarks that "it is simple and natural to suppose that for the Evangelist this descent of the Spirit and its abiding on Jesus was the occasion on which the Divine Logos was united to the human Jesus, and thereafter took the place of His natural soul." [1] Clearly there is no justification for the view that belief in the Incarnation and belief in the Miraculous Birth of necessity go together. This unwarranted assumption is made by L. M. Sweet in a reference to the Fourth Gospel in his *Birth and Infancy of Jesus Christ*, for Box [2] quotes him as saying that when the last of the Gospels was written "the miraculous birth was simply an item in a larger controversy. . . . No one denied the miraculous birth except as an item in a larger denial. The controversy in which John was absorbed concerned the reality of the Incarnation. There was no controversy as to the Virgin Birth considered in itself. No one who accepted the Incarnation denied or thought of denying the miraculous birth. All who accepted the Incarnation accepted, as a matter of course, the miraculous birth. When, therefore, John wrote the sentence,

[1] *The Ephesian Gospel*, p. 286.
[2] *The Virgin Birth of Jesus*, p. 148.

The Word became flesh, he gave in his allegiance to that entire systematic interpretation of Christ with which, in the mind of the early Church, the miraculous birth was essentially bound up." Generalities such as these are very precarious. There is much to give us pause before we assume that our Evangelist would necessarily accept the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. Among students of his Gospel the view seems to be gaining ground that the doctrine does not accord with his Logos conception. E. F. Scott suggests that he avoided the tradition because it might seem to imply a passivity in the Logos: "It was by His own free act that the Son of God entered the world as man. The evangelist shrank from any theory of His origin that might impair the central idea of full activity from the beginning of His work to the end." [1] And it is not alone the free and full activity of the Logos that may seem to be imperilled by the doctrine of the Miraculous Birth. To the Evangelist even His very Pre-existence may have been endangered. "It might appear," to quote Scott again, "as if He came into being as Son of God at a given moment of time by an act of the divine will; and thus the hypothesis of a miraculous birth, so far from supporting, might be so construed as to deny the doctrine of His essential divinity." [2] These views have received the endorsement of J. M. Thompson. Speaking of the Fourth Evangelist's doctrine of the Incarnation he says: "Two essential elements in that doctrine—the divine pre-existence of the Logos, and His voluntary entrance into the world—would have been damaged by any attempt to combine them with the Virgin Birth. The divinity of Christ does not depend, in St. John's thought, upon any supernatural event in time, whether at birth, or at baptism, or at resurrection." [3] Gardner also holds that the Virgin

[1] *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 187. [2] Op. cit., p. 188.
[3] *Miracles in the New Testament*, p. 156.

Birth and the coming of the Word in flesh "might well be regarded as alternatives." He does not think there is any notion of Pre-existence in Matthew and Luke, and, following M. Réville, he maintains that "there is an incongruity between the idea of a divine son born by a special interposition of God at a particular place and time, and the idea of an ever-existing Word, revealed to sense and time." [1]

Such considerations as these make it easy to believe that the Evangelist was content not to speculate on the way in which the Logos became flesh. Enough for him that He had become flesh. He was too much under the spell of the fact to be concerned about the *modus operandi*. Indeed it appears to me that there are places in the Gospel where it would have been impossible for the writer to refrain from making some reference to the Miraculous Birth if it had been included in his system of thought. One of these is vi. 41 ff., where we read: "The Jews therefore murmured concerning him, because he said, I am the bread which came down out of heaven. And they said, Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how doth he now say, I am come down out of heaven?" It would be a very superficial observation to say that the occurrence of the former of these two questions without any comment cannot be taken as indicating that the Evangelist regarded Joseph as the actual father of Jesus on the ground that an analogous question occurs in the First and Third Gospels (Matt. xiii. 55 = Luke iv. 22), both of which elsewhere show that their authors or compilers accepted the tradition of the Virgin Birth. We must go deeper than that; the cases are not parallel. Thompson is right in laying emphasis upon this passage.[2] Scott hesitates to draw the conclusion legitimately suggested by it, remarking that it would be

[1] *The Ephesian Gospel*, p. 285.
[2] *Miracles in the New Testament*, pp. 156, 7.

rash to argue "from words assigned to the unbelieving Jews."[1] But the questions asked by the Jews in the Fourth Gospel are the questions which were being addressed to the Christians at Ephesus by their Jewish antagonists at the time when the Gospel was written. What is the real significance of the double question of vi. 42 ? It means that the Jews of Asia Minor refused to accept the Pre-existence and Incarnation because they knew that Jesus was the son of Joseph and Mary. Surely if the doctrine of the Virgin Birth had been an integral part of the Evangelist's creed it would have been introduced into our Lord's reply to the Jews in verses 43 ff. There is, however, no trace of it to be found.

In view of all this we may without hesitancy conclude that if the Evangelist found in the Sophia-hymn, already transformed into a Logos-hymn, the reading ὃς . . . ἐγεννήθη he would not allow it to remain when he adopted the song as the Prologue of his Gospel. Perhaps we may detect his handiwork also in the change from ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρός to the more refined ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός.

This theory that the Evangelist made the change from the singular into the plural provides an explanation of the somewhat peculiar features of the sentence which have often been remarked. Of course the explanation is of the same nature as that offered by those who hold that the Evangelist himself wrote ὃς . . . ἐγεννήθη, which was subsequently changed into the plural. But this latter view, as we have seen, labours under the great disadvantage of having to admit that with the exception of one solitary Latin MS. all the MSS. and Versions have gone astray. The view that the change was effected by the Evangelist himself is free from this disadvantage, and explains the peculiar features of the clause equally well—some indeed in a decidedly more satisfactory manner.

[1] *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 187.

(*a*) Reference is frequently made to the awkwardness of the relative οἵ. For some it is the gender that constitutes the difficulty. But we are not bound to take τέκνα as its antecedent: verse 13 does not describe the kind of children the believers become, but rather describes the birth in virtue of which they become τέκνα Θεοῦ. The antecedent is not any particular word in verse 12; the relative clause refers to the persons of whom verse 12 as a whole speaks. And even if τέκνα had to be taken as the antecedent, the οἵ could easily be explained as an example of *constructio ad sensum* (so Meyer).

There is greater force, perhaps, in the contention of those who maintain that we should have expected the relative to be οἵτινες and not οἵ.

But whatever cogence there may be in these contentions, the simple relative would be natural in the Logos-song (in which ὅς would be substituted for the ἥ of the Sophia-song), and the mere fact that the Evangelist found the simple masculine relative in the existing song goes far to explain why we have οἵ and not some other form of the relative in the Prologue of the Gospel. It is of interest to note that D in the Greek (the Latin is wanting) as well as the Old Latin MS. *a* omits the relative. To some of the scribes at any rate it was awkward.

(*b*) Then there is the use of ἀνδρός. It is possible to argue that its use does not harmonise with the ordinary plural reading of the text. "The phraseology of the clause," says Allen in the article to which reference has already been made, "rather favours the singular, for οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός should be translated 'not of the will of a man,' i.e. 'of a husband.' Had the writer meant to say of human will, he would have written θελήματος ἀνθρώπου (cf. 2 Pet. i. 21). The former suits the case of Christ, who was born of Mary by Divine Conception, but does not so

well accord with the ' children of God ' born, not of the will of man, or woman, but of God." I am not sure that there is much in this argument. Whoever was responsible for the text in its present form did not find the use of *ἀνδρός* sufficiently out of accord with the reference of the clause to the children of God to cause him to substitute another word. The phrase *οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός* is a natural one to employ in order to state that the birth described is not due to the agency of a human father, and could as naturally be used in reference to the spiritual birth of the children of God, contrasting it with ordinary human birth, as of the Miraculous Birth of the Only-begotten Son. Still, what force there is in Allen's contention only confirms the view of the origin and history of the clause which is maintained in this article, while the use of *ἀνδρός* assuredly points to Sap. Sol. vii. 2 as the ultimate source.

(*c*) It is frequently asserted that the *tense* of *ἐγεννήθησαν* is unsuitable if the reference be to the spiritual birth of the children of God. I cannot but feel that too much is made of this point again. Godet, Zahn, Box and others call attention to the difficulty of the aorist. Allen is guarded in his statement: "It may be added," he says, "that the aorist in verse 13 is perhaps more in accordance with Johannine usage if applied to the one Son than if used of the many children." We are reminded that in 1 John the perfect is employed eight times of the believer, never of Christ; also that the aorist participle is used once of Christ (1 John v. 18), but never of the Christian. Much is made of this verse from the First Epistle in which *ὁ γεγεννημένος*, of the believer, and *ὁ γεννηθείς*, of Christ, are found side by side. But it is futile to attempt to discover an invariable Johannine rule: in John xviii. 37, for example, the perfect is used of Christ. Even if i. 13 had in the first instance been written in the plural of believers the use of the aorist would

have been by no means improbable. We must consider the tense in the light of the context. Verse 11 (which I think was originally preceded by verse 14) uses the aorist to describe the actual coming of the Logos to the Jewish people. The aorists ἔλαβον and ἔδωκεν in verse 12 are in some measure gnomic in character. They describe what actually happened, and if it happened once it may happen again. Now verse 13 as it stands is a relative clause describing the spiritual birth which took place when the great gift of verse 12 was bestowed and received, and I fail to see that the use of the aorist is in any way awkward. Still, it may be said here, as was said above in the case of ἀνδρός, that if there is any awkwardness, it only adds to the force of my contention. The aorist would have been naturally used of the birth of Wisdom in the Sophia-song, and would have been equally suitable when the song was applied to the Logos, and we can easily believe that when the Evangelist changed the number from the singular to the plural he may well have been content to effect the transformation without interfering with the tense of the verb.

(*d*) Attention is often drawn to the apparently unnecessary elaborateness of the negative side of the account of the birth. Box remarks that "we may also argue that such a sentence as is given in the Received Text would be otiose, for no one, either Jew or Christian, would need to be told that the spiritual relation between God and His children was not an affair of fleshly generation." [1] Tertullian, as we saw in one of the quotations given above, goes beyond this, and in a way that seems to us naïf argues that the words cannot apply to believers inasmuch as even the children of God must be physically born. One wonders whether he really thought that the words would be taken by any one to mean that they who received the Logos were exempt

[1] Op. cit., p. 231.

from physical birth! There is, however, some force in the contention that the clause is unduly elaborate. Zahn explains the fulness of the description on the ground that the Evangelist here describes the spiritual birth of the believer in a way that would inevitably remind the reader of the Miraculous Birth of Jesus: the origin of the children is portrayed after the pattern of the birth of the Only-begotten. This, to say the least, is very far-fetched, and if what has been said above as to the attitude of the Evangelist to the Miraculous Birth is right, the suggestion has no value. But the elaborateness has a simple and natural explanation if the clause was in the first instance suggested by the elaborate description of the birth of Solomon the Wise in the seventh chapter of the Wisdom of Solomon. Far-fetched, however, as Zahn's suggestion seems to be, we are reminded by the fact that the Evangelist is able to use of the birth of the believer words which had previously been employed to describe the Miraculous Birth of Jesus that our spiritual birth has some affinity with the birth of the Only-begotten Son of God.

J. Hugh Michael.

THE ASCENSION OF CHRIST.

An Oxford graduate, a friend of the present writer, once discussing with him our Lord's survival of death, summed up the subject by saying, "I can believe that in some way the risen Jesus communicated to His disciples assurances of His continued existence and of His enhanced power, but that the disciples saw, and conversed with a resuscitated body, and, finally, that that body floated up into the sky, and was lost to view amongst the clouds—this is grotesque." Such is, probably, the feeling of large numbers of thoughtful Christian people to-day, especially as regards the Ascension. To many, indeed, the story of the Ascension is just the final stage of a materialistic element present in the entire series of Resurrection-narratives, an element which, by at last becoming absurd, endangers the whole Easter message.

It is the aim of this paper to examine the story afresh, with a view to ascertaining its credibility for men in whose minds a spiritual æsthetic must certainly be one of the criteria of Truth. Our purpose will involve both an examination of evidence and an interpretation of whatever *data* result from this examination. To a certain extent both methods must proceed together, for the question as to whether the Ascension story is grotesque will be found to depend, not merely upon the amount of satisfactory evidence adduced, but upon the insight with which, at every step, we investigate this evidence. Naturally, however, if in the course of our discussion conviction of the pro-

bability of the story should result, interpretation will have the final voice.

I. *The Historical Material.*

Although the New Testament contains in almost every one of its apostolic types [1] some reference to the Ascension, it is in the Lukan writings alone we have any description of the event. And it is notably in the narrative of *The Acts* that the supposed grotesqueness lies.

We cannot think that for Luke himself there was any absurdity in the scene he tried to describe; and, as it is a well-established rule of criticism to ascertain the intention of the writer we are studying, it will be an advantage in this matter if we try to look at it with Luke's eyes.

A tradition that Luke was a painter has been traced back to the sixth century, and may have originated in nothing more secure than an enthusiastic appreciation of his literary style. There is, however, considerable support for the tradition in what we know about the medical profession to which he belonged. We assume, of course, that the work done upon the Third Gospel and *The Acts* by Dr. Hobart, Dr. Plummer, Professor Ramsay, Professor Harnack and others has established the claim that both these writings were written by that Luke described by Paul as "the beloved physician." [2] Dr. Hobart, especially, writing in 1882, proved so clearly (though it may be with some overstress) the medical colouring running through these two books, that it becomes an interesting problem to enquire how far medical training and practice reacted upon the author's qualities of heart and mind. Broadly speaking, the medical profession then was far less critical towards

[1] Mk. xvi. 19; John vi. 62, xx. 17; Acts i., ii. 33, v. 31; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Heb. iv. 14; 1 Peter iii. 22, etc.

[2] Col. iv. 14.

supernaturalism than it is to-day, though through the actual observations of pathology, it was trained to a more accurate judgment of phenomena than that of the contemporary lay mind. It is not, however, as an eyewitness that Luke comes before us here, but rather as a man with a distinct conception of life, and in this aspect of the matter his calling had a real influence upon his judgment.

There was a side of Greek medical training which resulted in a valuable Humanism. Walter Pater's *Marius the Epicurean* gives us a glimpse of this in a delightful chapter (vol. i. I. 3), describing what might be called a "rest-cure" at a pagan temple, where the patient is brought back to health largely by mental treatment. From modern research it would seem that the picture here drawn is fully justified. Thus there existed on the island of Cos a great medical temple-school, of which an account was given in 1913 by Professor Richard Caton, at the 17th International Congress of Medicine.[1] Here, according to Dr. Caton, in spacious sleeping-rooms, baths, libraries, theatre, with shrines and altars of the Health Deities casting a Divine sanction over all, the whole life of the patient was considered. Architecture, sculpture, painting, music and worship had their several parts to play in the healing of sickness, just as truly as had drugs and diet and fresh air. The priest-doctors were men of large education, and they ministered to their patients by their culture as well as by their medical skill. All the great influence of the Hippocratic tradition constrained them also to offer their services to suffering mankind with courtesy and with real desire for the welfare of their patients.

Whether Luke had ever visited the island of Cos or not we shall perhaps never know (although every reader of *Acts* recognises the author's feeling for the sea), but he can

[1] *Congress Report*, § xxiii.

hardly have missed the influence of the Coan School, and it is certain he reveals in himself a kinship of spirit with it. The spiritual value of such a temper is great. Humanism can never be a hard thing. It tends to charity of judgment,[1] and to that "feeling sense of all conditions" which John Woolman praised and, through another discipline, attained. It finds its seed-plot in men of sensibility and, perhaps most of all, in those who, without weakening their own manhood, have something of the woman's heart. We feel the presence of this quality in the Third Gospel and *The Acts*. Both Scriptures are marked by frequent tears and rejoicings.[2] Both give a large place to women. Both, when we yield ourselves without questioning to their sway, introduce a new tenderness into our thoughts about our fellow-men.

It is consonant with this temperament, too, that Luke, though himself not a Jew, displays an enthusiastic regard for the ancient things of the Hebrew people. It has been remarked [3] that his attitude to the Law is more sympathetic than that of Paul. The sudden plunge into Hebraisms, after the classical opening of his Gospel, points not so much to his dependence upon documents, for he often alters *Mark*, as to the fascination over him of the old times. He is drawn by the glory of the past which he idealises, and of which he writes with deliberate antiqueness of style.

Such a temperament, working upon the great Christian tradition, will determine the value of evidence, not after the manner of a modern Western law-court, but by a sense of the probabilities of Grace. It may be trusted neither to invent nor to miscalculate evidence, but at the

[1] It has often been remarked that "Luke ever spares the Twelve."

[2] Luke i. 14, x. 17, x. 21, xix. 41, vii. 38, etc.; Acts ix. 39, xx. 19, 23, xx. 31, 37, 38 xxi., 13, etc.

[3] Harnack's *The Acts*, p. 289.

same time it will certainly claim ability to *recognise* as by an intuition the truth of things. It will aim at presenting pictures of actual events in which chronology will necessarily have some place, though an unobtrusive place, much as anatomy has a place in the artist's presentation of the human figure : Time will be subordinate to the suggestion of Idea. The perception of this method at work in Luke's first account of the Ascension, to which we now turn, will help us to dispose of one difficulty in our subject.

In considering the Gospel narrative a question at once arises as to the text. Our English version reads at xxiv 51: "And it came to pass while He blessed them He parted from them, and was carried up into Heaven." The last clause has good MS. authority, but is omitted from some documents, and accordingly is regarded as doubtful by many modern scholars.[1] On the other hand, Professor Schmiedel [2] thinks that the words were probably struck out of the first text in order to harmonise the narrative with Acts i. ; and it cannot be denied that some divines have shown a tendency to prejudge the question on this ground, while others, like Professor Harnack, from opposite motives, reach the same decision. In the absence of general agreement amongst textual critics there is no real occasion for the excision of the clause, but, even if we delete it, the general effect of the paragraph remains the same. For what is described in the unquestioned words, "While He blessed them He parted from them," is clearly a final parting. Luke had already foreshadowed this in ix. 51, when he wrote, "The time was approaching that He should be received up." And, here we observe he uses a word ἀνάλημψις which had become virtually a technical term for the assumption of holy men. The great joy, too, with which

[1] Tischendorff and Weiss omit, WH regard as very doubtful.
[2] *Encyclo. Bib.* iv. 4039 ff.

the Eleven are said to have returned to Jerusalem after the parting would be incomprehensible, if they had not witnessed something of further moment than another vanishing of Jesus out of their sight. Finally, we have the express statement in Acts i. 2 that the former treatise had been intended to describe the events of the Lord's life "until the day in which He was received up." Luke himself, therefore, as Dr. Plummer [1] has pointed out, considered that he had already recorded the Ascension in his earlier book.

This brings us to a serious difficulty. A reader who had only the Third Gospel before him, if he were a man with some sense of order, would certainly regard the Ascension as having formed the climax to the stirring events of the first Easter Day. He would picture the Ascension as following immediately upon that scene in the upper room to which the two disciples from Emmaus returned, when the Risen Lord "opened the mind" of the little company "that they might understand the Scriptures." [2] If our reader were also a man of some reasonable imagination he would recognise that such a work might well have occupied most of the hours of that night, just as we read later that Paul at Troas talked with his disciples one Sunday evening through the night until break of day.[3] If the teaching given by the Risen Lord was of similar extent—and it is described in very big terms—then our supposed reader, with only this narrative before him, would venture, perhaps, to picture the little group of learners passing out through the empty streets, before dawn had actually arrived, and thence moving up to Olivet, under the constraint of a heavenly vision beckoning them on; and he would think of the final parting as coming amid the morning mists, the form of the Saviour lifted up and slowly receding upon a

[1] "Intern. Crit. Com.," *St. Luke in loc.*
[2] Luke xxiv. 45. [3] Acts xx. 7–11.

slanting path, wreathed in the yielding vapour—a gleam of feet whiter than mist and hands outstretched in blessing, the sight of a visage once marred more than any man's, now majestic with the light of another world, a vision creating haunting glories in the mind, as when in the play Shakespeare's Leontes, seeing once more the eyes of his queen deemed long dead, exclaims with passion,

"Stars, stars,
And all eyes else dead coals." [1]

Then as the sun leaps up from beyond the wall of Moab the clouds lift from the hills, the mist which half-veiled the Lord's rising form is rent into thin air, and He has passed. In vain may human eyes search the quickly clearing sky, but in the heart there is enshrined an image that can never perish, the source of that great note of joy wherewith the Gospel ends. In some such way we think the story in the Gospel might be read.

But in that case what are we to make of the forty days referred to in Acts i. ? Professor Blass [2] thinks that for both his accounts of the Ascension Luke had written authorities, and that he had no scruples about adopting both. There are certainly traces in early Christian literature of an Ascension in close sequence to the Resurrection, although it must be admitted these traces may be derived from Luke's Gospel. The Marcan Appendix (xvi. 19) places the Ascension in direct continuity with the appearance to the Eleven on the evening of the first day. If Mr. Strachan of Cambridge [3] is right in his theory of the fusion of two different writings in the Fourth Gospel, the words spoken to Mary in the Garden, "I ascend unto my Father and your Father," imply an immediate Ascension—

[1] *Winter's Tale*, v. 1.
[2] *Philology of the Gospels*, p. 141.
[3] *Is the Fourth Gospel a Literary Unity ?* *Expos. Times*, xxvii. 331–2.

and it must be owned that, in any case, the present tense here used can hardly be strained to cover an event to take place nearly six weeks later. In the *Gospel of Peter* (v. 56) the angel at the tomb announces that Jesus is risen and gone forth to the place whence he was sent. In the *Epistle of Barnabas*, written according to varying verdicts any time between A.D. 70 and 138, we read, "Wherefore also we keep the eighth day for rejoicing, in the which also Jesus rose from the dead, and having been manifested ascended into the heavens." [1] The view of this passage taken by some writers [2] that we have here no more than a clumsy way of identifying the first day of the week with both the events referred to, is hardly adequate. There are only seven days in a week, and "the eighth day," therefore cannot fall within the weekly category at all. Observe the context. The writer is endeavouring to show how Old Testament passages and ritual observances have received in Christ their true meaning. He comes to the Sabbath and traces it back to the story of creation. He shows that the Sabbath rest, which was founded upon God's Sabbath after the six days of creation, can only be kept by the hallowed heart, and that this calls for a new order of life in man. That order—"the beginning of another world," the writer calls it—is ushered in by the glorified Christ. Thus we are given a clear scheme of Divine days—the six days of creation, the seventh day on which God rested, the eighth day when Christ rose from the dead and ascended into the heavens. And that eighth day, says the writer, we keep for rejoicing. It seems clear that he regarded the Resurrection and the Ascension as falling upon the same date.

[1] διὸ καὶ ἄγομεν τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ὀγδοήν εἰς εὐφροσύνην ἐν ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς οὐρανούς (xv. 9).

[2] E.g., Plummer's *St. Luke*, p. 564.

It is probable that between the writing of the *Gospel* and the writing of *The Acts*, Luke gathered some fuller testimony concerning the event he had so briefly but so beautifully described, and that in fashioning a suitable proem for his second treatise he gladly inserted the results of his fuller enquiries. He would feel no need to apologise to his distinguished reader for what to us is a somewhat glaring discrepancy. His mind was artistic rather than logical, and here, perhaps, we may see the influence of the Coan medical culture upon literary work. Further, if according to the tradition we have already noticed, Luke actually practised the painter's art, he may often have set side by side in his own mind, and then upon the same canvas, scenes actually separated by considerable distances in time and space, just as later Michael Angelo combined in one picture both the Temptation and the Expulsion of Adam and Eve, and as in Raphael's masterpiece, the Transfiguration, the artist has set one immediately above the other both the glory on the mountain height and the agony of the epileptic in the valley. The motive of such pictures operates in just the didactic way in which Luke commonly wrote.[1] It is Art, not for Art's sake, but for the sake of Religion and the considerations of time and space are quite subsidiary. In the absence of full knowledge of the actual course of events when he wrote his first treatise, Luke may have even been content to leave things in somewhat unfinished outline, because in the exposition of a theme which breaks into the Infinite it is not outline that avails so much as colour, and when all is said the hue of the last paragraph in the *Gospel* is a rich gold.

We have now to consider the story of the Ascension given us in *The Acts*. We note that it agrees with Luke

[1] Cf. the change of construction in Acts xiv. 22.

xxiv. in the charge given to the Eleven, in the promise of a heavenly gift of power and in the event of the physical rising. We may notice also that the type of thought revealed in the saying, "It is not for you to know times or seasons," bears the hall-mark of the governing mind of the New Testament, the same mind that met the inquiry, "Lord, are they few that be saved?" with the swift rejoinder, "Strive to enter in by the narrow door." [1] We observe, further, that the form the story here takes in no way conflicts with the picture of a daybreak scene, as suggested by the passage in the *Gospel*.[2]

There is one difficulty in *Acts* which does not meet us in the *Gospel*, namely the appearance of the two men in white.[3] It would be good to know who these were supposed to be. We may dismiss as altogether improbable the suggestion of the Rev. Henry Latham [4] that Luke thought of unrecognised followers of the Lord belonging to the locality, possibly members of some sect like the Essenes who adopted white attire. On the other hand, angels were commonly spoken of as men. In the story of Cornelius he who is described in one verse as "a holy angel" is referred to a few verses further on as "a man in bright apparel." [5] It is possible, however, that this narrative of the Ascension, in some respects resembling as it does the narrative of the Transfiguration, intends to suggest the presence of Moses and Elijah. In any case one cannot resist the feeling that messengers from the unseen world are meant. And that being so, their message has an authority which could not attach to Dr. Latham's Essene sympathisers. Our

[1] Cf. also John xxi. 21–22, etc.

[2] I believe Dr. Latham in *The Risen Master* was the first to propose the hour of Dawn as the probable time of the manifestation.

[3] Acts i. 10–11.

[4] *The Risen Master*, pp. 402 ff.

[5] Acts x. 22, 30.

difficulty then is that Luke has put into the lips of these supernatural persons language which History does not seem likely to ratify. For when it is said, "This Jesus which was received up from you into Heaven shall so come in like manner as ye beheld Him going into Heaven," [1] the idea conveyed is that this was a word of comfort, and as such it was only relevant if those who saw the Lord go should also see Him return. And this thing never happened. The saying of the visitors may express the mind of the early Church, but it does not accord with the apostolic consciousness of earthly events. Perhaps what is really at fault, however, is our unimaginative way of reading the story, as in the case of the writer's Oxford friend who found the whole thing grotesque.

The question is, "How do we construe the heavenly message? It may be granted that in those rapt moments, when earth and heaven seemed so interfused, some assurance of the Christ-consummation of the age was given the Eleven. But it must be remembered that no report of a message from across the border can escape subjective entanglements. Man never has that perfect knowledge of which Plotinus says that in it the perceiver attains to be the thing itself which is perceived.[2] The dress of any new idea is a dress the percipient himself provides. This must especially be the case in all supernatural experience. It must have been so, not only on the Ascension mount, but in all the aspects and utterances of the Risen Saviour. In the instance before us the stimulated subjectivity of the Eleven is evident in the very salutation of the heavenly messengers. "Ye men of Galilee"—so the words run, and we read in them the wonder and gratitude and joy of the Eleven that they, despised provincials as they were, should receive so august a revelation from Heaven. In this tumult of feeling the

[1] Acts i. 11.

[2] *On the Good or the One*, § vii.

promise of the final victory of Christ would naturally be interpreted in the terms of the scene they had witnessed—the ascending Lord and the hands outstretched in blessing. As He went so He would return. It was natural for them to think so, but the thing really declared to them must have been the final triumph itself rather than the mode of its manifestation. And in the hour of the overthrow of Judaism, with its tremendous consequences for the world, the Jew, and the Church, the promise given to the Eleven for their own consolation in the loss of their Lord's manifested presence received its true fulfilment.

We have thus considered both accounts of the Ascension and may give a provisional verdict in favour of their historical value. A further question, however, arises, which must be frankly faced. Could an Ascension-legend naturally have arisen out of non-Christian materials ?

In approaching this question we observe, first of all, a considerable measure of agreement between Christian thought and the mind of antiquity. It is not wonderful that men generally, knowing nothing of science as we understand it, should have pictured heaven as a region above the earth, or that pious speculation should have mapped out the skies in a series of habitable worlds. As a fact the New Testament writers assumed the same seven heavens as non-Christian writers. Further, for those who believed in a motionless earth, spanned over by heaven upon heaven, it was natural to dream that men of conspicuous greatness, or holiness, should be translated to one of these higher realms. So in the Old Testament we have the Ascension of Elijah, and, outside Scripture, we have the two Ascensions of Enoch, the first from which he returns to instruct his sons, the second his final departure through darkness (*II. Enoch*), on the chariots of the Spirit (*I. Enoch*). Beyond

the Hebrew and Jewish world we have the ascension of Xisuthros, the Babylonian hero of the Deluge, and, more strikingly, the story in Livy of the Ascension of Romulus. This latter bears so vivid a likeness to the final assumption of Enoch that one is tempted to think there must have been some dependence, and in that case we have another instance of that conflation which so often happened in the Græco-Roman world. Observe the closeness of the parallel. While Enoch is talking to the people the Lord sends a cloud of darkness upon the earth, under cover of which Enoch is taken up to the highest heaven. Then the light returns and the people, understanding what has happened, glorify God.[1] So also Romulus is holding an assembly with his people when a sudden storm arises, the king is enveloped in a thick cloud and is never again seen upon earth. After the storm the people offer the ascended hero divine honours.[2] We observe that both *II. Enoch* and *The History of Rome* were written at about the same time, the beginning of our era, and that the former was the work of a Hellenistic Jew living in Egypt, probably at Alexandria, which in that time was a real clearing-house for the thought of the Roman world.[3] No doubt both legends are older than the books in which they have come down to us, but they may yet be connected in the actual forms they have taken. In any case they illustrate the religious atmosphere of the age in which the Christian tradition arose, and we have to reckon with that fact. Beyond question there were many legends of Ascension in the mind of Antiquity, continually swaying and merging,

[1] II. Enoch, 67.

[2] *History of Rome*, i. 16.

[3] Since this was written I have come across the following sentence: "Egypt . . . might almost be called the religious clearing house of the Hellenistic world" (*St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions* : Prof. H. A. A. Kennedy, p. 104).

like those white vapours of the morning upon the hills about Jerusalem, amid which Jesus is said to have disappeared. Out of such an atmosphere, without any wrongful intention on the part of the transmitters, one more story of the same type might easily proceed.

When, however, we study the Christian narratives, we see that what we have in them is something *not* of the same kind. In certain cases, as in *The Testament of Levi*, and *The Ascension of Isaiah*, the Ascension is merely a vision. In Isaiah's Ascension it is expressly said, "his mind was taken up from him. . . . And the people who stood near did not think, but the circle of the prophets did, that the holy Isaiah had been taken up." [1] So also in the so-called *Assumption of Moses*, the body is buried in the mountains. It is not as ἔνσαρκος—to use an early Church word concerning the Risen Lord—the saint ascends to heaven. Moreover, where in other Jewish and in Pagan legends the body is taken up, it is ever said or implied that some angelic or mechanical agency is employed. In *The Testament of Abraham* the patriarch is carried to heaven by Michael. In *The Secrets of Enoch* "the angels took (Enoch) on to their wings and bore him up . . . and placed him on the clouds." [2] Elijah was taken up by a whirlwind, which would appear also to have been the method of the assumption of Romulus. In no case does the hero manifest those supraterrestrial powers which are characteristic of the Christian Resurrection and Ascension narratives. It will become clearer, as we proceed to the second part of this paper, that there are no stories of a Hebrew or a Pagan kind which can account for the *contents* of the Church's belief in the Ascension of her Lord, and it is with these contents that faith is concerned.

[1] *Ascension of Isaiah* vi. 10 ff.; cf. viii. 14.
[2] II. Enoch iii. 1.

So far as the *form* of our belief is concerned, no doubt this presents a difficulty to minds that have long ago abandoned a geocentric view of the universe. But we have to remember that the truth of the Ascension was given first to men to whom that view was unquestionable. And revelation, like all teaching, must establish contact with the minds of men just as they are, oftentimes reserving the fulness of the truth until the recipients are able to carry it. Without unduly anticipating what must presently be said by way of interpretation, we may observe in passing that for these Galilean followers of the Lord the expression of the idea of triumph was necessarily an actual upward movement of His glorified Person.

Now though we differentiate the Ascension of Christ from the Ascension-legends of the age, it is probable that the story about Romulus had a good deal to do with Luke's thinking. There are some traces of the influence of Latin culture in *The Acts*.[1] Moreover the plan of the book clearly works up to the transfer of Paul's activity to Rome, and points to the writer's intention to pourtray the establishment of the Empire of Grace in the very heart of the Empire of Force. The founder of the Kingdom of Rome had ascended from the midst of a military scene, and had revealed himself later to his chief servant, to exhort his followers to make Rome the centre of the world by the might of their arms. The Founder of the Kingdom of God had ascended from amongst a group of peasant-disciples leaving instructions, afterwards confirmed in revelation to *His* chief servant, to establish an empire as broad by a Gospel of Love. It was probably the vivid apprehension of this contrast between Romulus and Jesus, between the

[1] See an interesting paper, *St. Luke and Virgil*, read before the 17th International Congress of Medicine by Miss Stawell, of Cambridge (*Congress Report*, § xxiii.).

Empire of Force and the Empire of Love, both of which at last were centred in Rome, that, more than mere desire to add further details of the event he had already recorded, guided Luke to retell the story of the Ascension as the best preface to his second book.

II. *Interpretation.*

Consideration of the Ascension of our Lord has naturally been merged somewhat in the contemplation of His Session and Heavenly Priesthood. In the late Dr. Milligan's Baird Lectures upon the two themes it is only about one-sixth of the whole book which deals with our subject. In this the lecturer does but follow the practice of the New Testament and of early Church writers. For these the glory of Christ as King eclipsed the special value of His Ascension considered as itself a revelation of God's ends in our human life. So also amongst later writings Professor Swete has observed that "one after another of the early *Acta Martyrum*, after noting the martyr's death by the years of the reigning emperor, ends with the inspiring words *regnante Iesu Christo*." [1] There is one interesting reference to the Ascension as separately considered in that part of *The Ascension of Isaiah* [2] which is of Christian origin, and here the Ascension of Christ to the seventh Heaven is declared to be an article of faith necessary to salvation. But that, generally speaking, the glory of the Ascension was lost in the glory of the Heavenly Reign was probably due to a natural failure to appreciate its distinctive humanistic significance. Not until our own age, with its contribution from physical science, has the Christian Church been in the position to achieve more than an approximate valuation of Ascension-truth. It will be seen in the end

[1] *The Ascended Christ*, p. 31, note.

[2] *Ascension of Isaiah* iii. 18 (probably belonging to the years 64–66 A.D.).

that whatever documentary deficiencies may lie in the evidence for the external fact, there are truths concerning it we may apprehend spiritually, which more than remedy the defect. Indeed the strength of our belief in the historic fact lies chiefly on the broad foundation of the Incarnate Life, and is built up by faith in that love of God which fashioned man after a certain type, and which finds its end only in the final harmony of all the elements of his being.

This brings us to the challenge of those who are willing to believe in our Lord's spiritual survival of death, while rejecting all belief in His risen body.

Professor Kirsopp Lake, Dr. Rashdall and other eminent scholars agree in accepting the immortality of the spirit of Jesus, very much as the present writer's Oxford friend, already quoted, accepted it, while finding no use for the fact of His Resurrection in any more literal sense. With great deference it is here submitted that this is a position which might suit another than the Christian Faith, but which is out of harmony with the genius of the gospel. It would seem to involve a rejection of the Christian belief in the immanence of God. It implies a sacrifice of the legitimate values of sense and matter; indeed it calls for the relegation of these to a lower world abruptly cut off from all vital connexion with any higher. It makes of death not only a gap, but a vacuum. It offers to the human heart no living hope alternative to that of traditional theology. It falls short of Scripture. For us, as Christian men, all thought about Divine and human things is regulated by the fundamental truth, *The Word became flesh.* The Incarnation was the beginning of the transfiguration of the whole life of man, both in his own being and in that order of Nature which is to share in his final splendour. Man is flesh as well as spirit.

Nor does it seem as though the virtual Deism we are combating were in agreement with the trend of modern scientific discovery. The truth which underlay the materialism of Huxley and Tyndall was the interpenetration of spirit and matter. As Bishop Westcott has said, the fact that no thought passes through the mind without an alteration in brain-fabric does not prove that the mind is material but that matter is spiritual.[1] Further, where there exists a scientific disbelief in the future life this is due to a conviction that the body is integral to the man. Now, the Gospel assents to this conviction, and meets the scientist's difficulty by foreshadowing for man a finer body after death one capable of visibility and of invisibility (on the earth plane) according to the dictates of our spiritual part. Those who decline the teaching upon the ground that, apart from the disputed stories of the Resurrectiom and Ascensio n we have no knowledge of such a body, would do well to remember the frequent discovery of previously unsuspected forces at work in our environment, the foreshadowed existence of which might readily have been met by a like incredulity. On the other hand, science is drawing very near to the historic faith of the Church, when a distinguished exponent of nature's powers writes thus, "Though it by no means follows that mind is dependent upon matter as we know it, it will probably be still by means of something akin to matter, something which can act as a vehicle and represent it in the same sort of way that matter represents it now—that it will hereafter be manifested." [2]

From science, again, we learn that "each kind of organism has . . . its own chemical individuality," and that probably individual man is "not only individual to his fingerprints but to his chemical molecules"; [3] so that, as Pro-

[1] *The Gospel of Life*, p. 33.
[2] Sir Oliver Lodge in *Hibbert Journal*, January 1906, p. 320.
[3] *Encycl. of Rel. and Ethics*, viii. p. 2.

fessor J. A. Thomson, whose words we have just quoted, observes, "We come back to what was said of old, 'All flesh is not the same flesh.'"

Now if there is this bodily uniqueness in each of us, how shall we conceive of the bodily life of Jesus? how shall we relate His moral consciousness to His physical frame? No fact is more patent to us than the damaging effect of moral evil upon the structure of the body. Thus the pursuit of certain trains of thought, such as those which are malicious to a fellow human being, will set up a pathological condition in the body. Conversely, a life of goodwill, based upon joyous communion with God, helps our physical vigour. Though one knows that such facts as these are only excerpts from a larger mass of physical phenomena, and so may be capable of other constructions, yet they enable us to feel our way a little in a region we cannot as yet wholly explore. We have no experience of the conscious life of one dwelling in unbroken communion with God. But we can indicate from such experience as we have in our own alternating moods of good and evil something of the consequences to the whole life of a heavenly-mindedness, wherein the intellect is continually flooded with the love of God, and where the will is ever active in the service of man. Under such conditions everything points to the physical life being an index of the spiritual, and corresponding to the holiness of the inner state by some potentialities—if not perhaps powers—to us utterly unknown. Here may be the truth of the great stanza in Spenser's *Hymne in Honour of Beautie:*

> "So every spirit, as it is most pure,
> And hath in it the more of heavenly light,
> So it the fairer bodie doth procure
> To habit in, and it more fairly dight
> With chearefull grace and amiable sight;
> For of the soule the bodie form doth take;
> For soule is forme, and doth the bodie make."

In point of fact nothing is more evident about the ministry of Jesus than His tremendous vitality, physical as well as spiritual. The gospels often constrain us to feel that something of radium-like energy wrought in Him, making both friends and foes, though on such different grounds, afraid at His presence. So death came to Him at the end not as a normal thing. Apart from the violence of man, mastering at length fear of the consequences, it might never have come at all. Bishop Westcott has somewhere suggested this, adding that a measure of the significance of the Transfiguration lies in the possibility of a glorifying of the body of Christ apart from death. St. Paul would readily have assented hereto, seeing that he actually conceives of those believers who should be alive at the Parousia as passing through change, but not through death, to the risen life.[1] What, however, through the wisdom of God was possible in that holy flesh which the Lord was, may not be possible for the most of us with our sin-soaked brain and spoiled nerve-tissue, so that the actual mode of normal human resurrection may be necessarily different from His, though ultimately conforming to the body of His glory.

In any case we can see the fitness for the utilisation of the broken earthly body of Christ in the creation of His heavenly body. It was fitting so, not only because His holy will had daily penetrated and suffused His flesh with its own quality in motions which were veritable

"Bright shoots of everlastingness,"

but also because in Christ a new era of human life was to be begun, and the new beginnings of God are neither revolutions nor contradictions, but sublimations of the past. What this new beginning in the Resurrection and Ascension was has been finely expressed by Bishop Chase.[2] "If,"

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 51 ff.

[2] Lecture on *The Supernatural Element in our Lord's Earthly Life*, p. 16.

he says, "we believe in the Resurrection at all, we believe in it as an event which is on a level with creation itself—a reconciliation of the antithesis of spirit and matter." In this reconciliation all is conserved to man which belongs to his propriety. The post-mortal condition is seen in strict relation with his entire nature as a being of both body and spirit. It is thus partly on grounds of science and reason that we are able to recognise the revelation of the risen Saviour and to accept the significance of the empty tomb.

When we approach the subject from the side of the history of doctrine we discover a singular agreement with our previous decision. To the Hebrew, as to the modern scientist, man was a unity. Jewish theology, it has been said,[1] never seriously admitted a dualism in him. The Hebrew language has not even a proper word for "body." Greek influence through Alexandria tended somewhat to weaken the conception of personal unity; yet in the Jewish thought of our Lord's time there was nothing to correspond with that strangely inconsistent Greek depreciation of the body, from which even Plato did not escape, and which led Epictetus to say, "Man is a soul carrying a corpse."

On the question of the future life the Jews were divided. *The Book of Jubilees*, written by a Pharisee between 135 and 105 B.C., frankly abandons all hope of a Resurrection. So also does *II. Enoch*. On the other hand, *I. Enoch*, in its earlier portion, entertains a somewhat carnal idea of the risen life; each of the righteous is to beget thousands of children. Something nearer to Christian doctrine may be found in the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, but this is late in the first century, and may have been influenced by Christian teaching in the kind of way in which modern Hinduism has been influenced by Christian missions; and even so the

[1] *Encycl. Rel. and Ethics*, art. "Body," ii. p. 772.

teaching in *Baruch* is only a vague conception of the healing and splendour which should fall upon the risen bodies of the just. Thus, while on the one hand the fairly compact thinking of the Hebrew race in the times of its noblest activity is found in singular agreement with the modern view of the unity of our life, on the other hand, there was nothing in the speculation of the time of Christ, so far as is recorded, to lead men to such a belief as came to be enshrined in our creed. Either men were content with the Greek idea of the immortality of the spirit, or they looked for the resumption of the old bodily life with all the functions of the flesh as before.

Now it is here that the Christian revelation, proceeding from the basal thought of the value of the body as an integral part of the man, makes its contribution to the hope of the race. To quote the late Dr. Denney, "Man is not revealed in moral character simply; there is a mode of being which answers to ideal goodness, and the Ascension is our clearest look at it." [1] Or again, in the language of Westcott, "By the Ascension all the parts of life are brought together and shown in the oneness of their common destination." [2]

It will not be needful here to dwell upon the various appearances of the risen Christ, or to attempt any harmonising of the records. Inconsistent in detail as these latter may be, their agreements, not only in the main fact, but in latent spiritual meanings, are abundantly impressive. They would be more instructive than they commonly are, were critics to abandon their frequent and deplorable practice of seeking to equate every ancient document with the documents which preceded it, as though it were never in the power or mind of God to say, "Behold, I will do a new

[1] Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, i. 162*a*.
[2] *The Historic Faith*, p. 81.

thing." The great truth which these artless stories convey, but which those who first related them scarcely measured, is the fact of the risen life as, on the one hand, no ghostly thing, and on the other, no carnally limited thing, but a spiritualisation of earthly elements, the efflorescence of the immanence of God, carrying with it for loving and sorrowing beings assurances of the continuity of our fellowship and of the mobility and efficiency of our immortal life in all the range of personal action. Such a truth, with its implied sanctions for the culture of the present order of our existence, and with its hopes of joyous service and intercourse in that which is to come, appeals to every heart that knows the love of God as being a thing too congruous with all our richest moments of experience to be doubted or withstood. We leap to it as to something which, while beyond our power to have imagined, yet once declared to us, is, if we may so say, characteristic of God.

It is, of course, as participating in the general aspects of the Risen Life that the truth of the Ascension is to be apprehended. The one glory dies into the other, the light of moonset into the majesty of sunrise. The credibility of the Ascension lies largely in this majesty; and one regrets that the unimaginative mind which can see in the narrative only a grotesque thing has been of apiece with the conspicuous failure of Art to produce a single picture helpful for the understanding of the event. It must be confessed, too, that the treatment of the subject by many commentators has been trivial in the extreme. We have greatly lacked an exposition of it couched in terms of moral dignity. Thus the Ascension has often been commended to our acceptance on certain commonplace grounds, such as the need to indicate to the Eleven the close of the appearances of the risen Lord. Doubtless, the event produced this effect. And certainly the entire epoch of manifestation was

governed by that superintending wisdom of God which determines the many parts and fashions of revelation, adapting them to actually existing human needs. But we should dismiss from our minds all ideas of little purposes, and even of self-regardfulness in One truly taken up into the central activity of God. Here was no piece of play-acting, such as Hebrew prophets had sometimes employed, but rather a life-development.[1] In a certain loved garden of the south of England one has watched at summer dusk the opening of the bloom of the evening primrose, as the loosened furls of petal, by pressure from within and by congenial invitation from without, shook themselves free into expanded loveliness—the work of a few moments alone, although prepared for by all the plant's anterior life. With as little theatricality was that moment reached when the full glory of the Son of Man, as type of all our race, wrought out the final separation from earthly conditions, and Manhood stood revealed as accomplished in the Divine. All that truly belonged to our personal life reached its destiny, the end for which, through unnumbered ages the Spirit of God had worked at His chosen design. And, though we exclude that vulgarizing of the event which would present it to us as a something staged, let us be careful to realise that the whole activity of the Lord was involved. We may learn here from the language employed concerning it in Scripture. The usage varies between the two terms "assumption" (ἀνάλημψις, Acts i. 2; i. 11; i. 22; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Mark xvi. 19); and "ascension" (ἀνάβασις, John xx. 17; Eph. iv. 8 ff.), and while the former is the more frequent,

[1] That it was this and yet also an event set forth in the frame of an obsolete geocentric science (as has been already admitted in the 1st part of this paper) involves no inconsistent scheme of ideas, if the supreme life is love, and, being love, stoops to the limitations and to the ranges of development imposed by the varying measures of human receptivity.

as implying more the power of God upon the life He thus took to Himself, the latter carries with it the welcome thought of the co-operation of that life with His power. We cannot afford to drop either term. "Taken up"—so the symbolic phrase runs—the Lord experienced the impact upon His perfected manhood of the Sovereign Will of the Universe. "Ascended"—again the word at its deepest is a figure of speech—He carried with Him all that He had achieved in Time of the wisdom of life.

For us who are to be younger brothers to this "Firstborn from the Dead" and who see the apex of the truth of His Resurrection in the story we have now considered, the Ascension casts a beauty about the world beyond the hues of sunshine, pointing the direction of the noblest Art, and giving impulse to the sciences that concern the physical and moral welfare of men. It teaches us

> "that a twofold world
> Must go to a perfect cosmos. Natural things
> And spiritual,—who separates those two
> In art, in morals, or the social drift,
> Tears up the bond of nature." [1]

It opens to us a vision of the age when the end for which man was made shall be attained, and all things of sense and time lie beneath his feet, when his earthly home shall have been outgrown, and a new earth and a new heaven be needed as his appropriate environment, and when, in entering upon that higher state, he shall not so much leave behind the lower, in which too often now he seems imprisoned, as carry with him the best it is able to contribute to the fulness of his life, just as the plant takes up and transmutes into bloom and fruit substances belonging to the lower mineral kingdom. Thus the Ascension is the revelation of the measure of man's life, of the gathering into himself the very essence

[1] *Aurora Leigh*, vii. 762 ff.

of his sense-conditioned activities. And, finally, it is the pellucid spring of that joy which rises in the heart when our faith and hope are in God, for it shows us that the things which are to come, and which here we can but dimly discern, are yet not foreign to our nature, but infinitely friendly, at once surpassing imagination and yet also of the very spirit to which we already belong.

A. D. Martin.

THE CONCEPTION OF A FINITE GOD.

For some years theology has been more than usually familiar with the notion of a finite or growing Deity. It is a thought which has always hovered round the periphery of Christian speculation, making spasmodic efforts to reach the centre; and for some minds the theistic perplexities of the war have probably invested it with fresh attractiveness. Can God rightly be called infinite or omnipotent when such enormities as the present conflict occur in His universe? Easier by far, surely, to believe that He is still grappling with a task too great for Him, though eventually His increasing power and knowledge will master it. He really is working out a history just like ourselves. He is the supreme Spirit, yet an individual inside the scheme of things, and thus far the scheme of things as a whole has partially frustrated His efforts. But it is faith to hold that time will bring equality between task and power, even if the argument seems to involve the conclusion that at each point the task also will have grown and presumably a certain Divine inadequacy will persist.

We must not allow ourselves to be so prejudiced by the obvious dissimilarity between this and the Biblical concep-

tion of God as to suppose that the advocates of Divine finitude are not handling real problems. In point of fact they are working at the crux of all apologetic. It has never ceased to be a question how a perfect God can rule so imperfect a world. This means, what actually is the case, that the problem is by no means so novel as it is often represented ; it also means that instructed thinkers have, at various times, in the endeavour to reconcile the theoretical difficulties of the case with the demands of religious faith, investigated possible solutions which in principle are fairly identical with some of those now placed before us with exaggerated claims to originality. Still, the past never quite repeats itself. A new theology is not merely the re-thinking of an old problem ; it is the emergence of a new problem.

We have first to elucidate the sense of the equivocal adjective " finite " as applied to God. We shall try to indicate the truth denoted by it and next inquire whether this truth vetoes the ascription to God of the epithet " infinite " in the carefully guarded meaning which trained theologians have sought to impose on the word.

A " finite " God, so far as I can see, is a tolerably misleading way of putting the fact that God, at all events for Christian thought, is not identical with the All of things. He is not the Absolute, if by Absolute we mean the Whole of being or the Universe. Unless the immediate certainties of the religious consciousness are to be bowed out of court, we start with the position that man is not a piece of God, but God and selves co-exist within the sphere of reality. Man, in short, is not part of a Whole in which all finites blend as absorbed elements, and if the Whole is the equivalent of all real existence, then the Whole is not God as Christians employ the term. All epigrams, it has been said, bear their falsehood on their face ; and the reported dictum of an eminent British philosopher to the effect that the word

" mind " should never be used in the plural except by way of metaphor is a good instance in point. If this is a typical example of the greater " concreteness " attained by advanced metaphysics, it will be harder than ever to wean intelligent people from common sense.

God, then, for the religious man, is not all-inclusive in the sense that ultimately there is one, and only one, experience. How indeed we should know enough of what " experience " means to predicate it of God unless our own thought and feeling formed a real illustration of it, it is hard to understand. Doubtless in a loose way God may be said to include Nature, since Nature is part of His sphere ; yet by very definition Nature is morally insusceptible of God, and it is only by virtue of an incurably spatial fashion of thought that we insist on talking as if God surrounded and pervaded the physical cosmos as the sea pervades and surrounds a sponge. Further, it is not a convincing view that God includes man as a constituent part of Himself in such wise that man and He are equally, or in some at least partially identical way, dependent on each other. According to faith, man is derived from God and dependent on God, but he is not one and the same with God as being only a phase or aspect of the Divine life. Vital religious experiences make any such thoroughgoing identification impossible. One of these is contrition. We cannot without violence overlook the sense of separation from God, of moral distance, apart from which repentance can neither be felt nor interpreted ; and the fact that in what the New Testament calls " repentance unto life " this is by no means incongruous with a concomitant awareness of union with the forgiving Father, does not in the least alter the case. In the experience of devout fellowship, moreover, duality as between God and man is implied no less centrally than in penitence itself. To quote Professor Pringle Pattison, " it takes two to love and to be loved,

two to worship and to be worshipped." Reciprocity vanishes when the two terms of relation fall into each other.

Now everything we can truly say about the reality of the individual is so much proof of the " conditionedness " of God. And those thinkers whom the spatial character of the expression does not deter from characterising God as all-inclusive must not object when other people hold that some human experiences—for example, my sinful desires—are outside of God. What more than anything else has led to the equation of God with the Universe, or at any rate with a universal Experience beyond which nothing falls, is the habit of philosophising on the purely logical in abstraction from the moral plane. Not infrequently God is really conceived of as the *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, of which finite spirits are the foci, or even just the logical instances. And, as it has been put, " if God is what we ordinarily mean by a logical Universal, then, of course, it follows that He has no existence except in the particulars." The real question for Theism, consequently, is this : Is there, or is there not, a supreme self-conscious Spirit which is *other than* the finite centres ? The phrase " other than," I feel, involves everything which people who speak of a " finite " Deity are trying to say. They are insisting that the moral experience of individuality is not to be sacrificed to an abstract generalisation. Undoubtedly they have adopted a misleading term, and one that creates more errors than it cures ; but their drift is clear enough. In short, if the term " Absolute " is to be employed, and if, as apparently is the case, it ought to signify the All of being, it must be used definitely to denote God and the world taken together in their living and essential correlativity. This will ensure justice being done to the human self, with its consciousness at once of dependence and independence. To any one convinced that God is a self it will always be evident that " to suppose a coincidence or literal

identification of several selves, as the doctrine of a Universal Self demands, is even more transparently self-contradictory than that two bodies should occupy the same space ! " [1]

A further deduction may be drawn from the moral implicates of Theism. The theory of a " finite " God indicates, with whatever confusion, that the Divine action is conditioned by intellectual and moral necessities. Theology has usually understood this not so much as a limitation of the Divine power as rather an explanation of its only possible meaning. It would be difficult to unearth a theologian accustomed to teach that God can literally do anything capable of being stated (I do not say *thought*, for it is an interesting question whether such combinations can really be thought), like making contradictory propositions both true at once, causing the past to be the future, or forcing one man to love another. Trained thinkers have no scruple in (not conceding) but asserting that these are things God cannot do, because they cannot possibly be done. In recent times, theology has been specially keen to ethicise the notion of omnipotence. The power of God is exerted in a moral world and under moral conditions. Suppose a man to pray long and exclusively for fame and money, suppose further his wishes to be granted, shall we say God is non-omnipotent because in these circumstances He cannot make the man Christlike ? Or because He cannot forgive the impenitent ? Or because He so rules the world that no one becomes noble without sorrow ? Would He be almighty in the proper sense if He could grant the vision of Himself equally to the pure and the impure ? When I want a true instance of omnipotence, as a morally qualified attribute, I survey the power by which He turned the death of Jesus—that sin of sins—to the redemption of the world. Here is real content for the idea re-affirmed by

[1] Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, pp. 389–390, n. 3.

our Lord : " With God all things are possible." He who can thus employ the Cross is almighty.

It is not irrelevant to remind ourselves at this point that the chief opponent of the new theory is not, as participants in the controversy occasionally seem to think, traditional theology, but the religious faith of the Bible, and specially of Jesus. So far from questioning Old Testament teaching as to the sublimity and omnipotence of God, Jesus, if possible, laid on it a deeper stress.

But it will be said : You object to finite as a misleading predicate of God ; do you then insist that He is infinite ? On this two remarks may be offered. In the first place, " infinite " is by no means one of those simple, manageable conceptions which we perfectly comprehend ; and even where for want of a better we do use it, we yet may be conscious of various perplexities. There are perplexities in its application to Time no less than to God, as every reader of Kant knows to his cost. An endless series of moments backwards or forwards is just as unthinkable as a series which stops. To handle this adjective in a lighthearted fashion, then, may be a sign of nothing except thoughtlessness. It is not that we stand ready with this predicate in hand, able to feel all round it, and merely in doubt whether or not we shall apply it to God ; we assert it of objects as to which all we may be certain of is that we cannot call them finite. It is in short (so far) a negative rather than a positive conception. We throw out our minds by means of it at an object which outstrips our faculty of thought. But we never understand it as we do the word finite. If I say that God's knowledge is infinite, I do not mean that I can go over His knowledge and point out in detail the qualities in virtue of which it merits the description ; the word is but a shorthand expression of the belief that there is nothing knowable which God does not know. But precisely how much is knowable I

am unable to say, and the difficulties which crowd upon us at this point may be surmised from what the Schoolmen wrote concerning the *scientia media* of God.

The second remark is that in the above-mentioned sense, which denies real limitations other than those imposed by the rational and moral nature of things, some equivalent of "infinite" is predicated of God by every theist. Thus, in a recent article on the theistic implications of Bergson's philosophy,[1] Professor F. H. Foster, while rejecting "infinitude in the old conception of that term," yet concedes that God must be thought of as "immeasurably great," and a few lines thereafter speaks of "the illimitability of His power." If we assume, as we are entitled to do, that Professor Foster has no wish to resuscitate the once prevalent distinction between God in Himself and God as known by us—in short, the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, which, particularly in its moral applications, brought so much discredit on theology—my own belief is that, provided always we bear in mind the explanations of the Divine omnipotence given in the best theology, there is little difference between Professor Foster's real point and the familiar contention of instructed thinkers. Both are bent on affirming that God is greater than we could ask or think. But when Professor Foster adds that "what we demand is a doctrine of God's greatness large *enough* to give us ground for a personal and individual trust in Him," he has scarcely chosen a happy form of words to represent the "immeasurable" demand really made by the faith of the single soul, as revealed in the New Testament. There, invariably, all things are in God's power, and it is expressly declared that nothing, not death nor life nor things present nor things to come, can separate us from Him. I cannot think that—metaphysics apart—this vital mood is adequately reproduced in the statement that God need

[1] In the *American Journal of Theology* for April, 1918, pp. 274–299.

not be "infinitely capable in order to meet my individual needs, but only sufficiently." In the future theology which is to pierce beneath the exterior of life to the depths of the soul, we must surely find some better way than this of saying that faith—and reason for that matter—proclaims God's power to be commensurate with the possibilities of all created being. The religious thought of omnipotence at its highest is put finely in the verse of Wesley's hymn:

> And whatsoe'er Thou wilt
> Thou dost, O King of kings,
> What Thine unerring wisdom chose,
> Thy power to being brings.

Let us now turn to another aspect of our theme, the conception of the "growing" God. Roughly we may say that this is the Divine finitude as related to time. Here, too, Professor Foster will furnish us with an emphatic formulation, stated with great force and much persuasive skill, of the changes desired in traditional views. Starting from Bergson's idea of the Vital Impulse as "an upward moving force, imperfect in power, uncertain as to methods, struggling toward a great end, itself enlarging as it goes," he faces the issue without concealment by asking, "How can God possibly be conceived of as ever progressing, enlarging, adding new degrees of strength and new attributes?" To this daunting inquiry he answers that, just as an artist becomes a better artist by painting, by creating what is beautiful, so "God, if He creates, also cannot be static, but grows." The thing is put even more unambiguously in a later passage. "If our human strength thus increases, why should it not be so with God's? As He acts why should He not think? And as He progresses in action from the building of a snail to the building of a man why should not His thoughts progress? That is, why should He not think of things He had not thought of? And why should not His purposes progress?

Why not, therefore, His power ? "[1] And again : " God, in doing, in exercising His powers for the good that may thereby be gained, struggles with a task at first too mighty for Him " ; " He is Himself ever growing to the growing task which He sets Himself."

In passing let us not altogether overlook the logical point, minor as it is, that on these lines God will never be perfect. In his vision of the consummation Professor Foster foresees that " the glory of God thus attained will be light ineffable." But if God is now unequal to His cosmic task, and if that task grows unendingly, His approach to perfect competence, at best, must be asymptotic. " Alps on Alps arise." Perfect, that is, will be an epithet inapplicable to God's work no less than man's, and inapplicable not merely now but for ever.

I need hardly say that most people are in hearty agreement with Professor Foster's preference for a dynamic to a static view of God. By static is meant, presumably, that notion of a rigid immutable Absolute which has often haunted, and still haunts, the realms of philosophy, and which has found epigrammatic expression in the *mot* of a famous metaphysician, " nothing real ever moves." To a faith fed by the Bible revelation of " the living God " this, of course, can have no meaning. But it is another question whether " the living God " can be identified with " the growing God " in the sense adumbrated by Professor Foster in the uncompromising words just quoted.

The living God, clearly, is a God possessed of Will, and expressing that will in action. He is not unrelated to the changes occurring in His world ; and if His relation to them

[1] This passage as a whole rests upon the assumption, which cannot be admitted, that we are entitled to call the present phase of the Universe a complete expression of the Divine will. It assumes, in other words, that the existing will of God is all, and always, realised.

is positive, we cannot speak of Him as sheerly unchangeable, since He must change in acting upon a developing universe in order not to change in a deeper, sinister sense. Mechanical uniformity of reaction to an altering situation is, ethically, no better than caprice. God, then, is the God of history—the history of the race, of nations, of individuals. How vital this reality of "change" in God is to the religious mind comes out, for instance, in the central experience of forgiveness. His bestowals on the penitent and on the impenitent are distinct, for moral reasons. Fellowship is reciprocal, and according to our attitude there must be variation on the part of God. This variety of Divine action within human life is one aspect of what is meant by "the living God," and religion cannot dispense with it.

But a growing God? Is this inferentially present in the great religious truth we have just noted, is it conceivably but another name for the same truth? This must not be assumed. The relation of God to time, as is well known, forms one of the *cruces* of theological philosophy; and it must be said that Professor Foster's handling of the topic as a whole scarcely reveals an adequate sense of its excessive difficulty and intricacy. From past discussions three possible views have emerged. First, God is unrelated to time, as are say mathematical truths; second, He is within time, just like our own empirical consciousness, enveloped by it and, so to speak, its subject or victim; third, He lives in an eternal present, and reality for Him is one duration which includes past, present, and future, as distinct from that abstract present better known to us which excludes from itself an abstract past and an abstract future. Professor Foster, without debate, takes the second view for granted: from the sentence already quoted, "Why should He not think of things He had not thought of?" it is plain that God is conceived of as within time like ourselves. This will

hardly do. If to apply the conception of growth to God involves His subjection, on a par with men, to time's passage and duration, we shall have to attribute to Him, to select but one example, such an ignorance of the future as will wreck Christian faith in providence from end to end.

The tendency on Professor Foster's part to push to its very limit the analogy between man's experience and God's leads to other consequences we are not enamoured of. Thus, after pointing out in an admirable passage that the painter grows as he paints, creating his own powers as truly as his picture, he adds that it is so with God likewise. But in time the energies of the painter decay and along with his energies, his skill; shall we also carry this over to the Divine life? In other words, the human analogy cannot be used *simpliciter* but only, as logicians say, *secundum quid*. Our thought of God must not be too human.

It does not on the whole appear as if advocates of the theory that God develops were prepared to carry through their view to its real conclusion. They seem to follow a tacit distinction between metaphysical and moral attributes. I do not, for instance, observe that Professor Foster anywhere contends that God is now more holy or more loving than formerly. Certain phrases, it is true, may suggest an increase of His wisdom, but not His love or holiness. But if so, then once more there is in this latter respect no important divergence of opinion between Professor Foster and the best theology of the past, for it has always been held—save by an occasional Neoplatonic thinker—that God's love has changed in its expression, its manifestation. It has done so in history, for Christ appeared at one date and not before; it has done so in the experience of the invididual. But in itself, theologians are wont to teach, it has never changed; and from his silence on the matter we are probably entitled to suppose that Professor Foster agrees.

In this supposition we are encouraged by the definite language he has used on the more general topic. Controverting the proposition that it is the first need of religion that God should be unchangeable, he suggests that for "unchangeability" we should put "reliability." "The need," he continues, "is that in the stresses of life we may be able always to turn to God and find Him invariably helpful, dependable, reliable." Nothing could be better said, but is not the opponent's whole case conceded in the one word "invariably"? After all, God is *unchangeably* helpful. His character is perpetually the same. We cannot question the Divine immutability without finding ourselves obliged to affirm it in a new form. There is truth which cannot be suppressed in the old prophetic word: "I the Lord change not, therefore ye, O house of Israel, are not consumed."

The proposal to define God as change, or progress, or a Becoming would undoubtedly be much more convincing were it not for the fact that Becoming as such implies that which does not become. As we may put it in a paradox which is true all the same, it is only the permanent that changes. Mutable would have no sense for our minds but for the contrast with immutable. It is unnecessary to adduce here all the puzzles that cluster round the question of personal identity or continuity, but at all events it is clear that not even in the case of the human individual does there exist any possibility of bringing all the constitutive facts under the rubric of "becoming." Some identity of content or principle must persist under changing forms of life if the "I" of to-day is to be in any real sense identical with the "I" of twenty years ago. But if change is a category unequal to the data of human experience, because there are data it does not cover, its insufficiency for the higher case is evident.

But this is not to assert the Divine unchangingness, but

rather to imply its opposite ; and thereby we open up a final and most momentous phase of the subject. It was said above that only the permanent changes, and this truth may well suggest, what it exemplifies, the general principle that all our higher thinking, done as it necessarily is from the periphery, not the centre of things, must always end in antinomy. Professor Foster's argument for the finitude and growth of God seems to me to gain its plausibility from the fact that he overlooks the presence of antinomy in religious thought at every turn. No doubt the person who appeals to antinomy is often a very annoying person, who seems merely to be dodging an irresistible argument. And in fact he may be doing this, if he drags in antinomy at the wrong place. But also he may simply be forcing on his neighbour's attention the specific character of religious knowledge. Again, people are often surprised to come upon a theological antinomy ; they insist on treating it as an accident. But, so far from being an accident, it is of the very fibre and substance of religious thought. The surprising thing would be *not* to encounter it at the end of any given avenue leading out from the starting-point of experience.

It remains to apply these generalities to our present theme. We have already considered what really is one form of antinomy in our discussion of the " finite " view of God. It became clear that there are divers human experiences which cannot be transferred to God, or in any way predicated of Him as experiences of His own ; our sinful desires, for example, fall outside His personal life. They are over against Him ; but if anything at all is in any positive sense other than God, He is so far, and in that respect, finite. We may call Him so, in a given relation, if we judge the term a helpful one. And yet writers like Professor Foster, who urge the predicate " finite " upon us, are compelled to add that God is immeasurable and illimitable. So far as I can

see, illimitable is just infinite. Certain things are outside God, yet He has no limits—this is an antinomy.

Similarly when we seek to construe the relation of God to time and its contents.[1] The difficulties of this topic are as old as theism ; philosophers and theologians have done their best with them, not altogether successfully. It is of course easy to render the problem simple by wiping out one half of the facts. Time, for instance, may be degraded into something subjective and illusory, as is done by a host of metaphysicians. Whether reality is denied to time, or only so low a degree of reality allowed that it can be ignored in the final reckoning, in either case God is untroubled by any relation to history or the filling of the time-scheme. Time is an intruder; in Shelley's phrase, it "*stains* the white radiance of eternity." Ideas of the same kind may be found in certain mediæval heretics, who applied the doctrine of Nihilism to the incarnation, protesting that at the coming of Christ nothing really happened which touched the Divine life. God's nature was completely unaffected. But the Church of course would not have it.

On the other hand, relief from antinomy may be sought by declaring boldly that God has a career like any one of us —that, in short, He is growing. The drift of such contentions will always commend itself to religious people in certain moods. To cut the Divine life away from all positive connexion with the stream of events would be to land our-

[1] It is to be hoped that the work of thinkers like Bergson and Croce will lead to history, as a specific kind of reality, being taken more seriously by philosophers. Idealists of every school may find food for thought in a passage such as the following: "There is a reality which stands over against individual action in all its forms, theoretical and practical. This reality is the whole, which is not constituted of the mere sum total of individual actions, but is the resultant or issue of constituent individual actions. In its complete form it stands before the mind as history. There in history stands unalterable fact. It is made and cannot be unmade, but we have made it and it is making us" (Wildon Carr, *The Philosophy of Croce*, pp. 106–107).

selves in utter theological agnosticism. No index of God could then be found in the noblest manifestations of human character. "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father" would have a purely emotional value. All passionate declarations of the preacher to the effect that in Jesus the Eternal has interposed to bear our load, or that through Christ's experience a new interior sympathy with human need has accrued even to God, become only so much poetic sentiment. Thus by a vital need of religion we seem driven to assert that God has new experiences. If for Him the temporal succession is other than a transient and worthless drama, if He does more than eternally contemplate the succession as a whole, then His will projects into history, and somehow its issues are a gain for Him.

This would be more or less plain sailing, were it not that faith with equal necessity eternalises the Divine life, denying the quality of progress to the character of God; and it is this aspect which, by unreal simplification of the data, Professor Foster ignores. The Christian mind cannot under any circumstances admit that God is more righteous or more compassionate now than at some earlier point, or that He is wiser, or that some day He will be more competent to rule the world than He is now. Pagan faiths no doubt show something of the kind, but Christianity has not even been tempted by the idea. "He who is over all is God, blessed for ever"; "Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail." Professor Foster disclaims the wish to deal with matters "beyond the reach of our observation"; yet, in summing up, he rightly deals with a far distant future, predicting that God will yet surmount all obstacles strewn in His path by the perverted human intellect. Such a prediction, regarding what is far beyond our observation, is the utterance of faith. The same faith, however, deals with the past not less instinctively than with the future, though

neither can be " observed " ; and in that past, to its furthest limit, it beholds God as perfect and all-sufficing.

This, it will be said, is to end in contradiction ; God in history and God above history form an opposition. It is at all events an antinomy—the synchronous affirmation of two ultimate truths whose unity, or point of convergence, lies beyond our ken. There seems no other way of understanding the two ideas except as distinct and united at the same time ; they are mutually dependent ; each is in the other, and each presupposes the other. It is just because faith is sure of God's positive relation to history that it cannot away with the notion that this relation should react creatively on His character by way of developing His moral being. It is the " living " God who says, " I the Lord change not." How these two attributes can hold good at once is an insoluble problem ; it is but one of a class of problems not accidental but native to genuine thought concerning God. H. R. Mackintosh.

THE EARLIEST INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR LORD'S TEACHING ON DIVORCE.

The meaning of the Lord's Teaching on Divorce (Matt. v. 31–32, xix. 3–9 ; Mark x. 2–12 ; Luke xvi. 18) has been much discussed, and this teaching is likely to be very much, and very variously, insisted upon in the near future.

It is important to see how it was interpreted in Ante-Nicene times. Among the Fathers of this period there are many comments on the above passages, some of considerable length.

On some points there is unanimity. (1) None of them takes the modern view that Mark's account (ch. x.) is primary, Matthew's secondary ; they all take Matthew as the main source. Those of us who take the other view ought

not to consider changes introduced by Matthew as *ipso facto* to be rejected; he may be combining some other source; at the very least his account gives far the earliest *interpretation* of the Lord's words as given by Mark.

(2) Hence it follows that none has any doubt of the genuineness of the words "Except on account of fornication" (παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας, Matt. v. 32; μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ xix. 9, with v. 1, as in former passages). In one place or the other the phrase is recognised, in comments by Theophilus (iii. 13), Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Lactantius, *Institutions*, vi. 23. It is, however, passed over in Athenagoras, *Leg.* 33.

(3) Nor does any one take the view that πορνεία means distinctively *pre-nuptial* sin. All who comment at any length take it as the equivalent of μοιχεία, adultery; in fact Latin Fathers often substitute "adultery." So Lactantius (above); Tertullian, (*Against Marcion*, iv. 34, "praeter causam adulterii"; *De Pudicitia*, 16, "praeter causam mœchiae"); and the treatise *De Bono Pudicitiae*, attached to Cyprian's works, "when Christ said a wife was not to be put away except for adultery, He gave much honour to chastity" (ch. vi.).

But on other points they diverge. Thus, Tertullian and Origen take opposite views on the question whether the Lord hereby simply re-affirmed Deuteronomy xxiv. 1, of which Tertullian adopts the stricter interpretation, Origen the laxer. Tertullian (*Against Marcion*, iv. 34) finds Marcion, on Luke xvi. 18, laying stress on the difference between the Law and the Gospel, Moses and Christ. He rejoins that "Marcion brings out this opposition simply by rejecting the other Gospel of the same Christ, in which He clears up this very point. He made this prohibition conditionally—if any one puts away his wife in order to take another. If His prohibition of divorce was conditional, it was not

absolute ; what He did not forbid absolutely, He permitted in other cases. . . . Thus He does not now teach contrary to Moses. If you (Marcion) deny that divorce is at all allowed by Christ, what will a husband among you do if his wife has committed adultery ? will he keep her ? But you know that not even your apostle allowed the members of Christ to be joined to a harlot. So righteousness has Christ also as the advocate of divorce. He confirms Moses, who mentions divorce on the same ground as Christ. Cp. Deuteronomy xxiv. 1 ("negotium impudicum") with Matthew v. 32. The Creator did not separate what He joined, except because of adultery (Deuteronomy xxii. 28–29 ; Malachi ii. 15). You then have Christ stepping everywhere in the footsteps of the Creator, both in allowing and in forbidding divorce ; you have Him caring for marriage whichever way you look—wanting it not to be broken, by forbidding divorce ; nor to be maintained with dishonour, by allowing divorce in that case." (Tertullian goes on to hold Luke xvi. 18 to be implicitly an attack on Herod, suggested by the mention of John in v. 16.)

Origen takes a different line. He thinks the Pharisees put the question to our Lord in hopes of trapping Him whatever He might say. (Matthew, Tome xiv. 16): "If He had said 'It is lawful,' they would have accused Him for dissolving marriage on trifling grounds ; if He had said 'It is not lawful,' for allowing a husband to live with a sinful wife. But His answer could not be laid hold of. First, He forbids putting away a wife on every ground, and then He gave answer to the question of the writing of divorcement ; for He saw that every cause does not reasonably dissolve marriage, and the husband ought to live with the wife, rendering the honour to her as to the weaker vessel, and bearing the burden of her faults. . . ."

"Perhaps a Jew will say that Jesus gave permission to

divorce a wife precisely as Moses did, 'unseemly thing' (ἄσχημον πρᾶγμα) in Deuteronomy xxiv. 1 answering to our Lord's 'case of fornication.' But since according to the Law the adulteress is stoned, the 'unseemly thing' which occasions divorce cannot be adultery or any such great dishonour; Moses gave the name of 'unseemly thing' to every fault which occasions divorce if discovered by a husband in a wife not finding favour with him; but our Lord does not allow marriage to be dissolved for any other sin than fornication alone."

Origen is the only Father in this period who finds difficulty over this being the only cause, and who sees some reasonableness in divorce on other grounds. "It may be enquired whether He forbids to put away a wife detected not in fornication, but in witchcraft (φαρμακεία), or in killing in her husband's absence the child born to them, or a murder (φόνος) of any kind, or if caught pilfering from or robbing her husband's house. Each alternative appears unreasonable. . . . It will appear unreasonable to put up with such great sins which seem worse than adultery and fornication; but every one would acknowledge it to be impious to act contrary to the meaning of our Saviour's teaching." Origen therefore calls attention to the fact that He did not say "Let no one put away His wife except on account of fornication," but "Whosoever puts away his wife except on account of fornication makes her commit adultery." "It is open to question whether a man has or has not a good defence who, as far as rests with him, makes his wife commit adultery by putting her away when detected in witchcraft or murder. A man may make her commit adultery in other ways—either by allowing her to do too much as she likes, and to enter into friendship with what men she choses; or by denying her the dues of marriage. Perhaps one who does this is more blameworthy than he

who has put her away not for fornication but for witchcraft or murder or any most serious sin."

On the crucial question of re-marriage of the innocent party, the evidence of these Fathers is not clear. They seem to imply it, but do not as a rule state it definitely, and some of their language may be taken otherwise. We must remember the repugnance felt by many to a second marriage after the *death* of the first wife ; Tertullian, e.g., never favoured it, and in his Montanist days utterly denied its lawfulness, as did Athenagoras, who calls it "specious adultery." Thus when Tertullian (above) says that "the Lord forbids putting away a wife in order to marry another," the natural construction is that this is the one ground and object of the divorce ; he is not at the moment contemplating the case of divorce for misconduct, but his words might be taken as rejecting the marriage in any case.

There is the same ambiguity in Clement, *Strom.* II. xxiii. 155: "Scripture distinctly lays down 'Thou shalt not put away a wife except on account of fornication.' But it considers it adultery to marry again during the lifetime of the other separated party." Here the obvious, but not necessary, construction is that this applies even in cases of divorce for misconduct.

He is unfortunately too brief also in *Strom.* III. vi. 50. He takes Matthew xix. 10 "If the case of a man be so with his wife" . . . as an *enquiry* whether it is permissible, when a wife has been condemned for fornication and divorced, to marry another. To this the Lord answered, v. 11, "All cannot receive this saying . . . " This obviously implies re-marriage to be *allowable.*

Lactantius (*Inst.* vi. 23) is clearer. "It is added that he is an adulterer who has married a wife put away by her husband ; and also he who has, except on the charge of adultery, put away his wife in order to marry another."

Thus, to sum up, all these Fathers recognise misconduct as a ground for divorce. Origen alone is inclined to think that other grounds are not excluded. With the exception of Lactantius, however, and Clement in one place, they are not clear whether re-marriage is allowable in this case.

HAROLD SMITH.

RE-WRITING ST. MATTHEW.

CANON ALLEN in the long Note which sums up the results of his Commentary on St. Matthew, writes as follows :

" It seems clear that the editor has re-written Mark x. 1–12 in order to bring Christ's teaching upon the subject of divorce once again into harmony with the stricter school of Jewish interpretations of Deuteronomy xxiv. 1–4."

" Again the editor seems clearly to have tried to interpret Mark vii. 14–23 in such a way as to avoid the obvious impression that Christ directly attacked the Mosaic distinction between clean and unclean meats."

" And once again : it seems clear that the editor has so altered Mark ix. 1 as to make it emphasise the near approach of the Second Coming." *Intern. Crit. Comm.*, p. 318.

These three divergencies between Matthew and Mark are apparently given as the decisive instances proving that Matthew has re-written Mark. Now whatever proof there may exist elsewhere for this contention, I would suggest that these three examples are not aptly chosen.

With regard to the first :—

It seems plain that Matthew gives us Christ's logion on the subject of divorce in an earlier form than that of Mark ; it is plainly Mark who has omitted, not Matthew who has " re-written."

The best translation of the words παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας is undoubtedly the simple and literal one :

QUITE APART FROM THE WORD "'ERVATH."

This word "'ERVATH" of Deuteronomy xxiv. 1 had become a much disputed term in the Jewish schools of our Lord's day, but He sets the whole discussion aside as irrelevant, considering that the whole Mosaic concession, whatever its extent, is of no further use to those who return to the legislation as contained in Genesis. It was said by Moses in Deuteronomy xxiv. 1–4, "Whosoever dismisses his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. *I* however tell you: Every one who [*πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων* stronger even than *ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ*] divorces his wife—no matter what the famous term "'ERVATH" may have meant—makes her commit adultery, and whosoever marries a divorcee commits adultery."

Now to suggest that an editor having the Marcan logion before him inserted this vivid touch, immediately true to life, at some later date, seems to me inconceivable. On the other hand, that Mark, having the Matthæan logion before him, should omit the reference to the Rabbinic dispute, unintelligible to all unacquainted with Jewish casuistry, seems to me perfectly natural.

I am afraid some commentators are still unconsciously biassed by Vulgate or English translations of the passage and see in the words some concession made by Christ Himself limiting His rejection of divorce, as if *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* meant "except for fornication." But where is the justification for translating *παρεκτός* by "except for"? All the passages known to us containing the word clamour for the translation: apart from, independently of, prescinding from. Several commentators render *παρεκτός* by "except for" and then blame Matthew for the clumsiness of the interpolation and the incoherence of the passage, and argue that because the passage thus interpreted is incoherent therefore it is obviously re-written from the Marcan logion, which is clear.

Now it may be urged that *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* only occurs in Matthew v. 32, that in Matthew xix. 9 we read *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*. To this the answer would be: first, that the textual attestation for *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας*, even in Matthew xix. 9, is so great that the reading *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ* cannot pass unchallenged; there are just as weighty authorities for as against, they are about equally balanced. Some may think that the assimilation of Matthew xix. 9 to Matthew v. 32 is antecedently much more likely than the deliberate substitution of the reading *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ* for *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας* in Matthew xix. 9. On the other hand, the present common reading of Matthew xix. 9 looks to others a substitution of a shorter simpler phrase for a more unusual and difficult one. As soon as the memory of the Rabbinic dispute about the meaning of 'ERVATH passed away from the Christian community Christ's words must have presented difficulties to the Greek reader, and perhaps *μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ* is an attempted solution.

Personally I would rather think that it is simply another rendering for the same Aramaic or Hebrew original, and that it is meant to convey the same sense: "let there be no exception for adultery." Whosoever divorces his wife—no exception for 'ERVATH—and marries another, commits adultery."

If we suppose בַּלְעֲדֵי עֶרוַת דָּבָר as the original, this may well have given rise to both Greek renderings, the one giving: "apart from the word 'ervath," the other: "not on account of 'ervath." The Peshitto Syriac has לבר מן מלתא דזניותא, and the original, if Aramaic, may well have been בַּר מִן עֶרוַת דָּבָר, both *παρεκτός* and *μή* being meant as equivalents for בַּר מִן.

When Canon Allen looks upon the words *κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν* the question of the Pharisees in Matthew xix. 3, as clearly, a Matthæan interpolation, I quite fail to follow him. It

seems imperatively demanded by the whole context and is obviously original. Can a man send his wife away *for any fault*, is a natural question for a Pharisee who is trying the mettle of a new Jewish Rabbi, for it brings into play all rabbinic lore as to the precise fault on the woman's side which authorises divorce. The unqualified question, however, Can a man divorce his wife? sounds strange amongst people who had not the remotest doubt that divorce was sometimes allowed and only disputed about the precise grounds for allowing it. Mark could indeed omit the words because he does not presuppose in his readers any close acquaintance with Jewish customs, they would sound natural enough to them; but any one who obviously wrote for Palestinian Jews would by omitting these words make the situation unintelligible to his readers, hence he gave them as they stood, just as he gave Christ's words corresponding to them.

Moreover the whole incident as told by St. Matthew has such dramatic coherence that it is hard to believe that it should be a later manipulation of the Marcan text which is much less immediately true to life. In Matthew a set of Pharisees comes to sample the teaching of the new Rabbi of Nazareth. They ply Him with a well-known point in casuistry. He asks them whether they have not read the Torah which settles the question, quoting Genesis ii. 24. Taken aback by the quotation of a text they never expected, they stammer: but what then about Moses permitting divorce? He answers: Moses *allowed* it because of the hardness of your heart, but God did not allow it in the beginning; hence I say, apart from the whole debate about Deuteronomy xxiv. 1 back to human nature as God made it, divorce is but a cloak for adultery. The Pharisees go, but Christ's own disciples are amazed at the strictness of this new doctrine and say: if the relation of a man to his wife is as

you say, it is not expedient to marry. Christ takes up those last words. They contain more wisdom than the disciples themselves are aware of. Yes, it is indeed sometimes expedient not to marry for the kingdom of heaven's sake.

Now the incident in St. Mark is given less graphically. The Pharisees ask whether divorce is permissible. Christ asks what Moses commanded. They answer: he allowed it. Christ answers: Moses gave you that command because of your hardness of heart, God did not allow it in the beginning. Read Genesis ii. 24: "Therefore what God has joined together let no man tear asunder." Then being later alone with Him, His disciples ask Him once more about this question and He gives them the absolute rule; divorce, whether practised by husband or by wife, is always unlawful.

That the Matthæan account should have been remodelled on the Marcan one seems to me nothing short of a literary impossibility. Both accounts are derived from witnesses, of whom one gave the sequence of events with greater precision. True Mark has one item which directly betrays the eyewitness: *καὶ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν πάλιν οἱ μαθηταὶ περὶ τούτου ἐπηρώτων αὐτόν.* There has been no previous mention of Christ being in "a house," but the Marcan witness was a man of strong visual memory, as is plain from other passages in this Gospel. Both he and the Matthæan witness remembered that after Christ had laid down the general principle to the Pharisees, explanations followed later on when they had gone out and He was once more with His special disciples; but the Marcan witness spontaneously puts it in the words: "When we were going back to the house." The Matthæan witness, having a more auditive memory, forgot the return to the house, or if he remembered it, he did at least not spontaneously express it, but he did remember the salient points of the discussion, both before and after. He still heard the half-querulous remark: "If matters

stand thus between man and wife, it is better not to marry," and the gentle retort of Jesus: "Quite so, for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, it may sometimes be better." The Marcan witness makes Christ simply restate to His disciples what He had already told the Pharisees, and that in most emphatic and inclusive terms. No doubt Christ did, but Matthew's story moves on to a natural climax, Mark's does not. Finally, in St. Mark the case is contemplated of a woman divorcing her husband, a case not very practical in the ordinary Jewish world of that day. The Matthæan witness did not remember them, or if he remembered them, he did not expressly mention them, because the case of a woman divorcing her husband and marrying another was such a monstrous breach of the moral law that *of course* she committed adultery,—no Jew could doubt it. The Marcan witness who was confronted by pagan morality naturally recalls a sentence which, to a Palestinian Jew writing for Palestinians, might seem hardly worth mentioning, but which for him, writing later in a pagan world, was not superfluous at all.

We submit that these points, especially when taken together, will suggest caution in taking it for granted that Matthew xix. 3–12 has only re-written Mark x. 2–12.

J. P. Arendzen.

"*NAKED AND LAID OPEN.*"

(Hebrews iv. 13.)

A very old explanation of the Greek word, in rendering which the R.V. has substituted "laid open" for the "opened" of A.V., was that it referred to the practice of placing a clog round the necks of condemned criminals to prevent them from hiding their faces from the public gaze as they were led through the streets to execution. The

younger Pliny in his Panegyric speaks of the gratification afforded to the citizens of Rome when Trajan suffered them "*desuper intueri delatorum supina ora retortasque cervices*," and he goes on to compare these informers, with their faces exposed and their necks drawn back, to victims dragged through the arena (ch. 34). Another passage appealed to was Suetonius' account of Vitellius' end, in which he tells how, "with hands tied behind his back, a noose upon his neck, with his clothes torn, he was dragged half-naked into the forum, accompanied along the whole length of the Via Sacra by grossest mockeries of act and word, his head drawn back by the hair, as is the way with criminals, and his very chin held up by the point of a sword, that he might have to expose his face to be stared at and might not lower it" (Suetonius, *Vitellius*, 17).

To this explanation of the idea conveyed by the word τετραχηλισμένα it was objected by Delitzsch that it needed support from Greek authors. In reply to this challenge a passage from Plutarch's treatise *Concerning Busybodies* may, I believe, be brought forward.

"When the Olympian victor Dioxippus was making a triumphal entry in a chariot, and could not drag his eyes from a beautiful woman among the spectators, but kept turning half round and throwing side glances in her direction, Diogenes—who saw it all—remarked, 'See how a bit of a girl gets the neck-grip on our great athlete!' Inquisitive people, however, are to be seen gripped by the neck and twisted about by any kind of sight, when they once develop a habit of squandering their glances in all directions."

So the passage (*Moralia*, 524 B.) is rendered by Professor Tucker. But, in view even of the quotations already given from Pliny and Suetonius, he would perhaps admit that "twisted about" (περιαγομένους) should be "led" or

"dragged about," and that the reference in τραχηλιζόμενον is not to wrestling but to the clogging of a criminal's neck. And I venture to think that he would feel that this is made certain by a passage from Xenophon's *Hellenica* (III. iii. 11), in which, describing the execution of Cinaedon and his associates, he writes:

ἐκ τούτου μέντοι ἤδη δεδεμένος καὶ τὼ χεῖρε καὶ τὸν τράχηλον ἐν κλοιῷ, μαστιγούμενος καὶ κεντούμενος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν περιήγοντο.

The last words illustrate and explain Plutarch's περιαγομένους, δεδεμένος τὼ χεῖρε is the *religatis post terga manibus* of Suetonius; δεδεμένος τὸν τράχηλον ἐν κλοιῷ recalls the *supina ora, retortasque cervices* of Pliny, while its object is shown by his *desuper intueri* and by the *ut visendum praeberet faciem neve submitteret* of Suetonius.

Diogenes would seem to have meant that the mora-feebleness of the Olympic victor had turned his triumphal entry into a procession such as the leading of a criminal to execution. It was a clog placed round his neck. The use of the word by the writer to the Hebrews shows that the treatment of criminals afforded an obvious way of bringing to men's minds the impotence of guilty men to hide their hearts from the eyes of Him with whom we have to do.

G. H. Whitaker.

IS THE NARRATIVE OF THE FALL A MYTH?

The narrative of the Fall, Genesis ii.–iii., has been a subject of renewed investigation and lively discussion in the Christian Church. Circumstances, however, have changed. The chief question is no longer as to what extent and on which lines the setting of the first chapter in the Biblical history of mankind ought to be explained as allegory or (more generally) as the accidental framework of the story of

a calamity that happened to the first parents of our race. That, in fact, we are confronted here with such a story of the personal experience of the first men had always been held as self-evident. And in his essay on *The Fall-Story* F. R. Tennant frankly acknowledges that "the narrative occurs in a context which professes to supply information as to the beginnings of human history; the story (so he goes on) could hardly be placed where it is, if it were solely or even primarily intended to have a psychological and didactic, and not a historical signification." [1] But since the beginning of the last century, or the end of the eighteenth, new views concerning the fundamental signification of our narrative began to assert themselves among liberal protestants in Germany. And at present the supposition is gaining acceptance among a large circle of Biblical interpreters that the narrative of the Paradise is—taking the word in a broad sense—a *myth* intended to convey the teaching of a truth of universal experience. The object of the alleged *myth* would be, either, as Wellhausen puts it, to show, as first illustrated by the supposed example of our first parents, the sad and fatal connexion of sin and consequent misery with the progress of culture throughout the whole history of mankind; or, as Gunkel prefers, to offer an account from a moral and psychological standpoint of the process of the awakening of reason and the acquisition of knowledge, especially of knowledge of sexual difference, in one way or another connected with sin, as it occurs in the experience of every individual.

In his learned and most comprehensive work on this subject,[2] Dr. Joseph Feldmann pointedly remarks that interpretations of that kind were not introduced by Biblical scholars, but by Kant, the philosopher, and by Schiller, the

[1] *The Fall-Story* (Essays for the Times, No. 5, London, 1905; p. 28.
[2] *Paradies und Sündenfall*, Münster, 1913; p. 557 ff.

poet. To which it may be added that Wellhausen, in presenting his explanation of the narrative, appeals, though rather timidly, to the authority of Goethe. His explanation, so he feels bound to say, "is not new; it is the old, popular one, and therefore also followed by Goethe in the Faustpoem." [1] One wonders whether it would not be fairer to give Goethe the honour of having been, on this occasion too, not a follower but a leader of popular wisdom though he may himself have been influenced by Rousseau.

Now, the fact must not be overlooked that the supporters of the mythical theory agree with the exegetes of the old school and vie with one another in extolling the narrative of the Fall as one of the finest and most striking pieces of Biblical literature. While many among the traditional interpreters of the narrative are ready to admit, or even eager to argue, that a considerable amount of picturesque folklore has been made use of by the sacred author as the vehicle of his higher religious teaching; even so, on the other hand, the mythists insist that the Hebrew compiler, though giving ample proof of his "naïveté," succeeded in composing out of the legendary material an altogether new story adapted to the demands of moral monotheism, and not only wonderful by its vividness of description and acute analysis of human nature, but most remarkable by its deep religious significance. Gunkel states that the "Ursagen" in Genesis are concerned with answering certain questions; the Creation-story asks: "Whence came heaven and earth?" and also: "Why is the Sabbath day holy?" the Paradise-story asks: "Whence comes human knowledge and insight, whence man's liability to death?" and so on. This is the place, so Gunkel remarks, where Hebrew genius had to deal with problems of universal human interest. And he goes on: "In a unique way has

[1] *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israëls*, 3 Ausg., 1886; p. 315.

this (that is the treatment of problems of universal human interest) been performed in the Creation and the Paradise story. These are the beginnings of theology and philosophy. No wonder that in post-biblical times special weight was laid on these passages, and that, ever since the Book of Genesis was read, each and every generation till the present day has contrived to read its profoundest thoughts into these narratives." [1]

The question which we have to deal with now is: whether the narrative of the Fall countenances the thoughts which the advocates of mythical exposition are contriving to read into it.

In order to determine what is meant by the "knowledge of good and evil" which the fruit of the forbidden tree was apt to impart, Gunkel points out that the condition of the first human couple before the eating, thus before sin, is described Genesis ii. 25 by the remark, that "they were both naked and were not ashamed"; their condition after the sin Genesis iii. 7 by the remark, "that the eyes of them both were opened and they knew that they were naked." And he concludes that the knowledge consisted in what the adult has over and above the child, that is: insight and reason, to which also belongs as characteristic the knowledge of sexual difference. The condition of innocence depicted before the sin is that of childhood, the condition described as obtaining after the sin is that of full growth.[2] But why should the acquisition of insight and reason be stamped as sinful? Because knowledge makes man Godlike, and God does not will that man should become like unto Him! It is God's will that knowledge should be reserved to Him alone. Therefore, when man,

[1] *Die Urgeschichte und die Patriarchen*, Göttingen, 1911; p. 18.
[2] *l.c.* p. 59.

against the will of God, acquired knowledge, God contrived that that acquisition should be followed by everlasting sorrow and grief: these are man's punishment.[1]—Though deviating from Gunkel's interpretation in some particulars, and especially, as we shall see presently, in his way of defending the position, the "new attempt" towards a right explanation of Genesis ii.–iii. made by E. Albert comes to the same general result. It is the author's purpose, so E. Albert says, "to show how the first men, at first mere children inexperienced and ignorant, gradually grow up and get understanding; therewith personal judgment develops and the truth of the divine commandment is put to the test; this commandment at a certain age is transgressed and thus sexual "knowledge" acquired, after which begins conjugal life."[2]

When Albert speaks of "the first man gradually growing up," of "personal judgment developing" in the children, and so on, that is consonant indeed with universal experience, the object of the supposed picture in the narrative; but it does not agree with the picture itself, which "shows" nothing of the kind. Gunkel puts it otherwise and remarks that the development which we achieve in the course of years is accomplished by the first men "in one moment."[3] This aims at consonance with the picture in the narrative, but admits a total disagreement between the picture and its supposed object of universal experience.

It is very difficult to understand how the Hebrew writer could have considered and stamped the natural development of the ignorant child into the full-grown man as sinful and encroaching on the right of God, who intends, and of

[1] *l.c.* p. 66.

[2] *Ein neuer Erklärungsversuch von Gen.* 2. *u.* 3. ("Zeitschr. für die alttest. Wissenschaft," 33. Jahrgang, 1913; p. 188).

[3] p. 61.

course intended from the beginning, the child to come to full growth and knowledge, and who Himself "made them man and wife." Let us remember, it is the first acquisition of reason and knowledge by itself, and, as a characteristic trait, the acquisition of sexual consciousness, that was *ex hypothesi* forbidden by God on the ground that it was apt to make man God-like.

However, we do not insist on that point, and come at once to the question whether it is true that the first men are looked on, in our narrative, as ignorant children before the eating of the forbidden fruit. The argument drawn from a comparison of the two statements about man's condition before and after the eating, in Genesis ii. 25 and iii. 7, we shall have to deal with further on, because our view of iii. 7 may be of some interest also with regard to Wellhausen's exposition. But here already we may state that in any case it is not the condition of ignorant childhood that is supposed to have been that of man before the Fall in the narrative as it stands. Let us remember how God brings to the man all the animals and birds formed out of the ground to see what he would call them, so that whatever the man would call the animals that should be their name (Gen. ii. 19–20); let us remember especially the jubilant address with which the man greets the bride brought unto him by God (ii. 23–24), and the manner in which the text consistently speaks of the two innocent creatures as "man and wife" (ii. 25; iii. 6. . . .).

Albert's attempt to account for the way in which the two little children are called "man and wife" in our text can hardly be called successful. That strange appellation of the two children had its origin, so Albert thinks, in the saying reported ii. *vv.* 23–24: "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called *'ishsha* because she was taken out of the *'ish*. Therefore shall a

man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh." That saying, in which the conjugal bond is described, did not, according to Albert's view, originally proceed from the writer of our narrative, but was borrowed by him from another source, some old "saga." Proof of this is that the saying does not fit in its present setting and is introduced by a merely artificial arrangement of the narrative. In the preceding verses we are told that the man was in "a deep sleep" when Jahve God took out of him the rib which He built into a woman. How then could the man know that she was bone of his bones, and flesh of his flesh? The truth must be that the saying was taken over from somewhere else. Our compiler sets out to illustrate it by a new explanation, but fails to notice that his representation of the "sleeping man" is in flat contradiction with the knowledge disclosed by the man in the saying thus introduced. And hence, under the influence of that foreign element taken over by the narrator from an "old saga," the incongruous designation of the two children as man and wife was brought about. Thus far Albert.

We cannot look on this explanation as a happy one. It is incredible that the author of "one of the finest narratives in the Bible" should have taken over a passage from another document to be part and parcel of his narrative, without being aware of its utter opposition to the fundamental traits of his own main narrative. Nor is it conceivable that under the influence of the borrowed foreign element he should have made use himself, in his description of the heroes of his narrative, of appellations absolutely inconsistent with his own notion of their condition.

Notwithstanding the high praise which he bestows on the Biblical narrator and his masterpiece, E. Albert does not seem to have realised all the merits and the real meaning

of the Paradise-story. Here, in the episode of the creation of the woman, was an occasion for a somewhat philosophically inclined mind to point, if not exactly to a "myth," at least to a striking example of the illustration of an abstract idea or a fact of universal experience by means of concrete and picturesque scenery. It is evident that the author's concern with the "sleeping man" has a much deeper meaning than Albert suspects. Jahve has resolved on giving the man a help like unto him (ii. 18). Consequently He first forms "out of the ground" all the beasts of the earth and fowls of the air, and brings them to the man—not, as Albert explains in a most ludicrous way, as playmates for the little child—but to see what he would call them, that is, to let him recognise their properties and true nature. And the man called all the beasts by their names, he recognised them as what they really were; but for him there was not amongst them "a help like unto him"; they were indeed made only out of the ground, foreign to him, of a lower nature. Then Jahve cast a sleep upon the man; and when the man was fast asleep He took one of his ribs and built the rib into a woman. . . . The circumstance that the man is described as fast asleep is not a mistake of the narrator due to his overlooking the contents of the man's address to his bride, but on the contrary it is purposely insisted on by the narrator with regard to the contents of the bridegroom's address. If the man had recognised the woman as part of himself only because he had seen the whole process of woman's creation, the point would have been missed. It is the author's purpose to show that just as the man had recognised the lower nature of the beasts without having witnessed their formation out of the ground, so again, without having seen anything, from the mere natural, unerring impulse of his innermost being, he recognised the woman as what she really is: bone

of his bones, flesh of his flesh, of the same human nature and dignity as himself; so that he could give her with full right the name *'ishsha*, the counterpart of the *'ish*. The scene of the woman's creation is indeed a comment as it were pictorially illustrating beforehand the speech of the man—a comment intended for the reader as a warrant of the general truth of the man's instinctive judgment. But in order that the first man's experience might appear as of the same kind as that of other men, in order to make his address to the woman due to natural prompting only, and therefore of universal representative value, it was necessary that the narrator should describe the first man as unconscious or asleep, while God took from him the rib which He built into the woman.

Gunkel's position with regard to some of the statements in the narrative which disagree with the conception of the first men as two little children before the Fall, differs from that of Albert. According to Gunkel two narratives, originally independent of one another, are twined together in the second chapter of Genesis; to the one of them, the "Creation-myth," he reckons the introductory notice which is concerned with the condition of the earth before there was any plant or herb, and especially those parts which describe the creation of the man, of the beasts, and of the woman, including the acknowledgment of the woman by the man as bone of his bones, etc. (ii. 5, 7, 18–24). Only the remaining fragments properly belong to the "Paradise myth" (ii. 4b, 6, 8–9 . . . 15–17, 25). Gunkel, in particular, insists on the sharp contrast in which verse 25 of chapter ii., stating the unblushing innocence of the two first men, stands out against the passage on the conjugal bond immediately preceding, "a clear proof that both sentences cannot have originally been part of the same context." [1]

[1] p. 57.

When Gunkel argues that the Paradise-story did not "need" to be introduced by the Creation-story, nor the Creation-story to be followed by that of the Paradise,[1] it is needless to say that such a remark does not offer the least ground for suspecting the composite character of the present narrative as it stands. For, on the other hand, it also was not only possible, but quite natural, that the author, proposing to describe the original condition and fate of the two first men, should have mentioned and described the origin of the two first men themselves and of their surroundings. If now we look a little closely into the literary composition of our narrative we find at once that the elements distributed by Gunkel into two independent stories are in reality linked up together so tightly that it is impossible to disentangle them from one another. In verse 8, belonging to the so-called "Paradise-story," we are informed that Jahve God planted a garden in Eden and placed there "the man whom he had formed." In verse 15 also, another passage of the same Paradise-story, "the man" is mentioned as a being already known to the reader. This supposes that something has been said concerning the formation of the man, just in the same way as verse 8, though outside the "Creation-story," records the "planting of the garden." And indeed, verse 7 describes how Jahve God formed the man of the dust of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life. It is evident that the references in verse 8 and verse 15 in the "Paradise-story" are to verse 7, which belongs to the "Creation-story." Again, in verse 25 we read about "the man and his wife"; in verses 8 and 15 there was question of "the man" only; now of "the man and his wife." This supposes that between verses 15 and 25, both of the "Paradise-story," something has been said concerning the first appearance

[1] p. 54.

of the woman on the scene; and that is what happens indeed in verses 18–24, in the "Creation-story." From these observations it should be plain that the disruption of the narrative into two originally independent documents is not suggested by the text but arbitrarily enforced upon it. Therefore all the objections arising from different parts of the narrative against the supposition that the two first men are considered as little children before the Fall, remain in full strength.

That supposition indeed is sufficiently exploded by verse 25 alone, without any account being taken of the preceding context. It is not likely that the narrative would have described two children as "the man and his wife"; or that, as the narrative goes on in chapter iii., he would have qualified the one of them as "the woman" (verses 1, 2, 4, 6); and the other as "her husband" (verse 6). What Gunkel says about the impossibility that the concluding sentence of the "Creation-myth" in ii. 24 and the sentence in verse 25 should have been part originally of the same context, we are at a loss to understand. It is evident that for the author of verse 25 also "the man and his wife" were to be one flesh. If there is a contrast between the last sentence in verse 24 ("and they shall be one flesh") and verse 25, it cannot be as between contradictory or incompatible terms, but as between terms supplementary to one another. It is quite possible indeed that after his reference to the general conditions of mankind in verse 24 the author took the opportunity to notice that, in implicit contrast to the sense of shame natural to men, the original condition of the first men was such that their sensual inclinations were under perfect control of their reason and will, those higher faculties proper to the spiritual principle of life that God had breathed into man's nostrils.

The very words of the notice in verse 25, which are used

as proof that the first men are thought of as children before the Fall, should make it clear to the attentive reader that the narrator's meaning is quite different. When he points out, as a characteristic trait of the original state of the first men, that "they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed," this statement imports that there is no question of little children. If the author had wanted to signify that the first men were as yet mere children, he would have said so plainly, without assuming the appearance of stating something very noteworthy. The emphatic nature of his utterance implies that he is about to mark a special perfection, a privilege proper to the first men before the sin. To this point we shall have to return further on.

So far we think we have reached the conclusion that the theory that the Paradise narrative is concerned with some speculative considerations about the awakening of reason and sexual consciousness in every human individual, is not admissible.

* * * * *

In that same essay on *The Fall-Story*, quoted at the beginning of the present article, the Rev. F. R. Tennant says (p. 7) that "the exegesis of the Fall-story which is now very widely adopted by English and German critical scholars is that which was suggested by Wellhausen." I have not been able to ascertain whether or not Wellhausen's explanation has really enjoyed such a large and permanent support. But the wide-spread fame attaching to that critic's name secures in any case a special interest for his view concerning the significance of our narrative. Wellhausen [1] defends the view that the teaching involved in the Paradise-story does not concern the fate of every individual man, but that of mankind as a whole. From the beginning man got into misery, when he stretched out

[1] *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israëls*, 3e. Ausg. 1886; p. 312 ff.

his hand to the forbidden good in order to become God-like. "The rudiments of clothing, the first step in the process of civilisation, were the nearest result thereof; but other more sad ones, followed forthwith": the culprits, now they have become God-like, are driven out of Paradise oppressed with heavy penalties; the fate of man, without any outlook in life but death, is henceforth utterly miserable. The knowledge of "good and evil," the acquisition of which was forbidden to man, is not to be understood, so Wellhausen means,—and in that negative contention we agree with him,—of the knowledge of *moral* good and evil. The Biblical narrator, according to the German critic, definitely thinks of "the knowledge of what is *beneficial* and *hurtful*"; thus sagacity and wisdom, clear insight into the true nature of things, that it is that is considered to trespass the limits of human right and to belong to God alone. By his audacious attempt to secure that good, Godlikeness, man comes into rebellion against God. That special knowledge signified in the narrative of Genesis ii.–iii. is not to be conceived as something inherent to the individual, it is a phenomenon of a permanent character, continually developing in the course of human history; nothing else is meant than what we are used to call "culture" (*Kultur*). According as man progresses in civilisation he goes backward in the fear of God and is made aware of the dismal consequences of his restless striving. Now, if it be true that such is the view taken of human history in the Biblical record, we are to expect that something more of it will be heard, beyond the Paradise-story. And, indeed, Wellhausen tries to follow up the development of the tragedy in the description of the further efforts of mankind, always attended by misery and punishment. In chapter iii. of Genesis we learn how man first came to clothing, his earliest gain acquired by sin and recom-

pensed by suffering. In chapter iv. the fateful story goes on : the sons of Adam begin building cities and further find out the arts—especially the art of the smith, "whence the sword takes its origin together with bloody vengeance." The never completed tower of Babel in chapter xi. is as it were the symbol of that unhappy and reckless Sisyphean toiling of mankind.

A very moving view of history indeed, but a view which, as regards its relation to the Biblical record, appears to be obtained by philosophising speculation round about it, much more than by sober consideration of its contents.

One cannot help feeling a little bewildered at first by the indistinctness of Wellhausen's exposition. Sometimes he seems to put it as if sin were identified with progress ; then again sin proceeds from progress, as in the case of the bloody vengeance brought about by the invention of smith-craft ; whereas, in the instance of clothing, progress is made to result from sin, so that here the moral of the story should be put under the formula that according as man goes backward in the fear of God he progresses in civilisation, which might not seem so high-sounding as the reverse. But perhaps in matters of this kind one must not press things too closely. Our main point is that the awful Faust-spirit, which is responsible for Wellhausen's explanation, was quite foreign to the composition of the Biblical record.

We are not sure that in the narrative of the tower of Babel (Gen. xi. 1 ff.) the dispersion of mankind all over the earth is conceived of by the Biblical writer as a misfortune and a penalty inflicted on men, on account of their sinful ambition, and not rather as a forcible realisation of God's beneficial purpose thwarted by misdirected social instinct. "The whole earth was of one language and one speech ; and as they journeyed east they found a plain in the land of Shinear and dwelt in it. And they said to one another :

Come, let us make brick, etc. And they said, Come, let us make a city and a tower, the top whereof may reach to heaven, and let us make us a name *lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth*"; "the city and its famous tower were to form a centre and rallying point, which would hold mankind together" (Driver, *Genesis*, 1904; in l.). Not to scale heaven as the giants of the Greek fable attempted to scale Olympus, but to prevent the dispersion of mankind over all the earth is the aim explicitly ascribed to the builders, and the Biblical narrative seems to imply that it was this which displeased Jahve. One wonders whether the "*shēm*" of the Hebrew text should not be taken as a literal translation of the Babylonian *zikkurat* (zikḳurat), wrongly taken as a derivate from *zakaru*, "to name": ". . . and let us make us a *zikkurat*" = a monument. The "zikḳurat" would be seen from a very great distance and so fulfil its destination as a rallying point, the more as it was a centre of worship. Jahve coming down saw the city and the tower, and said: "Behold, they are one people, and they have all one language; and this is what they begin to do; and now nothing will be withholden from them, which they propose to do." There is no reason why Jahve's complaint should be understood as an expression of fear lest men should do much greater things in future, and even become dangerous to Himself. According to the context it seems to us more natural to understand it as a consideration that as long as they remain one people and have all one language, they will go on in the same way; as they have now provided themselves with a centre and rallying point, they will be in a better position than ever to carry out their common designs and it will never come to a spreading of mankind all over the earth. Therefore Jahve does not in the proper sense "punish" them; even the tower is not destroyed. He simply compels them, by confusing their

speech, to disperse without delay, leaving the tower as it was, unachieved; so that it might not be used as a far-off visible rallying point. Dispersion is supposed to have been much better for mankind.

There is not a word in the passage recording the invention of the art of the smith (Gen. iv. 22) to suggest that the author looked on it as the origin of the sword and bloody vengeance: "Zilla also brought forth Tubalcaïn, who forged vessels of workmanship in brass and iron." [1] The art of the smith is mentioned all along with that of the musicians and the profession of those who dwell in tents and have cattle; it would be difficult to guess what kind of evil the narrator could have associated in his mind with the inheritance left by Jabal and Jubal. The notice concerning Tubalcaïn's work is indeed followed by Lamech's song; but we are not even told that the bloody vengeance taken by Lamech for his wound had as a fact any connection with Tubalcaïn's invention; and, moreover, in the same song Cain's fratricide is alluded to. The narrator was well aware that bloody murder had occurred long before Tubalcaïn's time.

The three sons of Lamech, who appear in chapter iv. as the fathers of all who practise the useful arts, form a parallel to Noah and his three sons, whose father and grandfather also was a Lamech as related in Seth's genealogy in chapter v. and who were the fathers of postdiluvian mankind. This reminds us how little even the Jahvistic Biblical account of the Flood agrees with Wellhausen's theory. Here was a good occasion for the narrator to indulge in his (supposed) pessimistic view of human achievement. Navigation certainly was one of the boldest efforts ever made by mankind

[1] The text in this passage seems more or less corrupt, though the general meaning is clear. Perhaps בֹּלֵי־חֹרֶשׁ instead of כָּל־חֹרֵשׁ would be a plausible emendation.

in its struggle onward on the path of progress, one of the most striking examples of man's self-assertion against the forces of nature. Should not an attempt at salvation by means of a ship have been described as a suggestion emanating from a power hostile to Jahve? In the Babylonian legend Ellil's anger is excited at the sight of Utnapishtim's preservation in the ship. But the Hebrew writer did not choose to take Ellil as the model of his Jahve. The beginnings of navigation, as recorded in the Biblical narrative, were attended indeed by a catastrophic manifestation of divine wrath, but not for those in the ship.

And just as the first ship mentioned in the Bible, instead of becoming the first instance of shipwreck, is described as Jahve's own device, even so, to come back to our Paradise-story, is the case with the beginnings of clothing. It is not true that the narrative is intended to show that the rudiments of clothing were the first step towards civilisation, the first manifestation of that insight and skill which had made man like unto God, and, as such, the fruit of man's rebellion against God as well as the origin of his own misery. Not to mention other inconveniences attaching to such an interpretation of the Paradise-story, it is evident that the rudiments of clothing devised by man are not considered at all by the author as a real gain or a progress of any kind. They are a failure. With their girdles of fig-leaves on, the culprits hide themselves and refuse to come forward. The garments of skins which they afterwards obtain are not their own invention, not an improvement achieved by sinful rebellion against God in striving towards higher culture; they are a present bestowed, notwithstanding sin, on the poor despoiled men by the mercy of God Himself.

* * * * *

The common and fundamental mistake of comments

of the kind we have noticed is the supposition which they start from, that according to the Bible narrative the evil consequences of the eating of the forbidden fruit depended mainly, if not only, on the intrinsic nature and direct action of the fruit itself.

We are of course very well aware that the tree of knowledge of good and evil is supposed to have been endowed with the special virtue signified by its name. It was, as well as the tree of life, a wonderful plant, owing its name, not merely to the practical experience that man should gain of good and evil by eating of its forbidden fruit, but to its own inherent power to impart the knowledge. This is manifest from the way in which it is mentioned, along with the tree of life, in the description of Paradise even before any allusion has been made to the divine prohibition laid on man (ii. 9), and indeed from the whole narrative.

But, on the other hand, it is not to be overlooked that the narrator lays the whole stress on man's disobedience as the cause of his fall, not on the physical action of the fruit. The tree of knowledge is called by that name first in the description of the Paradise (ii. 8–9), and then in the record of the divine command, ii. 16–17: And he "commanded the man saying: Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat. But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat. . . ." However, in the course of the narrative, as it touches on man's conscience before or after the eating, or on the cause of man's unhappy fate, we hear no more the name of the tree. The woman, in answer to the insidious suggestion of the serpent, says (Gen. iii. 2 f.): "We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden: but of the fruit of *the tree which is in the midst of the garden* God said: Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die." That the tree is the tree of knowledge is in no way, for the conscience of the woman,

the ground why partaking thereof is evil or dangerous; that circumstance forms merely the starting-point for the temptation. The reason why eating of the fruit is evil and would be eventful for man's fate is God's prohibition. Again in the judicial inquiry instituted by God (iii. 11): "Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree *whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?*" The dreadful result of the eating is not traced to the nature of the tree and its fruit, but only to the divine command and its transgression. The condemnation of the man, iii. 17, is to the same effect: "Because thou hast hearkened to the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the fruit, *whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat*, cursed is the earth for thy sake. . . ." The hardships of life are not considered as the fateful accompaniment of beginning "Kultur" resulting from the acquired knowledge of good and evil; they are simply a punishment for man's disobedience, without any regard to the specific value and action of the forbidden fruit.

The minute analysis of the temptation resulting in the act of sin also points to the moral factor as the real cause of all that followed.

Further, we maintain that according to the narrative the first man did not even acquire that knowledge of good and evil which the tree was by its nature supposed to impart. By their disobedience they forfeited their happiness without securing the coveted good. Here we must briefly refer to the conclusions of a paper which we contributed some time ago to the EXPOSITOR [1] on *The Literary Origin of the Narrative of the Fall.*

Several traits in the narrative point to the conclusion that the whole scenery of the Garden of Eden was borrowed by the author of the history of the Fall from the stores of

[1] 1914, December.

Hebrew folklore. We are not told in our narrative what was the primitive and permanent destination of the Garden. Certainly it was not simply to serve as an abode for the man ; if this had been the case, the Garden with its trees would have been suppressed after the man had sinned, instead of the culprits being expelled from the Garden, and the watch of the Cherubim would not have been placed at the entrance to keep the way of the tree of life. The Garden and the trees are supposed to have still a reason for their existence, other than man's benefit. There must have been current among the ancient Hebrews a tale or popular legend in which the proper or chief destination of the Garden and the trees was accounted for apart from any relation to the fate of the first men. Nor is it difficult to guess what purpose, according to the popular story, the Garden was primarily intended to serve. God placed, so we are told in our narrative, "*the*" Cherûbîm before the Garden. . . . The Hebrew reader is supposed to know something of a special relation between the Garden and the Cherûbîm. The Garden, indeed, was known to him as the proper abode of the Cherûbîm, and this we also learn from chapter xxviii. of the Book of Ezekiel, where the prophet describes the fate of the city of Tyre as represented by her king : the king was placed in Eden, the Garden of Elohîm, in care of the protecting Cherûb ! There he was, innocent and happy, from the day of his creation ; but as soon as he was found guilty of sin he was cast out of the mountain of Elohîm, etc. The author of the history of the Fall describes the fate of the first man in the same way. To signify that the first men were created in a condition of innocence and happiness, he represents them as guests in the garden of the Cherûbîm. The loss of their happiness through sin is described as their expulsion out of the wonderful garden. The sin itself, as we have heard, consisted in the transgres-

sion of a law put on them by God, in their disobedience. And how, under what form, is the divine law promulgated in the narrative? Again, under a form agreeing with the outward frame of the Garden of the Cherûbîm. In the Garden, according to the popular tale from which the Biblical narrative takes its imagery, there were two wonderful trees, the tree of life and the tree of knowledge of "good and evil." "Good and evil" are not to be understood of moral good and evil; as far as the men were concerned the knowledge of moral good and evil was a prerequisite condition of responsibility in their behaviour towards God's law. Nor is there any reason to suppose with Wellhausen that "good and evil" are to be taken here in the definite sense of *beneficial* and *hurtful*. The phrase "good and evil" is of frequent use in Hebrew to signify the notion of "anything whatever." The tree of knowledge of "good and evil" was the tree of knowledge of "anything," of "everything."[1] The law imposed by God on man in our narrative takes the form that man shall not eat of the tree of "knowledge of everything." Of course, the two trees are not supposed to have been in the Garden only or primarily for the sake of the two men. As for the tree of knowledge it would have been of no use at all, since men were forbidden to partake of it; and the tree of life is explicitly said to remain in the Garden, under the protection of the Cherûbîm, after the expulsion of the two sinners. The proper and original purpose of both trees was accounted for in the popular tale of the Garden of the Cherûbîm. From the tree of life the Cherûbîm had to take the medicine for perpetual immunity from death; from the tree of knowledge they ate their wonderful acquaint-

[1] For instance, Gen. xxiv. 50; xxxi. 24, 29; 2 Sam. xiii. 22. . . . In Jer. xlii. 6 the phrase *be it good or evil* is used as equivalent to that of *everything* in verse 5.

ance with everything, good and evil. The very nature of the means provided to secure that twofold prerogative shows that they were to be made use of again and again ; therefore the means consisted in the fruit of trees, continually reproduced.

To return to our view : that the narrative does not tell us that the two first men really acquired the knowledge of good and evil by eating of the forbidden fruit.

First of all the author never meant to state that the sin of the first man really or properly consisted in the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge ; no more than the prophet Ezekiel meant to state that the King of Tyre had really been thrown out of the Garden of Elohîm and cast to the ground before the kings and brought to ashes in the sight of all who beheld him. The tree of knowledge with the whole scenery of the Garden is nothing in the narrative of the Fall but outward form and frame-work taken over from popular lore in order to serve as a picturesque setting for the author's teaching. The teaching was that the first men forfeited their original happiness and privileges by transgressing a positive law of God. The ancient Hebrew readers knew that of course as well as the author himself. All mythical explanations, which lay stress on the importance of acquired knowledge as the result of sin, in the view ascribed to the Biblical writer, are therefore of necessity mistaken.

Moreover, even within the limits of the formal element in the narrative, the author does not tell us that the men, by eating of the fruit reserved by divine ordinance to the Cherûbîm alone, acquired any share in the prerogative of superhuman knowledge. His purpose on the contrary was to teach that the first men, by their disobedience to God's law, lost their own privileges without obtaining the object of their ambition.

Is such a view not evidently contradicted by the narrative?

The serpent, indeed, had said to the woman (iii. 4, 5): "You shall not die! But God knows that on the day you eat thereof your eyes shall be opened, and you shall be as Gods (= *as divine, superhuman beings*) who know good and evil!" And later on, after the Fall, after the solemn condemnation passed on the two culprits, God Himself says (verse 22): "Behold, the man is become as one of us, knowing good and evil. . . ." God avers, so it is argued, that the serpent had spoken the truth, and the suggestion has even been hazarded on that ground that the serpent may have been a good genius, favourable to man.

But in the light of the observations just made it is not difficult to recognise the connexion, obviously acknowledged in chapter xii. of St. John's *Apocalypse*, of the serpent of the Paradise-story with the dragon-like symbolical figure of the enemy of God, a figure well known in Egyptian as well as in Babylonian literature, and not foreign to Biblical poetry, as appears from several passages in the Book of Job. The seven-headed, ten-horned red dragon of the *Apocalypse* is introduced in the narrative of the Fall as an ordinary serpent, because again it had to be fitted into the artificial frame of the Garden. Therefore, also, the curse on the tempter (iii. 14, 15), at least in its first part, is formulated in terms literally applying to the mode and conditions of life of the serpent, the repulsive fate of the serpent being implicitly understood as figurative of the doom of the arch-enemy. The struggle between the serpent and the woman, between the seed of the serpent and her seed, is, in the ultimate instance, the counterpart in the religious and moral order of the celebrated struggle between the God of light and order and the evil power of chaos and darkness.

The serpent of the Paradise narrative cannot have been a good genius ; it acts and speaks as God's enemy : " *God knows* that your eyes will be opened. . . ." It had not spoken the truth, as the woman had to confess when it was too late (verse 13) : " The serpent beguiled me ! "

When God, uttering the last pronouncement of His justice on the fallen men, says : " Behold, the man is become as one of us, knowing good and evil ; and now lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever. . . .," these words, indeed, close in with the speech of the tempter to the woman, but not as a confirmation of their truth. How was it possible that Jahve, after having doomed man to lifelong pain and misery, after having invested him with the gross garb of his toiling service, should have proclaimed in all earnestness : " Behold, the man is become as one of us ? " . . . Nor can it be argued that the sentence is modified by a restriction, as if the meaning was : . . . the man is become as one of us so far as he knows good and evil. For the words in the prime sentence do not at all express a comparison, so that one might expect a determination of the peculiar respect in which the comparison is instituted ; they signify in an absolute way a certain equality of rank which man would seem to have reached with those comprised under the designation " us " (= Jahve and his court of Cherûbîm ?) ; the additional clause consequently is not a restrictive, but a justificative one, stating the ground why man would seem to have reached the said equality of rank. Gunkel remarks : . . . ." knowledge makes like into God, and is accordingly proposed as an exalted good. But of course not like unto Jahve ! According to Israelitish belief there were many and various divine beings, great and little ones, mighty and inferior ones ; and from the conclusion of the narrative it appears quite manifestly that the myth does not mean that the man really is

become like unto the highest of the Gods, Jahve: Jahve remains in His pre-eminence, and as a poor sinner the man stands before the piercing glance of God who can curse him and expel him, all as He likes." [1] This does not seem to agree with what the mythical explanations, that of Gunkel included, otherwise told us of the Godlikeness won by knowledge. We have heard indeed that God, that is Jahve, opposes acquisition of knowledge by man because it makes man like unto Himself! But then, it should have been a very little god, an extremely inferior one indeed, of whom the "poor sinner" now was become the like. And our wonder is the greater as we learn from the same Gunkel, and from the same book of his,[2] that the Hebrew religion was not good soil for growing myths, on account of its monotheism. The true view of God's words will be that they imply an ironical reference to the suggestion of the serpent. The tempter had said: "God knows that you will be as divine beings who know good and evil." . . . And the man had foolishly believed it! Now he sees how he is become "as one of us!" Well might the woman say: "The serpent has beguiled me!"

The ironical character of this last address of Jahve also asserts itself in the concern expressed about the tree of life: "And now lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever"! Jahve puts it as if it were enough for the man once more to taste of the tree to secure life for ever. Still, the very nature of the means described under the figure of a tree, perpetually renewing its fruit, seemed to imply that in order to obtain its intended effect it had to be made use of in a continued way. Why does God minimise so impressively the condition required to enjoy the full result of the fruit's virtue? Is that real anxiety, or is it not rather the ironical expression of affected care? The teaching conveyed by the

[1] *l.c.* p. 65. [2] *l.c.* p. 18.

circumstance that man, in the Paradise, had free access to the tree of life primarily intended for the use of the Cherûbîm, was that man in his state of innocence would have been provided with the privilege of security against the natural agencies making for death. But now man had sinned. It is not conceivable that for the poor sinner, irrevocably condemned to death, doomed to return to the dust from which he had been taken, there should earnestly have been question of a means to secure life for ever. The tree of life had lost its whole signification and value for him, just as the tree of knowledge, being forbidden, had never had it.

The tree of knowledge of good and evil was not to impart knowledge to men. It was, according to the implicit or underlying data of the popular story well known to the Hebrew readers, intended for the Cherûbîm. That was the reason accounting for its presence in the Garden notwithstanding the law forbidding man's access to it. And since it was, by God's prohibition, reserved for the Cherûbîm, no wonder that the narrative should have implied that the fruit, in case of trespass, could be of no use to man. Mythical interpretations, especially that of Gunkel, lay great stress on Genesis iii. 7: "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked." But the statement seems to us evidently to proclaim that the knowledge of good and evil was *not* won by man's eating of the fruit. The serpent had said: your eyes will be opened and you will be as divine beings who know good and evil—who know everything. And their eyes were opened, yes! But not as they had been led to expect by the beguiling suggestion of the serpent, not as the rising to a higher knowledge, to the boastful knowledge of everything! Their eyes were opened to a knowledge bringing confusion and shame: they knew that they were naked. In their state of innocence and happiness they enjoyed perfect control over their lower faculties; through sin that

prerogative was destroyed; they felt together with the revolt of the senses against the will, together with the spontaneous awakening of the law of the flesh, the reaction of the blush of shame. The fig leaves were not a sign of progress, but a confession of the Fall.

* * * * *

Very different from these mythical explanations are such considerations as those put forward by Hort. After having stated that in his belief the assumption of the "strict historical character" of the narrative of the Fall is now no longer reasonable, Hort goes on: "But the early chapters of Genesis remain a divinely appointed parable or apologue setting forth important practical truths on subjects, which, as a matter of history, lie outside our present ken. Whether or not the corrupted state of human nature was preceded in temporal sequence by an incorrupt state, this is the most vivid and natural way of exhibiting the truth that in God's primary purpose man was incorrupt, so that evil in him should be regarded as having a secondary or adventitious character. Ideal antecedence is, as it were, pictured in temporal antecedence." [1]

We think it would be vain to dispute that the author of the narrative of the Fall, as far as the fundamental facts are concerned, really meant to record the fate that befell the first men. On the other hand it is evident that as long as the book of Genesis is considered as a document of purely human origin there can be no justification for ascribing any objective historical value to its narratives concerning our first parents. What happened to the first men was as much beyond the natural ken of the author of our narrative as it is beyond ours. He could, for instance, as a result of his reflections on human nature in its relation to God and the world, have come to the conclusion that such facts as he conceived were the most plausible explanation of the origin

[1] Hort's *Life and Letters*, London, 1896; vol. ii. p. 329.

of evil, and he might consequently have put forward these facts as having really happened. But there would be no guarantee either for the logical soundness of his theories or for the historical truth even of the essential outline of the story devised by him.

However, as soon as one admits a divinely appointed teaching in the early chapters of Genesis, the question arises of what is meant by that divine appointment, and of the extent to which the divine interference warrants the truth of the reports written under its influence. One's judgment in such matters depends on one's theological standpoint. What was as a matter of history lying beyond the natural ken of the author of our narrative may have been some way or other conveyed to him by means of that same divine interference which made the early chapters of Genesis convey divine teaching to us.

And even on the broad assumption that inspiration warrants the objective and material truth only of the religious teachings directly or indirectly conveyed by Biblical writers, on the ground that religious teaching alone was the proper aim of inspiration itself, and consequently the exclusive object of the inspired writer's dogmatic judgment, it should remain to be considered whether, in the narratives concerning the creation and the fate of the first men, the essential facts themselves as well as any moral lesson to be derived from the facts were not to be held as part and parcel of that religious teaching the objective truth of which is warranted by divine inspiration. For even in regard of the deepest religious interest of present mankind, and according to the oldest authentic documents of Christian doctrine, it is not indifferent whether or no man is ultimately a creature of God, whether or no the original state of our first parents was an incorrupt state which in temporal sequence preceded the corrupted state of the race.

A Van Hoonacker.

THE MYSTERY OF CHRIST.

An attempt was made in a previous paper (April, 1917) to explain that the "mystery of Christ," at the dawn of reflection on the fact, was nothing more and nothing less than the meaning of his person, the "unique" of persons in relation to humanity and the world as a whole. Something new, elemental, issuing from the springs of being came with his person to the world, for which the world in various ways had been prepared, and which was vital to it and essential. Paul more closely and completely than any of the first interpreters sought to express it in all the sweep of its significance. He strove to place it in its own pre-eminence within the scheme of history and experience alike. For the mystery, or the mystery transmuted into meaning that possessed his mind, and swept his life before it, was the unifying or the unity of man, and of the universe in Christ. Long as the transcendent truth had been concealed from the ages and the generations, uncommunicated and unknown in its entirety, now, at length, the veil was done away, and there in the face of Jesus it was visible, shining like the light, when the light first had its birth, the great inclusive hope or purpose of the grace of God for all men, of all conditions, and for the world itself. It was so much a thing of light, creative light, to Paul that it was nothing of a secret any more, no kind of formula or doctrine wrapped in mystic rites exclusive to the many, but the universal gospel of the universal and inclusive grace of God.

In one point, indeed, there is a touch in common betwixt

the mystery "now revealed" and the exclusive mysteries or mystery-cults, with which the apostle was more or less acquaint, that it was revealed to "his saints," i.e. to those like the apostle himself, initiates we might name them, who in virtue of a power or aptness of their own were able to receive it, and openly and unreservedly declare it to the world.

As Paul puts it in Colossians i. 29, "that I may initiate all mankind in the fulness of this mystery." Hence "this mystery," or the true Gospel, has its mysteries, its initiation and the like, but it is alone in this, that these are free and open unto all alike. So that if in spite of that, as the apostle shows elsewhere, the Gospel is veiled or dark to men, the fault is not on his side, but on theirs. What is of a nature to illuminate the mind may yet be all obscure. "If between our Gospel and the heart a veil does intervene, this can happen only with men who lose their lives, in whose case the God of the present life so blinds the understanding of the unbelieving, that for them never shall morning break aglow with the light from the Gospel charged as that is with the glory of Christ, the image of God"[1] (2 Cor. iv. 3, 4; cp. 1 Cor. i. 18–iii. 1, especially ii. 7).

In all this, no doubt, the apostle is at home in the terms and the teaching of the mystery-cult, and even more in its atmosphere, absorbed as he was in the longings of soul which it was fain to satisfy, but far more was he at home in the teaching and the terms and in the atmosphere, as of the "day-dawn," of the mystery of the Gospel. For here he affirms in language fraught with his own experience, as all his language is, the identical principle that is found in St. Mark iv. 11 bearing on the mystery of the kingdom. "Unto you the mystery of the kingdom of God is committed, but to thoseout side it all comes in parables," etc.,

[1] St. Paul's Epistles To The Thessalonians And To The Corinthians. W. G. Rutherford.

where mystery refers as in the thought of Paul to a truth or doctrine or teaching, that is open, and alight to all who have it in them to believe, and is only dark to those who fail to bring the mental or the moral sense that sees. Thus while "mystery" in gospels and epistles both relates to truth or meaning that is universal, the vast access of meaning due to Christ, it is yet inseparable from the law or limit which St. Matthew quotes as part of Jesus' answer to his questioners. "For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have abundance, but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath" (Matt. xiii. 12).

Even if the words are but inserted here, as they seem to break the flow of utterance of verses 11 and 13 it was not inapt of the writer, as one may think, to insert them, bearing as they do profoundly on the nature of the parables and the preaching of the kingdom as a whole, as well as on the person of the preacher himself. The saying appears at a later point in the fourth chapter of St. Mark as one of a group of five short sayings, all more or less akin, and not infrequently in other portions of the gospels. That no saying appears so often in one connexion and another is no small proof of historicity, whatever may have been its connexion at the first. The original setting, if such exists, is not of great importance when a various setting is the case. It simply stamps the word as one of large account in the records of the prime. It is one of those "winged words," those polished shafts of thought, that shed a wealth of light upon the inner being of the speaker himself.

For if these sayings about the mystery of the kingdom and the law of its revealing and concealing are kindred to, or identical with, the great passage in St. Matthew xi. 25–27 = Luke x. 21–22, then there is a chain of evidence around

the fact that here we are in veritable touch with one of those authentic self-illuming words which conduct us to the knowledge of the person as well as of his thought. Even if there is scarce a word of his, but we may take it and explore it, for the light it casts upon his total mind and life, yet certain words have more than others to unfold, and especially such as these before us, which have their place so well attested in the historic stratum of the Gospel.

Ruskin holds in *Sesame and Lilies* that no teacher, having some essential truth to teach, cares to set it forth so plainly, that all may catch it up without an effort at a glance and then as rapidly forgetful proceed to their next diversion; he is minded rather to envelop or enfold his thought to such an extent that all who wish to grasp his meaning shall have it stamped upon the mind by the very effort to attain it. "Be sure, also," he says, "if the author is worth anything, that you will not get at his meaning all at once;—nay, that at his whole meaning you will not for a long time arrive in any wise. Not that he does not say what he means, and in strong words too; but he cannot say it all; and what is more strange, *will* not, but in a hidden way, and in parables, in order that he may be sure you want it. . . . They do not give it you by way of help, but of reward; and will make themselves sure that you deserve it, before they allow you to reach it. But it is the same with the physical type of wisdom, gold. There seems, to you and me, no reason why the electric forces of the earth should not carry whatever there is of gold within it at once to the mountain tops, so that kings and people might know that all the gold they could get is there; and without any trouble of digging, or anxiety, or chance, or waste of time, cut it away and coin as much as they needed. But Nature does not manage it so. She puts it in little fissures in the earth nobody knows where;

you may dig long and find none; you must dig painfully to find any."

All of which is true and to the point, and within the realm of art, to begin with, examples are not few or far to seek. Thus it is often supposed that the masterpiece, the work of art that is genuinely such in point of form, feeling, finish, and the like, carries its evidence or witness in itself, and so much upon the surface, so to speak, that it cannot but appeal to all who have even a partial sense of the witchery of colour or of sound and are touched by the great emotions of the human heart. It is a delusion. Else how comes it that nearly all the masters of the Beautiful have suffered from the lack of recognition at the first, and often for as long as life itself, and have only gained their own unquestioned place after having themselves created or evoked in men the needed sense of understanding and delight? No doubt the poet Keats inspired the Adonais of a Shelley, who extols him as

> A portion of the loveliness,
> Which once he made more lovely,

but it is the fact that to all but a handful in his time and after, he remained no more than a name. The loveliness so conspicuous to Shelley and so conspicuous now was hidden from their eyes and it was long and late of coming to its own. The truth is that the great artists in their art are not concerned about the pleasure or the comfort of the rest of us, they are making what one has rightly called their own impassioned answer to the glory of the universe, and that answer in its passion is beauty, is the loveliness which they make more lovely, to which we also must needs make our answer more or less in intimate accord.

> Such minds are truly from the Deity,
> For they are Powers,

says Wordsworth, and the power which they bear with them, is "the express resemblance" of the power which Nature loves to exert upon the face of outward things.

> That men, least sensitive, see, hear, perceive,
> And cannot choose but feel

the life that is behind them. Their mind works as if it were Nature herself, and their masterpiece becomes a power like one of Nature's own.

> They from their native selves can send abroad
> Kindred mutations: for themselves create
> A like existence.

Thus creatively endowed, their mission is to transmit their own clear sight of a new world,—"the sense that fits us to perceive objects unseen before," and to awake within us such a kindred life that we alike may "hold fit converse with the spiritual world." It stands to reason that on our side there must be a certain measure of response, a certain aptness and ability to appraise the proffered gift, a certain kinship to the life that hastens to enhance our own.

> but this I feel,
> That from thyself it comes, that thou must give,
> Else never canst receive.

The mind may be never so greatly stirred by the spell that genius lays upon it, but never in the absence of its own activity. The more it gives, the more in consequence it is able to receive. It must be because there is a breathing of the same creative spirit in all men, or at least the desire for expression inseparate from every soul which it is the function of the arts to satisfy. They simply bring to live and large expression that which men would say if they only could. They speak not merely to us but for us, and if they did not speak for us, they could not speak to us at all. It is theirs to present the universal with spirit and with truth. Which explains what Keats meant when he

said that poetry "should strike us as a wording of our own highest thoughts and appear almost as a remembrance." In this sense one might say it is the word made flesh.

Now if the value of the arts consists in what they do to kindle and augment the powers of human life, enlarging both their range of sensibility and the bounds of their delight, endowing them in especial with an ample means of self-expression, ample as the growth of their desire, the same is even more true in respect of the most enthralling person known to men. What the artist is wont to evoke in men, sheds light upon his own self-evocation, lets us see something of the process whereby he attained his own consummate mastership. And might we not say that a great teacher like Jesus, who was first and last a great personality, in uttering thoughts so full of spirit and of life to men, was at the same time disclosing the principles that lay at the heart of his own life and the life of the universe? All the while that Jesus was diffusing light and infusing power he was interpreting his inner life and the laws of its activity. "For he that hath, to him shall be given." May we not find in this reiterated word, simple though it seems, one of those inevitable gleams of light, that light up all the region of his consciousness? No one, perchance, may ever penetrate the depth and breadth of such a consciousness, not because it is supernatural or divine in any false exclusive sense, but because it lies so near the heart of things and is so much at home in the life of God. And, yet, just for this reason no consciousness has such "riches" to offer and impart, no consciousness is so enwrapped in light as in a garment. The value of Jesus is like the value of the arts in this, that he not only speaks to us but for us. He utters forth the universal, deep calling unto deep. It is on this account one must suppose that Jesus was subject to the laws which he expressed in immemorial words, and in particular to

the law which says, "whosoever hath, to him shall be given," and that he "grew and waxed strong, becoming full of wisdom" in obedience to that law. And so it falls to us to interpret Jesus in the light of that law as well as of the other laws which he impressed on men by speech and influence, and of which he was and is and ever shall be the subject *in excelsis.*

There can be little doubt that the word, "he that hath, to him shall be given," stands appropriately in or about the passage on the mystery of the kingdom, Mark iv. 11–12, etc., Matthew xiii. 11–13, and the fact that this passage is in such manifest accord with Matthew xi. 25–27=Luke x. 21–22 bears out the personal import of the law as so expressed. It is even claimed that the former is adapted from the latter, and that their real identity, in spite of the divergency of form, is shown by the transitional form assumed in an early apocryphal gospel quoted by Clement (*ca.* 220 A.D.). "My mystery is for me and the sons of my household." [1] If it is not possible to say for certain that the one passage is adapted from the other it is obvious that both are but slightly different statements of the same essential truth.

> At that season Jesus answered and said,
> I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth,
> that thou didst hide these things
> from the wise and understanding,
> and didst reveal them unto babes:
> yea, Father, for so it was well pleasing in thy sight.
>
> All things have been delivered unto me of my Father;
> and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father;
> nor does anyone know the Father, save the Son,
> and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal (him).

Few words, if any, found in the synoptic page have occasioned more debate than these, which has all been useful

[1] *The Beginnings Of Gospel Story.* B. W. Bacon, p. 48.

on the whole, inasmuch as it would appear to strengthen rather than reduce the case in favour of them mainly as they stand. If it is often laid to their charge that they are "sicklied o'er" with the Johannine cast of thought and are thus in part at least the product of a later time, yet it is not explained why they so easily assumed it, or became adapted to it. How account for the facility with which the Johannine leaven wrought itself in to the synoptic measure, so to speak?

There is another fact that bears upon the point before us and generally upon the question of the sources of the gospels, namely, the presence of what has been described as "the mystical and speculative element in the early records of Christ's Sayings which found its highest and most widely accepted expression in St. John's Gospel" and "may well have been much more general and less peculiarly Johannine than has hitherto been taken for granted." Such is the conclusion of the editors of *New Sayings of Jesus*, and since the discovery thereof and of the Odes of Solomon the evidence in favour of it has increased. With the admission of an active element of thought like this emerging altogether from a native source, one would not now attempt to isolate the passage—Matthew xi. 25–27—from the body of synoptic teaching as a whole. Nor need one flee for refuge to "a tendency, probably at work from an early time, to assimilate verse 27 to the Johannine type of doctrine." Further, there seems to be but little ground for the idea that "knoweth" was substituted for "hath known," as there is no real difference in meaning between the tenses, and as for the conjecture that the clause "no one knoweth the Son but the Father" was added "to bring out more clearly the theological implication," that is now of less account for the reason we have seen and may be set aside.

The whole theory, indeed, that because the thought of the passage, or its language, bears a likeness to the Fourth Gospel, it must needs be borrowed from the same, is shaken by the fact of an anticipative Jewish strain of doctrine kindred to but independent of it. Comparative religion often shows that where bonds of resemblance are observed among ideas they are not due to borrowing at all. If, then, in the present instance the hypothesis of borrowing in the interests of Johannine doctrine does not answer to the facts, there is every reason to retain the passage as it stands as one belonging to the primitive tradition. And, truly, there is nothing in the verses, rightly understood, that does not straightly mingle with the thought of Jesus as we find it there. Not only are they not so "separate" and by themselves as some suppose, but they strike one chiefly as but a fuller, in the sense of a more closely personal, articulation or assignment of the spiritual law: "for whosoever hath, to him shall be given." It is worth remarking in this connexion that immediately following upon the passage before us (Luke x. 21–22 = Matt. xi. 25–27) are the words in Luke: "Blessed are the eyes which see the things that ye see," etc., the same words as are found in Matthew in the section on the use and abuse of the parables.

Now it may be accepted that the "all things" of verse 27 are things of the selfsame nature as "these things" of verse 25 and, as the setting in St. Luke would seem to imply, they refer not to any supernatural power, but to the knowledge of things divine, "the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven" which had been hidden from the wise and understanding, and revealed unto those who were but babes, the simple or the open-minded for whom they were prepared. It is this knowledge or insight into the real nature of religion that Jesus here is pressing home against the crudite religion of the scribes, and no doubt

also against existing systems of an esoteric type. As one has aptly pointed out, "all doctrine and all knowledge with the Jews is παράδοσις, but the παράδοσις of Jesus springs direct from God and not from man. It has nought in common with the Jewish or the mystic but the name. In essence it is wholly different." [1] The "tradition" of Jesus (πάντα μοι παρεδόθη) is a revelation born of his own personal relation to the Father. As is the relation so is the revelation. It is but the content, as one might say, of that relation, which is the mystery of his person brought to light. It is but the truth of the mutual life of Son and Father, their comprehensive and creative fellowship unfolded and expressed. No words accordingly, it would seem, are nearer to the fact expressly as it stands than these:

> No one knoweth the Son save the Father,
> neither doth any know the Father save the Son
> and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal.

Here is sonship in such full accord with its idea, sonship of such an active and ideal character, at such a pitch and acme of its own, that it is able to impart the ideal knowledge in which itself consists and which is life to men. It is both the capacity and the choice to reveal. Although it is sonship high and lifted up, the very "top" of sonship, so to speak, fit to be entrusted with "all things" of the Father, it is not on that account exclusive or remote, wrapt in divinity apart, but, on the contrary, the very medium and the mouthpiece of the same to men. The "all things" gathered in its ken are all of a piece with the "these things" granted to the "babes." It is their nature to be revealed and to be received, and if revealed under set conditions, under the like conditions to be received. If the conditions

[1] Wellhausen, *Das Evangelium Matthaei*, p. 57.

of revealing are those of the ideal sonship of the Son, it stands to reason that the conditions of receiving are of the same commanding type. A fact so real as that the things revealed to babes are at the same time hidden from the wise and shrewd presupposes the existence of a law or laws which it makes all the difference to fulfil or no. The difference does not touch the surface merely, but dwells in the heart of the mystery of the things. Things of God, they cannot but enjoin a corresponding attitude in men. Herein lies the great cleavage between those who have and those who have not. And this is the triumph of the Gospel and its tragedy alike. "For he that hath, to him shall be given: and he that hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath."

It has been suggested that by "all things" Jesus refers to "all my experiences, success and failure, . . . for both I bless His name, because all things—success and failure—come to me from my heavenly Father. I can stand alone unrecognised, for He recognises me; I stand alone, I and my disciples, but it is we who know God and recognise the signs of His visitation." [1] There is truth in the idea in so far at least as it seeks to give to "all things" a real basis in experience. It is of value as supporting the belief that Jesus "advanced"—made progress—in the knowledge that was his, in the course of Providence, and as he "travelled on life's common way" of duty and of trust. A supreme learner in the universal school of the soul he strove to achieve, and did achieve, the very laws he afterwards addressed to men.

> Experience is by industry achiev'd
> And perfected by the swift course of time.

To say that the things of God were learned and an achievement of his own, is not to say that they were not also an

[1] Burkitt, *JTS.*, Jan. 1911.

afflatus from above. Revelation and experience are not alien or apart but simply the inseparable aspects of a single process in which God and man are mutually active all the time. The idea that the knowledge of Jesus proceeds direct from God does not mean that it does not proceed from experience or through experience. No one would say that the "these things" of the babes were independent of their own susceptibility, their open-mindedness, their own preparedness of soul, but rather that this was the very power within by which they took them in, "a master light of all their seeing." And one cannot but think that Jesus likewise must have lived into the "all things" absorbed and active in his sonship, becoming full of wisdom as he went about fulfilling all the will of Him that sent him. In a word, Jesus is the great exponent of his own instruction, "that whosoever hath, to him shall be given."

In this sense the whole passage sheds a world of light upon the personality of Jesus, and so far from being an intrusion from another source is all in keeping with his genuine sphere of thought. Since it rests upon historic ground and is laden with experience, it is surely meaningless to assert that the passage says nothing about an "eternal" relationship between the Father and the Son, but simply expresses an historical fact.[1] Is then an historical fact in some sense exclusive of an eternal relationship? Or is an eternal relationship something that lies over and above the region of historical fact? Surely it is a prime error of thought to establish such a dualism between eternity and time. An eternal relationship that transcends historical fact and cannot be expressed therein, what is it or what can anybody know about it? It is wholly past our finding out and cannot even be distinguished from historic fact. On the other hand, an historical fact like

[1] Harnack, *The Sayings of Jesus*, p. 219

the personality or the sonship that is conscious of a knowledge of the Father that comprises "all things" enshrines the only kind of eternal relationship that is intelligible to us at all. And that will be seen, perchance, as one tries to approach the meaning of the fact itself.

One thing is certain, if it is not both historical and fraught with the elemental or eternal truth that "all things" signify, it is not the fact upon which the Gospels rest, nor is it the fact that breathes and burns in the mighty invitation: "Come unto me" (Matt. xi. 28–30). It is to be observed that this saying is found in Matthew only, and is absent in the parallel in Luke, a striking circumstance that may suggest that it did not stand in this connexion at the first, but in some other moment of the ministry. It is only the connexion and not the authenticity that is in doubt; but even if the original connexion was other than the present, one cannot but again admit the insight of the evangelist in placing those momentous sayings side by side. There is a consummate aptness in the placing which is true in idea if not in fact. None but the one voice could have spoken both. Different moments of its speech are but different tones of its identity. For it is in every sense as one assured of knowing the Father with an intimacy all his own and of having it straight from the Father Himself ("no one knoweth the Son save the Father") that he utters these dynamic words: "Come unto me . . . and I will refresh you."

Here again the language is vibrant with experience. It is not without first-hand knowledge of the situation, not without the thrill of human sympathy, he calls to the exhausted and the heavy-laden, all of whom beneath the crying bondage of the Pharisaic yoke had fallen into their present evil plight. As though he had borne himself "the heavy and the weary weight" he

summons them in the sure and suasive terms of the deliverer to come unto him and take his yoke upon them, a yoke which is not imposed upon but is always imparted to the simple, or those who bring the simple and sincere desire of knowing God. In virtue of his own immediate knowledge of the Father, or, in other words, his personality, Jesus has within himself the source of insight into things divine, and it is not "esoteric." It is open, free, and easy of approach to all who please to come with humble and attentive minds. He is not less signally assured of this than of himself: of their seeing than of his own insight, of their attaining than of his own attainment. It is part of his assurance of himself. It belongs to the open secret of his personality. What is experience or achievement in his case must needs be achievement in theirs. Or, in other words, Jesus is not more certain of his own attitude to the Father than he is of the attitude required of them. Springing from the same deep fount of confidence in himself, his personality, his oneness of life with the Father, comes his determinate appeal to men to place themselves in that living contact or connexion in which he can impart and they possess the vital knowledge which is his alone. They must come to *him* . . . they must take *his* yoke . . . and learn of *him*.

In all of which the speaker is profoundly true to himself, and to his epoch-making point of view. All through he moves within his own creative realm of thought. He ranges his hearers under the same conditions as he is conscious of fulfilling in himself. Or, he ranges his own personality under the same laws as he applies to them. The truth about himself has been spiritually discerned. Like the "all things" delivered unto him of which it forms the core, it could not otherwise have been discerned. He that hath, to him has been given. To Jesus himself his

sonship was a mystery which nought but revelation could unfold. "No one knows the Son but the Father." It was only through a life absorbed in the effort to fulfil "all righteousness" or all the holy will of God, including a great act like that of union with his people in the moment of repentance at the Jordan (Matt. iii. 13–15; cp. Mark. xi. 30) that he came to realise the total meaning of his sonship for himself and for mankind. What that total meaning was, it is the aim of every student to explore, and something also of the process by which it grew within his consciousness, normally, as one may think, from more to more, from one expansion to another, till all that was implicit in the personal bond of sonship became explicit in the Messianic calling or the Christhood, that being the meaning and the magnitude of sonship realised. There are data which suffice to show that in tracing Jesus' knowledge of himself we are not dealing merely with a fixed or static frame of mind, but with one that grew—grew by being subject to the very laws which he declared to men.

Having reached this point of view as regards the mystery of the person, which calls, of course, for working out in its details, we may now return to the passage with which we began, about the mystery of the kingdom: "unto you the mystery of the kingdom of God is committed, but to those outside it all comes in parables" (Mark iv. 11, parallels). Why in parables? And who are "those outside"? And as there is some significant connexion between them and the parables, what is the connexion?

Now if we scan the process of events in Mark prior to the teaching of the multitude by the sea-side (Mark iv. 1; cp. Matt. xiii. 1)—there being something more than just a casual chronicle and some attempt to show how a later stage emerges from the one before it as in history itself—we can see that Jesus had aroused no ordinary feelings

of wonderment and admiration far and wide. On beholding what his word could do in the synagogue one day, "they were all amazed, so that they asked, What is this? A new teaching with authority!" (Mark i. 27). And when the paralytic rose at the same commanding word and went out before them all, again "they were all amazed, and glorified God, saying, We never saw anything like it before" (Mark ii. 12; cp. Luke iv. 32; Matt. vii. 28–29). In these vivid opening pages of St. Mark there runs the new and unfamiliar note of authority, which is more than merely independence of tradition and the like, and is essentially power, the power of saying things and doing things instinct with God. It is something "given from above" and in Jesus' mind and mouth one might call it the beatitude of power. It could not issue forth in word and deed without creating some rebound in men. If it soon aroused the rapture of the crowd, it was quick to inflame the violent repugnance of the scribes (Mark ii. 1–iii. 6). Antagonism here, acclamation there; and, yet, even the acclamation was due far more to the healer of the body, the wonder-worker, than to the saviour of the soul. Their attitude, if it was not one of Pharisaic hate, nor one of apathy as of those who "cared for none of these things," was, for the most part, merely superficial, unintelligent excitement feeding itself upon the marvels and hungering and thirsting after more to come. Not after righteousness, alas! It was not the attitude in any sense that Jesus craved, and had right or reason to expect considering the nature of his message and the object of his labours in their midst. It was not even the like of what the Baptist had awakened in the region round about the Jordan. For the inner life was all untouched and untransformed. Matthew relates that the verdict Jesus passed upon the Galilean cities was that "they repented not" (Matt. xi. 20). They

had failed to "buy up their opportunity" (Eph. v. 16).

It was not that enough had not been offered their acceptance up till now. Too much, indeed, had been already offered for their non-acceptance to be free from blame. For this reason, therefore, it would seem, Jesus was impelled to change his method of address that fain he might disturb and shake off their persistent thoughtlessness and levity of will. When, then, "He began to teach by the sea-side" (Mark iv. 1)—a very great multitude being gathered unto him—he replaced his former mode of teaching, which consisted in the main of exhortation and appeal, with the parable. He only took to the parable, one might say, at the bidding of necessity. "To those outside it all comes in parables." It was a new and striking fashion of address with a set intention of its own. It was still teaching and still therefore planned to suit the hearer, but with a certain added note of secret or obscurity the special aim of which was at once to quicken thought, provoke reflection, and evoke a proper finding of the truth. "Hearken," cried the preacher as he struck into the parable of the sower, and he wound it up as he began, with an arresting word which proved that more was meant than met the ear. "He that hath ears let him hear" (Mark iv. 3, 9; cp. *vv.* 33–34).

Thus the parable in Jesus' lips played a master part within his ministry. It stands for nothing less than a change of method due to stress of circumstance. It did not mean that Jesus ceased in any sense to be the teacher bent upon his task of setting forth the "things" of God, but only that in view of the prevailing shallowness of men, and all their lack of thought, and slowness to believe, he had to thrust into his word another element designed at once to chasten and arrest and rouse their inner life. It was more than just the novel teaching with authority as

at the first, and might perhaps be described as authority grappling with the situation in another way, taking the form of an assault upon the souls of men. It was a new endeavour of authority to meet the problem of the time, and it meant in every sense that more interest and not less, more intelligence and not less, more effort and application of the whole man were now required to seize and see the light. The parable laid upon its hearers one by one the added task of piercing through the parabolic veil and discovering for themselves the hidden truth. There was something left unsaid which it fell to them to supplement. It was a fresh and pointed challenge presented to the mind and will alike. It was a new and grand attempt to win the multitude.

Buzy [1] is surely right in claiming that the parable is partly of the nature of a chastisement or judgment brought upon the thoughtless and unwilling spirit of the crowd and that Mark and Luke are virtually at one with Matthew in this point of view. In Matthew it is stated thus:

> Therefore speak I to them in parables;
> because seeing they see not,
> and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.
> (Matt. xiii. 13; cf. Mark iv. 12, Luke viii. 10.)

It was not that they could not, but they would not understand, they would not give heed to the things that were heard. Immersed in a mere amaze of sight and sense (cp. John vi. 26), unconscious of the spiritual life at all, they doomed themselves to the inevitable moral loss of those that have not (Mark iv. 25; Matt. xiii. 12). Since there is some connexion, then, in the nature of the case between their failure to appraise the teaching with authority and the teaching in parables to which they were now summoned by the sea-side, the connexion is such as invests

[1] *Introduction aux Paraboles Évangéliques.* Par Le P. D. Buzy.

the parable with a certain air of discipline and even turns it into a rod of correction. To the question wherein the penal aspect of the parable consists Buzy answers, in its obscurity. Admittedly, the parable is obscure as the teaching at the first was not, because by means of image and allusion more or less disguised it shadowed forth a doctrine of the kingdom which did not tally with the view to which the people clung. But even if the parable was purposely obscure, its purpose was not therefore to obscure. Its purpose, no whit less than that of the teaching as a whole, was to enlighten and instruct. One might say indeed that its purpose more than ever was to enlighten and instruct, seeing that it involved a doctrine of the kingdom which was all so new and unfamiliar to his hearers that they could not take it in without unlearning much, and learning more. Its purpose, mainly, therefore, was to stir the deeper springs of thought, and capture or convince the conscience of the crowd. One may thus agree with Buzy in his view that while there is a penal aspect proper to the parable, its central aspect is the mercy or compassion of the teacher bent on making known to men the truth about the kingdom, and constraining them to enter in and share its benefits. There is nought in mercy that is incompatible with discipline or with the laying down of sovereign laws pertaining to the kingdom and its membership. It was all of mercy, the mercy that is moral at the core, that there was such a kingdom to announce and such vital laws to establish and achieve. What if the kingdom, what if its conditions were a problem that demanded thought of men, and a task as well that called for effort and endurance to fulfil? The kingdom as it was to Jesus was no mere portent to be flashed upon their gaze by the fiat of supernal power apart or all but apart from any faith or work of theirs. It was a kingdom that in every sense bespoke the agency

of men upon the earth, and if it had perforce to clothe itself in parable it was chiefly that it might impress its call and sharpen its assault upon their inner life—that inner life in which the kingdom comes and comes expressly if it comes at all. Therein lay the mystery of the kingdom as Jesus strove to set it forth in parables.

If, now, to conclude, we briefly scan the parables which bear upon the mystery of the kingdom as they are recorded by St. Mark, those of the Sower, the Seed growing secretly, the Mustard-seed, to which may be added the Leaven, companion to the Mustard-seed in Matthew xiii. 33, we shall find that they are all alike concerned in the selfsame principle that the kingdom is a power that lives and moves and has its being in the inner life. It has often been observed that what they severally present is the contrast between small causes and great effects, a process started by means so seeming slight and incomplete and the incomparable climax by and by. No proportion betwixt the means adopted and the end attained, no proportion but a vital partnership. If to all appearance there is but a fragment of connexion between the bare grain that is sown and the harvest that is reaped, yet the one must needs be sown in weakness, that the other may be raised in power. Just as the husbandman goes forth to sow and by the seed he sows constrains the earth to yield her fabulous increase, so—Jesus would have all his hearers hearken and perceive—the sower who sows the word will in like fashion cause the harvest of the same to ripen, or, in other words, the kingdom to come. In that season the word of the kingdom is being preached, the vital principle introduced which will issue in the kingdom as surely and as quickly, it would seem, as the strewing of the grain in harvest. The crowd, or "they that are without," perceive only that Jesus is publishing the kingdom; while "they that are within"

discern that he is producing it, causing it to come—that is the mystery, as one has rightly said. Of the seed that is being sown, while much no doubt will lead to nought, some will be sure to fall into fruitful ground and spring up thence abundantly. It matters not if the sower "knoweth not how," but once the seed, be it never so small, is sown the sequel is assured. The rôle of man seems almost insignificant in contrast with the vast response of earth; the little grain of mustard-seed swells into a shrub of spreading boughs and birds of the heaven lodging in its shade: the little lump of leaven mixing with the meal mysteriously assimilates the whole: the movement now in being, hid and humble though it seems, must needs result in the kingdom of God. There, to repeat, is the mystery.

It is not now before us to discuss wherein the thought of Christ departs from current forms of apocalyptic thought: enough to know that by exhibiting the kingdom as something already cast like seed into the ground he means that the kingdom is a fact or force obtaining in the inner life of men. The burden of his thought is not the pressing nearness of the age to come, but that it must be born of the sowing of the word, communicative human effort, unequal as the means may seem to realise the end. About the kind of effort that appears inadequate, but is essential, there is the vivid analogue taken from the life of the husbandman, who by his timely toil compels the earth to yield her fruit. Obviously the point of the analogue is not that man must wait on God for the advent of the kingdom, but that he must work the kind of work on which God waits to further its advance. It has nothing to do with the idea of non-interference—"the limit to the power of man to help on the kingdom of God"—but everything to do with its opposite, the idea of interaction, the strenuous exertion of his power to achieve an object common and

akin to both. Its message is not "be patient and wait for God," but "be active and work with God," and when Jesus said, "if I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then is the kingdom of God come upon you," he was pointing to the kind of activity that signally became the kingdom. There in his work and word the kingdom was present and real. In his person it had verily come with power. It was a quickening spirit within him and within "as many as received him." Of their activity no less than of his own, he believed it was essential to the one consummate end. The reign of God bespoke in them a like exertion, depended on their productive power of faith as on his, and was neither here nor there nor anywhere without it. "Neither shall they say Lo here! or There! for lo, the kingdom of God is within you."

Such being the spirit, attitude, or temper of the inner life that alone consisted with the kingdom, it was nothing less than this that Jesus strove to awaken in the crowd that gathered by the sea. It was for this reason he spoke unto them in parables. "And without a parable spake he not (spake he nothing Matt. xiii. 34) unto them," in order both insistently to urge their mind to think upon, and their heart to apprehend the truth of what he meant by the mystery of the kingdom of God. It was all so different to their cherished dreams and their desires, all so spiritual, intense and real as compared with their persistent levity, externalism, unbelief, that it required of them a total change of life, the regeneration of their heart and mind. Not otherwise could the mystery of the kingdom be revealed to them. It could only be revealed to them by being revealed in them. They must needs accept its laws to achieve its liberties. They must learn its husbandry to obtain its inheritance. If, to apply the language of Hebrews, "the word of hearing did not profit them because it was

not mixed with faith for them that heard " and so remained a mystery, it was only by being mixed with faith, and that a worthy or productive faith, that it could profit them and be in them the light of life.

> For he that hath, to him shall be given;
> and he that hath not,
> from him shall be taken away
> even that which he hath.

JAMES ROBERTSON CAMERON.

RICHARD BAXTER AD CLERUM.

Baxter (1615–1691) was one of the greatest of preachers, whether we judge by depth of influence or width of appeal. "Width of appeal" may be taken as a phrase descriptive of popularity; and Baxter's popularity was immense. He began his preaching at Dudley, and the people not only crowded the church, but thronged to listen "at the windows." After three-quarters of a year he removed to Bridgnorth, and spent there what he felt to be a barren twelve months. Yet his preaching was constantly applauded by the "generality." Then came (early in 1640) the call to Kidderminster followed by a success so great that the capacious church of St. Mary's could not hold the hearers, and had to be enlarged by the addition of five galleries. Ere long his fame spread throughout the land, and wherever he preached the people "hung upon him listening." He seems to have been especially popular in London. At various times he preached in various churches there—including Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's. On one occasion he notes that his auditory in St. Paul's was "the greatest he had ever seen." On another occasion, referring to a service at St. Lawrence Jewry, where Mr. Vines was Pastor, he says: "Though I sent the day before to secure room for the Lord Broghill and the Earl of Suffolk, with whom I was to go on in the coach, yet when I came the crowd had so little respect of persons that they were fain to go home again because they could not come within hearing. . . . And Mr. Vines himself was fain to get up into the pulpit and sit behind me, and I to stand between his legs. . . ."[1]: So it was to the last. Mrs. Baxter's

[1] *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, pt. i., p. 112.

reason for urging him to preach in defiance of the law after 1662 lay simply in her knowledge that he drew the common people as no one else could do. But it was not only the people whom he drew. Men and women of every type were irresistibly attracted.

There is no doubt, of course, that he possessed the natural gifts of a great speaker. We are told that he had a "moving voice"—"a very articulate speech"—an instinct which led him to place "the emphatical accent as the matter did require"—"a great command over his thoughts," i.e., full self-possession—an unfailing fluency—and an eagerness to express himself which made preaching a joy. But what nature gave he studied to improve. Thus the remarkable clearness, simplicity and pungency—what his friend, Mr. Sylvester, calls acrimony—of his style was something attained. "I have naturally such a style," he says, "as because of its brevity is accused of obscurity." But he amended it for the sake of teaching the people.

"I considered that I speak to plain unlearned men that cannot find our meaning in two narrow a room and that use to overlook the fullness of significant words. As they must be long in thinking so we must be long in speaking, or else our words fall short of the mark and die before they can produce the desired effect. So great is the distance between these men's ears and their brains." In connexion with the same point he says, "I confess I never loved affectation or too much industry about words, nor like the temper of them that do. May I speak pertinently, plainly, piercingly and somewhat properly I have enough. I judge as judicious Dr. Stoughton (out of Seneca), that he is the best preacher that feels what he speaks and then speaks what he feels."

Again, his friend Sylvester speaks of him as "a person

wonderful at extemporate preaching"; and by way of example he relates how "having once left his notes behind him he was surprised into extemporate thoughts upon (as I remember) Hebrews iv. 13, 'For we have not a high priest,' etc. Whereupon he preached to very great satisfaction unto all that heard him. And when he came down from the pulpit he asked me if I was not tired? I said, 'With what?' He said, with his extemporate discourse. I told him that had he not declared it I believe none would have discovered it. His reply to me was that he thought it very needful for a minister to have a Body of Divinity in his head." Here the point is that Baxter could be effective in extemporate preaching because, by diligent study, he had filled his mind with relevant matter. He was, indeed, an untiring student. When the Quakers "charged" him "to be empty of the Spirit because he studied" he replied, "I pray God forgive me that I study no more." "Those who speak for God must study unless they will despise God and His word and their hearers. Reade 2 Timothy ii. 15; Psalm i. 2; 1 Timothy iv. 15; Psalm cxix. 15, 23, 48, 78, 97, 98, 148, and see whether it be not our duty to study and meditate day and night." His Quaker critics accused him of idleness because he did not thresh and dig. "Thresh and dig," exclaims Baxter, "I professe if God would give me leave I should take it for a great recreation and refreshment to my body, and should think it incomparably a more easie life than that which I endure. Solomon knew, and I know it to my sorrow, that much study is a wearinesse to the flesh; and might I but plough and dig I should yet hope to live in some competent health, who now spend my daies in continual pain and languishing. But then how shall I fulfil God's command—1 Timothy iv. 15:

"'Meditate on these things, give thyself wholly to them

(mark *wholly*) that thy profiting may appear to all'?"[1]

Baxter, one sees, neglected his body, much to his discomfort and disadvantage. But he did so for the sake of exclusive attention to what he conceived to be the higher duty of Biblical study. His aim was so to fill his mind with knowledge as to enrich his lips with all utterance. He thought it an impiety to suppose that the Spirit would come to the help of his indolence.

This appears again in his notice of another Quaker charge, viz., that he read his "sermons out of a paper, and therefore he had not the Spirit." It were as wise to argue, replied Baxter, that "because we use spectacles or hour-glasses and pulpits we have not the Spirit." It is true that "I use notes as much as any man when I take pains, and as little as any man when I am lazie, or busie, and have not leisure to prepare. It is easier for us to preach three sermons without notes than one with them." But "regard to the work; and the good of the hearers" forbad this easy method; and, in short, he used notes that he might guard himself against a facility of speech which tempted to a poor quality of work. It was his ambition to be a workman needing not to be ashamed. Then only did he feel it reverent and reasonable to depend on the Spirit.

In passing I may mention how he met a demand for short, or shorter sermons. In his day any sermon under

[1] *Quaker's Catechism*, p. 20. Cp. *Our Sheet against the Quakers* (1657), p. 11, § 24. "The Quakers say we are idle drones that labour not and therefore should not eat. Answer: The worse I wish you is that you had but my ease instead of your labour. I have reason to take myself for the least of saints, and yet I fear not to tell the accuser that I take the labour of most Tradesmen in the Town to be a pleasure to the body in comparison of mine. . . . Their labour preserveth health and mine consumeth it. They work in ease and I in continual pain. They have hours and daies of recreation; I have scarce time to eat and drink. Nobody molesteth them for their labour, but the more I do the more hatred and trouble I draw upon me. If a Quaker ask me what all this trouble is, et him come and see, or do as I do, and he shall know."

an hour's length was deemed short, and there is no doubt that Baxter often outran his hour-glass. But what then? "Experience telleth us that very few words, and short time, serve not to inform men's understandings. And after that the *Will* and Affections must have time to be duly excited and resolved. And more time is necessary yet to drive the nail to the head, and to settle the soul against the force of all objections that may be produced to the contrary, and yet more time to settle it in the right way of practice." [1]

Brevity has been forced upon the modern preacher; but Baxter's rule is still good that the length of a sermon should be determined by its "aptitude" to reach the end in view.

(ii.) We have seen that popularity came to Baxter in abundance. He did not seek it nor did he care much for it except so far as it helped him toward his one object. What was that? He calls it, in well-worn phrase, the salvation of souls. However men praised his preaching he felt it had failed if it did not result in conversions, or the edification of souls. For this he "prayed without ceasing." And his success was wonderful—especially in conversions. To how few ministers has it been given to say as he could say: "When I first entered upon my labours in the ministry I took special notice of every one that was humbled, reformed, or converted, but when I had laboured long, it pleased God that the converts were so many that I could not afford time for such particular observations about every one of them." [2]

Again, "In the beginning of my ministry I was wont to number them" (conversions) "as Jewels, but since then I could not keep any number of them." [3] Did he boast of this? Far from it. "O what am I, a worthless

[1] P. 7. "The Duty of Heavenly Meditation," reviewed by *R. B.* at the invitation of Mr. E. Ferman's "Exceptions."

[2] *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, pt. i., p. 21.

[3] *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, pt. i., p. 84.

worm, not only wanting academical Honours, but much of that Furniture which is needful to so high a work, that God should thus abundantly encourage *me*, when the Reverend Fathers of my Youth did labour fifty years together in one place, and could scarcely say that they had converted one or two of their parishes. And the greater was this mercy because I was naturally of a discouraged spirit, so that if I had preached one year, and seen no fruits of it, I should hardly have forborn running away like Jonah, but should have thought God called me not to that place."

This brings me to the heart of what I want to say. I fear it has become somewhat rare for ministers to think much about the results of their preaching, or at least about conversions. I have seen this excused on the ground that Baxter had a motive for his concern which we have ceased to feel. He believed that Hell lies just beyond the border-line of death; and that every sinner, dying impenitent, is doomed to its fires everlastingly. He did, indeed, believe this—believed it with his whole soul—not because he wished to believe it: there is evidence that he would most gladly have believed otherwise if he had not been driven to it by the plain words of Scripture. But believing it, and apprehending it vividly as an unspeakably fearful fact, he was moved by it to a tremendous earnestness of appeal. He was like one who sees a train rushing in ignorance towards a broken bridge, and is in agony while his warning shouts and signals are unrecognised or unheeded. Not to warn men of the wrath to come and the way of escape seemed to him a base and heartless neglect of duty. "Dost thou live close by them, or meet them in the streets, or labour with them, or travel with them, or sit still and talk with them, and say nothing to them of their souls and the life to come? If their house were on fire thou wouldst run and help them, and wilt thou not help them

when their souls are almost at the fire of Hell? If thou knewest but a remedy for their diseases thou wouldst tell it them, or else thou wouldst judge thyself guilty of their death. *Cardan* speaks of one that had a Receipt that would suddenly and certainly dissolve the stone in the Bladder, and he concludes of him that he makes no doubt but that man is in Hell because he never revealed it to any before he died. What, then, shall we say of them that know of the Remedy for curing Souls, and do not reveal it, nor persuade men to make use of it?"

For himself, he could never preach, or speak much to individuals, or write at any length, without sounding the alarm. Listen to the following as a sample of his entreating urgency.

"It is most certain that one of these dayes thou shalt be either in everlasting, unchangeable Joy or Torments and doth it not awake thee? Is there so few that find the way of Life? So many that go the way of death? So hard to escape? So easie to miscarry? And *that* while we fear nothing, but think all is well? And yet you sit still and trifle? Why, what do you mean, what do you think on? The world is passing away; its pleasures are fading; its honours are leaving you; its profits will prove unprofitable to you; Heaven or Hell are a little before you; God is Just and Jealous; His threatenings are true; the great day of His Judgment will be terrible; your time runs on; your lives are uncertain; you are far behindhand; you have loitered long; your case is dangerous; your Souls are far gone in sin; you are strange to God; you are hardened in evil customs; you have no assurance of pardon to shew; if you die to-morrow, how unready are you, and with what terrors will your Souls go out of your bodies; and you do yet loiter for all this? Why, consider with yourselves, God standeth all this while

waiting your leisure; His Patience beareth; His Justice forbeareth; His mercy intreateth you; Christ standeth offering you His blood and merits; you may have Him freely and life with Him; the Spirit is persuading you; Conscience is accusing and urging you; ministers are praying for you and calling upon you; Satan stands waiting when Justice will cut off your lives, that he may have you. This is your time. Now or never." [1]

Such vehemence of persuasion helps us to understand what Mr. Sylvester says, that "when Mr. Baxter spake of weighty soul concerns you might find his very spirit drench'd therein." But if most of us (for good reasons) no longer think of Hell, and its imminence for sinners, as Baxter did, have we not paralyzed the nerve of our appeal, and lost a motive for earnestness which nothing else can replace? Baxter himself thought so. Many Christians of his day, and some ministers, showed little or no zeal for the saving of men; and among other "hindrances" to their zeal he indicates a "secret infidelity" with regard to Hell.

"Oh, Christians, if you do verily believe that your poor, carnal, ungodly neighbour, or wife, or husband, or child should certainly lie for ever in the flames of Hell, except they be thoroughly recovered and changed, and *that* quickly before death doth snatch them hence, would not this make you cast off all discouragements, and lie at them day and night till they were persuaded, and give them no Rest in their carnal state? How could you hold your tongue, or let them alone another day, if this was soundly believed?"

How indeed! But the belief has gone—gone from the minds of Christians generally as well as from the minds of ministers. If the latter still retained and preached it as Baxter did, they would soon be left, for the most part, like voices crying in the wilderness. How this has come

[1] *Saint's Everlasting Rest*, pt. iii., cap. 13, § 8.

about is not now the question. I will only say that the change may be traceable largely to a more Christian conception of God and a better knowledge of the Bible. But the question pressing on my mind is this—Can we, as ministers, find a motive for urgency not less strong than Baxter's ? The question is one to be faced. For probably the thing most characteristic of ordinary modern preaching is its lack of the urgent note : I mean that note of passionate entreaty which springs out of the feeling that the sermon is a message, a message of the utmost personal importance for the spiritual well-being of the hearers in time and Eternity. Is preaching Christian preaching without this ? Without this has not the preacher forfeited his function as an ambassador for God ? Is he not in danger of becoming merely a talker on religious themes ; or, at best, an expounder of the Christian cult and ethic ? In a word, the preacher must, for his very life's sake, discover a motive which will enable him to retain Baxter's intense Evangelism, and so his saving power over men.

If I ventured to suggest where the motive may be found I should say, in a realisation of such central Christian facts as these :—

(*a*) Christ's vision of every man as essentially a spiritual being of infinite value, a child of God.

(*b*) Christ's vision of sin as a perversity in man's will destructive of his true life in God and of all that belongs to his peace—so creative of his own hell.

(*c*) Christ's vision of God as holy love, ever active for man's good, ever suffering for his sin, ever judging and condemning it, ever seeking to save him from it.

(*d*) Christ's historic expression of God's love in that pouring out of His soul through life and death, for man's sake, which means his Cross.

Here are facts which, in proportion as they are studied,

understood and felt, would surely supply the preacher with a motive no less powerful than Baxter's and far more gladsome, for beseeching men to be reconciled to God. Anyhow such a motive must be found if the preacher is to work in the clear and constraining consciousness of a prophetic call.

Then, possessed of an equal motive for his work, I think he could hardly do better than give earnest heed to Baxter's manifold plea for doing it well.

1. He pleads for sincere and absolute devotedness to Christ. In a peculiar sense, a minister is Christ's man—bound to Him in a sacrament of loyalty which can endure the utmost strain. Baxter had a nephew who, after coquetting with this and that profession, announced a desire to enter the ministry. His uncle's answer was severely laconic. "William" . . . The ministry is not for you "unless you have that zeal and self-denial which would incline you to serve Christ upon the hardest terms." [1]

2. He pleads for a purely Christian type of preaching. "Be sure that the recovery and saving of souls be the main end of your studies and preaching. O do not propound any low and base ends to yourselves. This is the end of your Calling, let it be also the end of your endeavours. God forbid that you should spend a week's study to please the people; or to seek the advancing of your own reputations. Dare you appear in the Pulpit on such a business, and speak for yourselves, when you are sent and pretend to speak for Christ? Dare you spend that time, and wits and parts for yourselves? and waste the Lord's Day in seeking applause—which God hath set apart for Himself? O what notorious sacrilege is this! Set out the work of God as skilfully and adornedly as you can; but still let the winning of souls be your end, and let all your studies

[1] Baxter MSS. (Dr. Williams's Library), March 21, 1676–7.

and labours be serviceable thereto. Let not the window be so painted as to keep out the light, but alwaies judge THAT the best means that most conduceth to the end. Do not think that God is best served by a neat, starched, laced oration, but that *he* is the able, skilful minister that is best skilled in the art of instructing, convincing, perswading, and so winning of souls; and that is the best sermon which is best in these."[1]

In another place he exclaims: "Do we not study words and neat expressions that we may approve ourselves able men in the judgment of critical hearers? or, put our Tongues into some affected pace, and our language into some forced oratorical strain? As if a minister's business were of no more weight but to tell them a smooth tale of an hour long, and to look no more after them till the next sermon. Seldom do we fit our sermons either for matter or manner to the great end of our people's salvation, but we sacrifice our studies to our credit or our People's content, or some such base inferior end. Carnal discretion doth control our fervency. It maketh our sermons like beautiful pictures which have much pains and cost bestowed upon them to make them comely and desirable to the eye; but life or heat or emotion there is none. . . . The Lord pardon the great sin of the ministry in this thing and in particular my own."[2]

3. He pleads for preaching to be supplemented by constant pastoral care. "Do not think that all your work is in your studies and in the Pulpit. I confess that is great; but alas! it is but a small part of your task. You are shepherds and must know every sheep and what is their disease, and mark their strayings, and help to cure them and fetch them home. If the paucity of ministers in great

[1] *Saint's Everlasting Rest*, pt. iii., cap. 14, § 6.
[2] *Saint's Everlasting Rest*, pt. iii., cap. 6, § 5.

congregations (which is the great unobserved mischief in England that cries for Reformation) did not make it a thing impossible in many places, I should charge the ministers of England with most notorious unfaithfulness, for neglecting so much" this side of their duty. "O learn of Paul Acts xx. 19, 20, 31, to preach publickly and from house to house. Let there not be a soul in your charge that shall not be particularly instructed and watched over . . . keep in familiarity with them, that you may maintain your interest in them; and improve all your interest for God." This was written six years before he wrote *The Reformed Pastor*, of which it is the theme. He acted out his own advice, especially in the later stage of his Kidderminster ministry, and attributes to the practice much of his success. "Another great help to my success at last, was the foredescribed Work of Personal conference with every family apart, and Catechizing and Instructing them. That which was spoken to them personally, and put them sometimes upon Answers, awakened their Attention, and was easlier applied than Publick Preaching, and seemed to do much more upon them." [1] We may find it difficult, or undesirable, to follow Baxter in his catechumenal methods, etc., but there is, I think, as much need as ever for close, wise, and affectionate, individual treatment. Nor is it unlikely that our frequent failure in the "building up" of Churches may be set down as largely due to the lack of it.

4. He pleads for an honest handling of people. "Do not daub, or deal slightly with any. Some will not tell their people plainly of their sins because they are great men, and some because they are godly—as if none but the poor and the wicked should plainly be dealt with. Do not you so, but reprove them sharply (though differently and

[1] *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, pt. i., p. 91.

with wisdom) that they may be sound in the Faith." Nor ever be a respector of persons. "Many will much rejoice if they have been the instruments of converting a Gentleman (and they have good cause); but, for the common multitude, they look not after them, as if God were a respecter of the rich, or the souls of all were not alike to Him. Alas, these men little consider how low Christ did stoop to us . . . preaching up and down from city to city, and not the silliest woman He thought too low to confer with. Few rich and noble and wise are called. It is the poor that receiveth the glad tidings of the Gospel." [1]

5. He pleads that the life may preach as well as the lip. "Do not contradict and confute your own Doctrine by your practice. Be as forward in an Holy and Heavenly life, as you are in pressing on others to it. Let your discourse" (i.e., speech) "be as edifying and spiritual as you teach them that theirs must be. . . . If people wrong you, forgive them." "For evil language give them good; and blessing for cursing. Let go your right, rather than let go your hopes and advantages for the winning of one soul! Suffer anything rather than the Gospel and men's souls should suffer. Become all things (lawful) to all men, if by any means you may win some. Let men see that you use not the ministry only for a trade to live by, but that your very hearts are wholly set upon the welfare of their souls. Whatsoever meekness, humility, condescension, or self-denial you teach them from the Gospel, O teach it them also by your undissembled living example. This is to be Guides and Pilots, and Governours of the Church indeed. Be not like the orators whom *Diogenes* blamed, that studied *bene dicere, non bene facere*; nor like the sign at the Inn-door that hangs out in the rain itself, while it shows others where they may have shelter and refreshing; nor like the Fencer,

[1] *Saint's Everlasting Rest*, pt. iii., cap. 13, § 18.

that can offend but not defend, as *Cicero* said of *Cœlius*, that he was a good right-hand man, but an ill left-hand man. See that you are as well able to defend *yourselves* when you are tempted by Satan, or accused by men, to be proud, covetous or negligent as to tell others that *they* should be. O how many heavenly doctrines are in some peoples' ears that never were in the preacher's heart. Too true is that of Hilary, *Sanctiores sunt aures plebis quam corda Sacerdotum*. Alas, that ever pride, emulation, hypocrisie, or covetousness should come into a Pulpit. They are hateful in the Shops and Street, more hateful in the Church, but in the Pulpit most of all." In a marginal note he quotes from Luther, who "was wont to advise Preachers to see that these three Dogs did not follow them into the Pulpit—pride, covetousness, or envy." Especially does Baxter himself warn against covetousness. None of his day was a more resolute champion of the minister's right to live by the Gospel, and he has many a scornful word for the rich layman who, while content to abound himself, expects his minister to be content to suffer want. "But yet," he says, "let me desire the right-aiming Ministers of Christ to consider what is expedient as well as what is lawful; and that the saving of one soul is better than a thousand pound a year. . . . Let us make the Free-Gospel *as little burthensome and chargeable as is possible*. . . . Though the well-leading Elders be *Worthy of double honour, especially the labourers in the word and doctrine*, yet if the necessity of souls, and the promoting of the Gospel should require it, *I had rather preach the Gospel in hunger and rags than rigidly contend for what's my due*. And if I should do so, yet *have I not whereof to Glory; for necessity is laid upon me. Yea, woe is me if I preach not the Gospel, though I never received anything from men*. How unbeseeming the Messengers of His free grace and kingdom is it, rather

to lose the hearts and souls of their people than to lose a groat of their due? And rather to exasperate them against the Message of God than to forbear somewhat of their right? . . . This is not the way of Christ and His Apostles, nor according to the self-denying, yielding, suffering Doctrine which they taught. Away with all those actions that are against the main end of our studies and calling—which is to win Souls; and woe be upon that gain which hinders the gaining of men to Christ. I know flesh will here object. Necessities, and Distrust will not want Arguments; but we who have enough to answer to the Diffidence of our people, let us take home some of our answers to ourselves, and teach ourselves first, before we teach them." [1]

This is forceful, and his own example was yet more so.

He refused to take the Vicarage at Kidderminster.

He left the old worthless vicar to enjoy both it and most of the income.

He gave up any part of his tythe which pressed hard upon the poor.

He accepted less than £100 a year and gave much of that away. He offered to go on preaching and working for nothing, if only he might be allowed to retain his charge. Even so, he did not quite escape the accusation of covetousness, but no minister ever deserved it less.

Baxter once said, "If God would but reform the ministry and set them on their Duties zealously and faithfully, the Churches would certainly be reformed: all Churches either rise or fall as the ministry doth rise or fall (not in Riches and worldly Grandure) but in Knowledge, Zeal and ability for their Work." On the whole there was more need for such reform at the time he wrote than there is now, and we may think that he ascribed more influence to the ministry

[1] *Saint's Everlasting Rest*, pt. i., cap. 7, § 11.

than it has, or ought to have. But I have no doubt that if all our ministers were animated by Baxter's spirit and were striving, with pious zeal, toward the ideal which he describes, the Churches would quickly begin to exhibit an immense change for the better, while the ministry itself, at the same time, would win back much of the respect which it appears to have lost.

FRED. J. POWICKE.

WHY WAS JESUS A JEW?

WHY was Jesus a Jew? In a certain sense the answer to this question is fundamental to a right understanding and interpretation of Him and of His work and teaching. For the Jews were not, to the superficial eye, the best people in the world for the fulfilment of the divine purpose. As a nation they were insignificant. For six centuries they had possessed political independence only for short intervals. At the time of the birth of Jesus they were under the rule of a monarch who might appear to the outside world to be akin to them by race and whose government was at any rate tolerated. But he was the nominee, almost the agent of a foreign power, and belonged to that people who, above all others amongst Israel's immediate neighbours, had been the object of her bitterest antagonism and hatred. The Hebrew state had been confined at the best of times to a strip of territory hardly larger than an English county, whose proper bounds did not even reach the coast. There had been a time when they claimed that their king ruled from the Lebanon range to the Red Sea and from the Mediterranean to the desert, but, even if the limits of Solomon's kingdom have not been expanded by the idealism of a later age, the territory over which he ruled was not large compared with the great empires of the ancient world—Egypt,

Assyria, the Hittites, Babylon, Persia, Macedon, or, above all, Rome. Yet it was from none of these that there came the supreme revelation of God.

Nor could the Jew in any sense claim to govern the world's thought. That was the province and the privilege of Greece, and in spite of claims made by not a few cultured Jews in imperial times, there is no reason to believe that other rac s had ever to any great extent sought in Judaism their philosophical inspiration or their metaphysical insight into the being and working of God. Yet it was not at Athens that Jesus lived and taught, nor amongst the recognised leaders of the world's culture that God's last word on His own nature was uttered.

Again it could not have been claimed for the Jew that he was the best person in the world to make a satisfactory evangelist. His faith tended to confine his outlook and to cramp him to a close circle, and the early history of the Christian Church shows how narrowly the infant religion escaped the snare of this exclusiveness. Though in a sense Jewish monotheism involved a claim to universality, the temperament and religious outlook of Israel were such that hers was in practice one of the most intolerant creeds the world has ever seen. There was no doubt a historical reason for this, and apart from it she could never have survived the perils to which she was more than once exposed, but her narrowness hardly suggested a suitable soil for the planting of a universal faith. Yet Jesus was a Jew.

Apart from the metaphysical doctrine of the Trinity, there is hardly an outstanding feature of the Christian creed which has not been held at some time or other and in some form or other under some other faith than that of the Jew. He had no incarnation, yet the idea found a ready acceptance in the Indian mind, and the Christian missionary amongst the Hindus has always a common basis ready to

his hand in the theology of the Bhagavadgita. The very thought of a suffering God was repellent to the later Jew, and even Hosea never rose to the conception of a dying Saviour. But the mystery-religions of Egypt and Greece had learnt from the processes of nature that a redeeming Deity would lay down his life that he might take it again. Yet Jesus was neither Indian nor Greek nor Egyptian, but Jew.

It would seem to follow that Judaism possessed some unique feature without which Christianity would have been impossible. And this was the fact—a fact too often included amongst those truths which are in danger of being neglected because they are truisms. For in Judaism alone amongst the peoples of the ancient world was there to be found an Ethical Monotheism. There were great systems of ethics in the world before Christ and outside Israel. There was high speculation on philosophical things, and the Greek thinker would use the singular rather than the plural in speaking of the Supreme Being. But the popular faiths of the world were all polytheistic and all at least non-moral, whilst the philosophies were all at bottom pantheistic. Even Israel, along with her Semitic neighbours, started with a creed which may have been monolatrous but was certainly not monotheistic, and was very far from being ethical. Her development in spiritual things was, and is, one of the strongest evidences for the presence of God in human history.

We may then change the form, though not the ultimate meaning, of our initial question. Instead of asking why Jesus was a Jew, we may start from another point of view and inquire how it was that the Jew came to the position which made his faith the natural and inevitable preparation for Christ. The answer to this question is the Old Testament, read as the historian and the critic have taught us

to read it. Rightly understood, Jewish sacred literature forms the record of that spiritual evolution which culminated in Christianity. Starting where the peoples round about her started, Israel had to learn first of all the lesson of devotion, personal and national, to her own God Yahweh. She had to get rid of that almost universal doctrine of territorialism which linked the god and the land, and tended to draw her into the worship of those Ba'als whom she found already in possession of Canaan. She began to learn the lesson from her bitter experiences in the period of the Judges, though relics of the old view lingered down to the time of the exile. Even before this truth was fully absorbed the next step appears. The God who demanded the whole of Israel's devotion was utterly unlike the gods of the rest of the world, and His people must learn what were His nature and requirements. The message of the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries was that Yahweh was righteous and demanded righteousness first and foremost from His people. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this doctrine, perhaps the most startling innovation that has ever found its way into the religious thought of a nation. Even in Israel its progress was slow, and it was not practically accepted before the exile. That event proved to be the most profound religious experience through which the Hebrew people passed. Not only did they learn the lesson of Amos and his successors on the moral character of Yahweh, but —to the surprise of many of them —they discovered that their removal from their own home and its destruction did not put an end to their relations with their God. They thought they had left Yahweh behind them, but they went to Babylon and they found that He was there, and were thus in a position to learn the further lesson of His universality. It is at the close of this period that for the first time the monotheistic message rings out clear

and unmistakable in the utterances of "Deutero-Isaiah." No doubt it was implicit in the teaching of all the canonical prophets, but it was not till the eve of the Return that the final deduction was drawn.

Still there was much to learn, and the restored community had to pass through bitter times before they began to take hold of the idea of the life after death. But they did take hold of it, and in the fulness of time reached the point beyond which the national and personal spiritual life of Israel could go no further. Judaism attained the utmost development possible to it and was beginning to decline into mere Rabbinic legalism when God stepped in and gathered all that was real, permanent and universal in Jewish faith into the new and complete expression of Himself in Jesus.

From this it follows that Jesus was not an isolated phenomenon on the stage of human history. He is to be explained and understood in the light of that growing knowledge of God which is enshrined for us in the pages of the Old Testament. He took much for granted which He could not have taken for granted in Greece or in India. There were basic doctrines to which He never needed to call attention, because they were assumed in the minds of His hearers as well as in His own. There was a fundamental attitude which did not need to be explicitly stated, because it was implicit in the very fact that the incarnate God was a Jew. It is inevitable that for a right appreciation of Jesus these doctrines and this attitude must be taken into account. Words and ideas vary their meaning with the background and history of the thought that lies behind them. When the Greek spoke of the Fatherhood of God, he had originally a suggestion of physical ancestry in his mind. When Jesus used the phrase He implied a moral relationship. To the Hindu mind an incarnation of God

may be the very antithesis of righteousness; it is impossible to associate ethical imperfection with the idea of Christ.

There is perhaps some reason to fear that the Christian ministry in the last generation somewhat lost sight of these important facts. Probably there have been few periods of similar length in which so much has been done to develop the picture of Jesus. He is clearer to us and means more to us to-day than to any earlier time. But there has arisen a tendency to decry the Old Testament and to discourage its study. This may be due in part to the fact that a certain number of students find difficulty with Hebrew. And no translation adequately conveys the inner meaning of such literature as that of the old Testament, nor will the expositions which may be found in modern commentaries, admirable as many of them are, take the place of a first-hand knowledge of the original text.[1] Partly, too, there has been a feeling that an earlier age imported into its Christianity much from the Old Testament which was certainly not Christian. The line of reasoning has run: "The Old Testament was and is the Jewish Scripture; it is not and can never be the Christian one. Let us therefore concentrate on the New Testament and be prepared to see in the Old Testament one amongst many bodies of religious literature, all of which contain some truth, but none of which contains *the* truth." It has even happened that a missionary of liberal tendencies has sought to substitute a lesson from the Upanishads for that from the Old Testament in the public worship of the Church. Needless to say, he was unacquainted with Hebrew.

Now it must be maintained that the Old Testament cannot be regarded from the Christian point of view as a final revelation, nor would any serious student to-day seek to

[1] Cf. W. H. Bennett, "On the Impossibility of Translating the Old Testament," EXPOSITOR, May, 1918.

place it on precisely the same level of importance as the New. If we had to choose definitely between the two, there could be no possible hesitation. Further, it must be admitted that there is much in the Old Testament that was necessarily temporary and evanescent. No one would claim to-day that Psalm cix. represents the true Christian spirit—though had we lived through the days of Antiochus Epiphanes we might be able to understand and willing to condone. And Christianity has generally been inclined to discard the legalism of the older dispensation, though the process has not always been complete. Even the abrogation of the law of the Sabbath by Jesus Himself has passed unnoticed, though the apostolic abandonment of the sacrificial system and of circumcision has been accepted almost from the first. There is some justification for the revolt against the position which set Moses on the level of Christ as a lawgiver, and so far perverted the ethics of Jesus as to evolve a casuistic system of morality, mainly based on the Pentateuch.

But it is no longer necessary for us to hold the view of the Old Testament which meant so much to the Reformers and the Puritans. If ever there was an evidence of the work of the living Spirit of God in His Church, it is to be seen in what—for want of a better phrase—we call the Higher Criticism. This is not the work of one individual. There are no names which stand out like those of Luther, Calvin or Zwingli. It has been a steadily growing and deepening conviction, coming over the consecrated scholarship of all the western world that the Old Testament is to be understood and interpreted along lines which are wholly new, till Germany is probably the only Protestant country in which a "conservative" position is held to be compatible with the highest scholarship. There have been, doubtless, many mistakes and uncertainties. Progress

has not always been in the direct line and not infrequently an attempt at a forward movement has led only down a blind alley. Christian scholars and thinkers themselves have not always, perhaps not often, been conscious of the goal to which they were tending. They have been impelled by a sheer passion for truth which has driven them, frequently at the cost of frightful spiritual struggle to themselves, to break loose from the traditional views on which the faith of their fathers had rested. Like Abraham, they have heard the call of their God bidding them leave their ancient home and kindred, and have gone out not knowing whither they went. And to us of the present generation it has been given to see with unclouded vision the country which they sought in all ignorance and faith. They have laboured and we have entered into their labours. To many in their day it seemed that they were undermining the foundations of belief, and they themselves were forced back from time to time to find out what was left to them of the old spiritual value of the Hebrew Scriptures. To-day it is no longer a question of what was left, it is a question of what has been won. There is no loss, save of what was weak and dangerous; there is, on the contrary, an immeasurable gain in the understanding and appreciation of the methods and purposes of God in Revelation. The Old Testament is not a dead thing, the instantaneous utterance of a complete scheme of religion, formal, inelastic and stagnant; it is instinct with a vitality which reveals itself in development and expansion, in the power to grow both intensively and extensively towards a fuller light and truth. It is no longer a Law; it is a Life.

With this in mind it will be seen at once how much of the objection to the Old Testament loses its force. For the objection has overlooked one fundamental fact: Jesus was a Jew. He came, to use His own words, to complete the

Law. He accepted and adopted its basis as His own. He made no express protest either against practical polytheism or theoretical pantheism. He laid no stress on the connexion between religion and ethics. He insisted that the righteousness of the Pharisee was not of the right kind, but assumed that righteousness was a necessary element in religion. With these assumptions there went a yet deeper one. That was the stress on personality which of necessity lies behind both morality in practice and monotheism in theology. It is perhaps here that the supreme contribution of the Old Testament to Christianity was made.

Whenever the Indo-European mind has weighed its anchor and sailed out into the ocean of metaphysical speculation, its tendency has been to become pantheistic. The old Ionic philosophers sought to reduce all phenomenona to a single entity. Plato is fundamentally pantheistic, and that is perhaps the reason why not a few of us prefer Philo's Platonism to Plato's. The purest illustration of Aryan thought is to be seen, of course, in the Vedanta philosophy, whose orthodox confession of faith is the famous "Ekam eba advityam"—"One entity exists without a second." And in Hegel and some more modern speculative thinkers one may detect the same tendency. It has even appeared in Christian thought in recent years in the so-called New Theology.[1] Now it is obvious that in the last resort any pantheistic theory of the universe must end in a denial of personality as an ultimate reality. It is in this point mainly that it parts company with an idealism such as that of Philo or Berkeley. It follows that such an outlook, whilst it must be monistic in the strictest sense, can never be monotheistic. It may be after a fashion polytheistic, and Indian thought has shown how the two ideas may be

[1] Similar tendencies may be observed in certain developments of Islam which have appeared in Persia.

combined by reducing all personality, human and divine, to the same level, and including all under the same doctrine of Illusion. Buddhism, with clearer logic, starting from the Hindu philosophical basis, rejected the gods in practice, and whilst it endeavoured to lay stress on ethics, allowed itself to become in strict theory an atheistic system. Yet even Buddhism did not attain to complete consistency, and much of the old Hindu weakness clung to it. For pantheism can never be logically ethical. Morality is essentially a matter of the will, and it is the will which is the centre and citadel of personality. Without a fundamental personal basis there can be no conception of ultimate righteousness. That is necessarily an affair of persons, the lower morality involving the relations between one human person and others, and the higher morality involving the relation between human persons and a divine one. A pantheistic system must lead logically in the long run to the conclusion that nothing matters since all is one and indivisible. In so far as Buddhism and other pantheistic systems achieve an ethic, they do so by temporarily abrogating their very pantheism, and allowing to individual personality an unreal or evanescent independence.

The Semitic mind, on the other hand, except under the strong influence of contact with Indo-European thought, lays the greatest stress on personality. Gods and men were alike real, and were to be regarded as ultimate realities. It was only on such a basis that an ethical monotheism could be built. And the whole of Jewish theology, all that developing revelation of God which comes to us from the Old Testament, has this same stress on personality. The conception of God is essentially that of a person. His great characteristics, His love, His justice and the like, are only possible with this basis. The conception of man's relation to Him is essentially personal. Sin, as presented

by the Hebrew prophet, would be impossible under any pantheistic system. Forgiveness is essentially a personal matter between God and man. Human justice, human mercy, human love, are only valid on the supposition of genuine human personality. Without this there is no true Ethic possible.

Now these are examples of the heritage which Christianity received from Judaism. The ideas which involve them are not so much stated in the New Testament—especially by Jesus—as assumed. And yet they lie at the very root of the Christian revelation. The Christian Incarnation is that of a personal God. The Christian view of sin is that of revolt of persons against a person. The Christian view of the Atonement is that of reconciliation between persons who have been separated by the action and attitude of one of them. These things are all essential to the understanding of Jesus and His Gospel. Not once but many times has the Christian Church in the West shown the danger to which it would have been exposed but for this intense belief in personality as the fundamental reality. It has become clear again and again that the true defence against this danger lies in the absorption and assumption of those ideas which were absorbed and assumed in the spiritual life of that community in whose midst Jesus made His appearance. But as surely as that safeguard is neglected, the western mind tends to introduce pantheistic elements, with their subtle attractiveness and their insidious undermining both of the monotheism and of the ethic which lie at the basis of the Christian revelation. *But for the comparative neglect of the Old Testament, there could have been no "New Theology."* It is widely felt to-day that the Church needs to restate her position and to revise her creeds. If and when she does so, she must be on the watch lest she allow herself to be cheated of her inheritance and find herself

forgetting the process of evolution which made her faith at all possible. She must read and know her Old Testament as well as her New Testament, and read it and know it in the fresh light which the consecrated research of the last century has thrown thereon. *She must remember that Jesus was a Jew.*

T. H. Robinson.

ST. CYPRIAN, BISHOP AND MARTYR:

His Place in the History of the Church.

When we consider the influence that St. Cyprian exercised upon Catholic thought and upon the history of the Church, we cannot fail to see the importance of making ourselves acquainted with his opinions, ecclesiastical and theological, with the view of ascertaining whether that influence was healthy, and whether it was justified. Of Cyprian the *man* I am not going to speak. I honour him, nay, I love him, as a man who laid down his life for Christ and His Church. I believe that his retirement in the first hour of danger was due, not to fear, but to solicitude for the flock committed to him, and to whom his life was so precious. When his hour was come, and he could no longer, with any sense of honour or duty, remain in concealment, he faced the martyr's death with notable courage. What I have set before myself in undertaking to write this paper is to try and estimate what, *ideally*, his influence should have been; and this, I think we can best do by contemplating him as ecclesiastic, theologian, interpreter of Scripture, and controversialist.

I. *Ecclesiastic.*

Cyprian is certainly among the outstanding figures in the history of episcopacy; perhaps it might be said with truth that he occupies a pre-eminent place in that history.

In comparing his views of the Christian ministry with those of his predecessors, it is not easy to estimate the degree of novelty that characterised his opinions. Thus, for example, Professor Gwatkin tells us that his theory of the Christian ministry was new. Dr. Bigg, on the other hand, fails to recognise the novelty. "What is characteristic of Cyprian," he says, "is merely the zeal with which he spurs his theory." He points out that Clement of Rome, writing probably before the end of the first century, recognises the analogy, so dear to Cyprian, between the Jewish and Christian ministry; that Ignatius held views of episcopal authority little less pronounced than those of Cyprian; that Tertullian, of whom Cyprian speaks as his "master," and Hippolytus, his younger contemporary, use sacerdotal terms of the Christian ministry. We shall not be far wrong if we say that Cyprian formulated and developed, on particular lines, a monarchical and sacerdotal conception of episcopacy that had already made considerable progress in the Church before, and in, his time. Monarchical episcopacy had its champions before Cyprian in Ignatius, Irenæus, Tertullian, but Cyprian claimed for the bishop a position of importance and authority that had no precedent. "If," to quote from Bishop Lightfoot, "with Ignatius, the bishop is the centre of Christian unity, if, with Irenæus, he is the depositary of the apostolic tradition, with Cyprian he is *the absolute vice-gerent of* Christ in things spiritual."

Similarly in regard to the sacerdotal authority with which Cyprian invested the episcopal office. The development of this principle was a marked feature of his time; but he himself surpassed all his contemporaries in the zeal and determination with which he upheld it. It was at the close of the second century that the sacerdotal term ἱερεύς, or sacerdos, was introduced. "If," says Lightfoot, "Tertullian and Origen are still hovering on the border, Cyprian

has boldly transferred himself into the new domain." Dr. Hort, you may remember, emphasises the enormous changes that came over the official ministry of the Church between A.D. 150 and 250. It is safe to say that Cyprian contributed more to establish those changes than any other individual leader. His episcopate lasted from 248 to 258, the year of his martyrdom.

What then were his views of the episcopal office as shown in his writings ?

The name of Cyprian is associated with the doctrine of apostolic succession in its extremest development, and there are few portions of his writings in which it is not conspicuous. We must not lose sight of the fact that as early as the time of Clement, Bishop of Rome, that is before the end of the first century, there was *a* doctrine of apostolic succession, and one to which no exception could be taken, a doctrine, indeed, which was forced upon the Church by time and circumstance. The apostles and "apostolic men" were dead; the Lord had not fulfilled the expectation of primitive Christianity by returning in glory; the fundamentals of the faith were being denied by false teachers. It was absolutely essential to the Church's existence, much more to her well-being, that there should be a regular and authoritatively appointed ministry. What then could be regarded as a satisfying condition for such appointments ? The chief requirement was that every bishop, in whose hands lay the power of ordaining elders and ministers, should be in a line of direct descent from the apostles and apostolic men, who, in the first days, founded the Church in various parts of the world. Daughter churches must be supplied with ministers ordained to their office by those who had received regular, and therefore valid, ordination, and were thus directly connected with the apostles themselves. What other guarantee could there

be for transmitting the apostolic Scriptures and the apostolic creed? Clement of Rome, Hegesippus, Irenæus, Tertullian, in this sense, emphasise the importance of apostolic succession. This early and original doctrine of succession, however, was very different from that of which Cyprian became the exponent and champion. The view that he adopted was, indeed, so to speak, in the air before he gave such uncompromising expression to it; but he was the first to claim, not merely, as Irenæus, Tertullian and others had done, that he, as bishop, stood in a relation of ecclesiastical succession to the apostles, but that he was their veritable successor. He advanced this claim with no uncertain voice, and it is at once clear that he has revolutionised the conception of apostolic succession as held in earlier days.

The following words from the thirty-third Epistle put his thoughts on apostolic succession in a clear light. "Our Lord, whose precepts and admonitions we ought to observe, describing the honour of a bishop (mark those words) and the order of his Church, speaks in the Gospel, and says to Peter, 'I say unto thee, Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my Church,'" etc. Our Lord, you will observe, according to Cyprian's interpretation, is here *describing the honour of a bishop*. I might quote largely from his writings in confirmation of the foregoing passage; but time and space forbid. To this commission to St. Peter (Matt. xvi. 18, 19) Cyprian returns again and again; upon it he bases the *jus divinum* of the episcopal office. He appeals, indeed, to Matthew xvii. 18 and to John xx. 23 in support of his claim to be the successor of the apostles, but it is not too much to say that he rests the whole weight of his theory upon Christ's commission to St. Peter as recorded by St. Matthew; and it is to be carefully observed that he makes no attempt to find support in the

apostolic writings for his teaching on the apostolic succession. Where, we may ask, would he have found it?

Repeatedly, in his writings, Cyprian urges the contention that heresies originate in disloyalty to the bishop, which is nothing short of disloyalty to Christ; thus, in his own characteristic way, reasserting the principle maintained by Irenæus, that the bishop is the depositary of the apostolic tradition. Epistle lix.: "For neither have heresies arisen, nor have schisms originated from any other source than from this, that God's priest (i.e. bishop) is not obeyed, nor do they consider that there is one person, for the time, priest in the Church, and for the time judge in the stead of Christ." The wickedness and danger of opposition to the bishop is illustrated and enforced throughout his writings from the history of Korah and his company, and he quotes with wearisome reiteration Deuteronomy xvii. 12: "The man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest that standeth to minister there before the Lord thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die."

Cyprian claims, indeed, for the bishop little short of autocracy. In theory he is ready to do as his predecessors have done and consult with the clergy and the plebs, but in practice he disowns any such obligation. The bishop, in his opinion, possessed the powers of the ministry in all their completeness. In the words of Harnack, "the bishop was not only dux, dominus, rex, judex, but primarily pastor, magister, sacerdos. So far as I know, he was never called Σωτήρ; this is very significant; there were still limits." This fulness of ministerial power included the charismatic gift, which entitled him to look for special guidance and inspiration, qualifying him to act on his own initiative and authority.

Not that Cyprian claims for the bishop absolute and irresponsible power. His sacerdotium could be annulled

and taken from him on account of heresy, schism, or conduct unworthy of the episcopal office. The "indelible priesthood" was no part of his teaching; and in this, though opposed by his contemporary Calixtus of Rome, he was in agreement with the traditional view of the Church.

Cyprian was the first to proclaim the identity of schism and heresy, basing his decision on the history of Korah and his company. The subject occupies a very prominent place in his writings, being inseparably bound up with the Novatian controversy. In judging of Cyprian's course of action on this matter, it must not be forgotten that he had to face peculiar and difficult circumstances, and to deal with a novel problem in the history of the Church. Hitherto schism had been associated and identified with some definite heresy, especially, for a great part of the second century, with various forms of gnosticism. The serious and widely spreading schism of Novatian had nothing to do with doctrine. His followers had separated from the Bishop of Rome, and had elected their own bishop, on a question of discipline—namely, whether the lapsed could, or could not, be readmitted to Church-fellowship after apostasy; and the practical question with which Cyprian had to deal, was whether those who had been baptized in Novatian's schismatic fold should be re-baptized on entering the true Church, of which Cyprian himself was the leading representative in Africa. Cyprian, taking his stand on the principle that baptism could only be a reality when accompanied with full and entire faith of giver and receiver, a principle which would be fatal to the practice of infant baptism, insisted on an affirmative answer, in contradiction to the negative decision of the Bishop of Rome.

I am not going to plunge into the labyrinth of the Novatian controversy; if I did so, should I ever emerge from it? I only call attention to the most important feature of this

conflict, namely, that Cyprian's decision against the validity of schismatical and heretical baptism was reversed by the general voice of the Church. We rejoice in that final decision, in the triumph of a spirit of toleration, but we must not overlook the fact that Cyprian not only had the powerful voice of Tertullian, but also the general voice of antiquity, on his side in this question, which was finally decided for the Church by the authority of Augustine, who contended that the sacraments derive their efficacy not from the human agent, but from Christ, as the only source of grace and power—an argument which he applied even to the sacraments of confirmation and holy orders. In other words, the demands of Christian unity were felt by him to be stronger than ecclesiastical rule and precedent. In view of the violent and abusive language that Cyprian used in respect of those who differed from him, it comes as a relief to learn that he did not carry his bitterness and opposition to the point of breaking with them. We can hardly say that Stephen of Rome and Cyprian of Carthage agreed to differ on the subject, but, at least, they agreed not to excommunicate each other; "Cyprian refused to be bound by the fetters he had forged for himself." It is also a relief to know that, according to Novatian, the lapsed, if penitent, might trust in the mercies of God, which go beyond His covenant, though they could never recover their Christian status in this life.

As the vice-gerent of Christ, Cyprian held himself to be above criticism; to criticise and censure him was to criticise and censure Christ and God. I can only pause to substantiate this statement by one or two quotations. Thus in Ep. lxvi.: "You constitute yourself a judge of God and of Christ, who says to the apostles, and thereby to all chief rulers, who, by vicarious ordination, succeed to the apostles: 'he that heareth you heareth Me, and he that

heareth Me heareth Him that sent Me.'" In Cyprian's thought a deacon's disobedience to his bishop finds its parallel in a bishop's disobedience to God. His exact words are as follows: "If we may dare anything against God who makes bishops, deacons may also dare against us by whom they are made."

A more or less new claim that Cyprian made in his capacity as a bishop was that he represented Christ in His high-priestly office. I say more or less new, because his predecessor and "master," Tertullian, had given the title of *summus sacerdos* to the bishop, whilst, at the same time, strongly and systematically insisting upon the priesthood of the laity. Cyprian, as is well known, held that the Economy of the Jewish Church is reproduced in the Christian dispensation. This conception may have been suggested to his mind by analogies between the two dispensations indicated in the first epistle of Clement to the Corinthian Church. Cyprian nowhere attempts to substantiate his theory from Scripture, but appears to have regarded it from the first as axiomatic truth, that the bishop is the direct successor to the high-priest; "it is assumed rather than argued." Strangely enough, and with great inconsistency, the priest, as distinct from the high-priest, is unrepresented in Cyprian's ecclesiastical system, for in that system the presbyter represents, not the priest, but the Levite. It is significant that Cyprian does not invest the presbyterate with the priesthood; and when the presbyter, as of course he constantly did, celebrated, he did so, not in his own right, but as the bishop's delegate. Cyprian very seldom, perhaps never, uses the word sacerdos for any one but a bishop; the *collegium sacerdotale* is the collective *episcopate*.

At an earlier period than that of Tertullian and Cyprian the bishop would have shrunk from assuming the title of

high-priest, that title being reserved for our Lord ; and it is important to note that, in spite of Cyprian's teaching, the title, as belonging to the bishop, never became established. That he was in any way the delegate and representative of the people in their sacerdotal character was no part of his thought or teaching ; he represented God to the congregation, not the congregation to God ; and I doubt whether any passage in his writings could be quoted emphasising the common and collective priesthood of the Church, which was so prominent in the teaching of his predecessors, not excluding Tertullian.

Cyprian, as is well known, lays great stress upon the unity of the episcopate ; and this unity of the episcopate, as representing and reproducing the apostolic office age after age, involves the equality of all bishops. For reasons that I have not time to go into Cyprian concedes a certain degree of primacy to the See of Rome ; not, however, such a degree as, in any way, to constitute the Bishop of Rome arbiter or even head of the visible Church. On more than one occasion he firmly opposed the Bishop of Rome, notably in the Novatian dispute over baptism. The Bishop of Rome was *primus inter pares*, nothing more. Each bishop, according to Cyprian, is responsible for his own diocese ; he is independent of other bishops, and gives account of his stewardship to God only. Archbishop Benson sums up the position of the Cyprianic bishop in the following words : "A bishop could not resist the voice of his fellow-bishops without hardihood, but, if he did, he was unassailable, unless viciousness or false doctrine were patent in his life or teaching."

Irenæus, writing about A.D. 180, uses the terms presbyter and episcopus as interchangeable (as indeed does Clement of Alexandria twenty years later), but, while he constantly speaks of a bishop as a presbyter, he never speaks of a

presbyter as a bishop. Nor, indeed, had Cyprian quite broken with the traditional relation of the bishop to the presbyterate. Not infrequently he designates himself as *compresbyterus*, thus, perhaps unconsciously, confirming the indisputable truth that the episcopate was created out of the presbyterate; a truth which Ambrosiaster, whom Lightfoot identifies with Hilary of Poitiers, puts in a nutshell: "Every bishop is a presbyter, but every presbyter is not a bishop; for he is bishop who is first among the presbyters." If Cyprian had paid more heed to St. Peter's claim to be συμπρεσβύτερος (I. v. 1) he would have avoided the snare, into which he unquestionably fell, of neglecting St. Peter's caution against lording it over God's heritage, and magnifying his office in a sense that would have been abhorrent to St. Paul.

To Cyprian, as Archbishop Benson says, it was inconceivable that the Church could ever have carried itself on, or subsisted without its episcopal order; but as we listen to his confident assertion that "the bishop is in the Church and the Church in the bishop," it must strike one as remarkable that there are few, if any, traces of episcopal government in the Churches of Macedonia and Achaia before the beginning of the second century, that even a century later the Alexandrian Church was, strictly speaking, more presbyterian than episcopal; moreover, that much uncertainty hangs over the episcopal succession at Rome itself for nearly fifty years after the death of the last of the Apostles.

In connexion with the development of Cyprian's conception of the episcopal office, by which a strictly limited monarchy was transformed into little short of a despotism, we cannot overlook the prejudicial effect of his teaching (especially as touching the exclusive priesthood of the bishop) in separating the episcopate from the lower ranks

of the clergy and from the laity, thus reducing the effective power of clergy and laity alike in the organisation of the Church.

One more word before passing to Cyprian the theologian. As the uncompromising champion of that doctrine of apostolic succession which, from his time, more and more moulded ecclesiastical thought, can it be denied that he did much towards closing the door of the Church against those who deny no fundamental article of the faith once delivered to the saints ? for it will, I think, be agreed that the non-validity of other than episcopal orders is *a* chief, if not *the* chief hindrance to a spirit and policy of union between many branches of the Church of Christ which refuse allegiance to the See of Rome.

II. *Cyprian, theologian.*

In all that I say on this subject I shall confine myself to his own statements, not pausing to compare his views with those of his contemporaries, a task far beyond my powers, even if my time were unlimited ; but not without an attempt to give some idea of his relation, on the one hand, to the primitive apostolic Church, and, on the other, to the Church, yet unborn, of the middle ages. I shall try to show that, while holding fast the fundamental truths of the Christian faith, there was much in his belief and teaching that very strongly savours of superstition.

And first as to his sacrificial view of the Eucharist. In proportion as the sacrificial character of this sacrament was emphasised, it was inevitable that the sacerdotal nature of the ministry, with the bishop as its head and representative, should assume increasing prominence. Nor, I think, will it be questioned that Cyprian's sacerdotalism was an advance on that of his predecessors, an advance even on that of Tertullian, whose views he accepted on many questions ; for Tertullian's view of eucharistic sacrifice

never, probably, went beyond that of prayer and praise. Sacerdotal language, strictly speaking, is absent from the writings of the Church to the time of Hippolytus and Cyprian; and it is significant that the development of sacerdotalism should have so exactly synchronised with the introduction of a new doctrine of apostolic succession.

Cyprian's treatment of the Holy Communion is throughout his writings emphatically sacerdotal. In the earliest of his letters *sacerdotium*, *altare*, *sacrificio*, indicate principles fundamental to his scheme of faith and doctrine. "The Lord's passion is the sacrifice we offer," is a characteristic statement. *Deservire altari et sacrificia celebrare* is the distinctive work of the bishop. In the language he uses on this subject it might be difficult to detect any definite anticipation of the doctrine of transubstantiation, but there was much in his teaching to encourage a materialistic conception of the sacrament, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the teaching of the Church, as represented by Cyprian, had consciously, or unconsciously, been influenced by the "mystery"-religions and the sacrificial systems of paganism.

This superstitious and materialistic view of the ordinance may be illustrated by a passage from the treatise *De Lapsis*. He is giving several instances, some from his own experience, of the effects of reception of the elements, or attempts to receive, by the unworthy. I select two, following Wallis's translation: "Another woman, when she tried with unworthy hands to open her box, in which was the holy [body] of the Lord, was deterred, by fire rising from it, from daring to touch it" (here you have an early notice of reservation in its most unrestrained and superstitious form). "And when one," Cyprian continues, "who was himself defiled, dared with the rest to receive secretly a part of the sacrifice celebrated by the priest, he could not

eat or handle the holy of the Lord, but found in his hands, when opened, a cinder. Thus by the experience of one it was shown that the Lord withdraws when He is denied; nor does that which is received benefit the undeserving for salvation, since saving grace is changed by the departure of the sanctity into a cinder." Observe the grossly materialistic conception of the Lord withdrawing from the consecrated bread, and the consequent change of bread to a cinder.

It is, perhaps, significant that it is in the writings of Cyprian that we have the first notice of child-communion, though it does not follow that this was an innovation of his own time, or even a practice of very recent introduction.

I cannot deal with the details of Cyprian's teaching on the subject of the Eucharist, but in order to indicate the mystical and allegorical spirit (I was going to say the spirit of exaggerated symbolism) in which he approached the subject, I may draw your attention to his fondness for representing the wine as the blood of Christ, whilst the water, with which it is mingled, is the worshipping people. "When the water is mingled with the wine, the people is made one with Christ." So he expresses this view on which he dwells at considerable length.

What we may term the principle of the *requiem mass* was in full operation in the time of Cyprian. This is a prominent feature of his teaching and practice: e.g., "We always offer sacrifices for them (i.e. those who have won the martyr's crown) as often as we celebrate the passion." In the case of one Geminius Victor, a deacon, who had been guilty of a breach of ecclesiastical law, Cyprian forbids the celebration of the Eucharist for the repose of his soul.

We know so little on the subject of exorcism as practised in the early Church that it would be unfair to set down the experience and utterances of Cyprian on this point alto-

gether to superstition and delusion. We may note the fact that in his letter to Demetrianus, a persecutor of the Church, he appeals with confidence to the power of the exorcist, as an evidence for the divine authority and mission of the Church. He had already dealt with the subject in his treatise on the *Vanity of Idols*, where he describes the evil spirits, when challenged by the exorcist, departing from those of whom they have taken possession, "howling, groaning, entreating, confessing whence they came." These last words are important as they refer to that part of the context which indicates that the writer accepted the widely spread superstition that these evil spirits lurked under the statues and consecrated images of heathen worship; for it was a popular belief in the Church that, by some power of what we should call "black magic," dæmonia were compelled to inhabit the statues of an idol temple.

It is a moot point whether, in the time of Cyprian, virgins had been constituted a separate order; there is no question, however, as to the profound reverence in which he held the person of the professed virgin. It is notorious that his treatment of the subject of virgins and their betrothal to Christ was a decided step towards the elaborate ceremonial by which, in times not far distant from his own, a woman, on taking the veil, was espoused to Christ. Tertullian had prepared the way for Cyprian by an expression in his treatise on the Veiling of Virgins, *nupsisti Christo*. Cyprian, in urging the same point, sometimes adopts phrases and uses arguments, which justly give offence by what one can but term a fleshly realism. From Tertullian he also accepted the belief that virginity takes precedence in dignity of the married state. Speaking of the rewards of the faithful, he says, addressing the virgins of his own day, "The firstfruit for the martyrs is a hundredfold, the second is yours, sixtyfold." Again, "In that you continue chaste

virgins you are equal to the angels of God." But there is no attempt at proof from Scripture. In the same spirit, in his treatise on the Dress of Virgins, he says, "The glorious fruitfulness of Mother Church rejoices by their means, and in them abundantly flourishes; and in proportion as a copious virginity is added to her number, so much the more it increases the joy of the Mother."

An extremely important part of Cyprian's theological teaching remains to be noticed, namely, his doctrine of merit; and here again he is indebted to Tertullian. Cyprian's teaching on the subject is found in his treatise on *Works and Alms*. I have not time to quote at length from this treatise, which a thorough treatment of the subject would demand, and I cannot do better than give an abstract of what Dr. Bethune-Baker has written in his *Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*. Cyprian followed Tertullian in the conception of the doctrine of merit. Tertullian's conception of merit is based on the idea that in some spheres of life and conduct God imposes no law on men. God's *will* is not in all things imposed. He *permits* things that He does not *will*. Man is therefore free, either to avail himself of this permission (*indulgentia*) and follow his own natural inclinations in many things, or to forgo what God *permits* and follow instead the guidance of His *will*. He can choose, that is, between the *indulgentia* and the *voluntas* of God. *And to forgo what He permits, and to follow, instead, what He wills, is to acquire merit, and so establish a claim for reward from God.* Here is an undisguised doctrine of perfection. Tertullian taught that there must be satisfaction for sin. This *satisfactio* may be accomplished in various ways, e.g. by bodily castigation, by fasting, by lavish almsgiving, above all by the death of martyrdom. This satisfaction is of the nature of an expiatory sacrifice. If more than is

needed is offered, the surplus is deemed meritorious, a *bonum opus*, and counts as merit. These *bona opera* put God in our debt (*habent Deum debitorem*).

This teaching of Tertullian, especially as it was taken on and reproduced with his own developments by Cyprian, exercised a profound influence on the Church of the West in later times. Cyprian himself had recourse to this doctrine in his dealings with the Novatians. It is possible, he maintained, by special sanctity, or by martyrdom, to acquire an accumulation of merit over and above what is needed for the highest grade of the heavenly reward. This surplus of merit may pass over to the benefit of others through the intercession of those to whose credit it stands, the bishops and priests being used as the medium through which God gives it. "It is evident," says Dr. Bethune-Baker, "that all the germs of the mediæval theory are here." And when we think of the teaching of Rome on the subject of the merits of saints, and its fully developed fruit of papal indulgences, one can but wonder how men so good and devoted as Tertullian and Cyprian could have been led into these tortuous, irrational, anti-scriptural ways of thinking.

I shall not detain you long over the other parts of our subject.

III. *Cyprian, the Interpreter of Scripture.*

Having tried to show that Cyprian is an untrustworthy theologian, I proceed to maintain that he is equally unsound as an interpreter of Scripture. No one will accuse Archbishop Benson of a bias against the subject of his important biography (indeed the only adequate biography of Cyprian), but he well expresses what cannot but strike every reader of Cyprian's writings, when he speaks of his habit of "juggling with Scripture." It was, of course, a habit shared with many of the writers of the early Church, but this does not make it convincing. This practice of extracting from

the written word anything that he might want to find in it characterises the whole of Cyprian's works. I can but give specimens.

In the third Book of the Testimonies he supports his contention that a schism must not be made in the Church, even though he who withdraws himself should retain his orthodox faith, by Ecclesiastes x. 9, which he thus mistranslates: "he that cleaveth firewood shall be endangered by it, if the iron shall fall off."

Repeatedly, in urging the ideal unity of the Church, he has recourse to Canticles iv. 12. "A garden enclosed is my sister, my spouse, a fountain sealed, a well of living water, a garden with the fruit of apples." Here again the translation is wide of the mark.

By an unintelligible process of reasoning, Cyprian makes the new garment which the prophet Ahijah rent in the presence of Jeroboam, as recorded in 1 Kings xi. 31, into an argument confirming the ideal unity of the Church as represented by the unrent garment of our Lord.

He finds the unity of the Church illustrated and emphasised in the story of Rahab. To quote his own words: "It is said to Rahab, in whom was prefigured the Church, 'Thy father and thy mother, and thy brethren, and all the house of thy father thou shalt gather to thee in thine house, and it shall come to pass, whosoever shall go abroad beyond the door of thine house, his blood shall be on his own head.'" In these words Cyprian reads the essential unity of the Church. The same truth is to be found in the institution of the passover: "in one house shall ye eat it; ye shall not send its flesh abroad from the house"; and he quotes the psalmist as confirming this view, when he wrote: "God, who maketh men to be of one mind in an house."

Perhaps the most notable illustration of a forced interpretation in Cyprian's writings is to be found in his attempt

to show that the schismatic Samaritans are placed on the same level with the heathen Gentiles. But I must not stay to quote.

Cyprian does not hesitate to see in Noah drinking wine an expression of the figure of our Lord's passion. He finds an allusion to the consecrated wine of the Eucharist in Genesis xlix. 11. "He hath washed his garments in wine, and his vesture in the blood of grapes." "When," such is his comment, "the blood of the grape is mentioned, what else is set forth than the wine of the cup of the blood of the Lord?" In the same spirit he deals with Isaiah lxiii. 2. "Wherefore art thou red in thine apparel, and thy garment like him that treadeth in the wine-fat?" "Can water," says Cyprian, "make garments red? assuredly therefore mention is made of wine that the blood of the Lord might be foretold."

One more example before passing to Cyprian the controversialist. He fortifies himself in the conviction that Novatian baptism is a thing of nought, and worse than nought, by a text from Ecclesiasticus (xxxiv. 25), which he thus mistranslates: "he who is baptized by one dead, what availeth his washing?" What the author of Ecclesiasticus is likely to have known of Christian baptism Cyprian does not say, but, when we turn to our apocrypha, we find nothing about baptism, and what we do read is: "he that washeth himself after the touching of the dead body, if he touch it again, what availeth his washing?" Again, quoting from the Septuagint version of the prophet Jeremiah xv. 18, Cyprian says, "This matter of profane and adulterous baptism Jeremiah the prophet plainly rebukes, saying, 'Why do they who afflict me prevail? My wound is hard; whence shall I be healed? while it has, indeed, become unto me as deceitful water, which has no faithfulness.' The Holy Spirit makes mention by the prophet of

deceitful water, which has no faithfulness. What is this deceitful and faithless water? Certainly that which falsely assumes the resemblance of baptism, and frustrates the grace of faith by a shadowy pretence."

Archbishop Benson may claim for Cyprian that he was the most eminent master of forensic eloquence in the city of Carthage, but such handling of Holy Scripture does not suggest an eminent degree of forensic logic.

IV. *Cyprian, the Controversialist.*

In conclusion, again basing what I have to say upon his own writings, I would draw your attention to Cyprian as a controversialist. Here again we find much that does not commend itself; but it would be unfair to pronounce condemnation on his methods without bearing in mind that those methods belonged to the spirit of the age in which he lived,—a spirit that in less than a hundred years from his time, manifested itself in persecution of Athanasian by Arian and Arian by Athanasian; and, in the fifth century, expressed itself in the damnatory clauses of the so-called Athanasian Creed; and it was certainly no advantage, from this point of view, to have been brought up at the feet of Tertullian. But, while making allowance for time and temperament, we find Cyprian's controversial writings far from edifying. It would be difficult to exaggerate the bitterness and indignation with which he assails those from whom he differs, as the following specimens of his language will show. On the question of receiving back the lapsed into Church fellowship, as I have already said, our sympathies are strongly with the more charitable policy of Cyprian, as contrasted with that of Novatian; but in view of the fact that, though he differed from Cyprian on a point of ecclesiastical discipline, Novatian was an orthodox believer of saintly life, we should not feel justified in calling him "a deserter of the Church, a foe to mercy, a destroyer of

repentance, a teacher of arrogance, a corrupter of truth, a murderer of love."

Speaking of schismatics, he says: "They cannot dwell with God who would not be of one mind in God's Church. Although they burn, given up to flames, or lay down their lives thrown to the wild beasts, that will not be the crown of faith, but the punishment of perfidy, nor will it be the glorious ending of religious valour, but the destruction of despair. Such an one may be slain, crowned he cannot be." Cyprian supports his contention from 1 Corinthians xiii., his argument being that schism springs from lack of love; therefore, though a man give all his goods to feed the poor, and his body to be burned, his schism makes the sacrifice worthless; such an one, he proceeds to say, "is an enemy of the altar, a rebel against Christ's sacrifice, for the faith faithless, for religion profane, a disobedient servant, an impious son, a hostile brother, despising the bishops, and forsaking God's priests." It is to be noted that, with much less violence of language, Irenæus and Augustine use the same argument, namely, that true charity precludes schism.

Water consecrated by schismatic hands, he contends, is "adulterous and unhallowed; persons thus baptized are stained with the contagion of adulterous water." Any nativity that may be brought about by such adulterous water "does not generate sons to God, but to the devil." Their baptism by schismatics is null and void; on joining, or rejoining, the Church, they must be rebaptized; a view, as we have seen, repudiated by the Catholic Church. In reference to the same subject, Cyprian says, "Dares any one to say that the saving water of baptism and heavenly grace can be in common with schismatics, with whom neither earthly food nor worldly drink ought to be in common?"

A schismatical presbyter, "appointed as he is by human madness, has violated the divine disposition, and is adulterous, impious, sacrilegious." Of schismatic bishops he has still harder things to say; of them the Holy Spirit speaks in the psalms, and describes them as "sitting in the seat of pestilence, plagues and spots of the faith, deceiving with serpent's tongue, and artful in corrupting the truth, vomiting forth deadly poisons from pestilential tongues, whose speech doth creep like a cancer, whose discourse forms a deadly poison in the heart and breast of every one."

From these samples it will be seen that Cyprian did not observe the amenities of debate. He certainly did not obey the apostolic exhortation that "all bitterness and wrath, and anger and clamour and evil speaking should be put away with all malice." He loved what he believed to be the truth (though, in some directions, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men) but he did not speak the truth in love; and, as we read what he wrote, we can but wish that he had remembered, and heeded, the exhortation of St. James: "Let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath, for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God."

Probably no ancient father has been treated with less discrimination, whether of eulogy or censure, than this outstanding figure of the third century. I have tried honestly to form my own judgment from a careful study of his writings, and I have prepared this paper with a certain sentence in Archbishop Benson's *Life of Cyprian* running in my head, and impressed upon my mind. Emphasising the fact that Cyprian believed that he found his own view of the episcopal office plainly declared in Holy Scripture, a view held from first to last, as conspicuous in the earliest as in the latest of his writings, proceeds to say, "The influence of this view in moulding both then, and ever since,

all vigorous church life, which has had any continuity, all Christian organisation which has enjoyed any extension, can scarcely be over-estimated."

If that expresses the truth, or anything like the truth, it follows, from my point of view, that what Benson regarded as the only efficient church life and organisation resulted from a two-fold misreading of Scripture, (1) that the episcopal office was a direct inheritance from St. Peter; (2) that the Levitical high-priest reappears in the Christian bishop. How Cyprian would have explained the total absence from the New Testament of sacerdotal terms in connexion with the Christian ministry is left to conjecture. I should like some "master in Israel" to examine this statement by Archbishop Benson. I deprecate even the suggestion that the Church found its mainspring and strength through what, to me, must always appear a perversion of the truth through a misinterpretation of Scripture; for does not Benson's pronouncement on the Cyprianic theory force upon the mind the thought that the Church was made strong and fruitful by an act of gross self-deception on the part of third-century leaders of thought? and this, to my mind, is a most unworthy conception of ecclesiastical history.

G. S. Streatfeild.

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